LIBRARY 

OF    THE 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 

Class 


M 


TRUTH  AND  ERROR 


TRUTH  AND  ERROR 


OR 


THE  SCIENCE  OF  INTELLECTION 


BY 

J.  W.  POWELL 


CHICAGO 

THE  OPEN  COURT  PUBLISHING  COMPANY 

(IXJNDON:  KEGAN  PAUL,  TRENCH,  TRUBNER  &  Co.) 

1898 


COPYRIGHT  BY 

THE  OPEN  COURT  PUBLISHING  Co. 

CHICAGO,  ILLINOIS,  1898 


(All  rights  reserved) 


TO 

LESTER  F.  WARD 

PHILOSOPHER    AND    FRIEND,     I    DEDICATE 
THIS    BOOK 


C 


CONTENTS 


CHAP. 

I.  Chuar's  Illusion          .        .        .        .     •    . 

II.  Essentials  of  Properties 

III.  Quantities  or  Properties  that  are  Measured     . 

IV.  Kinds  or  Properties  that  are  Classified 

V.  Processes  or  the  Properties  of  Geonomic  Bodies 

VI.  Generations  or  Properties  of  Plants    . 

VII.  Principles  or  Properties  of  Animals 

VIII.  Qualities 

IX.  Classification 

X.  Homology 

XI.  Dynamics 

XII.  Cooperation  

XIII.  Evolution 

XIV.  Sensation 

XV.  Perception          ....... 

XVI.  Apprehension 

XVII.  Reflection  . 

XVIII.  Ideation 

XIX.  Intellections       .         .         . 

XX.  Fallacies  of  Sensation 

XXI.  Fallacies  of  Perception 

XXII.  Fallacies  of  Apprehension    ..... 

XXIII.  Fallacies  of  Reflection 

XXIV.  Fallacies  of  Ideation 

XXV.  Summary  

Index 


PAGE 

i 
9 

20 

31 
42 
64 

74 
98 
109 
133 
152 
168 
183 
207 
226 
237 
251 
264 
278 
307 
335 
352 
374 
39i 
413 
425 


TRUTH  AND  ERRO* 


OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY 
CHAPTER   I. 

CHUAR'S  ILLUSION 

IN  the  fall  of  1880  I  was  encamped  on  the  Kaibab 
plateau  above  the  canyon  gorge  of  a  little  stream. 
White  men  and  Indians  composed  the  party  with  me. 
Our  task  was  to  make  a  trail  down  this  side  canyon, 
which  was  many  hundreds  of  feet  in  depth,  into  the 
depths  of  the  Grand  Canyon  of  the  Colorado.  While 
in  camp  after  the  day's  work  was  done,  both  Indi- 
ans and  white  men  amused  themselves  by  attempt- 
ing to  throw  stones  across  the  little  canyon.  The 
distance  from  the  brink  of  the  wall  on  which  we 
were  encamped  to  the  brink  of  the  opposite  wall 
seemed  not  very  great,  yet  no  man  could  throw  a 
stone  across  the  chasm,  though  Chuar,  the  Indian 
chief,  could  strike  the  opposite  wall  very  near  its 
brink.  The  stones  thrown  by  others  fell  into  the 
depths  of  the  canyon.  I  discussed  these  feats  with 
Chuar,  leading  him  to  an  explanation  of  gravity. 
Now  Chuar  believed  that  he  could  throw  a  stone 
much  farther  along  the  level  of  the  plateau  than 
over  the  canyon.  His  first  illusion  was  thus  one  very 
common  among  mountain  travelers  —  an  underesti- 
mate of  the  distance  of  towering  and  massive  rocks 


2  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

when  the  eye  has  no  intervening  objects  to  divide 
the  space  into  parts  as  measures  of  the  whole. 

I  did  not  venture  to  correct  Chuar's  judgment,  but 
simply  sought  to  discover  his  method  of  reasoning. 
As  our  conversation  proceeded  he  explained  to  me 
that  the  stone  could  not  go  far  over  the  canyon,  for 
it  was  so  deep  that  it  would  make  the  stone  fall 
before  reaching  the  opposite  bank ;  and  he  explained 
to  me  with  great  care  that  the  hollow  or  empty  space 
pulled  the  stone  down.  He  discoursed  on  this  point 
at  length,  and  illustrated  it  in  many  ways:  "If  you 
stand  on  the  edge  of  the  cliff  you  are  likely  to  fall ; 
the  hollow  pulls  you  down,  so  that  you  are  compelled 
to  brace  yourself  against  the  force  and  lean  back. 
Any  one  can  make  such  an  experiment  and  see  that 
the  void  pulls  him  down.  If  you  climb  a  tree  the 
higher  you  reach  the  harder  the  pull ;  if  you  are  at 
the  very  top  of  a  tall  pine  you  must  cling  with  your 
might  lest  the  void  below  pull  you  off. ' ' 

Thus  my  dusky  philosopher  interpreted  a  subjec- 
tive fear  of  falling  as  an  objective  force;  but 
more,  he  reified  void  and  imputed  to  it  the  force  of 
pull.  I  afterward  found  these  ideas  common  among 
other  wise  men  of  the  dusky  race,  and  once  held  a 
similar  conversation  with  an  Indian  of  the  Wintun 
on  Mount  Shasta,  the  sheen  of  whose  snow-clad 
summit  seems  almost  to  merge  into  the  firmament. 
On  these  dizzy  heights  my  Wintun  friend  expounded 
the  same  philosophy  of  gravity. 

Now,  in  the  language  of  Chuar's  people,  a  wise 
man  is  said  to  be  a  traveler,  for  such  is  the  metaphor 
by  which  they  express  great  wisdom,  as  they  suppose 
that  a  man  must  learn  by  journeying  much.  So  in 
the  moonlight  of  the  last  evening's  sojourn  in  the 


CHUAR'S  ILLUSION  3 

camp  on  the  brink  of  the  canyon,  I  told  Chuar  that 
he  was  a  great  traveler,  and  that  I  knew  of  two  other 
great  travelers  among  the  seers  of  the  East,  one  by 
the  name  of  Hegel,  and  another  by  the  name  of 
Spencer,  and  that  I  should  ever  remember  these 
three  wise  men,  who  spoke  like  words  of  wisdom, 
for  it  passed  through  my  mind  that  all  three  of  these 
philosophers  had  reified  void  and  founded  a  philoso- 
phy thereon. 

*  Concepts  of  number,  space,  motion,  time  and 
judgment  are  developed  by  all  minds,  from  that 
of  the  lowest  animal  to  that  of  the  highest  human 
genius.  Through  the  evolution  of  animal  life, 
these  concepts  have  been  growing  as  they  have 
been  inherited  down  the  stream  of  time  in  the  flood 
of  generations.  It  is  thus  that  an  experience  has 
been  developed,  combined  with  the  experience  of  all 
the  generations  of  life  for  all  the  time  of  life,  which 

-"  makes  it  impossible  to  expunge  from  human  mind 
these  five  concepts.  They  can  never  be  canceled 
while  sanity  remains.  Things  having  something 
more  than  number,  space,  motion,  time  and  judg- 
ment cannot  even  be  invented;  it  is  not  possible 
for  the  human  mind  to  conceive  anything  else,  but 
semblances  of  such  ideas  may  be  produced  by  the 
mummification  of  language. 

Ideas  are  expressed  in  words  which  are  symbols, 
and  the  word  may  be  divested  of  all  meaning  in 
terms  of  number,  space,  motion,  time  and  judg- 
ment and  still  remain,  and  it  may  be  claimed  that 
it  still  means  something  unknown  and  unknow- 
able; this  is  the  origin  of  reification.  There  are 
many  things  unknown  at  one  stage  of  experience 
which  are  known  at  another,  so  man  comes  to  believe 


4  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

in  the  unknown  by  constant  daily  experience ;  but 
has  by  further  converse  with  the  universe  known 
things  previously  unknown,  and  they  invariably 
become  known  in  terms  of  number,  space,  motion, 
time  and  judgment,  and  are  found  to  be  only  com- 
binations of  these  things.  It  is  thus  that  something 
unknown  may  be  conceived,  but  something  unknow- 
able cannot  be  conceived. 

No  man  conceives  reified  substrate,  reified  essence, 
reified  space,  reified  force,  reified  time,  reified  spirit. 
Words  are  blank  checks  on  the  bank  of  thought,  to 
be  filled  with  meaning  by  the  past  and  future  earn- 
ings of  the  intellect.  But  these  words  are  coin  signs 
of  the  unknowable  and  no  one  can  acquire  the  cur- 
rency for  which  they  call. 

Things  little  known  are  named  and  man  speculates 
about  these  little-known  things,  and  erroneously 
imputes  properties  or  attributes  to  them  until  he 
comes  to  think  of  them  as  possessing  such  unknown 
and  mistaken  attributes.  At  last  he  discovers  the 
facts;  then  all  that  he  discovers  is  expressed  in  the 
terms  of  number,  space,  motion,  time  and  judg- 
ment. Still  the  word  for  the  little-known  thing 
may  remain  to  express  something  unknown  and 
mystical,  and  by  simple  and  easily  understood  proc- 
esses  he  reifies  what  is  not,  and  reasons  in  terms 
which  have  no  meaning  as  used  by  him.  Terms 
thus  used  without  meaning  are  terms  of  reification. 

Such  terms  and  such  methods  of  reasoning  become 
very  dear  to  those  immersed  in  thaumaturgy  and 
who  love  the  wonderful  and  cling  to  the  mysterious, 
and,  in  the  revelry  developed  by  the  hashish  of  mys- 
tery, the  pure  water  of  truth  is  insipid.  The  dream 
of  intellectual  intoxication  seems  more  real  and  more 


CHUAR  S  ILLUSION  5 

worthy  of  the  human  mind  than  the  simple  truths 
discovered  by  science.  There  is  a  fascination  in  mys- 
tery and  there  has  ever  been  a  school  of  intellects 
delighting  to  revel  therein,  and  yet,  in  the  grand 
aggregate,  there  is  a  spirit  of  sanity  extant  among 
mankind  which  loves  the  true  and  simple. 

Often  the  eloquence  of  the  dreamer  has  even  sub- 
verted the  sanity  of  science,  and  clear-headed,  simple- 
minded  scientific  men  have  been  willing  to  affirm 
that  science  deals  with  trivialities,  and  that  only 
metaphysics  deals  with  the  profound  and  significant 
things  of  the  universe.  In  a  late  great  text-book  on 
—  physics,  which  is  a  science  of  simple  certitudes,  it  is 
affirmed : 

4 'To  us  the  question,  What  is  matter?— What  is, 
assuming  it  to  have  a  real  existence  outside  our- 
selves, the  essential  basis  of  the  phenomena  with 
which  we  may  as  physicists  make  ourselves  ac- 
quainted?— appears  absolutely  insoluble.  Even  if 
we  become  perfectly  and  certainly  acquainted  with 
the  intimate  structure  of  what  we  call  Matter,  we 
would  but  have  made  a  further  step  in  the  study  of  its 
properties;  and  as  physicists  we  are  forced  to  say 
that  while  somewhat  has  been  learned  as  to  the 
properties  of  Matter,  its  essential  nature  is  quite 
unknown  to  us. ' ' 

.       As  though  its  properties  did   not   constitute   its 
essential  nature. 

So,  under  the  spell  of  metaphysics,  the  physicist 
turns  from  his  spectroscope  to  exclaim  that  all  his 
researches  may  be  dealing  with  phantasms. 

Science  deals  with  realities.  These  are  bodies 
with  their  properties.  All  the  facts  embraced  in  this 
vast  field  of  research  are  expressed  in  terms  of 


6  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

number,  space,  motion,  time  and  judgment;  no 
other  terms  are  needed  and  no  other  terms  are 
coined,  but  by  a  process  well  known  in  philology  as 
a  disease  of  language,  sometimes  these  terms  lapse 
into  meanings  which  connote  fallacies.  The  human 
intellect  is  of  such  a  nature  that  it  has  notions  or 
ideas  which  may  be  certitudes  or  fallacies.  All  the 
processes  of  reasoning,  including  sensation  and  per- 
ception, proceed  by  inference;  the  inference  may 
be  correct  or  erroneous,  and  certitudes  are  reached 
by  verifying  opinions.  This  is  the  sole  and  only 
process  of  gaining  certitudes.  The  certitudes  are 
truths  which  properly  represent  noumena,  the  illu- 
sions are  errors  which  misrepresent  noumena.  All 
knowledge  is  the  knowledge  of  noumena,  and  all 
illusion  is  erroneous  opinion  about  noumena.  The 
human  mind  knows  nothing  but  realities  and  deals 
with  nothing  but  realities,  but  in  this  dealing  with 
the  realities — the  noumena  of  the  universe — it 
reaches  some  conclusions  that  are  correct  and  others 
that  are  incorrect.  The  correct  conclusions  are  certi- 
tudes about  realities;  the  incorrect  conclusions  are 
fallacies  about  realities.  '  Science  is  the  name  which 
mankind  has  agreed  to  call  this  knowledge  of  reali- 
ties, and  error  is  the  name  which  mankind  has  agreed 
to  give  to  all  fallacies.  Thus  it  is  that  certitudes  are 
directly  founded  upon  realities ;  and  fallacies  alike  all 
refer  to  realities.  In  this  sense  then  it  may  be  stated 
that  all  error  as  well  as  knowledge  testifies  to  reality, 
and  that  all  our  knowledge  is  certitude  based  upon 
reality,  and  that  fallacies  would  not  be  possible  were 
there  not  realities  about  which  inferences  are  made. 
Known  realities  are  those  about  which  mankind  has 
knowledge ;  unknown  things  are  those  things  about 


CHUAR'S  ILLUSION  7 

which  man  has  not  yet  attained  knowledge.  Scien- 
tific research  is  the  endeavor  to  increase  knowledge, 
and  its  methods  are  experience,  observation  and 
verification.  Fallacies  are  erroneous  inferences  in 
relation  to  known  things.  All  certitudes  are  de- 
scribed in  terms  of  number,  space,  motion,  time 
and  judgment;  nothing  else  has  yet  been  discov- 
ered and  nothing  else  can  be  discovered  with  the 
faculties  with  which  man  is  possessed. 

In  the  material  world  we  have  no  knowledge  of 
something  which  is  not  a  unity  of  itself  or  a  unity  of 
a  plurality ;  of  something  which  is  not  an  extension 
of  figure  or  an  extension  of  figure  and  structure ;  of 
something  which  has  not  motion  or  a  combination  of 
motions  as  force ;  of  something  which  has  not  dura- 
tion as  persistence  or  duration  with  persistence  and 
change. 

In  the  mental  world  we  have  no  knowledge  of 
something  which  is  not  a  judgment  of  consciousness 
and  inference ;  of  a  judgment  which  is  not  a  judgment 
of  a  body  with  number,  space,  motion  and  time. 
Every  notion  of  something  in  the  material  world 
devoid  of  one  or  more  of  the  constituents  of  matter 
is  an  illusion;  every  notion  of  something  in  the 
spiritual  world  devoid  of  the  factors  of  matter  and 
judgment  is  a  fallacy.  These  are  the  propositions 
to  be  explained  and  demonstrated. 

In  the  following  chapters  an  attempt  will  be  made 
to  show  that  we  know  much  about  matter,  and 
although  we  do  not  know  all,  all  we  know  is  about 
matter  in  its  essentials  of  number,  space,  motion, 
time  and  judgment,  or  that  we  know  of  matter  in  its 
four  essentials  and  of  mind  as  consciousness  exhib- 
ited in  judgment  and  concepts,  but  always  this  mind 


8  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

is  associated  with  matter.  In  doing  this  we  shall 
endeavor  to  discriminate  between  the  certitudes  and 
fallacies  current  in  human  opinion. 

In  the  intoxication  of  illusion  facts  seem  cold  and 
colorless,  and  the  wrapt  dreamer  imagines  that  he 
dwells  in  a  realm  above  science — in  a  world  which  as 
he  thinks  absorbs  truth  as  the  ocean  the  shower, 
and  transforms  it  into  a  flood  of  philosophy.  Fever- 
ish dreams  are  supposed  to  be  glimpses  of  the  un- 
known and  unknowable,  and  the  highest  and  dearest 
aspiration  is  to  be  absorbed  in  this  sea  of  specula- 
tion. Nothing  is  worthy  of  contemplation  but  the 
mysterious.  Yet  the  simple  and  the  true  remain. 
The  history  of  science  is  the  history  of  the  discovery 
of  the  simple  and  the  true ;  in  its  progress  fallacies 
are  dispelled  and  certitudes  remain. 


CHAPTER   II 

ESSENTIALS    OF    PROPERTIES 

On  the  threshold  it  is  necessary  to  state  certain 
scientific  conclusions  which  I  accept.  These  are  the 
four  great  doctrines  taught  by  modern  science.  I 
accept  the  atomic  theory  that  the  constitution  of 
bodies  is  explained  as  a  numerical  combination  of 
ultimate  smaller  particles.  I  accept  the  modern 
doctrine  of  morphology,  that  forms  in  different  kinds 
of  bodies  exhibit  homologies  that  express  degrees  of 
relationship.  I  accept  the  modern  doctrine  of  the 
persistence  of  motion  as  the  proper  explanation  of 
the  correlation  of  forces.  I  accept  the  modern 
doctrine  of  evolution,  that  higher  bodies  are  derived 
from  lower.  In  accepting  these  doctrines  I  try  to 
embrace  them  in  all  their  logical  results,  some  of 
which  may  seem  strange  to  my  readers.  I  shall 
propound  the  hypothesis  that  consciousness  inheres 
in  the  ultimate  particle,  and  attempt  to  show  that  it 
harmonizes  the  principles  of  psychology. 

The  four  great  doctrines  of  modern  science  which 
I  have  enumerated  were  originally  guesses,  but  they 
have  largely  been  accepted  by  scientific  men  because 
they  explain  the  phenomena  of  the  universe  to  which 
they  relate.  The  chaos  of  scientific  phenomena 
collected  in  vast  catalogues  of  facts  are  seen  to  be 
explained  by  these  laws. 

The  chemical  theory  may  be  denominated  the 
persistence  of  units;  the  morphologic  theory  the 
persistence  of  extensions;  the  dynamic  theory  the 

9 


IO  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

persistence  of  speeds ;  the  evolutionary  theory  the 
persistence  of  existence. 

There  are  systems  of  stars,  and  every  system  is 
a  body.  The  one  to  which  our  earth  belongs  is  well 
known,  for  the  solar  system  is  the  theme  of  the 
venerable  science  of  astronomy.  The  earth  itself  is 
composed  of  four  grand  bodies:  an  outer  envelope 
of  air  or  atmosphere,  a  middle  envelope  of  water  or 
hydrosphere,  an  inner  envelope  of  rock  or  litho- 
sphere,  and  the  grand  central  nucleus  or  centre- 
sphere.  Neglecting  the  two  outer  envelopes  and 
considering  only  the  stony  crust,  we  find  that  it  is 
composed  of  many  bodies  or  formations  and  these  of 
rocks,  while  there  are  many  plants  and  animals,  and 
all  again  are  divided  into  grains,  crystals  or  cells, 
and  the  grains,  crystals  or  cells  are  divided  into  mole- 
cules, and  molecules  are  composed  of  other  mole- 
cules, until  at  last  chemical  atoms  are  reached ;  so 
it  is  discovered  that  the  universe  is  a  hierarchy  of 
bodies. 

The  universe  is  a  hierarchy  of  bodies  composed  of 
bodies  and  these  again  composed  of  bodies  in  a  vast 
succession  as  they  are  reduced  by  analysis.  When 
we  come  to  discuss  the  relations  of  these  bodies  to 
one  another  it  will  be  convenient  and  conduce  to 
exact  expression  if  we  make  a  distinction  between 
bodies  and  particles,  and  speak  of  a  body  when  we 
wish  to  consider  it  as  a  unit  and  then  speak  of  its 
particles  when  we  wish  to  speak  of  the  parts  of 
which  it  is  composed.  A  body,  therefore,  is  a  body 
of  particles  which  are  many  in  one,  the  one  being  a 
body;  the  many  particles  severally  may  be  bodies 
composed  of  particles,  that  is,  one  composed  of 
many.  The  solar  system  is  a  body  of  particles,  the 


ESSENTIALS  OF  PROPERTIES  II 

particles  being  the  stars  of  which  it  is  composed;  the 
earth,  one  of  these  particles,  may  be  considered  as  a 
body,  when  its  particles  will  be  the  air,  the  water, 
the  stony  crust  and  the  central  nucleus;  then  the 
air  may  be  considered  as  a  body  composed  of  many 
particles,  the  water  may  be  considered  as  a  body 
composed  of  particles,  the  stony  crust  as  a  body 
composed  of  particles,  and  finally  the  nucleus  as  a 
body  composed  of  particles.  In  this  sense  it  will  be 
understood  we  sometimes  speak  of  something  as  a 
body  and  again  of  the  same  thing  as  a  particle.  A 
body  and  its  particles  are  reciprocal.  When  we 
consider  a  body  as  composed  of  particles  we  con- 
sider internal  relations,  but  when  we  consider  the 
particles  severally  their  relations  to  one  another  are 
external.  Thus  a  body  has  internal  relations  and 
external  relations,  and  every  particle  of  the  body 
also  has  internal  relations  and  external  relations,  if 
it  is  composed  of  parts. 

A  substance  is  an  aggregation  of  like  particles  in 
one  body  or  a  number  of  bodies.  Bodies  are  com- 
posed of  substances.  For  example,  the  air  is  a 
substance  which  is  again  composed  of  substances; 
the  water  is  a  substance,  and  this  water  is  oxygen 
and  hydrogen  and  contains  in  solution  many  other 
substances.  In  the  envelope  of  rock  a  great  variety 
of  substances  are  discovered;  then  there  are  vege- 
tal and  animal  substances.  Thus  in  the  hierarchy 
of  bodies  there  is  discovered  to  be  a  hierarchy  of 
substances,  extending  from  elements  to  protoplasm. 
The  vast  multitude  of  substances  have  so  far  been 
resolved  into  about  seventy  seemingly  simple  sub- 
stances, but  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  they  are 
to  be  still  further  resolved  into  one  primordial 


12  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

substance,  which  is  called  matter.  Matter,  then,  is 
the  ultimate  substance  into  which  all  other  sub- 
stances which  constitute  the  bodies  of  the  universe 
are  resolved ;  and  matter  may  be  of  one  primordial 
kind,  or  it  may  be  of  seventy  kinds,  more  or  less. 

Bodies  are  resolved  into  more  and  more  simple 
and  homogeneous  substances,  and  it  is  the  theory  of 
some  chemists  that  ultimate  analysis  will  resolve 
them  into  one  simple  kind,  so  that  every  particle 
will  be  like  every  other  particle  in  all  its  properties. 
Matter,  then,  is  the  ultimate  kind  of  particle  into 
which  all  bodies  may  be  analyzed,  and  different 
kinds  of  matter  are  different  aggregations  of  the  one 
kind.  The  different  kinds  of  matter  made  different 
by  different  aggregation  are  different  substances, 
and  the  different  substances  are  aggregations  of 
matter  by  incorporation. 

An  army  is  composed  of  men,  but  there  are  pla- 
toons, companies,  battalions,  regiments, divisions, and 
corps  in  the  army.  So  it  is  organized  or  incorporated 
into  a  hierarchy  of  units.  The  platoon  is  one  as 
a  platoon,  composed  of  a  plurality  of  men ;  the  com- 
pany is  one  as  a  company  but  a  plurality  of  platoons ; 
the  battalion  is  one  as  a  battalion  but  a  plurality  of 
companies ;  the  regiment  is  one  as  a  regiment  but  a 
plurality  of  battalions ;  the  brigade  is  one  as  a  bri- 
gade but  a  plurality  of  regiments ;  the  division  is  one 
as  a  division  but  a  plurality  of  brigades;  the  corps 
is  one  as  a  corps  but  a  plurality  of  divisions.  Now 
we  understand  the  fundamental  property  of  numbers 
as  many  in  one.  The  platoon  differs  in  the  property 
of  number  from  the  individual ;  the  company  differs 
in  the  property  of  number  from  the  platoon,  and 
the  battalion  differs  in  the  property  of  number 


ESSENTIALS  OF  PROPERTIES  13 

from  the  company;  and  the  same  is  true  of  all  the 
units  in  the  hierarchy. 

These  units  of  different  orders  have  different  prop- 
erties of  space ;  the  platoon  occupies  more  space  in 
the  field  than  the  individual  soldier ;  the  company 
occupies  more  space  than  the  platoon ;  the  battalion 
more  space  than  the  company ;  and  the  same  is  true 
of  the  other  units  in  the  hierarchy.  If  we  have  two 
armies  exactly  alike  in  a  hierarchy  of  units  and 
spaces,  then  any  two  corresponding  units  and  spaces 
in  the  hierarchy  would  be  similar.  In  speaking  of 
the  bodies  of  the  universe  it  is  necessary  sometimes 
to  speak  of  the  corresponding  unit  in  the  different 
bodies,  and  we  call  them  substances.  The  oxygen  in 
one  molecule  of  water  is  the  same  in  all  molecules 
of  water,  and  we  call  all  units  a  substance.  Every 
body  of  water  is  composed  of  molecules  of  water,  and 
there  are  many  bodies  of  water,  and  we  call  bodies 
of  water  a  substance.  We  thus  designate  as  one  sub- 
stance all  like  units  of  matter. 

This  is  very  simple.  It  is  merely  a  statement  of 
the  resolution  of  more  compound  bodies  into  simpler 
bodies  and  of  more  compound  substances  into 
simpler  substances.  It  is  the  dissection  of  bodies  in 
parts  and  the  analysis  of  substances  into  elements. 

The  ultimate  particle  found  in  any  substance  may 
be  still  further  resolved  in  consideration.  Every 
body,  whether  it  be  a  stellar  system  or  an  atom  of 
hydrogen,  has  certain  fundamental  characteristics 
found  in  all.  These  are  number,  space,  motion  and 
time,  and  if  it  be  an  animate  body,  judgment.  They 
shall  here  be  known  as  properties,  and  to  them 
attention  must  now  be  turned. 

Let  us  first  consider  with  what  things  one  inanimate 


14  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

particle  is  endowed.  First,  it  must  have  unity. 
There  must  be  one,  or  it  does  not  exist.  Second, 
it  must  have  extension,  for  without  extension  it 
does  not  exist.  Third,  it  must  have  speed,  for  it 
cannot  have  motion  without  speed,  nor  can  it  have 
force  without  motion,  and  a  particle  of  matter  not 
in  motion  is  unknown.  The  body  lying  upon  the 
ground  at  rest  is  not  without  motion,  for  it  has  the 
motion  of  the  earth  about  its  axis  and  the  motion  of 
the  earth  about  the  sun ;  it  also  has  a  motion  of  its 
molecules  and  atoms,  which  is  heat  and  structural 
motion.  If  the  body  which  is  lying  upon  the  ground 
is  moved  the  motions  are  deflected  and  it  is  impos- 
sible to  discover  that  any  motion  as  speed  is  added 
to  them.  Rest  is  only  the  absence  of  molar  motion. 
Fourth,  the  same  particle  of  matter  must  have  per- 
sistence, for  persistence  is  necessary  to  its  existence. 
Here  persistence  is  used  to  mean  continued  exist- 
ence. 

I  shall  attempt  to  demonstrate  the  proposition 
that  every  particle  of  matter  has  consciousness,  and 
hence  the  fifth  property  here  called  judgment,  but 
shall  reserve  the  discussion  of  the  subject  to  a  later 
part  of  the  work. 

One  ultimate  particle  must  have  essentials  that  it 
may  exist,  but  they  are  all  comprehended  in  one 
particle.  If  we  consider  the  essentials  separately 
we  call  it  abstraction ;  if  we  consider  them  conjointly 
we  call  it  comprehension,  and  the  terms  abstraction 
and  comprehension  will  be  used  in  these  senses  only. 

These  essentials  are  simple  and  wholly  unlike  one 
another.  There  is  nothing  in  unity  like  extension, 
nothing  in  extension  like  speed,  nothing  in  speed 
like  persistence.  There  is  no  possible  way  of 


ESSENTIALS  OF  PROPERTIES  15 

deriving  one  from  another.  We  cannot  derive 
extension  from  unity,  but  extension  must  be  con- 
comitant with  unity;  extension  and  unity  are  con- 
comitant in  one  particle.  We  cannot  derive  speed 
from  extension,  but  the  thing  which  has  speed  must 
have  extension.  We  cannot  derive  persistence  from 
speed,  but  that  which  has  persistence  must  have 
speed.  So  we  may  run  through  all  permutations  of 
these  essentials  and  find  them  wholly  unlike  one 
another  and  discover  no  possible  way  of  deriving 
one  from  the  other.  Notwithstanding  their  total 
unlikeness,  they  are  never  dissociated  so  that  one 
exists  without  the  other;  they  may  be  considered 
separately  but  cannot  exist  separately.  They  cannot 
be  analyzed  and  the  unity  placed  in  one  box,  the 
extension  in  a  second,  the  speed  in  a  third,  the  per- 
sistence in  a  fourth;  but  they  may  be  considered 
separately,  and  this  is  abstraction  as  distinguished 
from  analysis.  Bodies  may  be  dissected,  substances 
may  be  analyzed,  essentials  may  be  abstracted  in 
consideration. 

The  essentials  are  indissoluble  in  every  particle. 
Where  there  is  no  unit  there  is  no  extension,  no 
speed  and  no  persistence.  Where  there  is  no  speed 
there  is  no  unit,  no  extension,  no  persistence. 
Where  there  is  no  persistence  there  is  no  tmit,  no 
extension  and  no  speed.  If  any  of  the  essentials  of 
a  particle  of  inanimate  matter  be  taken  away,  the 
matter  disappears.  A  particle  is  the  essentials  of 
which  it  is  composed,  and  it  has  no  other  substrate. 
It  exists  in  its  essentials,  and  its  essentials  exist  in 
it,  and  neither  existence  is  separate.  The  notion  of 
a  particle  of  matter  as  a  substrate  of  essentials,  or  as 
something  to  which  the  essentials  adhere  or  inhere 


1 6  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

and  from  which  they  may  be  taken  away,  leaving 
behind  the  particle,  which  is  not  a  unit,  an  extension, 
a  speed  and  a  persistence,  is  a  pseud-idea,  the 
result  of  mythologizing,  where  the  word  is  taken  to 
represent  more  than  the  sum  of  the  essentials  of  the 
object  to  which  it  is  applied.  A  unit  is  a  unit  of  an 
extension,  a  speed  and  a  persistence.  An  extension 
is  an  extension  of  a  unit,  a  speed  and  a  persistence. 
A  speed  is  a  speed  of  a  unit,  an  extension  and  a 
persistence.  A  persistence  is  a  persistence  of  a  unit, 
an  extension  and  a  speed. 

Think  of  properties  as  number,  space,  motion  and 
time ;  then  consider  the  things  which  must  exist  if 
these  properties  exist  and  you  have  the  essentials,  as 
the  term  is  here  used.  Thus  think  not  of  number, 
but  of  unity ;  think  not  of  space,  but  of  extension ; 
think  not  of  motion,  but  of  speed ;  think  not  of  time, 
but  of  persistence,  and  you  have  the  essentials  them- 
selves. 

This  chapter  is  designed  to  define  the  essentials  of 
an  inanimate  particle,  and  to  show  in  what  sense  the 
terms  for  the  essentials  are  used.  The  mathemati- 
cian might  say  that  A  stands  for  unity,  B  for  exten- 
sion, C  for  speed,  D  for  persistence,  E  for  conscious- 
ness, and  you  would  not  find  fault.  Should  he  for- 
mulate an  equation  you  would  not  quarrel  with  him 
about  his  symbols,  because  he  uses  A  for  apples,  B 
for  bushels,  C  for  cents,  D  for.  division,  and  E  for 
equality  to  show  the  equity  of  a  transaction  repre- 
sented by  F.  Let  me  use  my  symbols  in  my  manner, 
if  you  would  understand  my  demonstration.  Unity 
means  one,  extension  means  exclusive  occupancy  of 
space,  speed  means  change  of  position,  persistence 
means  continuance  in  time. 


ESSENTIALS  OF  PROPERTIES  17 

The  statement  might  be  left  to  stand  by  itself,  yet 
I  think  it  best  to  explain  why  I  use  these  terms. 
About  the  term  unity  no  one  will  cavil. 

For  extension  the  term  impenetrability  has  been 
used,  but  it  has  a  negative  connotation  which  I  wish 
to  avoid.  I  once  thought  of  using  dimension,  but  I 
soon  found  that  I  must  use  it  in  another  sense  in  dis- 
cussing measure.  Then  I  thought  of  space.  Now, 
space  has  a  metaphysical  use  in  which  it  is  synony- 
mous with  vacuum  or  void  and  from  which  I  wish  to 
rescue  it.  So  I  concluded  to  use  the  term  extension 
to  signify  exclusive  occupancy  of  space,  and  to  use 
space  itself  for  the  extension  of  positions  of  extensions, 
which  also  includes  the  extension  of  the  medium 
which  makes  up  the  space.  Let  this  be  made  clear.  As 
the  terms  are  here  used  the  particles  of  the  walls  of  this 
box  have  extension,  and  the  particles  of  air  which  it- 
contains  have  extensions,  and  the  particles  of  ether 
within  the  air  have  extensions,  but  the  space  of  the 
box  includes  the  extensions  of  the  box,  the  exten- 
sions of  the  air,  and  also  the  extension  of  the  ether. 
I  may  speak  of  the  space  of  the  box  and  refer  only 
to  the  position  of  the  particles  of  the  box  and  I  may 
then  speak  of  the  space  of  the  box  as  the  sum  of  the 
extensions  of  the  walls,  air,  and  ether.  It  may  be 
that  the  walls  of  the  box  have  minute  apertures  in 
which  air  exists,  so  that  all  the  air  is  not  excluded 
from  the  wood,  and  it  is  certain  that  the  ether  is  not 
excluded  from  the  wood.  And  it  may  be  that  there 
are  interspaces  between  the  particles  of  wood,  air  and 
ether.  Therefore  even  the  wood  of  the  box  must 
be  described  in  terms  of  space,  not  in  terms  of 
extension.  When  we  come  to  discuss  extension 
itself,  we  find  ourselves  considering  mass,  so  that 


l8  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

mass  and  extension  are  here  nearly  synonymous; 
but  mass  is  used  as  the  measure  of  extensions,  while 
space  is  the  dimensions  of  related  positions.  Mass 
is  the  measure  of  the  numbers  of  particles  of  exten- 
sion, but  units  of  space  are  measured  with  units  of 
length. 

I  use  the  term  speed  because  in  modern  physics  it 
has  exactly  the  meaning  which  I  desire.  The  popu- 
lar meaning  of  velocity  is  just  what  I  need,  but  in 
physics  velocity  means  rate  of  speed  and  also  rate 
of  deflection  and  the  term  is  needed  for  that  purpose. 

I  use  the  term  persistence  because  the  term  time 
or  the  term  duration  means  persistence  and  change 
or  they  may  mean  the  measure  of  states  separated 
b)T  change,  while  the  term  persistence  is  free  from 
these  implications. 

If  the  terms  are  understood  we  are  ready  to  pro- 
ceed to  another  stage  of  exposition. 

Essentials  are  comprehended  in  the  same  particle, 
and  we  shall  call  them  concomitants.  We  shall  not 
say  that  one  essential  is  related  to  another  in  the 
same  particle,  but  they  are  concomitant  with  one 
another,  though  the  essential  of  one  particle  may  be 
related  to  the  essential  of  another  particle.  A  unit 
may  be  related  to  another  unit,  an  extension  may  be 
related  to  another  extension ;  but  the  unit  and  the 
extension  in  the  same  particle  are  not  related  to  each 
other  but  concomitant  with  each  other,  and  these  same 
distinctions  must  be  observed  with  all  the  essentials. 
The  task  before  us  in  this  chapter  is  the  exhibition 
of  the  concomitants  of  particles  and  relations  of 
essentials,  concomitants  inhering  in  every  particle, 
the  relations  arising  by  reason  of  the  relation  of 
particles  to  particles. 


ESSENTIALS  OF  PROPERTIES  1$ 

The  student  who  follows  my  argument  must  first 
become  accustomed  to  the  discrimination  between 
concomitancy  and  relativity.  Relativity  is  the 
relation  of  one  particle  or  body  to  another;  con- 
comitancy is  the  coexistence  of  one  property  with 
another  in  the  same  particle  or  body. 

Having  deduced  or  discovered  four  essentials  or 
concomitants  in  every  particle  of  matter,  we  have 
yet  to  determine  whether  these  are  all,  and  for  this 
purpose  we  are  compelled  to  assemble  in  a  passing 
review  all  of  the  bodies  of  the  universe.  TO  do  this 
it  becomes  necessary  to  discover  in  what  manner 
these  four  essentials  become  properties  as  quantities 
and  kinds,  for  we  have  quantitative  properties  and 
classific  properties.  Having  discovered  how  the 
essentials  become  properties,  we  can  then  go  on  in  the 
review  of  the  universe  of  bodies. 


CHAPTER   III 

QUANTITIES  OR  PROPERTIES    THAT    ARE    MEASURED 

Two  short  chapters  must  now  be  presented  which 
will  be  found  rather  dry,  but  they  must  be  mas- 
tered if  the  subsequent  chapters  are  to  be  under- 
stood. The  principles  therein  stated  are  the  A,  B, 
C,  of  the  work — the  multiplication  table  of  our  logic. 
I  beg  of  my  reader  not  to  be  deterred  from  their 
careful  consideration  by  reason  of  their  simplicity. 

I 

The  universe  is  a  concourse  of  related  bodies  com- 
posed of  related  particles.  Every  relation  must 
exist  between  two  or  more  particles  or  bodies,  and 
every  particle  or  body  is  related  to  every  other  par- 
ticle or  body  directly  or  indirectly.  The  universe  is 
a  hierarchy  of  bodies,  and  thus  there  is  a  hierarchy 
of  relations.  A  relation  cannot  exist  independent  of 
terms.  We  may  consider  a  relation  abstractly,  but 
it  cannot  exist  abstractly.  To  affirm  a  relation  the 
terms  must  be  implied.  When  an  abstract  is  reified, 
that  is,  supposed  to  exist  by  itself  independent  of 
other  essentials,  and  the  illusion  is  entertained  that 
there  is  something  independent  of  the  essentials 
which  support  them,  a  mythology  is  created  so  sub- 
tle as  to  simulate  reality.  So  when  relations  are 
reined  and  supposed  to  exist  independent  of  terms, 
the  mind  is  astray  in  the  realm  of  fallacies.  When 
it  is  discovered  that  rest  is  only  a  relation,  the  mind 
is  prone  to  believe  that  nothing  exists  but  relation, 


QUANTITIES  OR  PROPERTIES  THAT  ARE  MEASURED    21 

for  we  have  often  discovered  that  which  we  thought 
was  absolute  was  in  fact  relation;  but  rest  is  a 
relation  between  terms  which  are  absolute.  The 
internal  or  molecular  motions  of  the  body  at  rest 
have  a  certain  relation  to  the  external  or  astronomic 
motions  of  the  body  which  are  changed  when  the 
body  is  given  molar  motion,  but  the  absolutes  still 
remain,  though  deflected. 

Human  beings  are  molar  bodies,  and  have  a  deep 
interest  in  one  another  as  such  and  in  the  other 
molar  bodies  with  which  they  are  associated.  Molar 
bodies  and  their  relations  are  the  first  bodies  dis- 
covered by  primitive  man,  and  his  converse  with  the 
external  world  at  first  seems  to  be  wholly  with  molar 
bodies.  Molar  bodies  are  those  in  which  he  first 
discovers  relations  and  with  which  he  first  consciously 
and  purposely  associates,  and  they  become  the  type 
of  the  others.  Molecular  bodies  are  known  as  such 
only  to  science.  The  stellar  bodies  are  first  believed 
to  be  molar  bodies,  and  it  is  long  before  the  cor- 
poreal structure  of  the  earth  is  discovered  as  a  body 
of  great  magnitude  associated  with  other  bodies  more 
nearly  commensurate  with  them,  as  the  sun,  moon 
and  stars. 

Of  the  internal  relations  of  molecular  bodies 
little  is  known  even  yet,  and  in  the  same  manner  of 
the  internal  relations  of  stellar  bodies,  but  little  is 
yet  known.  Our  ideas  of  molecular  and  stellar 
bodies  are  largely  ideas  of  their  individuality,  or  as 
units  related  to  units  of  the  same  order,  while  their 
constituent  units  scarcely  receive  consideration.  In 
the  mechanical  or  molar  world  the  relations  of  parts 
are  immeasurably  more  numerous  than  the  parts 
themselves.  Not  only  are  rocks  multifarious  and  the 


22  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

imperfect  embodiments  of  air  and  water  multifa- 
rious, but  special  classes  of  embodiments  are  dis- 
covered as  plants  and  animals  distributed  over  all 
the  earth  in  multitudinous  kinds  with  multitudinous 
relations,  and  men  as  molar  bodies  are  related  to  one 
another  and  in  all  of  these  relations  men  are  funda- 
mentally interested. 

Relations,  therefore,  are  so  great  in  number  and 
so  many  in  kind  that  the  subject  of  relations  is  apt 
to  overwhelm  the  mental  powers,  for  man  discovers 
that  in  his  reasoning  he  is  forever  dealing  with 
relations  far  more  than  directly  with  the  bodies 
themselves.  In  this  manner  he  discovers  that  the 
world  is  a  congress  of  molar  bodies  that  are  related 
to  one  another  through  their  properties ;  when  they 
are  analyzed  into  related  particles  or  synthesized 
into  related  bodies,  relation  seems  to  swallow  all 
else,  so  that  philosophers  often  assume  and  some- 
times affirm  that  all  that  is  known  of  the  universe  is 
these  relations,  and  finally  that  the  universe  is 
only  a  system  of  relations  and  the  substantiality  of 
the  universe  is  denied.  The  universe  thus  becomes 
a  universe  of  relations  without  terms.  The  con- 
founding of  concomitancy  with  relativity  is  a  cause 
of  inextricable  confusion — a  snare  to  the  intellect 
and  a  vice  of  logic.  Unity  and  extension  are  con- 
comitant but  not  related,  while  one  unit  may  be 
related  to  another  unit  and  one  extension  may  be 
related  to  another  extension.  Concomitancy  and 
relativity  must  always  be  distinguished  or  there  can 
be  no  sound  psychology.  The  antithesis  of  this 
doctrine  is  sometimes  held,  which  is  an  affirmation 
that  the  siibstrates  of  the  universe  are  unknown 
reifications  of  number,  space,  motion,  time  and 


QUANTITIES  OR  PROPERTIES  THAT   ARE  MEASURED    23 

judgment.  About  unknown  and  unknowable  things 
any  assertion  may  be  made,  and  all  philosophies  that 
are  founded  upon  these  reifications  are  therefore 
philosophies  of  disputation,  as  no  two  are  alike. 
That  which  some  great  mind  imposes  upon  his 
generation  is  by  a  succeeding  generation  gradually 
found  to  be  more  or  less  erroneous,  and  new  philos- 
ophies are  thus  forever  springing  up,  the  one  not 
founded  upon  the  other;  but  gradually  from  gen- 
eration to  generation  science  establishes  some  things. 

The  relations  which  we  are  now  to  consider  are 
those  which  are  discovered  when  bodies  are  con- 
sidered as  particles.  Quite  a  new  class  is  discovered 
when  we  consider  bodies  as  bodies. 

As  every  particle  of  inanimate  matter  is  a  com- 
bination of  four  essential  factors  there  are  four  classes 
of  relations,  namely:  relations  of  plurality,  relations 
of  position,  relations  of  path  and  relations  of  change, 
and  these  are  all  concomitant  in  number,  space, 
motion  and  time.  The  same  fact  may  be  expressed 
in  this  manner.  Relations  of  number  are  founded 
upon  pluralities;  relations  of  extension  are  founded 
upon  position;  relations  of  motion  are  founded  upon 
trajectory;  relations  of  time  -are  founded  upon 
change.  Thus  we  have  four  classes  of  relations  that 
must  exist  between  particles.  Then  bodies  have  inter- 
nal relations  of  particles  and  external  relations  when 
the  body  is  considered  as  a  particle  in  a  higher  body. 

II 

In  a  former  chapter  we  spoke  of  the  essentials  of 
a  particle  of  matter  and  considered  them  separately. 
Now  we  must  consider  them  as  they  are  related. 
There  is  a  multeity  of  units,  and  plurality  is  founded 


24  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

upon  units.  The  units  are  the  terms  that  are  related 
to  constitute  a  plurality.  A  unit  is  unrelated  or 
absolute  in  unity,  that  is,  its  unity  does  not  depend 
upon  others,  but  a  plurality  is  dependent  upon  a 
number  of  related  units;  for  example,  the  plurality 
may  be  ten ;  then  ten  as  a  plurality  depends  upon 
the  units  of  which  it  is  composed ;  nine  is  also  a 
plurality,  but  it  depends  only  upon  nine  units.  A 
plurality  is  therefore  a  relation  of  units  considered 
as  a  sum.  Unity  is  constant  only  in  ultimate 
particles.  Bodies  are  combined,  dissolved  again 
and  recombined,  making  variable  units  of  plurality. 

I  am  writing  on  a  sheet  of  paper ;  it  is  one.  With 
a  match  it  is  ignited  and  disappears;  it  is  many.  It 
was  many  before  the  conflagration,  but  many  in 
one.  After  the  combination  these  molecules  though 
disembodied  as  a  sheet  of  paper  are  still  related  to 
one  another  by  all  the  concomitants,  but  now  their 
more  immediate  relations  are  with  the  other  particles 
of  the  molecules  in  which  they  are  combined,  while 
the  new  bodies  thus  formed  have  relations  to  one 
another  of  a  higher  degree  or  order  in  the  corporeal 
world,  for  fixed  internal  relations  constitute  incor- 
poration. Incorporation  consists  in  the  establish- 
ment or  fixation  of  internal  relations.  When  a  body 
is  disincorporated  its  particles  dissolve  their  relation 
as  one  and  assume  relation  with  others  to  constitute 
new  bodies  or  enlarge  other  bodies. 

There  is  a  great  variety  of  relations  between 
numbers.  Numbers  in  nature  are  unified  in  orders 
of  various  kinds.  The  orders  thus  developed  are 
multitudinous  and  quite  beyond  human  comprehen- 
sion. As  the  several  units  are  compounds  of  individ- 
uals of  lower  units  they  are  related  to  one  another  in 


QUANTITIES  OR  PROPERTIES  THAT  ARE  MEASURED    25 

infinite  ways,  as  one  is  a  multiple  or  sub-multiple  of 
another.  Thus  we  have  one-fourth,  one-half,  equal 
to,  twice,  four  times,  etc.  Mass  is  a  sum  of  units 
measured  in  terms  of  force,  and  such  units  may 
become  constituent  parts  in  higher  orders  of  units. 
One  number  is  thus  a  measure  of  another.  Out  of 
these  relations  ratios  and  proportions  arise.  It  seems 
unnecessary  to  enter  into  a  discussion  of  the  relations 
of  numbers,  as  they  are  developed  in  the  science  of 
arithmetic  and  algebra. 

Ill 

Extension  is  exclusive  occupancy  of  space.  As 
there  is  more  than  one  extension,  and  every  one 
excludes  all  others,  there  is  relative  position.  Thus 
we  have  positions  derived  from  many  extensions. 
Position  is  the  relation  of  one  extension  to  another. 
Space  is  founded  on  extension,  for  if  a  particle  had 
no  extension  it  could  not  be  an  element  of  space ;  a 
plurality  of  particles,  each  having  extension,  con- 
stitutes space.  If  the}'-  are  in  juxtaposition  the  space 
is  the  sum  of  their  extensions.  If  they  are  separated 
by  a  medium,  as  for  example  an  intervening  fluid, 
the  space  is  marked  by  their  position  and  in  this 
sense  is  related  position ;  position,  therefore,  depends 
upon  relation,  but  there  can  be  no  related  positions 
if  the  extensions  are  annihilated.  Extension  is  abso- 
lute, position  is  relative  and  space  is  absolute  in 
extension  and  relative  in  position ;  extension  is  con- 
stant or  persistent  in  ultimate  particles. 

In  space  one  particle  may  be  related  to  another  in 
distance  and  in  direction.  These  relations  give  rise 
to  geometry  and  trigonometry  and  are  the  relations 
chiefly  dealt  with  in  astronomy. 


26  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

In  order  that  space  may  be  discussed  mathematic- 
ally it  must  be  reduced  conventionally  to  number; 
this  is  done  through  the  agency  of  measure.  Then 
units  of  measure  are  devised  giving  rise  to  fractions 
and  whole  numbers,  multiples,  and  sub-multiples, 
when  it  becomes  amenable  to  the  operations  of 
mathematics. 

IV 

Speed  exists  in  the  unit  of  extension  whether  there 
be  other  units  or  not ;  speed,  therefore,  is  unrelated 
or  absolute.  But  the  extended  unit  having  motion 
must  also  have  path,  which  is  a  change  of  position 
to  others  and  variable  by  collision  with  others.  It 
is  thus  relative.  Speed  is  constant  in  the  ultimate 
unit,  which  will  be  demonstrated  in  a  subsequent 
chapter;  but  path  is  change  of  position  in  relation 
to  others,  and  motion  therefore  is  absolute  in  speed 
and  relative  in  path. 

There  is  persistence  or  indestructibility  in  the 
fundamental  unit  of  extension  and  motion,  but  this 
unit  changes  its  relation  to  other  units  in  position 
and  also  in  trajectory;  the  persistence  is  absolute 
and  constant,  the  change  relative  and  variable. 

Motions  are  related  to  one  another  in  direction  and 
also  in  the  positions  of  trajectories.  Directions  may 
differ  in  innumerable  ways  and  paths  may  have 
innumerable  deflections  and  thus  trajectories  may 
have  innumerable  variables.  In  order  that  direction 
and  trajectory  may  be  treated  mathematically  it 
becomes  necessary  to  devise  methods  for  the  measure- 
ment of  directions  which  are  expressed  in  degrees 
and  of  lengths  which  are  expressed  in  various 
measures.  By  these  conventions  motions  are 


QUANTITIES  OR  PROPERTIES  THAT  ARE  MEASURED    27 

reduced  to  spaces  and  spaces  to  numbers,  all  giving 
an  inconceivably  great  number  of  relations.  But 
there  are  no  motions  without  particles  in  motion,  and 
there  are  no  speeds  without  particles  having  speed, 
and  there  are  no  trajectories  without  particles  having 
trajectories.  There  is  no  path  without  a  particle 
having  the  essentials  of  a  particle. 

The  science  of  the  mathematics  of  motion  deals 
with  the  speed  of  one  and  its  trajectory,  the  speed 
of  another  and  its  trajectory,  and  of  their  collisions, 
and  for  this  purpose  it  has  to  deal  with  the  measure 
of  their  relations,  and  forever  relation  is  considered 
and  thus  an  illusion  is  sometimes  produced,  when 
motion  itself  seems  to  be  wholly  relation.  Every 
particle  of  matter  is  in  motion,  and  while  this  motion 
is  absolute  it  is  also  relative.  There  can  be  nothing 
relative  which  is  not  also  absolute,  nor  can  there  be 
anything  absolute  which  is  not  also  relative,  and 
motion  being  thus  absolute  and  relative  it  is  quite 
proper  to  affirm  this  of  motion,  but  it  is  not  correct 
to  affirm  that  motion  is  a  relation  any  more  than  it  is 
correct  to  affirm  that  motion  is  an  absolute,  if  by  these 
assertions  it  is  implied  that  motion  is  one  rather  than 
the  other ;  but  if  these  assertions  are  made  with  regard 
to  one  correlative  implying  the  other,  then  they  are 
both  correct.  It  is  better  form  of  speech  to  say  that 
motion  is  absolute  or  relative  when  it  is  desired  to 
call  attention  to  one  factor  or  the  other,  rather  than 
to  say  that  motion  is  an  absolute  or  a  relation. 

The  motion  of  particles  is  of  such  a  nature  that 
paths  must  impinge,  and  then  collisions  arise  which 
give  rise  to  impulse,  or  collision  by  which  paths  are 
deflected. 

As  bodies  are  incorporated  in  molecules  of  higher 


28  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

and  still  higher  orders,  and  through  various  molar 
forms  as  crystals,  rocks,  cells,  phytons,  plants,  organs 
and  animals  and  on  into  stars  and  systems  of  stars, 
each  embodiment  appropriates  a  part  of  the  motion 
of  its  several  particles  or  atoms.  The  molecules  of 
the  lowest  orders  have  their  motions,  the  molecules 
of  the  second  order  have  their  motions,  the  cell  and 
the  crystal  have  their  motions,  the  earth  has  its 
motion  and  the  stellar  system  has  its  motion. 

The  speed  of  every  particle  of  matter  is  the  sum 
of  all  the  speeds  of  the  bodies  in  which  it  is  incor- 
porated. Speed  can  never  be  increased  or  diminished 
in  an  ultimate  particle;  it  may  be  increased  or 
diminished  in  any  one  of  its  embodiments,  but  only 
by  deflecting  the  motions  in  its  other  embodiments. 
This  point  is  vital  to  a  clear  comprehension  of  the 
philosophy  of  science  and  is  worthy  of  further 
illustration  from  the  fact  that  it  becomes  necessary 
to  rid  ourselves  of  an  illusion  of  sense.  I  see  a  bird 
perched  upon  a  tree,  then  I  see  it  flying  through  the 
air  to  perch  upon  another  tree.  The  bird  seems  to 
have  motion  between  the  trees  which  it  did  not  seem 
to  have  while  perched  on  the  one  or  the  other;  but 
the  molecules  of  the  bird  before  the  flight  had  the 
motion  of  vitality,  and  in  moving  from  tree  to  tree 
the  trajectory  of  these  multifarious  minute  mo- 
tions are  all  deflected.  The  millions  of  millions 
of  molecular  motions  had  their  trajectories  changed. 
The  bird  itself  was  moving  with  the  earth  about  its 
axis  and  with  the  earth  about  the  sun,  and  with  the 
sun  about  a  point  in  Hercules.  This  is  its  astro- 
nomical motion.  The  change  in  the  trajectory  of  the 
millions  of  millions  of  molecules  was  only  the  equiv- 
alent of  the  change  in  the  trajectory  of  the  astronom- 


QUANTITIES  OR  PROPERTIES  THAT  ARE  MEASURED    29 

ical  motion  of  the  bird.  We  know  that  all  of  these 
trajectories  are  changed;  we  do  not  know  that  the 
velocity  or  rate  of  speed  of  any  particle  of  the  bird's 
body  was  increased  or  diminished.  If  Newton's  third 
law  of  motion,  that  action  and  reaction  are  equal,  is 
true  in  the  exact  terms  in  which  he  stated  it,  then 
we  must  affirm  that  the  speed  of  no  particle  was 
changed  but  only  its  trajectory.  We  do  not  see  the 
astronomical  motions  of  the  bird  nor  its  molecular 
motions.  We  do  see  the  molar  motions  in  flying 
from  tree  to  tree  and  thus  an  illusion  is  produced 
that  motion  can  be  created  or  destroyed  by  the  bird, 
and  the  persistence  of  motion  seems  to  be  a  fallacy 
and  the  correlation  of  forces  a  fiction.  We  do  not 
see  the  creation,  continuance  and  annihilation  of 
motion  in  the  bird,  but  the  deflection  of  astronom- 
ical and  molecular  motions  as  known  by  scientific 
investigation.  This  discussion  is  designed  to  show 
that  motion  is  not  a  relation,  but  that  one  motion 
may  be  said  to  be  related  to  another  or  related  to 
any  selected  position. 

V 

Time  is  persistence  and  change,  the  persistence 
being  absolute  because  it  exists  in  the  particle  inde- 
pendent of  other  particles,  and  constant,  for  the  par- 
ticles cannot  be  annihilated.  Change  is  relative,  in 
that  it  inheres  in  the  relations  of  the  particles,  and  it 
is  also  variable,  for  particles  are  constantly  changing 
their  relations  of  position  to  each  other  by  occupying 
a  succession  of  positions.  Thus  time  is  absolute  and 
relative,  constant  and  variable. 

The  earth  as  a  body  changes  the  position  of  its 
particles  by  rotation  upon  its  axis  and  thus  passes 


30  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

through  a  series  of  daily  events.  It  also  as  a  particle 
changes  its  position  in  relation  to  the  sun  in  a  series 
of  annual  events.  The  position  of  the  same  body  at 
one  time  may  be  related  to  the  position  of  that  body 
at  another  time;  that  is,  its  space  relations  may 
change. 

As  the  motion  of  one  body  in  its  space  element 
may  become  the  measure  of  the  motion  of  another 
body  in  its  space  elements,  so  the  motion  of  one  body 
in  its  time  element  may  become  the  measure  of 
another  body  in  its  time  element.  While  particles 
are  related  to  one  another  in  number,  space  and 
motion,  these  relations  are  constantly  changing  so 
that  they  are  also  related  in  time ;  that  is,  particles 
are  related  to  each  other  through  their  changes.  A 
particle  unmodified  in  its  individuality  may  pass 
through  a  succession  of  changes  by  reason  of  its  own 
proper  motion  determined  by  the  motion  of  other  par- 
ticles. As  the  orbit  of  the  moon  around  the  earth  may 
become  the  measure  of  the  orbit  of  the  earth  around 
the  sun,  so  the  day  may  become  the  measure  of  the 
year.  We  have  now  found  that  numbers,  spaces,  mo- 
tions and  times  are  properties  which  can  be  measured, 
and  through  measurement  which  is  conventional  they 
can  be  investigated.  We  shall  hereafter  see  how 
large  a  part  of  the  scientific  research  pursued  by  man 
is  occupied  with  these  subjects.  Quantity  is  the 
reciprocal  of  something  else  which  is  usually  called 
quality,  but  in  the  course  of  this  discussion  it  will 
be  found  that  the  term  quality  is  badly  chosen,  that 
the  real  reciprocal  of  quantity  is  kind  or  class. 


CHAPTER   IV 

KINDS    OR    PROPERTIES    THAT    ARE    CLASSIFIED 


Having  considered  the  nature  of  the  properties  of 
a  discrete  particle  of  matter  by  reason  of  its  own 
existence  and  the  existence  of  others,  we  have  now 
to  consider  how  these  relations  are  developed  by 
incorporation.  Still  it  is  necessary  only  to  draw  upon 
the  common  stock  of  knowledge  and  deduce  from  it 
legitimate  results  which  are  easily  understood.  We 
have  shown  that  the  ultimate  discrete  particles  are 
related  to  each  other  through  pluralities,  positions, 
paths  and  changes,  and  we  have  now  to  consider 
another  method  of  association,  for  particles  of  matter 
are  incorporated,  and  enter  into  fixed  associations 
with  one  another  by  affinity,  the  nature  of  which  has 
never  been  explained,  although  the  association  is 
well  known.  Every  particle  of  matter  under  certain 
conditions  seems  to  be  able  to  choose  its  associate, 
and  a  group  of  such  particles  that  have  mutual 
affinities  become  compounded  into  that  which  is 
usually  denominated  a  molecule.  This  association 
of  particles  in  a  molecule  is  not  easily  dissolved  under 
ordinary  conditions,  yet  if  special  conditions  are  pro- 
vided the  association  is  fickle  and  old  combinations 
are  dissolved  that  new  combinations  may  be  formed. 

Then  molecules  enter  into  association  with  one 
another  without  cohesion  in  gases,  with  feeble 
cohesion  in  liquids,  and  a  more  tenacious  cohesion 

31 


32  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

in  solids.     A  body  thus  considered  of  like  molecules 
is  called  a  substance. 

II 

In  the  combination  of  particles  into  molecules  and 
other  bodies,  an  interesting  development  of  the 
properties  is  observed.  Such  a  combination  pro- 
duces a  new  unit  of  a  higher  order.  Here  we  find  a 
new  unity  made  such  by  combination,  and  it  must  be 
observed  that  it  depends  upon  a  plurality  combined 
in  one.  It  is  therefore  a  new  kind  of  unit.  Thus  a 
kind  is  developed  by  the  combination  of  a  plurality 
of  units  into  one — a  process  familiar  in  the  conven- 
tional units  of  arithmetic,  where  ten  units  of  the 
lower  order  make  one  of  the  next  higher  order.  That 
which  is  accomplished  by  convention  in  arithmetic, 
is  accomplished  by  incorporation  in  nature.  In  this 
manner  by  combination  the  quantitative  property  of 
number  in  the  particle  becomes  the  classific  prop- 
erty or  kind  in  the  molecule,  and  as  there  is  a  hier- 
archy of  molecules  and  every  one  considered  as  a  unit 
may  become  a  particle  in  a  higher  order,  we  are 
compelled  to  consider  it  in  this  double  and  relative 
capacity,  as  one  of  many  and  as  many  in  one.  A 
molecule  in  its  internal  aspect  appears  as  many;  in 
its  external  aspect  as  one.  Thus  we  have  incor- 
porated units,  and  these  may  be  incorporated  in  a 
still  higher  order,  and  on  indefinitely.  There  are 
many  bodies  of  a  kind  and  they  constitute  a  class. 
Thus  a  class  is  a  series  or  sum  of  a  kind. 

Ill 

Ultimate  particles,  by  reason  of  their  extension  and 
position ,  give  rise  to  space ;  when  they  are  incorpo- 


UNIVERSITY 


or 

•^  *^r 

KINDS  OR  PROPERTIES  THAr^tftfi^LASSIFIED          33 

rated  positions  are  established  in  relation  to  one 
another,  and  thus  a  form  is  constituted.  It  is  thus 
that  space  is  developed  into  form  by  incorporation. 
It  is  seen  that  the  particles  of  the  molecule  considered 
as  such  exhibit  space  with  extension  and  position, 
while  the  molecule  or  other  body  also  exhibits  figure 
and  structure.  If  we  view  the  body  from  within 
as  composed  of  particles,  space  is  presented;  if  we 
view  it  from  without  as  a  body,  form  is  presented. 

Again,  this  same  molecule  may  become  a  particle 
in  a  higher  order  of  molecules,  when  it  will  exhibit 
space  characteristics,  and  a  higher  molecule  will 
exhibit  form  characteristics.  Thus  space  is  the 
reciprocal  of  form. 

In  my  room  there  are  desks,  chairs,  book-cases, 
books  and  many  other  articles.  Their  relations  of 
position  are  relations  of  space.  Were  all  these 
articles  consolidated  into  one,  so  that  one  could  not 
be  moved  without  moving  all,  their  relations  would 
become  relations  of  form.  Contemplate  a  pile  of 
cannon-balls;  the  relations  of  these  balls  to  one 
another  are  relations  of  space  ;  combine  them  into 
one  body  in  such  a  manner  that  they  will  move 
together  as  one,  their  relations  of  space  become  rela- 
tions of  form  also. 

IV 

It  has  already  been  asserted  that  a  particle  cannot 
lose  speed.  When  we  contemplate  a  molecule  com- 
posed of  particles  in  which  relative  positions  are  fixed, 
we  are  compelled  to  develop  the  thought  one  stage 
farther  and  conceive  of  them  as  still  retaining  their 
speeds.  The  concept  of  particles  with  relative  posi- 
tions fixed,  and  every  one  retaining  its  motion,  can 


34  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

be  realized  by  a  consideration  of  facts  presented  by 
celestial  bodies.  The  earth  and  moon  revolve  about 
a  common  axis  which  is  within  the  periphery  of  the 
earth,  and  each  retains  its  own  speed  while  the 
relative  position  of  each  is  preserved.  But  the  sun 
and  the  earth  revolve  together  about  a  common  axis 
in  the  same  manner,  and  the  relative  positions  are 
preserved,  while  the  relative  position  of  the  moon  to 
the  sun  is  indirect  through  the  mediation  of  the 
earth.  In  like  manner  it  can  be  shown  that  the  rel- 
ative positions  of  all  the  members  of  the  solar  system 
are  preserved  directly  or  mediately  by  a  system  of 
motion.  Now,  the  solar  system  may  be  considered 
as  the  type  of  a  molecule  in  which  the  particles 
retain  their  speeds  and  have  their  relative  positions 
fixed  by  deflection  in  the  motion  of  revolution.  Yet 
the  concept  is  not  complete;  for  every  one  of  the 
members  of  the  solar  system  is  rotating  about  its 
own  axis.  So  that  there  is  a  complex  system  of 
motions  within  the  solar  system  by  which  the  orbs 
are  kept  within  the  theater  of  the  system  itself,  even 
though  the  system  as  a  unit  may  be  revolving  about 
some  other  point  in  the  heavens ;  and  the  fixity  of 
position  of  celestial  particles  is  fixity  of  space  rela- 
tions about  axes  of  revolution. 

We  do  not  know  that  the  particles  of  a  molecule 
move  within  the  sphere  of  the  molecule  by  a  system 
of  rotations  and  revolutions,  though  such  a  system 
can  be  conjectured;  but  whatever  the  system  may 
be,  it  must  accomplish  the  same  results  by  confining 
a  certain  portion  of  the  speeds  of  the  particles  within 
the  theater  of  the  molecule  by  a  system  of  deflec- 
tions, and,  whatever  may  be  the  motion  of  the  mole- 
cule itself  in  relation  to  other  molecules,  the  speed 


KINDS  OR  PROPERTIES  THAT  ARE  CLASSIFIED  35 

of  the  particle  must  be  partly  taken  up  within  the 
molecule,  and  it  must  then  be  divided  between 
internal  motion  and  external  motion.  Let  us  vivify 
this  concept  into  greater  distinctness. 

Imagine  a  particle  moving  to  and  fro  in  vibration 
at  the  rate  of  millions  of  vibrations  a  second;  the 
sphere  of  this  motion  is  measured  by  the  amplitude 
of  the  vibration.  If  the  deflection  is  something  less 
than  one  hundred  and  eighty  degrees  at  both  extrem- 
ities of  the  vibration  and  on  the  same  side,  the  particle 
will  move  off  in  the  direction  normal  to  the  vibration. 
Its  motion  in  the  new  direction  increases  inversely 
with  the  angle  of  deflection,  until  it  reaches  ninety 
degrees. 

Now  consider  the  speed  of  the  particle  in  vibration 
when  the  deflection  is  one  hundred  and  eighty 
degrees ;  then  the  total  speed  is  represented  in  the 
vibration,  but  when  the  particle  is  moved  in  a  direction 
normal  to  the  vibration,  the  speed  of  the  vibration  is 
less  by  the  amount  of  speed  taken  up  in  the  new 
motion;  thus  the  speed  of  the  particle  is  divided 
between  its  two  motions.  In  this  manner  we  may  con- 
ceive of  the  speed  of  the  ultimate  particle  as  being 
divided  among  the  speeds  of  the  bodies  of  a  hierar- 
chy in  which  the  particle  is  incorporated.  What  we 
have  shown  about  the  speed  of  a  particle  in  rectilineal 
motion  is  true  of  it  in  all  forms  of  curvilineal  motion. 
When  one  molecule  collides  with  another  each  has 
its  path  deflected  inversely  proportional  to  its  mass, 
for  its  mass  is  the  sum  of  its  particles,  every  one  in 
motion  and  having  a  path  of  its  own,  and  all  of  the 
particle  paths  must  be  deflected  to  a  greater  or  less 
degree  in  order  that  the  molecular  path  may  be 
deflected.  The  force,  therefore,  with  which  one 


36  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

body  deflects  another  and  by  which  it  resists  deflec- 
tion itself  is  the  sum  of  the  motion  of  its  particles. 
Force,  therefore,  is  a  compound  of  motions.  Thus 
motion  in  the  particle  becomes  force  in  the  molecule 
or  other  body.  But  the  molecule  itself  may  become 
a  particle  in  a  higher  molecule,  when  its  force 
becomes  a  motion  which  again  must  be  composed. 

V 

We  have  now  to  consider  the  development  of  time 
by  incorporation.  It  has  been  seen  that  time  is  per- 
sistence and  change.  The  endless  persistence  of  the 
particle  is  interrupted  by  changes  in  its  relation  to 
other  particles,  but  when  these  relations  are  incor- 
porated and  become  established  as  kinds,  forms,  and 
forces,  time  undergoes  a  development,  for  it  then 
becomes  causation  as  antecedent  and  consequent,  or 
cause  and  effect.  In  ultimate  particles  collisions 
result  in  deflections  and  the  changes  which  occur 
relate  to  paths;  but  the  particles  themselves  are 
unmodified.  When  bodies  are  considered  another 
set  of  relations  are  generated.  With  every  collision 
the  body  may  be  modified,  and  a  succession  of  these 
collisions  may  ultimately  produce  a  great  change. 
The  change  which  bodies  undergo  in  this  manner  is 
called  causation.  Thus,  a  body  may  be  deformed  or 
broken  up,  it  may  grow  or  decay  when  cause  and 
effect  are  involved.  Whatever  happens  to  a  molecule 
is  distributed  to  its  particles  and  is  observed  in  its 
particles.  If,  now,  we  discover  an  effect  and  desire 
to  learn  its  cause,  we  find  the  effect  distributed  to 
all  of  the  particles  which  constitute  the  molecule  and 
must  go  outside  the  molecule  for  its  cause.  This  is 
what  is  known  as  the  infinite  regressus  of  causes. 


KINDS  OR  PROPERTIES  THAT  ARE  CLASSIFIED  37 

The  total  cause  of  any  event  to  a  molar  body  stretches 
out  through  all  the  earth,  and  as  the  earth  is  a 
particle  in  the  solar  system  the  total  cause  embraces 
the  sun  and  its  planets  and  their  satellites.  Now, 
when  we  are  considering  an  event  as  an  effect,  we 
are  considering  it  as  a  change  in  the  individual,  but 
when  we  are  considering  the  total  cause  of  the 
change,  we  are  considering  the  environment.  The 
effect  again  becomes  cause,  which  proceeds  onward 
as  a  multiplication  of  causes  distributed  to  all  the 
environment.  In  the  regressus  of  causes  the  total 
cause  is  multifarious ;  but  we  may  from  time  to  time 
consider  any  one  of  the  effects  of  the  total  cause  as 
the  cause  which  may  be  varied  in  the  production  of 
an  effect ;  then  out  of  the  effects  of  the  total  cause 
the  one  selected  may  be  known  as  the  special  cause. 
This  is  the  cause  to  which  reference  is  made  in  com- 
mon speech.  An  effect  is  observed  in  the  explosion 
of  gunpowder.  We  may  consider  the  cause  as  the 
instability  of  the  compound,  the  ignition  of  the 
powder  with  a  match,  or  the  purpose  of  the  mis- 
chievous boy,  etc.  In  like  manner  we  may  go  on  in 
an  indefinite  regressus  to  catalogue  the  causes  of  the 
explosion.  When  I  am  considering  the  conduct 
of  the  boy  I  attribute  the  cause  to  him ;  when  I  am 
considering  the  flame  I  attribute  the  cause  to  the 
flame;  when  I  am  considering  the  constitution  of 
the  powder  I  attribute  it  to  the  explosiveness  of  the 
substance.  These  are  special  causes  as  distinct 
from  the  total  cause.  Man  comes  to  consider  cause 
in  this  manner  for  a  practical  reason,  for  he  inter- 
feres in  causation  for  his  own  ends,  and  is  forever 
searching  for  the  most  economic  means  of  changing 
events 


38  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

I  am  not  familiar  with  any  discussion  of  causation 
equal  to  that  of  John  Stuart  Mill  in  his  work  on 
Logic ;  but  he  failed  to  distinguish  causation  as  an 
abstraction  from  force,  form  and  kind.  In  his  chap- 
ter on  the  Composition  of  Forces,  he  says: 

"  I  shall  give  the  name  of  the  Composition  of  Causes  to  the 
principle  which  is  exemplified  in  all  cases  in  which  the  joint 
effect  of  several  causes  is  identical  with  the  sum  of  their  sepa- 
rate effects. 

"This  principle,  however,  by  no  means  prevails  in  all  depart- 
ments of  the  field  of  nature.  The  chemical  combination  of  two 
substances  produces,  as  is  well  known,  a  third  substance  with 
properties  entirely  different  from  those  of  either  of  the  two 
substances  separately,  or  of  both  of  them  taken  together.  Not 
a  trace  of  the  properties  of  hydrogen  or  of  oxygen  is  observable 
in  those  of  their  compound,  water. ' ' 

In  the  chemical  union  of  oxygen  and  hydrogen  a 
new  kind  is  produced  as  water.  Here  we  have  com- 
position of  kind;  when  causes  are  composed  new 
conditions  are  developed ;  thus  the  oxygen  and  the 
hydrogen  are  found  under  new  conditions  of  incor- 
poration. In  these  new  conditions  there  is  a  change 
in  space  relations,  so  that  water  occupies  less  space 
than  the  gases  of  which  it  is  composed;  thus  the 
composition  of  kinds  gives  rise  to  the  composition 
of  conditions,  but  is  not  itself  the  composition  of 
conditions  as  an  abstraction.  To  discuss  the  com- 
position of  conditions  it  is  necessary  to  discuss  the 
very  things  to  which  Mill  refers  when  he  speaks  of 
the  development  of  new  properties. 

Heretofore  we  have  used  the  terms  total  cause 
and  special  cause  and  have  shown  that  the  special 
cause  is  that  one  of  a  multiplicity  of  causes  which  is 
considered.  Recurring  to  the  illustration  used 
before,  it  will  be  remembered  that  the  cause  of  the 


KINDS  OR  PROPERTIES  THAT  ARE  CLASSIFIED  39 

explosion  might  be  considered  as  the  constitution  of 
the  dynamite,  or  it  might  be  considered  as  the  spark 
by  which  the  powder  was  ignited,  or  it  might  be  con- 
sidered as  the  act  of  the  incendiary,  and  in  this  man- 
ner we  obtain  the  infinite  regressus  of  causes.  The 
considered  cause  may  be  any  one  near  or  remote  in 
the  infinite  regressus.  When  any  one  is  selected  all 
the  others  become  conditions ;  hence  we  have  a  cause 
and  its  conditions.  So  cause  is  related  to  effect  and 
cause  is  also  related  to  condition. 

At  this  moment  a  man  is  climbing  to  the  roof  of 
my  house.  The  cause  of  his  climbing  is  a  breach  in 
the  roof  which  he  intends  to  repair.  The  cause  of 
his  climbing  is  his  intention ;  the  cause  of  his  climb- 
ing is  my  request ;  the  cause  of  his  climbing  is  my 
knowledge  of  the  breach  in  the  roof;  the  cause  of  his 
climbing  is  the  information  given  me  by  another 
that  my  roof  leaks ;  the  cause  of  his  climbing  is  his 
desire  to  earn  a  fee;  the  cause  of  his  climbing  is  his 
desire  to  purchase  food ;  the  cause  of  his  climbing  is 
his  love  of  his  family;  the  cause  of  his  climbing  is 
the  hunger  of  his  children.  So  we  may  go  on  for- 
ever to  enumerate  remote  and  distinct  causes,  and 
when  we  consider  any  one  of  them,  the  others 
become  conditions  which  must  be  assumed  as  neces- 
sary to  the  operation  of  the  selected  cause. 

We  have  considered  teleologic  causes;  now  we 
must  consider  genetic  causes.  The  man  falls  from 
the  roof.  The  cause  of  his  falling  is  the  misstep  he 
makes;  the  cause  of  his  falling  is  gravity;  the  cause 
of  his  falling  is  the  greater  distance  of  the  roof  than 
the  surface  of  the  earth  to  the  center  of  the  earth ; 
the  cause  of  his  falling  is  the  ascent  to  the  roof; 
the  cause  of  his  falling  is  his  coming  to  make  repairs. 


40  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

If  any  one  of  these  conditions  had  been  omitted  he 
would  not  have  fallen,  and  we  can  go  on  to  multiply 
these  conditions  to  an  indefinite  degree  and  discover 
that  if  any  one  was  omitted  this  particular  case  of 
falling  would  not  have  occurred. 

Why  is  one  condition  selected  rather  than  another? 
This  question  might  be  answered  by  referring  to  the 
seriality  of  thought,  which  is  the  name  for  the  law  by 
which  many  things  cannot  be  considered  simulta- 
neously. To  comprehend  all  of  the  causes  it  is  neces- 
sary to  consider  them  separately ;  and  while  this  is 
not  a  complete  answer,  it  must  be  considered  as  an 
important  condition  to  be  understood  that  the  answer 
itself  may  be  understood.  Man  himself  is  a  causa- 
tor,  and  changes  the  currents  of  events  in  himself 
and  in  external  nature.  All  human  activities  are 
designed  to  interfere  with  the  course  of  natural 
events.  Man  bent  upon  the  modification  of  events  is 
forever  intent  upon  the  discovery  of  the  most  easily 
variable  cause,  and  no  small  proportion  of  his 
energies  are  devoted  to  this  discovery,  and  the  inven- 
tion of  the  way  by  which  his  discoveries  may  be 
made  of  avail.  Hence  it  comes  that  particular 
causes  are  selected  as  those  of  most  interest.  Every 
act  performed  by  man,  every  word  spoken  is  an 
interference  in  the  laws  of  causation  and  is  designed 
as  such.  The  artisan  who  repaired  my  roof  inter- 
fered in  the  laws  of  causation  by  making  the  repair, 
but  this  interference  can  only  be  accomplished  by 
the  substitution  of  a  new  cause. 

VI 

We  have  now  discovered  that  there  is  an  additional 
property  of  the  inanimate  particle  when  it  is  incor- 


KINDS  OR  PROPERTIES  THAT  ARE  CLASSIFIED  41 

porated,  and  that  this  is  affinity.  All  we  know  of 
affinity  is  that  it  is  the  choice  of  one  particle  for 
another  as  its  associate  or  is  their  mutual  choice. 
Here  we  are  introduced  to  the  multitudinous 
phenomena  of  affinity,  which  can  be  explained  only 
as  choice.  We  must  yet  go  on  to  consider  other 
bodies  than  molecules  to  obtain  a  clearer  idea  of  the 
nature  of  affinity  itself. 

VII 

Class  is  the  reciprocal  of  number.  It  is  class  in 
the  body  as  kind  and  series,  and  it  is  number  in  the 
particle  as  unity  and  plurality.  Form  is  the  recip- 
rocal of  space,  which  is  form  in  the  body  as  figure 
and  structure,  and  it  is  space  in  the  position  of  the 
extensions  of  the  particle.  Force  is  the  reciprocal  of 
motion ;  it  is  force  in  the  body  as  action  and  passion ; 
it  is  motion  in  the  particles  as  speed  and  path. 
Causation  is  the  reciprocal  of  time;  it  is  causation 
in  the  body  as  cause  and  effect ;  it  is  time  in  the 
body  as  persistence  and  change. 

Number,  space,  motion  and  time  are  concomitant 
as  they  inhere  in  the  same  particle ;  kind,  form,  force 
and  causation  are  concomitant  because  they  inhere 
in  the  same  body.  These  distinctions  are  radical, 
and  must  be  firmly  grasped  if  the  argument  herein 
presented  is  to  be  understood. 


CHAPTER  V 

PROCESSES     OR     THE     PROPERTIES     OF     GEONOMIC     BODIES 

The  particles  and  bodies  of  the  universe  are  funda- 
mentally classified  in  six  groups,  as  follows:  (i)  the 
particles  of  the  ether,  the  science  of  which  I  call 
ethronomy;  (2)  the  bodies  and  particles  of  the 
stars,  the  science  of  which  is  astronomy;  (3)  the 
bodies  and  particles  of  the  earth,  the  science  of 
which  I  call  geonomy ;  (4)  the  bodies  and  particles 
of  plants,  the  science  of  which  I  call  phytonomy;  (5) 
the  bodies  and  particles  of  animals,  the  science  of 
which  I  call  zoonomy;  (6)  the  bodies  which  are 
invented  by  men,  the  science  of  which  I  call 
demonomy. 

I  shall  not  write  special  chapters  about  ethronomy 
and  astronomy,  and  shall  consider  demonomy  in  an 
incidental  way  and  reserve  it  for  a  future  volume; 
but  I  must  devote  a  chapter  severally  to  geonomy, 
phytonomy,  and  zoonomy,  in  order  that  we  may  dis- 
cover something  more  about  the  nature  of  affinity 
and  see  if  there  are  other  properties  which  will 
require  for  their  explanation  more  than  the  five 
essentials. 

I 

The  earth  is  composed  of  four  bodies  surrounded 
by  the  ether. 

First,  there  is  a  central  nucleus  constituting  the 
principal  mass. 

Second,  there  is  a  crust  of  structurally  disposed 


PROPERTIES  OF  GEONOMIC  BODIES  43 

rock  surrounding-  the  nucleus,  the  thickness  of  which 
is  comparatively  small. 

Third,  there  is  an  aqueous  body  surrounding  the 
rocky  crust,  through  which  the  islands  rise,  the 
largest  of  which  are  called  continents.  On  these 
islands  there  are  many  lakes  and  rivers  which  ramify 
into  innumerable  brooks,  creeks  and  rills. 

Fourth,  there  is  an  aerial  mantle  of  air  extending 
to  a  limit  which  is  not  well  determined. 

Fifth,  these  four  bodies,  one  outside  the  other,  in 
succession,  are  surrounded  by  the  ether. 

The  earth  is  thus  composed  of  encapsulated  globes 
enclosing  a  nucleus  and  bathed  in  ether,  to  desig- 
nate which  certain  definitive  terms  are  needed.  I 
shall,  therefore,  speak  of  the  nucleus,  the  rocky 
crust  or  crust,  the  aqueous  envelope  or  envelope, 
and  the  aerial  mantle  or  mantle,  and  shall  call  them 
all  spheres.  For  the  sake  of  clearer  distinction, 
these  spheres  may  be  called  (i)  the  centrosphere ; 
(2)  the  lithosphere;  (3)  the  hydrosphere,  and  (4)  the 
atmosphere.  It  must  be  observed  tftat  the  ether  is 
common  to  all  of  the  celestial  bodies,  and  perhaps 
penetrates  them  as  it  does  the  earth. 

The  centrosphere  is  the  chief  mass  and  has  a 
density  of  5.6.  By  reason  of  this  great  specific 
gravity,  which  is  about  twice  that  of  the  rocky  crust, 
it  is  often  supposed  to  be  metallic.  Geologic  facts 
in  a  vast  system  lead  to  the  induction  that  the 
centrosphere  does  not  exist  in  the  solid  state ;  if  it  is 
metallic  the  weight  reduces  it  to  a  trans-solid  con- 
dition. To  this  condition  the  form  of  the  earth  testi- 
fies, as  it  is  an  oblate  spheroid  assuming  the  figure 
of  a  fluid  under  the  combined  action  of  gravity  and 
rotation.  These  are  facts  which  have  led  physicists 


44  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

to  conclude  that  it  must  have  a  rigidity  said  to  be 
equal  to  that  of  steel.  This  rigidity  may  be  explained 
as  a  function  of  its  rotation,  revolution,  and  molec- 
ular motion,  when  the  physicist  and  the  geologist 
would  be  in  substantial  accord. 

The  theory  of  a  metallic  centrosphere  seems  ade- 
quately to  account  for  the  trans- solid  state,  as  the 
metals  are  found  to  flow  under  pressure;  but  the 
molten  material  which  from  time  to  time  is  brought 
to  the  surface  from  the  interior  of  the  earth  never 
reveals  this  metallic  constitution.  It  may  be  that 
there  is  a  zone  of  matter  beneath  the  structural  rock 
and  overlying  the  metallic  nucleus  which  is  pene- 
trated by  heat,  now  here,  now  there,  and  only  these 
molten  rocks  are  extra vasate d ;  or  it  may  be  that 
the  solid  state  is  limited  by  heat  in  one  direction  and 
by  pressure  in  the  other  in  such  manner  that  all 
rocks  flow  under  great  pressure  as  do  the  metals. 

The  stony  crust  has  been  revealed  by  direct  pene- 
tration to  a  depth  of  more  than  six  thousand  feet, 
but  it  is  indire'ctly  revealed  in  many  regions  to  a 
much  greater  depth,  perhaps  in  extreme  cases  to 
fifty  or  sixty  thousand  feet. 

The  islands  of  dry  land  have  all  been  beneath  the 
sea  at  some  time  or  other,  and  all  show  that  they 
have  been  submerged  more  than  once,  some  more 
frequently  than  others.  During  that  portion  of  the 
history  of  the  crust,  which  is  the  theater  of  geological 
investigation,  these  periods  of  submarine  condition 
in  one  region  always  appear  to  be  contemporaneous 
with  periods  of  subaerial  conditions  in  some  other 
region.  Thus  there  seem  to  have  been  regions  of 
dry  land  and  regions  of  ocean  bottom  coexisting  with 
a  large  predominance  of  oceanic  area. 


PROPERTIES  OF  GEONOMIC  BODIES  45 

The  aqueous  envelope  covers  the  rocky  crust  over 
about  three-fourths  of  its  surface,  and  has  an  average 
depth  of  about  twelve  thousand  feet,  though  in 
extreme  cases  the  bottom  of  the  sea  is  more  than 
five  miles  below  its  surface,  while  in  some  few  cases 
mountains  rise  to  more  than  five  miles  above  the 
level  of  the  sea.  It  is  certain  that  we  are  now  able 
to  study  rocks  which  were  deposited  at  depths  much 
greater  than  that  of  the  mean  depth  of  the  ocean, 
and  there  are  many  cases  where  rocks  found  on  the 
summits  of  high  mountains  are  known  to  have  been 
deposited  at  great  depths  beneath  the  sea.  Great 
regions  of  country  are  at  one  time  submarine,  and 
at  another  subaerial.  These  oscillations  of  upheaval 
and  subsidence  are  oft-repeated  in  geological  his- 
tory, and  the  swing  of  oscillation  seems  to  have  been 
in  some  regions  tens  or  scores  of  thousands  of  feet 
where  they  reach  the  maximum,  and  to  be  only  tens 
or  scores  of  feet  at  the  minimum,  so  that  the  surface 
of  the  earth,  in  so  far  as  it  has  been  studied  geolog- 
ically, is  found  to  give  evidence  of  oscillations  of 
level  varying  in  these  quantities. 

These  variations  are  geographically  heterogene- 
ous :  one  region  may  have  its  oscillation  on  a  small 
scale,  another  on  a  large  scale,  the  minor  oscillations 
forming  distinct  geographical  series  and  the  major 
oscillations  forming  distinct  geographical  series; 
that  is,  one  region  has  been  subject  during  geo- 
logical time  only  to  minor  oscillations,  and  another 
during  the  same  time  to  major  oscillations. 

We  must  now  more  fully  consider  the  nature  of 
these  movements.  Sometimes  upheaval  is  by  anti- 
clinal flexure,  where  the  rocks  are  lifted  along  a  line 
of  upheaval  and  caused  to  dip  away  on  either  side  in 


46  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

gentle  or  abrupt  slopes  which  are  sometimes  beauti- 
fully curved;  but  such  an  upheaval  often  seems  to 
be  accompanied  by  a  subsidence  on  the  flanks. 
Symmetrical  anticlinal  flexures  are  not  very  common, 
but  often  one  side  slopes  gently  while  the  other  is 
abruptly  deflected.  This  abrupt  slope  is  especially 
subject  to  rupture,  in  which  case  faults  are  substi- 
tuted for  flexures.  Thus  a  block  which  dips  gently 
in  one  direction  has  its  margin,  on  the  side  of  a 
fault,  displaced  as  an  abrupt  escarpment.  Blocks 
formed  in  this  manner  often  careen  upon  their  edges, 
so  that  the  strata  may  become  vertically  disposed  or 
quite  overturned  where  the  lower  formed  strata  are 
found  on  top.  Between  careened  blocks  and  flexed 
blocks  no  line  of  demarcation  can  be  drawn:  the 
same  block  in  different  parts  of  its  course  may  be 
bent  or  broken,  and  the  flexed  blocks  themselves  be 
quite  overturned.  The  rocks  which  are  upheaved 
or  depressed  by  faulting  and  flexing,  one  or  both, 
are  always  found  to  be  ruptured  in  line  of  the  faults 
or  flexures,  and  also  transversely  to  them.  This 
rupture  is  often  minute,  so  that  the  sheets  of  rock 
are  faulted  and  jointed  and  thus  found  in  blocks  of 
varying  dimensions,  but  all  very  minute  as  com- 
pared with  the  widely  spread  formations  from  which 
they  are  broken.  Thus  the  whole  system  of  rocks, 
of  igneous  and  aqueous  origin  alike,  are  broken  into 
blocks  by  faults  and  ruptures,  and  still  further 
divided  by  planes  of  deposition,  so  that  the  structural 
crust  is  a  system  of  fragments  sometimes  with  an 
area  of  many  yards,  other  times  with  an  area  of 
fractions  of  inches.  When  we  compare  these  blocks 
with  the  great  area  of  the  structural  crust  we  find 
that  it  is  but  an  accumulation  of  blocks  that  are  to 


PROPERTIES  OF  GEONOMIC  BODIES  47 

the  formations  what  grains  of  sand  are  to  the  blocks. 
We  must  now  realize  that  the  structural  crust 
nowhere  has  a  continuous  coherence;  that  faults, 
joints,  and  partings  render  it  a  vast  body  of  minute 
and  loosely  accumulated  fragments.  All  of  this 
upheaval  and  subsidence  with  flexures,  faults,  joints, 
and  partings  seem  to  have  been  brought  into  this 
condition  by  intermittent  convulsions  often  exhibited 
in  earthquakes. 

Having  contemplated  the  lithosphere  as  a  body 
moving  in  upheaval  and  subsidence,  and  shown 
what  is  about  the  maximum  and  minimum  of  these 
oscillations  and  their  paroxysmal  character,  we  are 
prepared  to  consider  the  structure  of  this  crust. 

In  all  geological  ages  volcanic  eruptions  have 
occurred  and  rocky  material  from  the  depths  has 
been  brought  to  the  surface.  Such  appearances  of 
lava  at  the  surface  have  been  very  common  in  human 
history,  and  they  appear  to  have  been  just  as  com- 
mon in  all  the  geological  ages  revealed  by  science. 
Lavas  vary  in  chemical  and  mineralogical  constitu- 
tion, but  this  variation  is  within  narrow  limits.  All 
of  the  mineral  substances  known  to  mankind  appear, 
but  are  intimately  mixed  as  minute  ingredients. 
Lavas,  therefore,  are  intimate  mixtures  of  many  sub- 
stances, the  average  of  which  falls  within  narrow 
limits.  It  would  appear  from  our  present  knowledge 
that  the  primordial  surface  of  the  earth  was  cooled 
lava  and  that  lava  has  been  erupted  from  time  to 
time  through  all  of  the  great  geological  ages. 

Upon  these  cooled  surfaces  a  new  crust  of  rocks 
from  below  and  rocks  from  above  appears  to  have 
been  spread.  Wind  waves  and  tidal  waves  are  for- 
ever beating  the  lands  and  undermining  the  cliffs 


48  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

and  distributing  the  materials  beneath  the  sea. 
Then  atmospheric  agencies  disintegrate  the  rocks 
and  the  rains  wash  the  sands  into  the  streams,  which 
carry  them  into  the  lakes  and  into  the  sea.  By 
many  cognate  processes  the  lands  are  worn  down 
and  the  sea  bottoms  built  up ;  the  amount  of  detritus 
thus  accumulated  in  zones  about  the  meandering 
shores  is  great,  so  that  in  regions  of  maximum 
activity  formations  are  accumulated  thousands  of 
feet  in  thickness. 

The  winds  contribute  to  the  material  which  falls 
into  the  sea;  plant  life  also  furnishes  its  quota; 
accumulations  of  vegetation  are  ultimately  con- 
solidated among  the  formations  as  beds  of  coal ;  and 
animal  life  adds  to  the  marine  formations,  for  corals, 
shells,  and  bones  are  all  brought  to  be  buried  in  the 
sand,  and  often  extensive  formations  of  calcareous 
matter  are  thus  produced.  From  these  sources  the 
sedimentary  rocks  are  brought  to  be  mingled  with 
the  eruptive  rocks  and  intercalated  among  them, 
while  in  turn  they  are  thrust  between  the  sedimen- 
tary rocks. 

Layers  of  rock  of  sedimentary  origin  appearing  as 
strata  are  commingled  with  other  masses  of  rock  of 
volcanic  origin  which  come  from  the  interior.  Some- 
times the  lava  flows  under  or  between  the  sedimen- 
tary strata.  When  great  masses  of  lava  are  found 
in  these  conditions  they  are  called  lacolites.  Thinner 
sheets  are  called  intrusive  rocks.  Beds  poured  over 
the  surface  are  called  coulees.  The  floods  of  lava 
come  through  fissures  and  fill  them  both  below  and 
above  coulees,  intrusions,  and  lacolites ;  such  fissure 
formations  are  called  dikes.  Where  the  lava  comes 
forth  in  volcanoes,  the  orifices  are  filled  with  molten 


PROPERTIES  OF  GEONOMIC  BODIES  49 

rock  which  consolidates  and  are  then  called  chim- 
neys. Great  bodies  of  lava  are  ejected  by  some 
volcanoes  as  scoria  and  ashes,  and  often  the  ashes 
are  minutely  comminuted;  the  expulsion  of  such 
material  is  doubtless  due  to  the  production  of  gases 
and  vapors,  especially  of  steam,  and  the  com- 
minution is  probably  due  to  the  explosive  actions  of 
particles  of  water  expanded  into  steam.  Great  vol- 
canic cones  are  often  formed  by  the  piles  of  scoria 
and  ashes  which  are  extravasated,  and  the  ashes 
themselves  when  highly  comminuted  are  drifted  by 
the  wind,  sometimes  far  away  from  the  locus  of 
eruption.  Beds  of  ashes  and  scoria  formed  in  this 
manner  are  called  tuff.  So  the  bodies  of  rock  formed 
by  eruption  are  commingled  with  the  bodies  formed 
by  sedimentation,  and  all  are  known  as  formations. 
Both  the  sedimentaries  and  the  eruptives  undergo  a 
further  change,  which  to  a  greater  or  less  extent 
obscures  their  origin,  for  the  original  formations  are 
metamorphosed,  that  is,  recrystallized  and  lithified ; 
so  that  the  planes  of  sedimentation  are  partly  or 
largely  obscured  and  the  beds  of  lacolites,  intrusive 
sheets,  coulees,  dikes,  chimneys,  and  tuffs  have  a 
new  structure  imposed  upon  them,  and  are  then 
known  as  metamorphic  rocks. 

An  attempt  has  been  made  to  define  formations ; 
now  they  must  be  considered  in  a  new  light. 

The  land  areas  have  always  been  subject  to 
degradation  by  rains,  rivers,  and  waves,  and  the 
materials  washed  from  the  land  have  been  carried 
into  the  sea  and  there  deposited ;  thus  the  continu- 
ance of  dry  land  area  is  comparatively  ephemeral. 
Not  only  are  the  lands  degraded  in  this  manner,  but 
when  they  reach  the  level  of  the  sea  they  continue 


50  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

to  subside;  when  above  the  sea  they  are  speedily 
unloaded,  but  when  brought  to  the  level  of  the  sea 
or  nearly  so  the  islands,  though  having  their  loads 
discharged,  continue  to  sink.  The  regions  which 
have  received  the  detritus  of  the  islands  and  are  thus 
loaded  by  them,  are  elevated  into  the  island  or  con- 
tinental condition;  thus  land  areas  rise  to  be  un- 
loaded and  then  sink,  while  oceanic  areas  are  loaded 
and  then  rise  to  become  land  areas.  The  extent  of 
this  upheaval  and  subsidence  and  the  vertical  move- 
ments, involved  together  with  the  vast  transporta- 
tion of  material  from  land  to  sea,  seems  to  be  enor- 
mous when  we  contemplate  the  almost  silent  and 
unseen  agencies  by  which  it  is  accomplished. 

In  considering  large  areas  of  the  surface  of  the 
earth,  as,  for  example,  the  great  continents  or  zones 
of  archipelagoes,  we  reach  certain  generalizations  of 
prime  significance. 

Regions  of  great  denudation  are  also  regions  of 
great  deposition,  regions  of  great  eruption,  regions 
of  great  upheaval  and  subsidence,  and  also  regions 
of  great  flexure  and  fracture ;  thus  denudation  and 
deposition,  eruption  and  displacement  (as  subsidence 
and  upheaval  and  as  fracture  and  flexure)  are  corre- 
lated in  this  manner:  that  where  there  is  more  of 
one  there  is  more  of  all;  where  there  is  less  of  one 
there  is  less  of  all. 

Geologists  have  found  no  law,  condition,  or  cause 
by  which  to  explain  these  phenomena  of  the  earth's 
crust  as  the  law  of  gravity  explains  the  constitution 
of  celestial  systems.  The  search  for  this  law  has 
been  almost  exclusively  in  one  direction,  under  the 
hypothesis  of  a  cooling  and  contracting  earth,  but 
with  the  lapse  of  time  it  has  been  found  inadequate. 


PROPERTIES  OF  GEONOMIC  BODIES  51 

Attempts  have  been  made  to  compute  the  amount 
of  contraction  supposed  to  result  from  the  wrinkling 
of  the  crust  of  the  earth  in  anticlines  and  synclines. 
It  seems  to  entirely  fail  quantitatively.  Contraction 
does  not  seem  to  be  an  explanation  of  all  or  even  the 
chief  phenomena  which  we  have  briefly  set  forth. 
When  this  hypothesis  was  considered,  flexion 
seemed  to  be  the  chief  method  of  displacement ;  now 
we  know  that  fracturing  and  faulting  is  the  chief 
method  in  regions  of  maximum  action.  When 
inclined  rocks  are  studied  they  seem  to  have  been 
stretched,  as  evidenced  in  the  elongation  of  particles 
transverse  to  the  strike,  and  they  seem  further  to 
have  been  stretched  by  the  opening  of  fissures  and 
joints.  Altogether  it  may  be  affirmed  that  displace- 
ment does  not  teach  the  doctrine  of  a  contracting 
earth,  or,  if  that  statement  is  too  strong,  it  does  not 
give  evidence  of  a  sufficient  contraction  necessary  to 
the  hypothesis,  and  it  also  fails  to  explain  the 
concomitant  phenomena. 

With  this  hypothesis  another  is  associated,  namely, 
that  the  centrosphere  of  the  earth  is  metallic,  for 
which  no  vestige  of  inductive  evidence  has  yet 
appeared ;  and  the  stupendous  fact  remains  that  the 
centrosphere  has  more  than  twice  the  density  of  the 
crust.  All  eruptive  rocks  which  come  into  the  pur- 
view of  science  are  found  to  have  an  average  con- 
stitution which  is  about  the  same  as  that  of  the  sedi- 
mentary rocks.  It  is  found  by  experiment  in  the 
industrial  arts  that  under  pressure  metallic  and 
other  substances  flow;  and  geology  teaches  that  all 
of  the  other  rocks  are  secularly  deformed  under 
differential  pressures,  so  that  rocks  highly  metamor- 
phosed in  this  manner  are  twisted,  contorted,  and 


52  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

kneaded  into  new  shapes.  Finally,  there  is  now 
abundant  geologic  evidence  to  show  that  the  faulting 
near  the  surface  appears  as  flexure  at  greater  depths, 
and  finally  that  flexure  appears  as  molecular  read- 
justment at  still  greater  depths,  expressed  in  slaty 
structure  where  the  particles  of  the  rocks  are  rear- 
ranged in  parallel  planes. 

The  metals  of  the  normal  condition  have  great 
density,  but  in  a  pure  condition  are  found  only  in 
exceedingly  minute  quantities ;  all  the  other  rocks 
have  a  small  density.  If  we  now  assume  that  all  rocks 
flow  tinder  pressure,  that  the  critical  point  is  vari- 
able and  that  the  modulus  of  compression  is  also 
variable,  being  greater  for  the  lighter  rocks  and  less 
for  the  heavier,  and  that  this  modulus  is  greatly 
accelerated  at  the  critical  point,  we  have  a  law 
which  will  regiment  the  facts  of  geonomy  as  the  facts 
of  astronomy  are  marshaled  by  the  law  of  gravity. 

Under  this  theoretic  law  of  the  accelerated  mod- 
ulus of  compression  at  the  critical  point  for  different 
substances,  subsidence  and  upheaval  are  explained. 
The  reassumption  of  constitutional  structure  in 
crystallization  and  glassy  lithification  necessitates 
expansion,  and  thus  upheaval  is  explained.  When 
lands  rise  and  are  denuded,  the  process  of  relithifica- 
tion  in  the  centrosphere  continues  upheaval  and 
exposes  the  lands  to  further  upheaval,  and  this  proc- 
ess goes  on  until  an  equilibrium  is  reached  at  the 
epoch  when  the  land  is  brought  to  the  level  of  the 
sea  by  degradation.  On  the  other  hand,  as  land  is 
loaded  the  subjacent  crust  rocks  are  brought  within 
the  zone  of  accelerated  compression,  and  this  proc- 
ess continues  while  the  loading  continues  until  it  is 
brought  to  a  close  at  the  epoch  when  the  land  area 


PROPERTIES  OF  GEONOMIC  BODIES  53 

from  which  the  detritus  is  taken  is  brought  to  the 
level  of  the  sea  and  transportation  ended  so  that  load- 
ing ceases. 

Universal  contraction  by  cooling  must  still  be 
postulated  as  an  agency  for  the  destruction  of 
equilibrium,  or  perhaps  we  may  find  this  agency  in 
astronomical  conditions;  but  some  such  agency  is 
necessary  for  the  continuation  of  the  process.  But 
the  changing  of  material  from  the  interior  to  the  sur- 
face and  the  changing  of  load  from  one  district  to 
another  by  transportation  under  the  law  of  the  accel- 
erated modulus  of  compression  is  the  principal 
agency  of  upheaval  and  subsidence. 

This  doctrine  was  proposed  several  years  ago  by 
myself,  but  has  received  little  attention  except 
among  a  few  geologists  engaged  in  this  branch  of 
research ;  from  its  reception  by  these  gentlemen  I 
am  encouraged  to  repropound  it. 

The  hydrosphere  requires  a  little  further  con- 
sideration. The  water  evaporates  from  the  surface 
aided  by  a  variety  of  conditions  which  cannot  here 
be  considered ;  as  vapor  it  floats  in  the  air ;  then  the 
rocks  by  atmospheric  agencies  are  reduced  to  dust 
and  blown  by  the  winds  and  seized  by  the  vapor,  so 
that  particles  often  become  the  nuclei  of  raindrops. 
The  falling  of  the  water  restores  the  particles  of 
dust  to  the  crust.  On  the  other  hand  the  water 
penetrates  the  rocky  crust  by  the  innumerable 
fissures  which  have  already  been  described  and  along 
the  partings  of  the  rocks  and  among  the  sands  of 
which  they  are  composed.  In  a  condition  of  vapor  it 
is  probable  that  it  penetrates  through  all  of  the 
stony  crust.  Thus  it  falls  into  the  earth  by  streams, 
by  capillary  channels,  and  into  the  metamorphic 


54  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

masses  at  great  depths,  where  it  assumes  the  role  of 
an  agent  of  rearrangement  in  crystallization.  There 
is  much  evidence  to  show  that  this  finally  becomes 
the  agent  of  explosion  when  the  rocky  masses  are 
thrust  by  the  weight  of  superincumbent  rock  into 
the  centrosphere,  for  this  seems  to  be  the  explana- 
tion of  the  tufaceous  material  thrown  out  by  vol- 
canoes. This  penetrating  water  becomes  the  agent 
of  another  process  which  goes  on  in  the  crust  on  a 
vast  scale,  for  the  waters,  especially  when  they 
become  thermal,  dissolve  certain  substances  and 
redeposit  them  as  they  are  evaporated  above  and  as 
they  become  waters  of  crystallization  below. 
Especially  are  the  metals  treated  in  this  manner, 
giving  rise  to  metallic  lodes  by  solution  in  the  water 
and  their  subsequent  evaporation  and  crystallization. 
The  formation  of  mineral  lodes  in  this  manner  is 
a  long  but  interesting  chapter  in  the  story  of  geology. 
We  now  have  a  condensed  but  perhaps  sufficient 
account  of  the  structure  of  the  earth  in  spheres  and 
their  interaction  in  the  production  of  formations. 
We  must  now  consider  these  formations  abstractly 
in  the  light  of  the  essentials  as  they  are  changed  in 
relations  of  quantities  and  categories  into  formations. 

II 

In  the  deeply  seated  rocks  substances  are  trans- 
muted by  recomposition,  secularly  accomplished  by 
changes  in  heat  and  changes  in  pressure  which  pro- 
duce chemical  reactions.  As  the  rocks  sink  under 
the  materials  piled  upon  them  by  extravasation  and 
deposition,  they  are  faulted  and  jointed,  and  this 
permits  the  water  to  flow  in  underground  courses ; 
these  flowing  waters  dissolve  certain  substances  on 


PROPERTIES  OF  GEONOMIC  BODIES  55 

their  way  down,  and  deposit  them  again,  filling  the 
joints  and  fault  seams  with  deposits  accumulated 
from  higher  grounds.  As  the  upper  and  lower  sur- 
face of  the  crust  is  approached  the  rate  of  change  in 
the  substances  is  increased  until  these  surfaces  are 
reached.  At  the  upper  surface  the  disintegrated 
rocks  form  an  overplacement  of  soils  which  undergo 
such  chemical  reaction  that  the  substances  of  vegetal 
life  are  produced.  This  material,  exposed  for  longer 
or  shorter  periods,  is  transported  by  streams  to  lakes 
or  to  the  sea  and  sinks  to  the  bottom,  where  it  is 
recombined  into  various  substances,  especially  as 
carbonate  of  lime,  chloride  of  sodium,  other  salts, 
clay  and  coal.  All  of  this  transmutation  is  a  numer- 
ical change  in  the  relation  of  the  atoms  to  the  mole- 
cules of  the  substances  developed.  Let  us  call  it 
metalogisis. 

The  new  substances  which  appear  in  the  changes 
wrought  by  the  agencies  which  have  been  described 
are  segregated  in  the  deeply  seated  rocks  as  crystals. 
Those  which  are  formed  in  the  fissures  appear  as 
bodies  of  ore  and  those  that  are  washed  from  the 
surface  and  deposited  at  the  bottoms  of  lakes  and 
seas  are  arranged  in  strata,  but  as  the  waters  them- 
selves dissolve  the  substances  of  the  surface  they  are 
often  recombined  and  crystallized.  Thus  it  is  that 
the  new  substances  are  segregated  and  the  new  mass 
of  comminuted  material  has  the  new  kinds  developed 
in  this  manner,  separated  more  or  less  distinctly  from 
the  kinds  of  the  original  mass.  Thus  metalogisis  is 
the  genesis  of  new  kinds  and  their  segregation  by  a 
succession  of  changes. 

Thus  we  see  that  in  the  processes  that  go  on  in  the 
crust  of  the  earth  new  kinds  of  substances  are 


56  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

developed  and  new  kinds  of  formations  produced, 
and  the  chemist  finds  these  substances  to  be 
arranged  in  series,  and  the  geologist  finds  that  sedi- 
mentary formations  are  arranged  in  series.  So  in 
geonomy,  kinds  are  developed  into  series. 

Ill 

With  the  change  in  kind  comes  the  change  in  form 
which  is  accomplished  by  minute  increments.  When 
the  mineral  substances  are  recombined  in  the  deeply 
seated  rocks  they  are  slowly  metamorphosed  by 
recrystallization  and  rearrangement  in  slaty  struc- 
ture. The  ores  are  deposited  in  mineral  lodes  and 
to  some  extent  crystallized.  The  sedimentary  for- 
mations are  arranged  in  layers  or  strata,  and  are 
thus  seriated.  Heavier  and  larger  materials  are 
sooner  deposited,  lighter  and  smaller  materials  are 
slowly  thrown  down,  and  the  currents  of  the  water 
carry  them  farther  away  from  the  shore ;  thus  there 
is  an  assorting  process  which  is  still  farther  extended 
by  the  deposition  of  materials  in  solution.  In  this 
manner  the  structure  of  the  rocky  cellate  is  con- 
stantly undergoing  metamorphosis. 

The  slates  are  seriated  a,nd  the  sedimentary  strata 
are  seriated.  Thus  kinds  are  seriated  as  forms 
revealed  in  structure  and  figure.  The  elements  of 
structure  are  set  forth  in  a  more  elaborate  form  in 
structural  geology  when  slaty  structure,  lode  struc- 
ture and  stratified  structure  are  the  themes,  and 
where  flexures,  faults,  fractures  and  displacements 
are  set  forth  in  describing  the  structure  of  moun- 
tains, plateaus,  hills  and  plains  as  slates,  lodes  and 
strata,  giving  figure  to  the  topographic  features  and 
the  endless  variety  and  beauty  of  the  topographic 


PROPERTIES  OF  GEONOMIC  BODIES  57 

landscape.     This  figure  is  revealed  in  valleys  with 
stream  channels  and  canyons. 

In  plains  that  are  sometimes  baselevels  being 
asymptotic  and  sometimes  surmounted  with  monad- 
nock  elevations,  in  plateaus  with  abrupt  escarpments 
and  fringing  hills,  in  mountains  which  are  often 
systems  of  ridges  carved  by  gorges  into  peaks  or 
elevated  as  volcanic  cones,  all  spread  with  a  parterre 
of  forest,  meadow,  field  and  flower  through  which 
flow  rivers,  creeks,  brooks  and  rills,  where  cataracts 
and  cascades  are  found  and  where  fountains  issue 
from  the  rocks  and  lakes  are  nestled  that  mirror  the 
vegetal-clad  shores ;  while  away  to  the  polar  region 
the  ice  gathers,  and  the  glaciers  break  into  icebergs 
and  float  down  the  sea,  or  following  the  land,  carve 
valleys  and  build  moraines.  All  these  things  and 
many  more  constitute  the  theme  of  physiography, 
which  is  a  description  of  the  figure  of  the  oblate 
spheroid.  A  succession  of  changes  of  form  we  call 
metamorphosis. 

IV 

In  the  change  which  comes  in  the  development  of 
the  rocky  cellate,  forces  become  energies ;  that  is, 
pari  passu  with  metalogisis  and  metamorphosis  there 
is  metaphysisis ;  and  metaphysisis  is  energy  and 
work  as  reciprocals.  The  same  fact  is  sometimes 
expressed  in  another  form.  The  spherical  members 
of  the  earth  and  the  formations  of  which  the  crust  is 
composed  exhibit  strains  and  stresses  in  their  interac- 
tion and  these  strains  and  stresses  produce  changes. 
The  varying  heat  of  the  ether  by  contraction  and 
expansion  rends  the  rocks  and  is  an  agency  for  their 
disintegration.  The  ether  evaporates  the  water,  the 


58  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

wind  carries  it  about  and  fills  the  air  with  dust,  and 
the  dust  and  vapor  again  fall  to  the  earth  as  rain, 
and  the  falling  becomes  a  process  of  disintegration  in 
part,  but  mainly  an  agency  for  the  transportation  of 
material  of  the  rocky  cellate  by  sheets  of  water  into 
streams  and  by  streams  into  the  larger  bodies. 
Then  gravity  acts  as  a  process,  throwing  the  load  of 
transportation  to  the  bottom  in  assorted  layers. 
Then  the  percolating  waters  exhibit  new  processes  of 
transmutation.  With  all  of  this  there  go  the  proc- 
esses of  strains  and  stresses  in  the  rocks  themselves, 
some  formations  being  relieved  of  pressure  and 
others  having  pressure  added,  and  all  these  work 
their  changes.  Then  there  are  the  processes  of 
extravasation  consequent  upon  the  relief  and  addi- 
tion of  the  strains  and  stresses. 

All  of  the  processes  which  are  here  but  partly 
enumerated  are  intermittent.  The  ethereal  proc- 
esses change  hourly  and  daily  with  the  longitude, 
and  vary  with  the  latitude.  The  winds  blow  and  are 
calm;  evaporation  goes  on  until  critical  conditions 
are  reached  when  storms  fall ;  floods  are  also  vari- 
able, and  floods  produce  effects  in  geometrical  ratio. 
The  pressures  of  formations  have  their  accelerations 
intermittent,  so  that  stresses  are  revealed  by  earth- 
quakes, and  the  fractures  caused  by  earthquakes  pro- 
duce the  channels  for  eruption,  and  add  to  pressures 
and  stresses. 

There  is  a  change  in  hydrostatic  pressure  of  such 
importance  that  it  must  not  be  neglected.  The 
waters  that  are  wedged  between  the  stony  blocks 
and  thrust  into  pervious  strata  and  absorbed  into  all 
of  the  rocks  by  processes  of  crystallization  are  sub- 
ject to  the  same  intermittent  activities. 


PROPERTIES  OF  GEONOMIC  BODIES          59 

Again,  on  the  streams  of  great  floods,  great  blocks 
are  loaded,  and  as  these  blocks  become  larger  they 
are  the  more  efficient  as  hammers  in  the  corrasion 
of  stream  channels  both  vertically  and  laterally ;  so 
that  glaciers  load  themselves  with  rocks  and  become 
the  agencies  of  corrasion  by  which  valleys  are  carved. 

All  of  these  processes  are  the  work  of  gravity, 
heat,  light,  electricity  and  magnetism,  and  combined 
they  produce  a  set  of  chemical  changes  which,  as  a 
mode  of  motion,  we  call  chemism,  which  must  be  dis- 
tinguished from  affinity,  for  affinity  means  choice, 
while  chemism  means  energy,  and  valency  expresses 
numerical  proportions.  Heat  produces  expansion, 
gravity  produces  contraction  in  the  materials  of  the 
rocky  crust,  and,  conjoined,  they  produce  chemism. 
This  geochemism  is  the  fundamental  energy. 

Stresses  and  strains  are  produced  in  celestial 
bodies  as  exhibited  in  their  spheroidal  structure,  but 
chemism  appears  in  the  particles  of  which  celestial 
bodies  are  composed,  and  at  present  we  cannot 
study  these  particles  in  any  other  celestial  body  than 
that  of  the  earth ;  chemism  is  a  new  mode  of  motion 
exhibited  to  us  only  in  the  earth,  though  we  may 
conjecture  that  it  exists  in  other  globes  if  we  could 
examine  into  their  geonomy.  A  succession  of 
changes  of  force  is  metaphysisis. 

V 

We  have  next  to  consider  a  succession  of  causes 
and  a  succession  of  effects.  The  rill  rolls  down  the 
declivity ;  by  the  process  of  corrasion  a  channel  is 
cut,  and  this  effect  is  a  continuous  deepening  of  the 
channel.  The  cause  is  a  process  and  the  effect  is  a 
process;  a  serial  causation,  therefore,  is  a  double 


60  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

process,  one  of  cause  and  the  other  effect.  The 
water  on  its  way  down  the  rill  transports  the  abraded 
rocks ;  thus  there  is  a  constant  process  of  cause  in  the 
flowing  of  the  water,  and  a  constant  process  of  effect 
in  the  transportation  of  the  load.  When  the  rill 
reaches  the  foot  of  the  declivity  by  the  change  of 
grade  in  the  stream  it  is  no  longer  able  to  cany  the 
load,  and  it  is  deposited.  The  constant  process  of 
discharge  from  the  water  results  in  a  constant  proc- 
ess of  deposition  upon  the  bottom.  It  is  in  this 
manner  that  causation  is  continuous,  and  such  a  cau- 
sation is  a  double  process.  A  serial  force  is  a  process. 
In  energy  the  work  done  by  force  is  proportional  to 
the  time  in  which  the  force  acts,  but  in  the  process 
this  law  does  not  necessarily  obtain,  for  cause  is  not 
wholly  a  question  of  force  but  it  is  also  a  question 
of  form  and  kind. 

The  rate  at  which  the  stream  corrades  its  channel 
is  due  in  part  to  the  mass  of  the  water  and  the 
declivity  of  the  stream,  that  is,  energy,  but  it  is 
also  dependent  upon  the  form  of  the  rocks  and  their 
chemical  constitution.  If  they  are  easily  disinte- 
grated they  are  loaded  the  more,  and  the  sedimentary 
particles  as  the  instruments  of  corrasion  are  multi- 
plied. Much  depends  upon  the  constitution  of  the 
rocks.  If  they  dissolve  in  minute  particles  they 
corrade  less ;  if  the  particles  are  larger  they  corrade 
more.  Thus  the  rate  of  corrasion  is  a  function  of 
force,  of  form  and  of  kind,  and  hence  there  can  be 
no  equality  between  the  work  done  as  an  effect  and 
the  energy  as  a  cause.  Again  in  transportation  of 
the  material  the  rate  of  transportation  depends  upon 
the  rate  at  which  the  supply  is  furnished,  and  not 
upon  the  force  of  the  waters,  for  the  supply  is  load 


PROPERTIES  OF  GEONOMIC  BODIES  6 1 

and  the  load  adds  its  own  weight  to  the  gravitating 
energy.  The  condition  of  fineness  in  the  particles 
constituting  the  load  will  greatly  aid  transportation ; 
the  larger  particles  will  sink  sooner,  the  smaller 
particles  will  be  carried  farther;  the  deposition  will 
in  one  place  be  of  large  particles,  another  place  of 
small  particles ;  hence  a  new  effect  is  produced,  that 
of  sorting  the  material.  It  has  already  been  shown 
that  causes  are  multifarious  and  run  into  an  infinite 
regressus,  and  between  no  one  of  these  causes  and 
the  effect  does  there  exist  the  relation  of  equality, 
and  because  the  causes  are  disparate  from  the  effect 
there  can  be  no  equality  between  the  cause  and 
effect. 

This  is  one  of  the  strange  fallacies  often  met, 
and  its  origin  lurks  in  the  term  action  and  reaction 
when  bodies  in  motion  collide.  A  and  B  are  two 
bodies  in  motion;  they  impinge  and  are  mutually 
deflected.  Now  if  we  consider  A  before  the  deflec- 
tion and  after  it,  we  have  the  two  directions  sepa- 
rated by  an  event.  The  same  is  true  of  B  before  the 
collision  and  B  after  it.  At  the  collision  there  is  a 
double  cause  involved  in  the  incident  motions  of  A 
and  B  before  the  collision,  and  a  double  effect  in 
their  reflected  motions.  As  force  there  is  a  mutual 
action  and  reaction,  then  there  is  equality  existing 
between  them.  As  cause  and  effect  there  is  a  mu- 
tual causation.  The  angle  of  incidence  equals  the 
angle  of  deflection ;  that  is,  there  is  equality  between 
angle  and  angle  as  relations  of  form ;  but  this  is  not 
a  relation  of  cause  and  effect  as  such.  We  must  find 
the  cause  of  the  collision,  and  then  we  may  find 
what  the  collision  causes.  Change  the  conditions  in 
the  two  particles;  let  one  of  them  be  easily  crushed 


62  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

and  the  other  not,  then  one  ball  will  rebound  and 
the  other  will  be  shattered.  Now  action  and  reac- 
tion as  force  will  still  be  equal,  but  cause  and  effect 
will  be  different  conditions ;  one  body  has  its  course 
changed,  the  other  body  is  shattered  into  fragments, 
and  these  fragments  take  different  courses.  Thus  it 
is  seen  that  between  cause  and  effect  equality  can- 
not be  asserted.  There  is  no  equality  between  a 
word  of  command  and  prompt  obedience  to  the  com- 
mand. There  is  no  equality  between  sunrise  and 
the  opening  of  the  morning-glory;  there  is  no 
equality  between  the  story  of  the  Bonnie  Brier  Bush 
and  my  emotion.  It  is  always  abuse  of  logic  to 
assert  that  equality  exists  between  cause  and  effect, 
although  the  first  mode  of  causation  has  that  charac- 
teristic as  change  of  direction. 

When  we  consider  force  as  force  there  is  always 
equality  between  action  and  reaction ;  but  when  we 
consider  force  as  cause,  then  no  relation  of  equality 
exists  between  it  and  effect.  A  unit  of  force  may 
raise  a  hundred  pounds  to  a  given  height ;  two  units 
of  force  may  raise  two  hundred  pounds  to  the  same 
height.  Thus  the  work  is  proportional  to  the  force ; 
but  we  are  not  considering  a  relation  between  forces 
but  a  relation  between  cause  and  effect.  When  in 
lifting  the  weight  we  consider  it  as  an  effect  and 
wish  to  refer  to  its  causes,  they  are  found  to  be  in 
the  machinery  by  which  the  effect  was  produced,  in 
the  application  of  the  force  to  produce  the  effect, 
and  in  the  origin  of  this  force.  That  is  to  say,  when- 
ever we  are  examining  the  relation  between  cause 
and  effect  we  are  examining  into  conditions  or  states 
and  not  into  equalities  or  inequalities  of  force. 
When  a  weight  of  a  hundred  pounds  is  raised  a  unit 


PROPERTIES  OF  GEONOMIC  BODIES  63 

of  altitude,  the  effect  is  a  new  position,  and  the  force 
employed,  which  was  one  of  the  causes  of  the  new 
position,  is  an  action  equal  to  the  lifting  of  the 
weight  as  reaction.  But  the  cause  might  have  pro- 
duced a  very  different  effect  than  that  of  lifting  the 
weight ;  the  effect  might  have  been  the  breaking  of 
the  rope ;  then  the  cause  is  the  force  and  the  effect 
the  fracture.  Cause  and  effect  are  not  relations 
of  force  to  force,  form  to  form,  nor  kind  to  kind,  but 
they  are  relations  of  time  to  time  as  they  are  affected 
by  force,  form  and  kind.  There  can  be  no  cause 
without  force,  form  and  kind;  that  is,  we  cannot 
analyze  cause  but  can  only  abstract  it.  We  cannot 
put  cause  in  one  basket,  force  in  a  second,  form  in  a 
third,  and  kind  in  a  fourth ;  and  this  is  only  a  repeti- 
tion of  what  I  have  said  about  unity,  extension, 
speed  and  persistence. 

A  process  of  causality  is  here  called  metagenesis 
and  a  series  of  changes  are  produced. 

We  have  now  seen  that  the  four  essentials  are  still 
represented  in  the  processes  of  geonomic  bodies,  and 
we  also  see  the  action  of  affinity  in  these  bodies, 
and  affinity  itself  is  never  revealed  except  as  choice. 


CHAPTER  VI 

GENERATIONS    OR    PROPERTIES    OF    PLANTS 


We  are  yet  to  follow  properties  through  higher 
degrees  of  relativity.  For  this  purpose  it  becomes 
necessary  to  examine  the  relations  exhibited  by 
plants  in  metabolism,  growth,  vitality,  and  heredity. 
Plants  are  not  wholly  disparate  bodies,  but  rise  by 
a  discrete  step  or  degree  in  relativity  not  exhibited 
in  ethronomy,  astronomy  and  geonomy.  So  that 
not  only  are  the  properties  in  those  realms  found  in 
this  new  realm,  but  in  addition  a  new  set  of  relations 
which  we  denominate  generations.  We  have,  there- 
fore, to  examine  those  characteristics  by  which  plants 
are  distinguished  from  geonomic  bodies,  of  course 
in  only  a  general  and  summary  manner. 

In  plants  new  kinds  appear  by  chemical  recomposi- 
tion.  A  new  substance,  protoplasm,  is  constituted, 
being  organized  of  many  molecules  of  different 
kinds,  which  again  combine  with  other  substances. 
These  molecules  seem  to  be  still  further  arranged  in 
different  proportions,  by  which  the  new  plant  sub- 
stances become  many;  the  formation  of  these  sub- 
stances is  called  assimilation. 

The  many  substances  of  plant  tissue  have  a 
secular  development  which  is  growth  in  size  and 
form.  The  period  of  existence  of  the  plant  body  is 
limited,  and  at  death  returns  to  simpler  conditions ; 
this  return  is  decay,  and  belongs  to  the  grade  of  proc- 
esses. In  growth  the  plant  undergoes  a  change  of 

64 


GENERATIONS  OR  PROPERTIES  OF  PLANTS  65 

increasing  relativity,  and  in  decay  returns  to  a 
simpler  state  of  relativity. 

During  growth,  which  is  an  increase  of  form  and 
structure  by  a  succession  of  changes,  it  also  exhibits 
a  new  mode  of  motion,  which  is  vitality  or  life,  and 
the  cessation  of  this  activity  is  death,  when  the  plant 
returns  to  the  geonomic  world  by  decay.  But 
assimilation,  growth  and  life  are  continued  from  one 
generation  to  another,  and  imply  time  from  period 
to  period.  This  time  is  occupied  in  making  changes, 
and  causation  is  metagenesis.  Now  a  new  element 
of  time  appears,  for  by  producing  germs  and  thus 
multiplying  individuals  like  itself  the  same  stages  of 
metabolism,  growth  and  life  observed  in  the  parents 
are  repeated  in  the  offspring.  This  new  element  is 
heredity,  in  which  the  offspring  inherits  the  poten- 
tiality of  the  parent  as  it  is  restricted  within  certain 
narrow  limits  to  careers  of  metabolism,  growth  and 
vitality  similar  to  that  of  the  parent. 

Thus  generations  are  generations  of  processes. 
The  processes  are  assimilation,  construction  and 
destruction,  growth  of  form  and  structure,  vitality 
exhibited  in  endosmosis  and  exosmosis,  and  finally 
processes  are  repeated  by  heredity  represented  by 
parents  and  children. 

In  this  grade  of  concomitants  it  must  be  observed 
that  there  can  be  no  assimilation  without  growth, 
no  growth  without  vitality  and  no  vitality  without 
heredity. 

Indeed,  as  we  go  on  to  contemplate  the  concom- 
itants that  appear  by  increasing  relations,  it  becomes 
more  and  more  evident  that  one  cannot  exist  with- 
out the  others,  and  that  abstraction  must  always  be 
distinguished  from  analysis.  It  becomes  possible  to 


66  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

treat  the  whole  process  of  plant  formation  as  assimila- 
tion or  as  growth  or  as  life  or  as  heredity,  and  yet 
we  distinguish  these  concomitants  in  thought.  If 
we  treat  of  the  assimilation  of  plants,  the  phytology 
of  plants,  the  vitality  of  plants  or  the  heredity  of 
plants  through  germs,  we  seem  to  take  the  whole 
subject  in  view,  for  the  concomitants  are  not  dispa- 
rate but  only  abstract  in  consideration. 

II 

I  define  constructive  assimilation  as  the  building 
up  of  protoplasm,  a  compound  composed  of  many 
molecules,  and  I  define  differentiating  assimilation 
as  the  recombination  of  protoplasm  into  other  sub- 
stances which  are  simpler  compounds.  These  sim- 
pler substances  are  composed  not  only  of  some  of  the 
molecules  of  protoplasm  itself,  but  also  of  other  sub- 
stances, and  are  used  for  various  purposes  in  the 
economy  and  structure  of  the  plant.  In  these  re- 
combinations a  surplus  of  substance  is  found  which 
is  excreted  by  the  plant  in  two  ways :  first,  as  water 
which  is  imbibed  and  used  as  a  vehicle  for  other  sub- 
stances, for  the  amount  of  water  is  in  excess  of  the 
amount  ultimately  used  in  the  tissue  of  the  plant, 
and  is  excreted  by  transpiration ;  and  second,  as  car- 
bon-dioxide, for  the  oxygen  of  the  air  unites  with  an 
excess  of  carbon,  and  it  is  then  excreted  by  respira- 
tion. Thus  protoplasm  is  the  basis  of  the  tissues  of 
the  plant;  but  to  make  these  tissues  it  must  be 
recombined  into  different  substances  which  are 
newer  compounds,  and  new  substances  not  found  in 
protoplasm  are  necessary  therefor.  The  water  which 
is  necessary  for  protoplasm  is  furnished  together 
with  an  additional  amount  which  becomes  the 


GENERATIONS  OR  PROPERTIES  OF  PLANTS  67 

vehicle  for  the  new  substances,  and  the  surplus  is 
excreted.  In  the  building  of  new  substances  oxygen 
from  the  air  is  needed  to  dispose  of  some  of  the  car- 
bon, and  this  office  is  accomplished  by  respiration. 
Imbibition  of  water  by  the  roots  furnishes  the 
material  for  assimilation  both  constructive  and 
differentiating,  while  respiration  in  the  leaves  fur- 
nishes the  oxygen  necessary  for  certain  chemical 
changes.  We  must  now  consider  the  substances 
produced  by  assimilation. 

The  plant  is  a  chemical  laboratory  of  exceeding 
complexity,  where  all  of  the  operations  are  carried 
on  with  marvelous  deftness  and  delicacy,  and  with  a 
system  of  chemical  paraphernalia  adapted  to  the 
operations  of  microscopic  life.  The  entire  plant  is 
engaged  in  these  operations  as  long  as  life  lasts, 
sleeping  in  partial  rest  by  night  and  hibernating  in 
semi-torpidity  during  the  winter,  but  carrying  on  its 
operations  in  full  vigor  when  the  sun  is  genial. 
Assimilation  deals  with  particles  so  minute  that  even 
the  eye  of  the  microscope  cannot  see  them,  and  they 
can  be  known  only  when  aggregated  in  masses  as 
material  for  use  or  as  products,  but  the  operations 
are  carried  on  particle  by  particle  in  such  a  manner 
that  what  is  and  what  becomes  reveal  the  method 
of  becoming  only  to  the  eye  of  reason;  thus  ulti- 
mately all  chemical  knowledge  is  the  product  of 
inference.  Nevertheless  this  inferred  knowledge  is 
erected  upon  a  foundation  of  consciousness  as 
revealed  by  the  senses,  and  the  ultimate  proof  of  the 
validity  of  the  inferences  is  the  multiplication  of  facts 
as  they  are  accumulated  in  vast  numbers  by  history 
and  attested  by  the  verification  of  prophecy ;  finally, 
as  the  facts  are  resolved  into  laws  their  congruity  is 


68  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

made  evident.  The  love  of  truth  born  of  the  gene- 
rations of  thinking  minds  forever  engaged  with  the 
materials  of  consciousness  in  the  process  of  inference, 
ultimately  establishes  a  habit  and  love  of  truth  that 
submits  every  judgment  to  the  tribunal  of  congruity, 
the  court  of  equity  which  every  man  erects  in  his 
own  soul.  This  is  the  supreme  court  of  judgment. 

History  may  decide  and  prophecy  may  confirm, 
but  these  decisions  are  annulled  if  the  court  of  con- 
gruity finds  them  contradictory.  Experience  in  the 
laboratory  may  pile  up  facts,  prophecy  in  the 
laboratory  may  be  fulfilled  in  multitudinous  cases; 
biit  under  the  decrees  of  the  court  of  congruity  if 
any  incongruity  appears  the  chemist  is  turned  again 
to  his  experiments,  resting  assured  that  somewhere 
his  facts  or  theories  are  wrong,  and  he  plunges  into 
his  labors  to  reach  peace  only  when  congruity  is 
found.  To  a  man  who  has  not  devoted  his  life  to 
chemical  research  and  has  familiarized  himself  only 
to  a  limited  extent  with  the  history  and  theories  of 
chemistry,  the  vast  body  of  experiments,  the  innu- 
merable verifications  of  prophecies  and  the  congeries 
of  congruities  which  have  developed  since  Dalton 
propounded  the  atomic  theory  are  such  a  monument 
of  accomplishment  by  inference  and  verification 
that  they  appear  as  a  pyramid  of  truth. 

The  fact  to  which  especial  attention  is  called  is 
this :  That  the  laboratory  reveals  in  the  substances 
of  plants  innumerable  new  kinds  and  these  new 
kinds  are  found  in  series. 

Ill 

The  plant  is  a  laboratory  for  the  evolution  of  many 
substances ;  but  as  the  particles  of  which  they  are 


GENERATIONS  OR  PROPERTIES  OF  PLANTS  69 

composed  have  number  and  as  they  are  arranged  in 
numerical,  that  is,  molecular  orders,  they  have  at 
the  same  time  extension,  and  their  arrangement 
implies  that  they  are  placed  in  forms.  Thus  having 
considered  generations  of  kinds,  we  are  led  to  the 
consideration  of  generations  of  forms,  and  the  forms 
which  we  have  to  consider  are  forms  of  cells,  forms 
of  tissues,  forms  of  phytons  and  forms  of  plants. 
Plants  also  exhibit  forms  of  crystals ;  the  crystalliza- 
tion is  fundamentally  a  theme  of  geonomy,  so  on  the 
very  start  of  this  subject  we  are  confronted  with  the 
fact  that  the  plant  exhibits  the  concomitants  of  lower 
relativity,  but  for  present  purposes  we  may  neglect 
them. 

The  normal  and  developed  cell  has  three  concen- 
tric envelopes  which  may  be  called  blasts,  the  whole 
enclosing  a  nucleus,  so  that  the  structure  which  we 
found  in  the  earth  as  spheres  is  repeated  here  as 
blasts.  These  are  the  exoblast,  mesoblast,  and 
endoblast.  Some  plants  are  single  cells,  other 
plants  are  aggregates  of  loosely  attached  cells  joined 
together  as  threads  or  as  webs  of  threads  as  in  the 
slimes,  but  in  plants  of  a  little  higher  grade  these 
webs  are  consolidated  by  a  woof  of  plant  tissue  as 
in  some  of  the  lichens  and  seaweeds. 

The  tissues  are  consolidated  and  modified  cells. 
Then  tissues  are  differentiated,  exhibiting  different 
structures;  different  structural  tissues  are  again 
related  and  modified  for  the  performance  of  func- 
tions as  phytons  and  the  phytons  are  systematized 
to  constitute  the  plant,  but  the  phytons  are  differen- 
tiated for  special  functions  and  we  have  the  roots  for 
imbibition,  the  leaves  for  respiration  and  tran- 
spiration, the  circulatory  apparatus  for  transporta- 


70  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

tion,  the  floral  phytons  for  reproduction  and  the 
protecting  apparatus  for  the  external  covering  of 
plants. 

A  system  of  phytons  constitutes  the  higher  plants. 
In  the  history  of  plant  life  the  morphology  of  plant 
phytons  is  an  important  part  of  the  science  of 
botany,  for  the  forms  of  phytons  undergo  a  suc- 
cession of  changes,  the  investigation  of  which  vies 
in  importance  with  that  of  the  chemical  development 
of  kinds  to  which  we  have  heretofore  alluded. 
When  the  different  classes  of  plants  are  examined 
in  this  respect,  the  succession  appears  in  the  develop- 
ment of  classes,  those  plants  of  the  lower  classes 
passing  through  morphologic  stages  which  are 
repeated  in  higher  classes  and  continued  to  still 
higher  stages,  so  that  the  plants  of  the  highest  class 
practically  include  all  of  the  stages  in  succession  as 
exhibited  in  the  order  of  the  lower  classes.  While 
some  research  has  been  devoted  to  this  subject,  much 
more  requires  to  be  done. 

IV 

That  which  we  call  chemism  is  one  of  the  con- 
comitants of  process  and  is  here  transmuted  into 
vitality.  Vitality  is  chemism  internally  controlled 
by  the  plant  in  obedience  to  the  laws  of  heredity, 
and  externally  controlled  by  heat,  gravity,  and  strain 
which  produces  stresses.  Thus  vitality  is  a  new 
mode  of  motion.  We  must  here  remember  that 
motion  as  speed  is  inherent  and  constant  in  the 
particle  and  that  motion  as  path  is  always  determined 
from  without,  but  the  particles  within  the  body  are 
all  external  to  one  another,  and  therefore  the  direc- 
tion of  motion  which  is  internal  to  the  body  is  in 


GENERATIONS  OR  PROPERTIES  OF  PLANTS  71 

obedience  to  the  laws  of  heredity,  and  the  direction 
of  motion  which  comes  from  without  the  body  is 
heat,  gravity  and  strain.  Heat  and  its  modification 
as  light  and  perhaps  as  electricity  and  magnetism 
play  an  important  role  in  vitality,  which  has  been 
subject  to  much  investigation  by  the  observation  of 
nature  and  artificial  experimentation.  The  vitality 
of  the  plant  is  accelerated  by  heat,  and  becomes 
torpid  when  it  is  insufficient.  Certain  chemical  proc- 
esses, like  that  of  the  production  of  chlorophyll,  are 
dependent  upon  light.  Doubtless  gravity  exerts  a 
direct  influence  upon  the  functions  of  the  plant,  but 
this  influence  has  had  inadequate  examination. 
Stress  and  strain  are  exhibited  as  endosmosis  and 
exosmosis,  exhibited  to  us  in  the  circulation  of  fluids 
through  the  membranes  of  the  cells,  and  is  an 
important  theme  in  the  physiology  of  plants. 

V 

As  the  plant  germinates  the  motions  of  its  par- 
ticles in  change  are  directed  by  the  preexisting  con- 
stitution of  the  germs ;  assimilation,  therefore,  is  a 
directed  motion,  and  as  changes  in  assimilation  and 
growth  proceed  the  continued  motion  of  vitality  is 
controlled  by  antecedent  conditions.  In  this  manner 
the  plant  must  pass  through  the  same  phases  of 
assimilation  and  growth  through  which  the  parent 
proceeded;  thus  conditions  are  imposed  which  con- 
stitute causation;  but  there  are  other  causes  than 
those  inherited,  for  the  germ  may  not  grow  at  all ;  it 
may  not  get  footing  in  the  soil,  it  may  not  find 
sufficient  moisture,  or  the  moisture  may  not  contain 
other  necessary  ingredients.  When  it  starts  the 
frost  may  nip  it,  the  sunlight  may  fail  it  because  of 


72  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

an  overhanging  shade,  herbivorous  animals  may 
devour  it,  man  may  dig  it  up.  All  of  a  multitude 
of  conditions  are  necessary  that  a  plant  may  mature ; 
and  these  causes  may  be  traced  to  the  ultimate  sup- 
ply of  food,  as  effecting  the  assimilation,  to  external 
forms  which  cast  destructive  shadows  or  protect 
from  destruction,  or  they  may  be  traced  to  external 
forces,  so  that  there  are  heredity  conditions  and 
environmental  conditions. 

The  plant  is  thus  subject  to  inexorable  conditions 
by  its  inheritance,  and  these  conditions  restrict  its 
growth  to  the  course  pursued  by  its  ancestors ;  but 
heredity  is  not  the  only  factor  of  causation  involved ; 
the  environmental  factors  may  succeed  in  prevent- 
ing, arresting  or  modifying  the  development  of  the 
plant.  When  the  plant  arrives  at  maturity  and  pro- 
duces other  germs,  they  also  are  subject  to  the  laws 
of  heredity ;  but  the  inheritance  which  they  receive 
has  accumulated  in  the  development  of  the  parent. 
Thus  as  generations  pass  there  is  secular  develop- 
ment. 

VI 

Metabolism  implies  affinity,  and  again  we  have  the 
problem  of  its  nature  in  plants.  It  has  often  been 
surmised,  and  sometimes  taught,  to  be  choice.  It 
seems  to  be  the  same  thing  in  plant  life,  but  there 
are  other  phenomena  which  appear  in  plants  which 
suggest  that  the  ultimate  particles  have  not  only  the 
power  of  choosing  their  atomic  and  molecular  associ- 
ates, but  they  also  seem  to  have  the  power  to  a 
limited  degree  to  choose  the  attitude  of  their  phytons 
toward  external  objects  in  space.  Thus  certain 
phytons  seek  the  soil  where  they  may  perform  the 


GENERATIONS  OR  PROPERTIES  OF  PLANTS  73 

function  of  roots,  and  others  seek  the  air  where  they 
may  perform  various  functions  in  the  plant  life. 
These  subaerial  phytons  seem  to  be  able  to  direct 
their  course  toward  different  objects,  when  they 
require  support,  as  in  the  case  of  climbing  plants, 
and  the  leaves  seem  to  be  able  to  open  or  close  in 
order  to  adjust  themselves  to  conditions  of  light  and 
darkness.  The  investigations  into  these  functions 
of  the  plant  are  numerous  and  interesting,  but  they 
have  been  pursued  mainly  with  the  purpose  to 
account  for  them  as  of  a  mechanical  nature.  Yet 
the  problem  remains :  Have  the  plant  elements  the 
property  of  choice?  If  they  have  such  a  property 
they  must  also  have  consciousness. 

We  find  in  plants  the  same  essentials:  unity, 
extension,  speed,  and  persistence  as  they  are  com- 
pounded into  the  properties  of  number,  space, 
motion,  and  time,  and  as  they  are  further  developed 
as  time,  form,  force,  and  causation ;  we  also  find  the 
fifth  property  of  affinity,  which  now  seems  to  be 
choice  even  more  plainly  than  we  have  found  it  in 
other  bodies. 


CHAPTER  VII 

PRINCIPLES  OR  PROPERTIES  OF  ANIMALS 

We  are  yet  to  consider  a  higher  degree  of  rela- 
tivity than  that  exhibited  in  the  bodies  which  we 
have  heretofore  examined.  This  higher  degree  is 
the  discrete  degree  observed  in  animals.  Plants  have 
assimilation,  which  is  both  constructive  and  differ- 
entiating. In  animals  this  rises  to  a  high  degree 
of  relativity  in  that  assimilation,  both  constructive 
and  differentiating,  is  coincidently  accompanied 
by  destruction  of  the  part  that  is  reconstructed. 
The  plant  assimilates  until  its  growth  is  com- 
plete, except  in  the  higher  plants  in  which  the  leaves 
drop  from  time  to  time  and  are  returned  to  the 
inorganic  world,  and  except  in  the  same  higher 
plants  germs  are  given  off  which  may  be  returned 
to  the  inorganic  world,  or  continue  as  new  plants 
when  new  plants  are  developed,  but  the  trunk  of  the 
plant  remains  while  it  grows,  and  is  returned  to  the 
inorganic  world  only  when  it  dies.  The  animal 
assimilates  and  coincidently  with  this  assimila- 
tion gives  up  a  part  of  its  material  to  the  inorganic 
world.  This  is  what  I  call  metabolism,  which  is 
both  constructive  and  differentiating  of  the  material 
wrought  into  the  structure  of  the  body,  while  at  the 
same  time  a  part  of  the  material  of  this  structure  is 
disintegrated  and  returned  to  the  inorganic  world. 
Thus  the  animal  dies  in  part  that  it  may  live  as  an 
individual,  and  if  it  ceases  to  die  in  part  it  ceases  to 
live,  and  when  it  ceases  to  live  through  death,  it  dies 

74 


PRINCIPLES  OR  PROPERTIES  OF  ANIMALS  75 

altogether  and  returns  to  the  inorganic  world.  In 
other  words  we  may  say  that  in  the  plant  phytons 
are  dropped  and  renewed,  but  in  the  higher  animals, 
organs  which  are  homologous  to  phytons  are  not 
dropped  and  renewed,  with  minor  exceptions, 
although  molecules  of  the  organ  are  discarded  and 
coincidently  new  molecules  take  their  place.  By 
metabolism,  therefore,  we  mean  something  higher 
than  assimilation  by  a  discrete  degree  of  relativity. 

So  the  animal  grows  not  only  by  molecular 
additions  to  its  substance,  through  which  its  size  is  in- 
creased, and  whereby  structural  material  is  added, 
but  the  structure  of  the  animal  itself  is  constantly 
undergoing  a  change.  Throughout  the  whole  ani- 
mal body  a  reconstruction  is  forever  in  progress; 
and  this  continues  even  after  growth  ceases  as  long 
as  life  lasts.  This  is  the  new  principle  of  form,  which 
is  reconstruction. 

Every  particle  of  matter  has  speed,  which  cannot 
be  increased  or  diminished,  but  the  particles  of 
inanimate  matter  seem  mutually  to  direct  one 
another's  paths  except  in  the  case  of  incorporation, 
when  they  seem  to  be  directed  by  affinity,  the  nature 
of  which  is  not  fully  explained.  The  animal  has  a 
new  power  by  which  it  determines  its  own  path  as  a 
body ;  thus  it  can  direct  its  own  course.  The  animal 
is  encompassed  by  an  environment  out  of  which  it 
cannot  pass  but  within  which  it  can  move  as  it 
chooses.  With  some  animals  this  environment  is  the 
atmosphere,  with  others  it  is  the  hydrosphere,  while 
other  animals  are  fixed  to  the  rocky  sphere  and  have 
their  movements  greatly  restricted  in  the  hydro- 
sphere or  the  atmosphere.  Of  those  animals  that  have 
three  degrees  of  freedom  in  the  two  outer  spheres 


76  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

many  are  restricted  by  climatic  conditions.  The 
mode  of  motion  by  which  animate  bodies  are  capable 
of  this  higher  degree  of  motion  I  call  motility, 
which  is  self-directed  molar  motion  or  self-activity. 

As  this  self-directed  molar  motion  appears  in  the 
animal  it  enlarges  its  theater  of  action,  being  able 
to  seek  a  new  theater  in  which  its  self-activity  may 
be  employed.  Thus  the  animal,  no  longer  confined 
by  a  narrow  environment,  is  able  to  invade  a  new 
region  and  exercise  itself  there.  The  animal  can  go 
from  one  environment  to  another  in  search  of  new 
conditions,  changing  the  environment  by  its  activi- 
ties and  taking  advantage  of  the  new  environment 
by  receiving  the  effect  which  the  new  environment 
produces.  It  is  necessary  for  the  plant  to  remain  in  a 
fixed  environment  and  to  act  only  when  it  is  acted 
upon,  but  the  animal  may  seek  an  environment  more 
congenial  and  conducive  to  its  wants,  or  ideals  of 
good ;  thus  it  may  escape  evil  on  the  one  hand  or 
acquire  good  on  the  other.  It  may  choose  its  activi- 
ties. This  I  call  self -activity,  which  is  force  of  a 
higher  degree  of  relativity  than  that  observed  in 
plants  by  a  discrete  degree. 

The  animal,  like  the  plant,  has  heredity,  and  its 
ancestors  are  the  causes  of  its  activity  from  which  it 
cannot  wholly  escape.  Its  self-activity  is  therefore 
only  within  the  compass  of  its  hereditary  activity; 
but  while  it  has  hereditary  activity  it  is  also  subject 
to  environmental  actions,  which  are  also  causes  from 
which  it  cannot  escape.  But  as  it  chooses  its  environ- 
ment within  degrees  of  freedom,  the  environment 
is  not  wholly  inexorable.  Thus  if  food  does  not 
come  to  the  animal  the  animal  may  go  to  the 
food.  When  the  storm  comes  it  may  escape  its 


PRINCIPLES  OR  PROPERTIES  OF  ANIMALS  77 

action  "by  seeking  shelter,  and  in  multitudinous  ways 
it  may  choose  the  activities  in  which  it  was  engaged, 
and  choose  the  actions  of  others  to  which  it  will  sub- 
mit. 

The  lower  forms  of  plants  multiply  by  subdivision, 
but  in  the  higher  plants  they  multiply  by  sexual  con- 
jugation, the  different  sex  organs  being  produced  in 
the  same  plant  or  in  different  plants.  In  these 
higher  plants  the  conjugation  is  adventitious  in  that 
the  pollen  must  be  carried  by  the  wind  or  by  insects 
or  other  agencies  from  the  male  to  the  female  plant. 
But  the  higher  animals  have  the  power  of  choosing 
their  mates,  so  that  the  continuance  in  generations 
is  controlled  by  volition. 

In  plants,  male  and  female  germs,  as  particles, 
conjugate  or  choose  one  another.  In  the  higher 
animals  male  and  female  bodies  conjugate  as  bodies. 
This  conjugation  is  accomplished  by  the  mutual 
choice  of  the  individuals  as  bodies,  and  the  mutual 
choice  of  the  individuals  as  bodies  involves  the  con- 
sciousness of  both,  and  this  consciousness  must  have 
expression,  and  this  expression  is  language.  Hence 
reproduction  in  animals  is  dependent  upon  the 
mutual  choice  of  animals,  which  choice  is  expressed 
in  language  in  some  form  or  other.  Here  we  have 
a  discrete  advance  in  degree  of  relativity  in  repro- 
duction which  we  call  expression. 

In  animals  we  clearly  find  a  fifth  property  which 
we  cannot  ignore,  and  which  ultimately  we  shall  find 
to  be  strangely  like  affinity.  This  property  of  the 
animate  body  permits  it  to  form  judgments  about  the 
nature  of  environments,  and  then  it  may  form  judg- 
ments about  the  good  and  evil  of  these  environments 
in  relation  to  itself.  Judgments  grow  into  concepts 


78  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

as  judgment  is  added  to  judgment  by  experience. 
Thus  a  body  of  judgments  is  formed  concerning 
every  object  in  the  environment  which  grows  by 
increments  of  judgments.  These  concepts,  which 
are  the  creation  of  the  animal,  constitute  the  fifth 
principle  which  we  have  to  consider.  We  have  there- 
fore metabolism,  reconstruction,  motility,  expression 
and  conception  with  which  to  deal  in  the  considera- 
tion of  animal  bodies. 

These  five  principles  exist  in  the  lowest  protozoa 
or  unicellular  animals.  The  evolution  of  animal  life 
is  the  development  of  organs  of  metabolism,  recon- 
struction, motility,  reproduction  and  conception. 

The  five  systems  of  organs  are  concomitant  in  the 
same  animal  body.  They  are  also  concomitant  in 
every  organ  of  the  body,  so  that  when  we  describe 
organs  it  becomes  necessary  to  consider  their  con- 
comitants. An  organ  may  have  the  function  of  one 
concomitant,  but  it  has  the  essentials  of  all  the  con- 
comitants, for  they  cannot  be  dissociated,  as  we  have 
many  times  seen.  A  certain  part  of  the  matter  of 
the  body  is  set  apart  to  perform  a  specialized  office 
for  the  other  parts ;  and  this  specialization  is  accom- 
plished by  assigning  a  function  to  the  essentials  or 
concomitants  severally.  It  is  thus  that  there  are  five 
systems  of  organs;  the  first  for  metabolism,  the 
second  for  reconstruction,  the  third  for  motility, 
the  fourth  for  reproduction,  and  the  fifth  for  con- 
ception. Thus  we  have  the  digestive  apparatus,  the 
circulatory  apparatus,  the  motor  apparatus,  the  gen- 
erative apparatus  and  the  conceiving  or  thinking 
apparatus.  These  apparatuses  are  completely  con- 
comitant with  one  another;  so  that  every  organ  of 
the  body,  whatever  function  it  may  peform,  must 


PRINCIPLES  OR  PROPERTIES  OF  ANIMALS  79 

also  perform  the  other  four  functions  in  an  ancillary 
manner.  When  we  are  considering  an  organ  we 
are  compelled  to  consider  a  dominant  function  with 
four  ancillary  functions;  or  it  may  be  stated  in 
another  way:  an  organ  cannot  act  but  in  a  coopera- 
tive way  with  other  organs.  Thus  while  the  essen- 
tials are  concomitant  in  every  particle  of  matter  they 
are  also  concomitant  in  every  cell,  in  every  organ, 
and  in  every  body.  If  the  expression  may  be  per- 
mitted, nature  reasons  as  men  reason,  abstractly, 
but  is  always  cognizant  that  abstractions  can  be  real- 
ized only  in  the  concrete.  Thus  the  mouth  is  one  of 
the  organs  of  the  digestive  system ;  but  it  also  has 
ancillary  organs  of  circulation,  motility,  reproduction 
and  conception.  The  eye  is  an  organ  of  the  con- 
ceiving apparatus,  but  it  has  ancillary  organs  of 
digestion,  circulation,  motility,  and  probably  of 
reproduction.  The  animal  itself  is  an  organ  in  a 
society  of  animals.  Society  is  the  culmination  of  a 
hierarchy  of  organs  of  lower  grade,  and  every  organ 
in  every  grade  of  the  hierarchy  has  ancillary  organs. 
Without  entering  into  these  subjects  at  length,  we 
must  give  a  description  of  these  organs  and  func- 
tions of  the  animal  with  such  elaboration  only  as  our 
present  purpose  demands. 

II 

Again  in  this  higher  realm  of  relativity  we  are 
forced  to  consider  the  numerical  relations  of  ultimate 
particles  in  a  hierarchy  of  molecules  which  appear  in 
kinds  of  substances.  For  present  purposes  we  may 
not  delay  the  argument  for  the  purpose  of  setting 
forth  the  metabolic  processes  of  digestion  and  excre- 
tion by  which  vegetal  food  is  wrought  into  animal 


80  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

bodies  in  all  the  kinds  of  animate  things ;  we  may 
simply  illustrate  the  facts  necessary  for  this  argument 
as  they  are  derived  from  the  higher  animals.  Diges- 
tion begins  with  mastication  and  a  special  substance 
is  developed  in  the  salivary  glands  to  elaborate  the 
food.  Then  the  food  is  carried  to  the  stomach,  where 
another  special  substance  is  furnished  by  the  liver. 
Finally  the  materials  of  the  food  are  digested,  exclud- 
ing such  indigestible  substances  as  are  taken  into  the 
stomach,  and  the  selected  and  prepared  food  is  the 
blood,  which  bears  a  relation  to  the  animal  analogous 
to  that  which  protoplasm  does  to  the  plant.  Out  of 
the  blood  all  of  the  tissues  are  wrought,  each  in  its 
kind,  and  every  tissue  is  a  kind  of  its  own,  and  there 
are  kinds  of  kinds,  so  that  the  animal  organism  is  a 
chemical  laboratory  engaged  during  the  existence  of 
the  animal  in  building  up  more  complex  substances 
and  tearing  them  down  into  more  specialized  sub- 
stances, and  this  is  metabolism,  or  zoochemistry. 
When  the  animal  dies  decay  supervenes  as  a  chemi- 
cal process.  The  metabolic  organs,  therefore,  are 
the  organs  of  digestion  which  prepare  the  food  for 
the  blood,  the  organs  of  secretion  which  furnish 
material  to  aid  digestion,  and  the  organs  of  excre- 
tion. The  science  of  the  chemistry  of  animate  sub- 
stances is  yet  in  its  infancy  and  the  kinds  appearing 
in  the  animate  realm  are  at  the  present  stage  of 
research  vicariously  represented  by  forms.  We 
must  therefore  consider  them  as  factors  of  morphol- 
ogy. The  blood  is  composed  of  serum,  which  is  the 
vehicle  of  transportation.  In  this  serum  there  float 
erythrocytes  or  red  corpuscles,  which  are  unicellular 
organisms  into  which  much  of  the  food  has  been 
converted  and  which  is  the  material  for  reconstruc- 


PRINCIPLES  OR  PROPERTIES  OF  ANIMALS  8l 

tion.  Thus  the  tissues  of  the  animal  are  reconstructed 
out  of  unicellular  organisms.  In  the  blood  there 
are  also  leucocytes  and  other  unicellular  organisms. 
We  cannot  enter  into  a  discussion  of  the  functions 
which  these  additional  organisms  perform,  but  go  on 
to  remark  that  the  red  corpuscles  are  built  into  the 
tissues  of  the  animal  or  stored  temporarily  in  fatty 
structures  which  are  subsequently  used  in  the  tissues. 
In  so  far  as  these  red  corpuscles  are  incorporated  into 
the  tissues  by  molecular  rearrangement,  and  in  so  far 
as  they  are  decorporated  by  molecular  arrangement, 
we  have  metabolism ;  while  in  so  far  as  this  produces 
a  change  of  form,  reconstruction  is  involved.  Here 
the  rearrangement  of  molecules  by  number  becomes 
structural  arrangement  in  form,  for  in  a  body  kinds 
and  forms  are  concomitant. 

Ill 

The  blood  prepared  by  the  organs  of  metabolism 
is  delivered  to  the  organs  of  reconstruction.  These 
are  the  blood-vessels,  consisting  of  the  heart,  veins, 
arteries,  and  capillaries,  by  which  the  material  is 
transported  and  distributed  to  the  parts  where  recon- 
struction is  carried  on.  Thus  there  is  a  system  of 
organs  for  reconstruction. 

That  which  we  found  in  the  geonomic  realm  as 
spheres  and  in  the  phytomic  realm  as  blasts,  we  here 
find  in  the  zoonomic  realm  as  derms,  and  we  have  the 
ectoderm,  esoderm,  and  endoderm  as  encapsulating 
bodies,  with  a  concentric  nucleus.  These  cells 
are  modified  as  they  are  combined  into  larger  cells, 
but  the  cellular  structure  is  still  preserved  in  organ 
and  individual.  The  metabolic  organs  or  those  of 
digestion,  secretion  and  excretion  are  compound 


82  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

nuclei  inclosed  in  cellular  sacs ;  sometimes  these  sacs 
are  greatly  elongated  so  as  to  be  tubular,  but  in 
general  the  organs  of  digestion  and  excretion  have 
a  cellular  form  with  permanent  compound  nuclei  or 
with  passing  nuclei  when  they  are  conduits  to  con- 
tents. 

In  the  circulatory  system  of  organs  the  same  der- 
mal structure  is  observed  with  its  triune  elements. 
In  the  heart  there  is  a  compound  nucleus,  but  in  the 
artery  or  vein  the  nucleus  is  passing  content,  and  in 
the  higher  animals  there  is  a  vast  system  of  ramify- 
ing tubes,  which  are  duplicated  as  arteries  and  veins 
directly  connected  in  the  heart,  and  functionally 
connected  with  the  capillaries. 

In  the  activital  or  muscular  system  every  organ  is 
a  fascicle  of  muscles,  and  each  member  of  the  fasci- 
cle has  a  dermal  structure.  The  nucleus  of  the 
heart  is  a  compound  muscular  organ  of  this  charac- 
ter, whose  function  is  to  impel  the  blood;  muscular 
tissue  undergoes  important  metamorphoses,  becom- 
ing tendonous  and  osseous  for  a  variety  of  mechani- 
cal purposes.  Tendons  are  dermal  in  structure, 
and  bones  are  sacs  enclosing  nuclei  of  osseous 
tissue. 

It  was  in  the  bony  structure  that  homologies  of 
form  were  first  discovered,  and  the  homologies  of 
the  vertebrate  skeleton  was  at  one  time  the  sole  theme 
of  morphology.  Of  especial  interest  were  the  trans- 
formations that  were  discovered  in  the  vertebrae  in 
the  development  of  limbs  and  cranium ;  but  the  sub- 
ject of  morphology  has  passed  out  of  this  stage  into 
a  wider  field  embracing  all  realms  of  nature.  Only 
of  late  has  it  appeared  in  the  morphology  of  forma- 
tions and  land  features. 


PRINCIPLES  OR  PROPERTIES  OF  ANIMALS  83 

The  reproductive  cells  are  compounded  into  organs 
still  preserving  the  typical  structure. 

It  is  in  the  organs  of  sense  that  the  most  mar- 
velous changes  of  form  are  discovered.  The  metabolic 
sense  organs  are  thrown  into  two  not  thoroughly 
differentiated  groups  known  as  the  sense  of  taste  and 
smell ;  but  these  groups  seem  to  be  continuous,  that 
is,  without  a  well-marked  plane  of  separation;  the 
one  group,  that  of  taste,  taking  cognizance  of  liquids, 
the  other,  that  of  smell,  taking  cognizance  of  vapors. 
The  organs  of  touch  are  distributed  throughout  the 
skin;  these  are  primarily  the  sense  organs  of  form. 
The  sense  of  stress  or  pressure  seems  to  be  in  or 
immediately  under  the  skin ;  the  sense  of  duration 
or  time  is  the  sense  of  hearing,  and  the  sense  of 
ideation  is  the  sense  of  seeing.  The  homologies  of 
mouth  and  nose,  skin,  muscle,  ear  and  eye,  are  yet 
imperfectly  known ;  though  much  research  has  been 
bestowed  upon  them  they  are  difficult  to  under- 
stand. Thus  there  are  homologies  of  form  in  all  the 
hierarchy  of  organs,  for  they  all  have  the  dermal 
structure. 

IV 

There  are  five  modes  of  motility  called  functions ; 
these  are  the  functions  of  the  metabolic,  circulatory, 
muscular,  reproductive  and  reasoning  organs,  as 
heretofore  set  forth.  Metabolism  continues  as  long 
as  animate  life  continues,  but  is  increased  when  the 
special  function  of  the  organ  is  stimulated ;  that  is, 
both  anabolism  and  catabolism  increase  in  the  organ 
by  increase  of  its  special  function,  but  metabolism 
wanes  as  special  function  wanes. 

The  reasoning  function  may  increase  or  retard  the 


84  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

other  functions,  though  it  cannot  wholly  inhibit  their 
action  nor  can  it  increase  their  action  beyond  certain 
limits.  This  fact  is  well  known  to  psychologists  and 
physiologists.  It  seems  to  be  accomplished  by  the 
promotion  of  metabolism. 

Here  we  are  confronted  with  a  problem  met  before 
concerning  the  nature  of  affinity  which  we  have  not 
been  able  to  solve.  If  it  were  permitted  to  hold  the 
doctrine  which  has  been  entertained  by  some  great 
minds  that  every  particle  of  matter  has  judgment, 
the  question  would  be  solved  and  affinity  would  be 
conscious  choice.  Affinity  is  often  expressed  as 
choice  and  many  chemists  have  held  this  doctrine. 

Next  we  have  to  consider  how  molar  motion  in 
the  individual  is  self -directed.  We  have  seen  that 
molar  motion  is  accomplished  by  compound  organs. 
These  organs  are  found  in  pairs,  so  that  one  acts 
against  the  other.  We  have  seen,  too,  that  the 
mind  can  accelerate  metabolism  and  the  mind  can 
direct  the  motion  of  the  animal.  Now  let  us  sup- 
pose that  the  mind  can  accelerate  anabolism  in  one 
muscle  and  catabolism  in  its  opposing  muscle,  and 
we  have  a  very  simple  explanation  of  the  nature  of 
the  self -direction  of  muscular  energy — the  nature  of 
the  mechanism  by  which  the  animal  may  walk  to 
the  east  or  west  at  will.  That  muscles  are  in  pairs 
is  an  anatomical  fact,  and  that  the  one  contracts  while 
the  other  relaxes  is  a  physiological  fact,  and  that 
the  mind  somehow  controls  this  muscular  activity  at 
will  is  a  psychologic  fact,  and  the  whole  thing  is 
rendered  simple  and  clear  by  the  doctrine  that 
anabolism  in  one  muscle  and  catabolism  in  its 
opponent  are  each  under  the  control  of  mind.  But 
the  mind  of  the  cortex  does  not  consciously  choose 


PRINCIPLES  OR  PROPERTIES  OF  ANIMALS  85 

the  association  of  the  several  particles  involved  in 
metabolism.  The  affinity  which  is  involved  in 
metabolism  must  be  the  choice  of  the  particles 
themselves,  in  obedience  to  commands  issued  by  the 
organism  of  unicellular  particles  of  which  the  body 
is  composed,  these  ultimately  acting  in  obedience  to 
the  command  of  the  cortical  consciousness.  Metab- 
olism is  controlled  by  the  central  mind  in  some 
manner  or  other.  Believing  this  we  must  infer  that 
the  particles  of  the  muscles  are  conscious  as  units  in 
a  hierarchy  of  organs  which  at  the  other  pole  is  the 
cortical  consciousness.  Here  we  first  reach  the 
facts  the  explanation  of  which  seems  to  require 
the  hypothesis  that  consciousness  primarily  inheres 
in  the  ultimate  particle.  If  this  hypothesis  is 
accepted,  we  have  the  fundamental  doctrine  of 
psychology. 

Science  has  demonstrated  that  motion  cannot  be 
created  or  destroyed.  Mind,  therefore,  cannot 
create  motion  but  only  direct  it.  Mind  directs  the 
motion  of  the  body  by  directing  the  motion  of  the 
organs  of  locomotion,  and  these  are  directed  by  the 
device  of  opposing  muscles — the  one  being  contracted 
and  the  other  relaxed.  So  the  choice  of  the  animal 
is  delegated  to  the  choice  of  the  organ,  and  the  choice 
of  the  organ  is  delegated  to  the  choice  of  the  mus- 
cles. The  muscles,  therefore,  must  have  the  power 
of  choice,  which  it  also  delegates  to  molecules. 
Therefore  the  molecules  must  have  choice.  We 
know  that  every  unicellular  organism  of  the  blood  is 
an  independent  animate  being,  with  consciousness 
and  choice.  These  independent  animate  beings  are 
incorporated  in  the  tissues  of  the  animal  having 
self-activity.  We  must  therefore  suppose  that  they 


86  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

retain  their  choice  and  consciousness,  and  the  same 
choice  seems  to  be  exercised  by  every  particle  of 
the  molecule ;  if  so,  animate  existence  as  conscious- 
ness and  choice  is  universal  in  every  particle  of 
matter. 

The  human  body  is  a  hierarchy  of  conscious  bodies. 
In  this  hierarchy  the  lower  members  are  controlled 
by  the  higher  members.  The  lowest  members  are 
ultimate  particles  and  the  highest  member  is  the 
cortical  body.  Now  the  cortical  body  controls  all 
the  others  in  the  hierarchy  and  it  ought  to  receive 
intelligence  from  all  the  others,  for  the  conscious- 
ness of  the  particle  is  transmitted  to  the  cortex,  and 
the  will  of  the  cortex  is  transmitted  to  the  cortical 
body,  but  only  those  which  require  regulation  by  it. 
Not  all  of  the  judgments  of  the  cortical  body,  but  only 
those  of  the  particles  which  need  regulation  in  a 
particular  part,  are  transmitted  to  special  particles. 
The  government  of  the  human  body  in  all  its 
hierarchy  of  bodies  is  strictly  analogous  to  the  gov- 
ernment of  a  nation  where  the  governing  body  of 
the  nation  is  not  cognizant  of  all  which  the  individ- 
uals do,  but  it  receives  intelligence  about  the  way 
they  do  in  respect  to  those  things  which  it  attempts 
to  control  and  it  controls  the  individual  only  in  those 
actions  which  are  necessary  to  the  welfare  of  the 
body  politic.  Thus  the  cognition  and  volition  of  the 
controlling  body  is  but  partial.  There  is  local  con- 
sciousness and  local  self-government.  We  will  find 
some  confirmation  of  this  doctrine  as  we  proceed, 
but  its  final  elaboration  will  be  more  fully  made  in  a 
subsequent  work.  Stated  in  our  own  terms,  this 
is  the  doctrine  of  modern  scientific  physiology  and 
psychology. 


PRINCIPLES  OR  PROPERTIES  OF  ANIMALS  87 

V 

As  in  the  geonomic  realm  so  here  in  the  animate 
realm  there  are  processes.  As  in  the  phytonic  realm 
so  in  this  there  are  generations;  now  causation 
appears  under  a  new  aspect  as  development.  The 
animal  is  composed  of  organs  and  these  organs 
develop  as  they  are  exercised  under  the  stimulus  of 
mind,  for  while  they  are  cooperative  one  part  of  a 
system  may  be  developed  at  the  expense  of  another, 
so  that  one  organ  in  a  congeries  of  organs  may  have 
great  development  while  another  organ  in  the  same 
congeries  may  be  neglected  and  ultimately  in  a  series 
of  generations  may  become  atrophied.  There  is  a 
law  which  finds  its  chief  expression  in  this  realm 
where  one  organ  of  the  same  system  may  be 
developed,  while  another  may  be  atrophied.  This 
may  be  stated  as  follows :  progress  in  unification  in 
organs  of  the  same  function  is  progress  in  rank. 
There  is  another  law,  the  correlative  of  this ;  it  is  that 
the  differentiation  of  functions  with  distinct  organs 
is  progress  in  rank. 

The  mechanical  causes  of  force,  form,  and  kind 
are  conditions  that  are  genetic,  while  the  conditions 
of  conception  are  teleologic.  The  teleologic  condi- 
tions are  concomitant  with  the  genetic  conditions. 

VI 

It  seems  probable  that  every  particle  of  matter  has 
consciousness  and  choice;  certain  it  is  that  every 
particle  of  animate  matter  has  these  properties.  In 
the  animal  body  all  of  the  particles  cooperate  and 
for  this  purpose  a  special  nervous  system  is  provided. 
In  this  system  there  is  a  congeries  of  cells,  whose 


88  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

function  is  conception,  connected  by  another  con- 
geries whose  function  is  association.  The  conceiv- 
ing cells  are  ganglia,  the  associating  cells  are 
medullary  or  fibrous.  A  group  of  such  gray  cells  is 
connected  with  other  groups  by  white  fibers,  and 
finally  all  of  the  ganglia  are  connected  with  all  other 
animate  cells  of  the  individual  by  fibers.  Thus  the 
nervous  system  is  a  congeries  of  ganglionic  organs, 
connected  with  and  presiding  over  the  other  systems 
of  organs.  The  fibers  are  connecting  lines  between 
the  outer  systems  of  organs  and  the  special  ganglia 
of  the  organs.  These  ganglia  are  grouped  in  the 
hierarchy  of  nervous  organs  by  intervening  fibrous 
nerves  until  they  reach  the  master  ganglion  of  the 
brain,  which  is  the  cortex.  There  is  a  peculiarity 
of  the  nervous  system  in  the  relation  between  the 
cells  of  the  ganglia  and  the  fibers  of  the  connecting 
nerves,  in  that  the  fascicles  of  fibers  are  not  struc- 
turally continuous  with  the  ganglionic  cells.  Thus 
when  a  feeling  starts  in  the  end  organ  and  is  pro- 
duced by  its  activity,  it  is  carried  along  the  fibers 
through  the  hierarchy  of  ganglia  to  the  central 
cortex;  the  intervening  ganglia  may  continue  its 
transmission  to  the  cortex  or,  as  it  seems,  may  inhibit 
it;  or  when,  as  in  a  dream,  the  system  is  relaxed,  the 
impulse  may  go  astray  among  the  cells  of  a  ganglion, 
and  may  be  transmitted  by  unwonted  fibers  to  the 
cortex  at  some  incongruous  point,  for  the  cells  of  the 
ganglion  constitute  a  shunting  or  directive  apparatus 
by  which  impulses  from  one  region  are  directed  to 
others  throughout  the  system.  Now  all  of  the  met- 
abolic, circulatory,  motor,  and  reproductive  organs 
are  themselves  organs  for  the  initiation  of  impulses 
to  the  nervous  system,  and  the  ganglia  of  this  nervous 


PRINCIPLES  OR  PROPERTIES  OF  ANIMALS  89 

system,  especially  the  cortex,  are  organs  for  the 
initiation  of  impulses  that  are  conducted  by  the 
fibrous  nerves  to  the  metabolic,  circulatory,  motor, 
and  reproductive  organs.  A  ganglion  seems  to  have 
the  power  to  distribute  these  impulses  to  such  point 
in  the  peripheral  organs  as  they  may  select,  but  the 
central  ganglion  or  cortex  cannot  directly  reach  the 
peripheral  organ,  but  only  through  the  intermediate 
ganglia  in  the  hierarchy.  An  impulse  emanating  in 
the  cortex  is  delivered  to  its  nearest  ganglion  in  the 
line  in  which  it  should  go;  this  ganglion  in  turn 
directs  it  to  another  or  to  any  group  of  end  organs. 
Thus  all  of  the  systems  of  congeries  of  organs  of 
which  the  body  is  composed  are'  put  in  relation  to 
the  cortex.  An  impulse  which  originates  in  any 
organ  of  the  complex  system  when  transmitted  to  a 
ganglion  I  call  a  feeling  impression. 

Having  seen  the  nature  of  the  apparatus  by  which 
the  other  organs  are  put  into  communication  with 
the  ganglionic  organs,  and  finally  with  the  cortex 
through  feeling  impressions,  it  becomes  necessary  to 
exhibit  the  apparatus  of  the  nervous  organism  which 
exists  to  connect  the  cortex  and  subordinate  gan- 
glia with  the  world  external  to  the  periphery  of 
the  body. 

This  apparatus  consists  in  the  sense  organs  and 
the  fibrous  nerves  by  which  they  are  connected  with 
the  cortex.  For  the  sense  of  taste  and  smell,  which 
are  metabolic,  we  have  two  organs  that  are  not  very 
well  differentiated  in  structure,  nor  are  they  well 
differentiated  in  function,  although  they  seem  to  be 
more  thoroughly  differentiated  by  the  nature  of  the 
stimuli;  for  taste  the  object  must  be  reduced  to  the 
fluid  state,  and  for  smell  it  must  be  reduced  to  the 


90  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

vapor  state.  Both  of  these  organs  have  their  nervous 
bodies  connected  by  fibers  with  the  central  ganglia. 
The  mouth  and  the  nose  are  simple  organs  for  the  ac- 
cumulation of  sense  stimuli,  single  in  the  one  case  and 
partially  double  in  the  other,  but  the  nervous 
organs  to  which  they  lead  and  which  they  unify  are 
many. 

In  the  skin-covering  of  the  body  there  are  many 
tactual  organs,  which  are  unified  through  the  con- 
tinuity of  the  skin  itself,  yet  they  seem  to  be  dispa- 
rate not  only  in  organ  but  in  function.  They  are 
also  connected  with  the  cortex,  but  through  ancil- 
lary ganglia,  which  are  themselves  ancillary  brains. 
Touch  is  the  primary  organ  of  form. 

There  also  seem  to  be  organs  of  pressure  either 
in  the  skin  or  immediately  beneath  it,  though  they 
have  not  been  clearly  made  out.  The  fibers  of  the 
muscles  themselves  may  be  the  end  organs  of 
the  motor  system,  and  it  may  be  that  nerve  fibers 
everywhere  accompany  muscular  fibers.  Thus  we 
know  that  the  motor  system  is  connected  usually 
through  ancillary  ganglia  with  the  cortex.  The  end 
organs  of  this  system,  be  they  the  muscles  themselves 
or  specialized  parts  of  them,  are  the  organs  for  con- 
veying to  the  cortex  impressions  of  muscular  force. 

For  the  sense  of  hearing  there  are  two  organs  for 
gathering  the  impulses  which  are  propagated  through 
the  atmosphere,  but  in  each  there  are  many  nerve 
organs.  They  are  also  connected  with  the  cortex  by 
their  fibers.  The  semicircular  canals  seem  in  man 
to  convey  only  feelings,  but  in  aquatic  animals  it  is 
probable  that  they  are  true  sense  organs,  and  convey 
sense  impressions  brought  to  them  through  the 
medium  of  the  water.  The  ear  is  the  primordial  or 


PRINCIPLES  OR  PROPERTIES  OF  ANIMALS  QI 

fundamental  sense  by  which  time  is  conveyed  to 
the  cortex. 

The  eye  is  the  organ  for  conveying  sense  impres- 
sions that  are  received  from  objects  at  a  distance 
through  the  medium  of  the  ether.  Primarily  or 
fundamentally  it  is  the  organ  by  which  the  conscious 
movements  of  other  bodies  are  conveyed  to  the  cor- 
tex. 

In  man  and  probably  in  many  of  the  lower  animals 
all  of  these  senses  are  highly  vicarious.  This  is  pre- 
eminently the  case  with  the  eye.  This  organ,  by 
reason  of  its  self-activity,  is  peculiarly  adapted  to  a 
great  variety  of  vicarious  functions,  for  it  can  adjust 
itself  to  direction  through  its  muscles  or  by  accommo- 
dation to  distances  and  degrees  of  light.  The  faculty 
by  which  the  eye  moves  and  accommodates  itself, 
together  with  the  rapid  vibration  of  ether  particles, 
renders  it  possible  to  receive  many  sense  impressions 
which  come  to  it  with  a  speed  which  is  for  all  prac- 
tical purposes  instantaneous.  For  these  reasons  and 
for  others  that  hereafter  will  be  set  forth,  the  eye  is 
a  universal  organ  of  sense  impression. 

The  ear  also  is  highly  adapted  to  vicarious  func- 
tions, the  air  being  the  medium  whose  vibrations  are 
rapid,  though  to  a  less  degree  than  those  of  the  ether. 
In  the  early  history  of  mankind,  when  language  was 
chiefly  oral  speech,  the  ear  was  rapidly  developed  in 
vicarious  functions,  especially  in  the  function  of  con- 
veying the  properties  of  mind  observed  in  other 
human  beings,  for  by  this  organ  men  learn  that  other 
human  beings  have  ideas  and  emotions  like  their  own. 

The  motor  sense  also  seems  capable  of  becoming 
highly  vicarious,  for  those  persons  who  are  deprived 
of  sight  and  hearing  can  yet  through  the  aid  of  this 


92  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

sense  obtain  a  knowledge  of  the  world  which  they 
can  neither  see  nor  hear;  and  what  is  more  wonder- 
ful still,  they  can  yet  gain  a  knowledge  of  the  ideas 
and  emotions  of  their  fellow  men.  The  other  senses 
in  a  still  lower  degree  are  vicarious. 

It  will  be  seen  that  I  do  not  consider  the  tempera- 
ture feeling  to  be  a  sense  or  to  have  sense  organs. 
The  temperature  feeling  seems  to  be  the  feeling  of 
the  functions  of  the  circulatory  system  in  degrees 
when  it  partially  congeals  the  blood,  or  increases  its 
fluidity,  and  is  a  feeling  like  that  of  a  burn  when  it 
injures  the  skin.  The  distinction  which  is  made 
between  a  feeling  impression  and  sense  impression 
is  fundamental,  and  must  be  considered  when  here- 
after the  nature  of  cognition  is  discussed. 

VII 

Essentials  are  comprehended  in  the  same  particle, 
and  are  thus  concomitant,  and  related  in  different 
particles,  and  are  thus  correlative.  As  particle  is 
related  to  particle,  so  unit  is  related  to  unit,  extension 
to  extension,  speed  to  speed,  and  persistence  to  per- 
sistence. Now  we  have  discovered  another  property 
in  bodies,  which  we  have  found  in  inanimate  bodies 
as  affinity  or  choice,  and  in  animate  bodies  as  con- 
sciousness and  choice.  There  can  be  no  choice  with- 
out consciousness.  Consciousness  is  to  choice  what 
unity  is  to  plurality,  what  extension  is  to  position, 
what  speed  is  to  path,  and  what  persistence  is  to 
change ;  that  is,  consciousness  is  the  absolute,  choice 
is  the  relative. 

Thus  for  every  absolute  we  find  a  relative;  for 
every  constant  a  variable.  Unity  as  an  absolute  has 
plurality  for  its  relative;  extension  as  an  absolute 


PRINCIPLES  OR  PROPERTIES  OF  ANIMALS  93 

has  position  for  its  relative ;  speed  as  an  absolute  has 
path  as  its  relative ;  persistence  as  an  absolute  has 
change  for  its  relative,  and  consciousness  as  an  abso- 
lute has  choice  for  its  relative. 

Unity  and  plurality  constitute  number,  the  unity 
being  absolute  and  constant,  while  plurality  is 
related  and  variable;  this  is  the  fundamental  defi- 
nition of  number. 

Space  is  composed  of  extension  and  position,  the 
extension  being  absolute  and  constant,  the  position 
relative  and  variable.  This  is  the  fundamental 
definition  of  space. 

Motion  is  speed  and  path,  the  speed  being  absolute 
and  constant,  the  change  relative  and  variable ;  this 
is  the  fundamental  definition  of  motion. 

Time  is  persistence  and  change,  the  persistence 
being  absolute  and  constant,  the  change  relative  and 
variable ;  this  is  the  fundamental  definition  of  time. 

Judgment  is  consciousness  and  choice,  the  con- 
sciousness being  absolute  and  the  choice  relative; 
this  is  the  fundamental  definition  of  judgment. 

Let  us  further  consider  these  properties  to  bring 
out  another  phase  of  the  subject.  Unity  is  the  sub- 
strate, foundation,  ground  or  condition  of  plurality, 
for  without  units  there  can  be  no  pluralities.  Unity, 
therefore,  is  independent  of  plurality,  but  plurality 
is  dependent  on  unity.  There  are  many  particles 
that  have  extension  or  space  occupancy ;  thus  there 
are  many  positions.  Extension  is  the  substrate, 
foundation  or  ground  of  position,  for  the  several 
positions  depend  on  the  several  units  having  exten- 
sions that  exclude  one  another  in  the  occupancy  of 
space.  Speed  is  the  substrate,  foundation,  or  ground 
of  path,  for  every  speed  produces  a  path,  or  in  other 


94  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

terms,  every  path  is  dependent  on  a  speed.  Every 
unit  having  extension  and  speed  has  persistent 
duration ;  but  as  these  units  change  in  position  and 
also  change  in  trajectory,  they  could  not  change  if 
there  were  not  something  that  persisted  through 
change.  Persistence,  therefore,  is  the  substrate, 
foundation  or  ground  of  change.  Consciousness  is 
the  substrate  or  ground  of  choice,  for  if  there  is 
no  consciousness  there  can  be  no  choice.  Thus 
it  is  that  in  every  one  of  the  properties  there  is  a 
substrate  or  a  support  and  that  which  is  supported, 
or,  in  other  terms,  a  ground  and  that  which  is 
grounded,  or  in  still  other  terms,  a  foundation  and 
that  which  is  founded,  and  finally  an  independent 
and  a  dependent.  This  is  but  another  way  of  say- 
ing that  in  every  one  of  the  properties  there  is  a  sub- 
strate and  a  dependent.  The  substrates  are  unity, 
dimension,  speed,  persistence  and  consciousness ;  the 
dependents  are  plurality,  position,  path,  change,  and 
choice. 

It  will  be  seen  that  we  can  call  a  particle  a  unit  or 
we  may  call  it  an  extension,  or  a  speed,  or  a  persist- 
ence, or  a  consciousness,  and  these  several  names 
refer  to  the  same  particle  because  it  has  the  five  con- 
comitant essentials. 

In  the  foregoing  presentation  the  nature  of  the 
properties  has  been  deduced  from  knowledge,  with 
which  every  intelligent  person  is  possessed,  and 
which  rests  upon  the  experience  of  the  race.  No 
recondite  induction  or  deduction  has  been  necessary, 
but  only  the  statement  of  known  facts  in  proper 
sequence  has  been  required  to  understand  the  nature 
of  the  five  properties,  except  in  the  case  of  judgment, 
which  is  made  analogous  by  hypothesis. 


PRINCIPLES  OR  PROPERTIES  OF  ANIMALS  95 

This  is  the  result  at  which  we  have  arrived  in  the 
foregoing  discussion. 

One  particle  by  itself  has  unity,  extension,  motion, 
persistence,  and  if  animate,  judgment;  but  by  reason 
of  others  it  has  plurality,  position,  path,  change  and 
choice.  What  it  has  by  itself  we  call  its  essential 
concomitants;  what  it  has  by  reason  of  others  we  call 
its  relations.  Concomitants  with  relations  we  call 
properties,  and  as  the  essentials  are  concomitant  the 
properties  are  concomitant;  hence  the  number  can- 
not be  absorbed  by  one,  the  space  by  a  second,  the 
motion  by  a  third,  the  time  by  a  fourth,  and  the 
judgment  by  a  fifth.  Properties,  then,  are  concom- 
itant and  relational. 

The  theory  of  hylozoism,  which  I  have  presented 
in  this  chapter,  is  very  old,  and  has  had  many  illus- 
trious champions.  When  alchemy  was  developed 
into  chemistry  a  great  impetus  was  given  to  it.  The 
discovery  by  Darwin  and  the  masterly  advocacy  of 
evolution  by  Spencer,  through  which  the  doctrine  of 
the  survival  of  the  fittest  was  established,  for  a  time 
gave  a  decided  check  to  the  theory.  The  blow 
struck  by  Spencer  was  especially  efficient,  for  Spencer 
resolved  all  of  the  properties  into  force  with  a  clear- 
ness which  left  no  room  to  doubt  his  meaning. 

A  host  of  scientific  men  following  Darwin  and 
accepting  the  doctrine  of  the  survival  of  the  fittest 
have  found  it  to  be  inadequate  as  a  single  theory  of 
evolution.  There  are  other  laws,  especially  one 
expounded  by  Lamarck.  I  myself  have  set  forth  a 
new  doctrine  of  evolution  as  that  of  culture,  and  in  a 
subsequent  chapter  of  this  work  I  shall  set  forth  the 
doctrine  of  evolution  in  which  I  shall  attempt  to 
prove  that  the  fundamental  law  of  evolution  is  the 


96  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

law  of  affinity  by  which  bodies  are  incorporated, 
and  hence  that  evolution  is  primarily  telic. 

In  the  five  fundamental  realms  of  nature,  ethereal 
particles  are  numerically  related  and  numbers  are 
organized.  Stellar  particles  are  related  in  numbers 
and  forms,  and  forms  are  organized.  In  geonomic 
bodies  forces  as  well  as  forms  and  kinds  are  organ- 
ized. In  plants  causations  are  organized  as  genera- 
tions as  well  as  forces  and  forms  and  kinds.  In 
animals  concepts  are  organized  as  well  as  causations, 
forces,  forms  and  kinds.  In  every  one  of  these  sys- 
tems there  is  a  special  differentiation  and  integration 
of  organs ;  so  the  entire  body  is  organized  in  a  hier- 
archy of  organs.  This  may  be  stated  in  another  way. 
In  ethereal  bodies,  which  are  probably  ultimate  par- 
ticles themselves,  numbers  are  organized.  In  the 
stars  numbers  and  spaces  are  organized.  In  the 
geonomic  bodies  numbers,  spaces,  and  motions  are 
organized.  In  plants  numbers,  spaces,  motions  and 
times  are  organized.  In  animals  numbers,  spaces, 
motions,  times,  and  judgments  are  organized.  Or 
again,  it  may  be  stated  in  another  way.  In  ethereal 
bodies  units  are  organized.  In  stellar  bodies  units 
and  extensions  are  organized.  In  geonomic  bodies 
units,  extensions  and  speeds  are  organized.  In 
plants  units,  extensions,  speeds  and  persistences  are 
organized.  In  animals  units,  extensions,  speeds, 
persistences  and  the  consciousness  of  many  particles 
are  organized.  While  every  particle  in  the  universe 
has  consciousness  and  choice  and  hence  judgment, 
it  is  only  in  animals  that  we  find  judgments 
organized  as  concepts.  Only  animals  have  reason. 

The  various  doctrines  of  hylozoism  heretofore 
presented  in  the  history  of  philosophy,  conscious- 


PRINCIPLES  OR  PROPERTIES  OF  ANIMALS  97 

ness  and  reason  have  been  confounded.  The  terms 
mind  and  reason  are  nearly  synonymous.  Reason- 
ing is  a  process,  as  we  shall  hereafter  show,  and  mind 
is  that  which  reasons.  Thus  these  two  terms  refer 
to  the  same  thing,  the  one  when  it  is  considered  as 
a  process  of  an  organism,  the  other  considering  it 
as  an  organism.  Reason  is  a  function  of  animal 
organism.  Every  particle  has  consciousness,  only 
animals  have  reason. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

QUALITIES 

There  is  another  class  of  relations  which  here 
require  careful  consideration.  They  will  be  called 
qualities.  Sometimes  the  words  property  and  quality 
have  been  considered  synonymous,  while  the  words 
quality  and  class  or  category  are  often  used  as  syn- 
onyms. Perhaps  the  distinction  now  made  between 
properties  and  qualities  has  never  been  set  forth. 
I  think  that  the  foregoing  chapters  will  have  made 
clear  to  the  reader  the  sense  in  which  the*  term  prop- 
erty has  been  used.  These  properties  in  the  five 
realms  of  nature,  namely,  the  ether,  the  stars,  the 
rocks,  the  plants,  and  the  animals,  all  subserve 
human  ends  or  purposes,  which  may  be  considered 
as  good  or  evil.  In  this  manner  qualities  arise,  while 
terms  denoting  these  qualities  are  found  in  all 
languages.  These  quality  terms  have  the  charac- 
teristic of  being  more  or  less  vague,  in  that  they  may 
instantly  change  with  the  point  of  view.  Some 
illustrations  will  be  given  to  make  this  distinction 
plain.  Number  is  a  property.  Here  are  five  apples 
and  the  number  cannot  be  changed  without  adding 
or  substracting  therefrom,  but  the  five  apples  may 
be  few  or  many  by  a  change  in  the  point  of  view. 
Five  apples  in  a  tray  at  a  dinner  board  where  twelve 
persons  are  sitting  are  few,  but  upon  the  plate  of  one 
of  the  guests  are  many.  Thus  it  is  that  a  number 
may  become  few  or  many  by  some  circumstance  or 

purpose  in  view.     Few  are  thus  qualities,  while  five 

98 


QUALITIES  99 

is  a  property.  A  barrel  of  apples  on  a  table  would 
be  many  or  very  many ;  in  the  cellar  plenty ;  in  the 
warehouse  when  the  steamer  is  seeking  a  cargo  it 
would  be  few,  and  the  merchant  would  not  be  con- 
sidered untruthful  if  by  a  figure  of  speech  he  affirmed 
that  he  had  none. 

Again,  extension  and  form  are  properties,  but  they 
may  easily  become  qualities  where  there  is  some 
purpose  in  view.  A  pin  may  be  large  or  small  in 
relation  to  the  hole  which  it  is  to  fill  in  the  timbers 
of  a  house ;  the  same  pin  may  be  too  large  for  one 
purpose  and  too  small  for  another.  The  watchmaker 
uses  a  pin  so  small  that  it  can  be  seen  only  with 
care,  and  yet  it  may  be  large  or  too  large  for  the 
purpose  intended.  A  hill  in  the  Park  Mountains 
would  be  called  a  mountain  in  the  Catskills,  and 
a  mountain  in  the  Park  would  be  called  a  hill  in  the 
Himalayas.  Thus  properties  are  transformed  into 
qualities  by  ideal  circumstances. 

The  railway  train  is  fast  to  the  man  who  is  driving 
an  ox-team,  but  the  train  is  slow  to  the  mother  who 
is  on  her  way  to  the  death-bed  of  her  child.  An  old 
man  may  say  at  one  moment  that  the  day  is  long, 
and  in  the  next  that  life  is  short.  To  the  laborer 
who  is  bent  on  his  task  the  hum  of  the  machinery  is 
scarcely  heard,  but  on  his  couch  at  night  the  tick  of 
his  clock  is  loud.  The  razor  is  beautiful  and  good 
in  the  hand  of  the  skilful  barber,  but  it  is  ugly  and 
dangerous  in  the  hands  of  an  assassin ;  thus  proper- 
ties are  transmuted  into  qualities  by  human  ideas. 
Red  is  beautiful  in  the  rose,  ugly  in  the  spot  of 
blood  on  the  floor.  The  sheen  of  sable  in  the  ousel 
is  beautiful,  but  the  sheen  of  sable  on  the  carrion- 
loving  buzzard  is  ugly.  If  all  serpents  were  harm- 


IOO  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

less,  gentle  and  intelligent,  their  lithe  forms  and 
gliding  motions  would  be  beautiful.  If  robins  were 
poisonous  their  red  breasts  would  be  symbols  of 
horror.  If  the  red  lightning  and  the  crimson  cloud 
could  change  relations  to  men's  ideas  of  good  and 
evil,  the  one  as  the  harbinger  of  summer  rain  and 
the  other  as  a  visit  of  death,  the  lightning  would  be 
a  thing  of  beauty  and  the  cloud  a  terror. 

The  coming  of  the  rain  may  be  welcomed  by  the 
husbandman  who  has  planted  his  field  of  corn;  it 
may  be  unwelcome  to  the  belated  traveler.  Time  is 
long  and  weary  to  the  invalid  on  the  couch  of  pain ; 
time  is  short  and  joyous  to  the  child  in  the  park. 

It  is  thus  that  properties  become  qualities  through 
our  ideals,  through  the  purposes  which  we  have  in 
view.  There  is  no  difficulty  in  distinguishing 
between  qualities  and  properties  as  they  have  here 
been  defined.  Properties  are  not  qualities  and  quali- 
ties are  not  properties,  but  qualities  are  founded 
upon  properties.  Properties  are  qualities  when  they 
are  considered  teleologically.  It  is  right,  therefore, 
to  say  that  properties  are  real  in  the  sense  that  they 
are  grounded  on  matter  and  that  qualities  are  ideal 
in  the  sense  that  they  are  dependent  for  their  exist- 
ence upon  the  mind.  When  we  reflect  upon  these 
facts  nothing  can  be  more  simple.  The  distinction 
can  be  discovered  without  difficulty  and  it  would 
seem  that  there  need  be  no  confusion  between  prop- 
erties and  qualities  as  here  defined.  To  affirm  prop- 
erties is  to  affirm  inseparable  concomitants  of  matter, 
but  to  affirm  qualities  is  to  affirm  things  that  change 
with  the  point  of  view.  I  see  a  man  suddenly  push 
another  upon  the  street,  and  think  it  rude,  and  am 
indignant.  The  next  moment  I  see  that  he  saved 


QUALITIES  101 

him  from  falling  into  a  pit,  and  in  an  instant  the 
quality  of  the  act  is  changed,  and  I  call  it  wise  and 
kind,  while  the  activity  as  property  remains  the 
same. 

From  the  days  of  Aristotle  to  the  last  book  of 
philosophy,  substance  and  the  properties  of  which 
it  is  composed,  bodies  as  compounded  substance  and 
hence  compounded  properties,  relations  and  com- 
pounded relations,  qualities,  and  compounded  quali- 
ties all  have  been  under  discussion,  and  attempts 
have  been  made  to  define  them. 

;  These  distinctions,  which  seem  simple  and  are 
simple  when  understood,  and  may  be  understood  by 
every  intelligent  man,  have  led  to  tomes  and  libraries 
of  discussion  and  disputation  not  always  friendly 
and  charitable.  There  are  those  who  affirm  that 
qualities  and  properties  are  all  one  as  ideal ;  there 
are  those  who  affirm  that  qualities  and  properties 
are  all  one  as  real  or  material.  And  thus  we  have  an 
idealistic  philosophy  and  a  materialistic  philosophy. 
A  few  idealists  have  gone  so  far  as  to  affirm  that  not 
only  qualities  but  properties,  bodies  and  relations 
are  ideal ;  that  there  is  no  material  or  real  world 
which  exists  except  as  it  is  created  by  the  mind  and 
that  all  these  things  exist  only  in  mind. 

The  difference  between   qualities  and  properties 
was  vaguely  seen  by  Aristotle,  but  seems  to  have 
been  unrecognized  by  Plato.     In  modern  times  we 
find  Locke,  with  a  clearness  never  before  exhibited, 
giving  the  distinction  between  properties  and  quali-      / 
ties,  though  he   called  them   all  qualities,  but  the  \ 
names  used  are  of  little  moment.     He  divided  quali- 
ties  into    primary   and    secondary;    what  are  here 
called  properties  he  called  secondary  qualities.     But 


102  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

at  his  time  the  nature  of  force  was  unknown  and  the 
laws  of  evolution  or  time  were  undiscovered  and 
many  of  the  properties  of  force  and  change  were 
relegated  to  his  second  class  and  confounded  with 
what  are  here  called  qualities.  Then  he  added  a 
third  class  which  he  called  powers ;  so  the  properties 
of  force  were  divided  between  secondary  qualities 
and  powers.  Dropping  his  term  as  primary  and 
secondary  qualities,  and  using  the  terms  properties 
and  qualities  in  their  stead,  it  is  proposed  briefly  to 
explain  the  errors  into  which  Locke  fell.  In  his 
time  his  errors  were  excusable ;  at  the  present  time 
they  are  inexcusable.  All  of  this  can  now  be  set 
forth  and  the  truth  demonstrated  as  simply  and 
clearly  as  a  proposition  in  Euclid,  and  it  must  be 
understood  if  modern  science  is  to  be  understood, 
for  upon  these  simple,  self-evident  propositions  all 
modern  science  is  founded.  Since  Locke  all  later 
writers,  so  far  as  my  reading  extends,  instead  of  clear- 
ing away  Locke's  errors  have  piled  up  a  mountain  of 
new  fallacies.  To  reduce  these  questions  to  their 
simple  elements  it  becomes  necessary  to  go  back  to 
Locke. 

The  correlation  of  forces  which  has  its  ground  in 
the  persistence  of  motion  was  unknown  in  Locke's 
time,  though  Locke  himself  affirmed  it.  In  his  dis- 
cussion he  clearly  set  forth  that  numbers  are  primary 
qualities — i.e.,  properties;  but  he  does  not  see  that 
kinds  are  derived  from  number  and  also  are  prop- 
erties. He  clearly  explains  that  extension  and  all 
the  properties  of  form  derived  therefrom  are  prop- 
erties. He  clearly  sees  that  motions  are  properties, 
but  he  does  not  see  the  relation  between  motions 
and  forces,  so  he  places  some  of  the  forces  in  the 


QUALITIES  103 

second  class  of  qualities  and  thus  includes  them  in 
what  we  call  qualities,  while  others  he  includes 
among  powers.  Thus  classes,  forces  and  durations 
were  practically  left  in  the  second  class  and  among 
powers.  The  nature  of  the  first  class  he  clearly 
understood  and  explained,  and  finally  he  refers  the 
second  class  of  qualities  and  powers  also  to  a  founda- 
tion or  substrate  in  qualities  of  the  first  class,  or  prop- 
erties. His  second  class  of  qualities  he  included 
with  pains  and  pleasures,  which  are  true  qualities. 
He  clearly  saw  that  good  and  evil,  however  expressed 
as  pleasures,  satisfactions,  joys  and  delights,  or  as 
pains,  discomforts,  dangers  and  horrors,  formed 
another  class  of  attributes.  But  with  them  he 
grouped  classes,  though  he  does  not  make  this  plain; 
but  he  does  make  it  plain  that  he  grouped  many  forces 
and  many  changes  in  his  second  class  of  qualities. 

Since  Locke's  time  this  classification  has  been 
modified  mainly  in  the  direction  of  his  errors.  More 
and  more  have  properties  been  considered  as  quali- 
ties, and  a  school  of  idealists  has  sprung  up  who  hold 
that  all  properties  are  qualities  in  the  sense  in  which 
these  terms  are  here  used.  At  the  same  time  a 
school  of  realists  has  sprung  up  who  hold  that  there 
are  no  qualities,  but  only  properties,  as  these  terms 
are  here  used.  By  what  course  of  reasoning  did 
Locke  lapse  into  error?  On  carefully  examining 
this  matter  it  will  be  seen  that  while  he  did  not  dis- 
cuss the  whole  question  fully  and  left  much  unsaid 
that  should  have  been  said,  he  clearly  understood  his 
position ;  yet  it  will  be  seen  that  he  stumbles  over 
those  properties  of  force  that  are  revealed  to  us 
through  the  senses  of  seeing,  hearing,  and  smelling. 
He  clearly  saw  that  the  bodies  revealed  to  us 


104  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

through  these  senses  do  not  act  directly  as  bodies 
upon  the  self,  but  in  the  case  of  seeing  and 
hearing  through  media  and  in  the  case  of  smelling 
through  the  action  of  minute  particles  dissevered 
from  the  bodies.  At  least  all  this  may  be  justly 
gathered  from  his  statement,  though  he  is  not  always 
clear  upon  these  points.  It  is  fair  to  Locke  to  credit 
him  with  this  degree  of  insight  into  the  truth.  He 
believed  that  in  seeing  there  must  be  a  medium 
between  the  body  perceived  and  the  perceiving  mind, 
but  he  did  not  clearly  understand  it  as  the  universal 
ether.  In  his  time  the  existence  of  the  universal 
ether  was  a  doubtful  doctrine  in  the  history  of 
science.  Locke  denied  the  validity  of  the  actio  in  dis- 
tans  in  his  first  publications,  and  he  never  retracted, 
but  under  the  influence  of  the  supposed  opinions 
of  Newton  in  regard  to  the  attraction  of  gravity, 
Locke  affirmed  that  he  was  not  prepared  to  assert 
that  God  could  not  do  things  in  any  way  he  pleased. 
Had  he  known  what  we  now  know,  that  Newton  used 
the  term  attraction  in  a  metaphoric  sense,  and  no 
more  believed  in  actio  in  distans  than  did  Locke 
himself,  he  would  not  have  made  this  apparent  con- 
cession to  the  opinions  of  Newton. 

It  still  remains,  however,  that  Locke  believed 
and  taught  that  certain  properties  of  force  (espe- 
cially those  manifesting  themselves  to  the  senses 
above  mentioned)  and  many  properties  of  change 
are  qualities  and  do  not  exist  as  properties  or 
primary  qualities.  Fallacies  of  force  and  change 
were  still  current  in  his  time,  for  the  correla- 
tion of  forces  through  the  persistence  of  motion 
was  unknown  and  untaught,  and  the  fallacies  of 
evolution  were  yet  to  be  dispelled.  This  state  of 


QUALITIES  105 

things  has  passed  away,  and  no  man  who  now  under- 
stands light  or  heat  will  call  it  a  quality  in  the  sense 
in  which  the  term  is  here  used,  but  a  property 
inherent  in  matter  itself.  At  first  view  it  seems 
strange  that  Locke  fell  into  this  error  in  the  case  of 
sound,  but  it  must  be  remembered  that  in  his  time 
the  kinetics  of  gas  was  unknown,  and  although  Locke 
and  his  predecessors  for  two  thousand  years  had 
understood  that  sound  was  a  mode  of  motion,  yet  it 
was  very  vaguely  or  inadequately  explained. 

Locke's  contemporaries  and  successors  have  but 
added  to  the  confusion  in  which  the  subject  was  left 
by  himself.  Spencer  takes  up  this  subject  for  discus- 
sion in  three  chapters  of  his  Psychology  under  the  sub- 
ject of  static,  dynamic,  and  statico-dynamic  attributes. 
We  first  note  that  he  replaced  Locke's  term  of  quali- 
ties by  another,  namely,  attributes.  He  did  not  dis- 
cuss Locke's  classification,  but  that  of  Hamilton, 
which  is  much  more  vague  than  that  of  Locke,  but 
Hamilton,  like  others,  had  introduced  a  third  class 
between  the  primary  and  the  secondary,  which  was 
called  secundo-primary.  Spencer  adopted  this  three- 
fold classification,  but  used  the  terms  static,  dynamic, 
and  statico-dynamic.  It  will  be  remembered  that 
Spencer  was  a  Monist,  and  believed  that  the  primor- 
dial unity  is  based  on  dynamics  or  reified  force.  With 
him  all  the  properties,  and  in  them  he  included 
qualities,  manifest  only  the  primordial  force.  This 
was  his  first  error.  His  second  error  was  to  neglect 
number  and  to  consider  class  as  classification,  or  a 
process  of  the  mind,  and  not  a  property  of  bodies 
discovered  "by  the  mind.  Then  he  presented  his 
two  classes,  one  based  on  dynamics  and  the  other 
on  statics,  but  statics  is  not  the  other  to  dynamics, 


106  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

but  the  other  to  change;  state  and  change  are  the 
reciprocals  of  time.  The  reciprocals  of  force  are 
action  and  passion  or  action  and  reaction.  You  may 
read  Spencer  on  this  subject  with  great  care  many 
times,  as  I  have,  and  you  will  see  that  he  himself  is 
vaguely  conscious  of  this  illogical  proceeding  and 
affirms  that  he  uses  the  term  statics  with  an  especial 
meaning  devised  for  his  own  purpose;  but  under 
dynamics  he  appears  to  include  change,  although  he 
purports  to  be  the  philosopher  of  evolution,  and 
under  statics  he  includes  a  part  of  the  properties  of 
duration  and  change  and  a  part  of  the  properties  of 
number  and  class  and  of  extension  and  form.  It  is 
thus  that  the  confusion  introduced  by  Locke  in  his 
discussion,  due  to  the  ignorance  of  his  time,  was  still 
further  increased  by  Spencer,  and  his  three  chapters 
on  the  attributes  of  matter  constitute  a  monument 
of  errors.  An  erroneous  classification  is  the  bane  of 
science,  for  it  throws  phenomena  into  false  relations 
and  makes  that  which  is  simple  appear  to  be  complex, 
difficult,  profound  and  even  unknowable,  as  Spencer 
believed. 

Locke's  ''Essay"  introduced  a  new  theme  into 
philosophy,  which  at  last  comes  down  to  us  in  the 
form  of  epistomology.  It  seeks  to  discuss  the  activi- 
ties of  mind  and  the  certitudes  of  its  conclusions. 
Berkeley  seized  upon  Locke's  explanation  of  vision 
and  amplified  it.  Neither  Locke  nor  Berkeley  clearly 
saw  that  the  properties  of  bodies  discovered  by  the 
several  senses  are  integrated  by  conception  in  such 
a  manner  that  one  sense  impression  becomes  a  sym- 
bol or  mark  of  all  the  properties  belonging  to  the 
body  which  are  known  to  the  mind;  that  a  light 
impression,  a  sound  impression,  a  taste  impression 


QUALITIES  107 

or  a  smelling  impression  are  by  conception  trans- 
formed into  symbols  of  the  body  perceived  with  all 
its  properties.  Failing  to  understand  this  in  its 
full  significance,  and  science  not  having  explained 
the  nature  of  light,  heat  and  other  forces,  all  forces 
were  by  Berkeley  considered  to  be  qualities  as  the 
term  is  here  used,  and  then  he  made  a  further  step, 
that  all  properties  are  but  qualities,  and  have  their 
existence  only  in  the  mind.  Thus  it  was  that 
Berkeley  robbed  us  of  the  beautiful  world,  but 
with  a  literary  skill  that  is  alluring;  he  was  not 
a  vulgar  highwayman  crying,  " Stand  and  deliver!" 
but  a  knight  of  the  green  wood  who  courteously 
invoked  our  assistance  in  yielding  to  him  our 
treasures. 

Hume  took  up  the  same  problem  and  with  sturdy 
blows  destroyed  the  world,  and  reason  was  crushed 
in  its  fall.  Then  in  Germany  Kant,  Schelling,  Fichte 
and  Hegel  essayed  to  solve  these  problems;  Kant 
leaving  behind  a  monument  of  criticism  erected  into 
antinomies  where  truth  and  certitude  are  lost. 
Fichte  carried  the  whole  subject  to  its  logical  con- 
clusion by  reducing  it  to  an  absurdity.  It  was  a 
simple  demonstration  the  meaning  of  which  he  never 
knew,  dying  in  a  mist  of  reification.  Hegel,  see- 
ing the  contradictions  of  Kant  and  Fichte  and  accept- 
ing their  conclusions,  developed  the  most  elaborate 
and  artificial  philosophy  ever  presented  in  the 
history  of  human  thought — a  philosophy  of  contradic- 
tion, a  scheme  of  the  negative  by  which  it  was 
attempted  to  show  that  words  are  divine,  but  the 
world  is  finite  and  contradictory,  and  that  every 
proposition  affirmed  of  the  world  contains  within 
itself  its  own  contradiction,  and  that  words  must  be 


v 

r 

I08  TRUTH  AND   ERROR 

believed  and  that  sensation,  perception,  understand- 
ing, and  reflection  create  phantasms. 

So  these  problems  have  come  down  to  us.  In  the 
meantime  an  army  of  scientific  men  have  been  at 
work  clearing1  away  the  fallacies  of  imperfect  reason 
by  designed  and  skilful  investigation.  Mysterious 
forces  have  been  resolved  into  their  simple  elements 
as  the  motion  of  matter  in  collision,  and  the  metagen- 
eses  of  the  world  have  been  resolved,  and  the  laws 
of  evolution  formulated,  and  the  subject  is  once 
more  taken  up  by  Spencer  with  a  literary  skill  equal 
to  that  of  Berkeley  or  Plato,  and  with  the  powers  of 
an  advocate  never  excelled.  The  attributes  or  things 
which  may  be  attributed  to  an  object  are  properties 
and  qualities.  It  was  the  distinction  between  prop- 
erties and  qualities  that  the  Greeks  sought  to 
characterize  as  noumena  and  phenomena.  Noumena 
are  the  properties  of  bodies  as  they  are  in  them- 
selves, while  phenomena  are  the  qualities  of  bodies 
and  the  fallacies  which  we  entertain  concerning  them. 
But  when  in  later  times  noumena  were  held  to  be 
occult  or  mysterious  substrates,  then  science  adopted 
the  term  phenomena  as  synonymous  with  properties. 

Qualities  give  rise  to  emotions,  for  qualities  are 
good  and  evil.  All  properties  may  be  considered  as 
good  or  evil  in  relation  to  man's  wants.  The  emo- 
tions are  founded  upon  the  cognition  of  good  and 
evil.  We  are  not  in  this  volume  to  set  forth  the 
good  and  evil  of  environment,  nor  their  cognition  as 
emotions.  All  of  this  subject  must  be  treated  in  a 
subsequent  volume.  In  this  volume  we  are  endeavor- 
ing to  explain,  first,  what  are  properties  and  bodies, 
and  how  they  are  cognized.  This  brief  reference 
to  the  cognition  of  qualities  must  here  suffice. 


•  CHAPTER   IX 

CLASSIFICATION 

The  science  of  number  is  natural,  for  units  and 
pluralities  are  found  in  nature,  but  measure  is  con- 
ventional, for  conventional  units  of  measure  are 
used  in  order  that  undiscovered  numbers  may  be 
represented  by  their  equivalents  in  computation,  for 
while  we  may  not  be  able  to  discover  the  number  of 
natural  units  in  a  body  we  may  be  able  to  measure 
its  form  in  conventional  units  of  extension,  and  for 
some  purposes  of  computation  these  units  serve  the 
desired  purpose. 

There  are  other  computations  which  are  not  prop- 
erly subserved  by  the  measurement  of  form.  Here 
we  measure  the  force  which  the  body  exerts  through 
the  action  of  gravity  and  determine  its  mass  in  units 
of  weight,  and  these  mass  units  serve  the  same  pur- 
pose in  our  computations  that  higher  units  of  num- 
ber would  serve  if  we  were  able  to  count  the  parti- 
cles. Thus  the  science  of  number  is  natural,  but  the 
device  of  measure  is  conventional.  It  serves  a  useful 
purpose  in  that  it  enables  us  to  represent  by  num- 
bers certain  facts  about  bodies  which  we  are  not  able 
to  discover  as  natural  numbers  by  reason  of  their 
multiplicity  and  minuteness ;  so  we  assume  that  one 
concomitant  property  represents  the  others.  This 
we  measure.  We  do  not  search  with  the  microscope 
for  atoms  and  count  them,  but  we  consider  their 
forms  as  extensions  or  their  forces  as  masses  and 

reason  about  the  artificial  numbers  derived  there- 
log 


110  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

from  by  measurement  with  the  same  degree  of 
certainty  that  we  would  have  if  we  should  actually 
count  the  particles.  Thus  meas'ure  is  devised  in 
order  that  we  may  consider  numbers  when  the  actual 
numbers  are  concealed  from  observation.  That 
every  property  is  concomitant  with  all  others  is  thus 
assumed  as  the  fundamental  doctrine  of  mathematics 
where  quantitative  reasoning  is  held  to  be  exact  and 
irrefragable.  All  this  depends  upon  the  law  that 
the  essentials  are  persistent  in  the  particle. 

While  measure  is  thus  conventional  there  is  still 
another  conventional  usage  in  the  science  of  mathe- 
matics. In  natural  units  bodies  are  the  higher 
units  of  particles,  the  particle  and  the  body  are  units 
of  different  orders,  and  the  different  orders  of  units 
in  nature  are  thus  coextensive  with  all  the  bodies  of 
the  universe.  Thus  there  is  an  infinite  system  of 
orders  of  numbers;  but  man  devises  a  numerical 
system  where  a  definite  plurality  is  considered  as  a 
higher  unity,  and  such  a  system  serves  him  a  valu- 
able purpose  as  a  labor-saving  device  for  the  mental 
faculties.  He  cannot  stretch  his  mind  to  the  con- 
cepts of  natural  units  of  particles  in  natural  higher 
units  of  bodies,  but  he  creates  a  representative  sys- 
tem, so  that  the  multiplicities  of  nature,  which  are 
infinite,  may  be  representatively  considered  by  the 
finite  mind. 

In  conventional  number  the  units  of  different 
orders  are  compounded  symmetrically  in  constant 
ratios.  Early  in  the  history  of  language,  while  it 
was  largely  gesture  speech,  the  fingers  of  one  or 
both  hands  or  the  fingers  and  toes  were  used  as  an 
abacus  by  which  numbers  were  told  off ;  and  this  led 
to  a  habit  which  has  continued  and  developed  so 


CLASSIFICATION  III 

that  in  the  various  languages  of  the  world  it  is  found 
that  the  number  five,  the  number  ten  or  the  number 
twenty  has  been  used  as  the  normal  ratio  between 
conventional  orders.  Of  the  three  methods  the 
decimal  has  been  retained  in  civilization  as  the  one 
used  in  enumeration,  computation  and  notation.  By 
this  device  a  plurality  of  units  are  arranged  in  a 
system  of  orders,  ten  units  constituting  the  first 
order,  ten  of  these  the  second,  etc.  In  this  manner 
numbers  are  classified  as  kinds  in  series  for  the 
purpose  of  convenient  counting.  Counting  is  a 
compound  process  of  two  coordinate  elements;  one 
determines  the  kind,  the  other  the  series,  and 
determination  of  kind  logically  precedes  enumera- 
tion. The  kind  must  first  be  determined  and  then 
seriated.  The  kinds  may  be  natural  or  conventional, 
one  or  both,  and  the  series  may  be  natural  or 
conventional,  one  or  both.  When  we  count  horses 
in  the  field  we  count  a  natural  kind,  but  we  seriate 
only  those  in  the  field  as  a  conventional  series.  We 
must  not  confound  horses  with  stumps  if  we  are  to 
get  a  valid  sum.  We  may  place  stones,  blocks  of 
wood  and  fragments  of  paper  as  marks  of  sites 
where  trees  are  to  be  planted,  but  we  classify  them 
not  as  stones,  blocks  of  wood,  and  fragments  of 
paper,  but  as  marks.  In  this  case  the  kinds  are 
conventional.  Conventional  counting  and  classifica- 
tion differ  in  this  respect  only  that  in  counting  the 
series  is  conventional,  while  in  classification  the 
series  is  natural.  In  counting  the  all  of  the  kind  is 
the  all  of  our  purpose;  in  classification  the  all  is 
the  all  of  nature.  Then  we  must  remember  that  in 
mathematics,  number  is  taken  as  the  representative 
of  the  other  concomitant  properties  of  quantity  and 


112  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

that  they  are  reduced  to  number  by  measurement, 
while  in  classification  kinds  are  used  to  represent 
the  other  properties  and  they  are  reduced  to 
kinds  by  logical  convention.  While  in  conventional 
counting  we  consider  kinds  in  series,  so  in  classifying 
the  bodies  and  properties  of  nature  we  are  com- 
pelled to  consider  kinds  in  series. 

It  was  more  than  a  chance  that  produced  the 
decimal  system,  for  the  universe  is  pentalogic,  as  all 
of  the  fundamental  series  discovered  in  nature  are 
pentalogic  by  reason  of  the  five  concomitant  proper- 
ties. The  origin  of  the  decimal  system  was  the 
recognition  by  primitive  man  of  the  reciprocal 
pentalogic  systems  involved  in  the  two  hands  of  the 
human  body,  and  the  pentalogic  properties  are 
always  in  pairs.  While  the  properties  are  five,  they 
are  manifested  in  reciprocal  pairs. 

The  universe  is  not  an  endless  series  of  infinitesi- 
mal variables,  but  it  is  a  universe  of  divergent  series 
which  spring  from  an  ascending  series  as  branches 
spring  from  a  trunk.  In  the  branches  the  extreme 
variation  appears  in  the  extremities  of  the  divergent 
branches,  but  the  branches  are  not  linked  to  one 
another  by  these  peripheral  extremities  but  by 
their  trunk  connections,  and  the  grand  advance 
in  nature  is  made  as  an  ascending  series  as  by  a 
trunk. 

When  we  study  a  group  of  plants  or  animals  that 
are  intimately  related,  as,  for  example,  the  members 
of  an  order,  and  compare  them  with  the  members  of 
another  order,  the  two  orders  are  found  related  not 
by  their  highest  members  but  by  their  lowest.  It  is 
thus  that  two  branches  of  phytonomic  or  zoonomic 
species  are  found  related  to  each  other  by  discover- 


CLASSIFICATION  113 

ing  the  synthetic  form  which  belonged  to  the 
ascending  or  trunk  series. 

Synthetic  forms  are  often  extirpated  by  time,  and 
to  a  large  extent  living  species  are  found  in  well- 
demarcated  groups,  this  demarcation  being  the 
clearer  by  reason  of  the  extirpation  of  the  synthetic 
types  of  the  trunk,  while  the  branch  groups  diver- 
gently elongate  until  an  extreme  differentiation  is 
found.  Sometimes  whole  branches  are  extirpated 
and  thus  are  found  as  fossils.  Species  multiply  by  the 
splitting  of  branches  and  each  new  branch  consitutes 
a  lineal  series  of  individuals  which  are  separated  by 
the  extirpation  of  the  main  branch ;  while  the  main 
branch  remains  the  new  branches  are  held  as 
varieties. 

The  true  method  of  classification,  therefore,  is  not 
by  invention  but  by  discovery. 

The  growth  of  a  mineral  is  a  progressive  change 
by  internal  metamorphosis  of  the  molecules.  The 
growth  of  the  individual  plant  is  accomplished  by 
successive  additions  of  particles,  and  is  thus  a  serial 
kind,  while  the  growth  of  the  individual  in  the 
animal  is  accomplished  not  only  by  a  constant 
addition  of  particles,  but  also  by  a  concomitant 
subtraction  of  particles ;  the  individual  is  doubly  a 
serial  kind. 

A  species  is  a  series  of  connected  individuals 
differing  from  one  another  by  minute  distinctions 
but  differing  from  other  species  by  gaps;  such  a 
group  is  the  lowest  demarcated  class.  A  variety  is 
an  inchoate  species  not  marked  by  gaps  or  discrete 
degrees.  Species  are  further  classified  in  hierarchies, 
when  the  species  becomes  one  of  a  series  of  species. 
The  production  of  a  species  is  nature's  method  of 


114  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

summating  a  series,  and  a  production  of  any  higher 
class  is  still  another  method  of  more  distinctly 
summating'  a  series  of  series.  Series  spring*  from 
the  division  of  trunks,  and  may  be  traced  back  to 
their  origin;  classification,  then,  becomes  seriation 
of  species  in  such  a  manner  as  to  exhibit  their  origin 
in  less  differentiated  species. 

The  kinds  of  nature  considered  in  the  series  of 
nature  are  classes,  and  these  are  regrouped  in  hier- 
archies which  are  systems  of  classes.  Every  science 
of  such  a  grand  group  of  bodies  gives  rise  to  a 
special  science  and  thus  we  have  systematic  miner- 
alogy, systematic  botany  and  systematic  zoology. 

We  have  seen  that  the  other  properties  of  a  particle 
when  treated  in  the  science  of  mathematics  require 
conversion  into  terms  of  number.  Space  properties 
are  measured  by  conventional  units,  and  are  thus 
reduced  to  number.  Motion  or  force  properties  are 
measured  in  terms  of  space  and  these  again  are  also 
expressed  in  number.  Times  are  measured  in  terms 
of  motion,  the  motion  in  terms  of  space  and  the 
space  reduced  to  terms  of  number.  It  is  thus  by  the 
device  of  measure  that  all  the  other  properties  of 
matter  are  reduced  to  number  for  the  purpose  of 
verification.  Abstract  mathematics  is  therefore  the 
science  of  number,  but  applied  mathematics  is  the 
utilization  of  the  laws  of  mathematics  in  concrete 
investigation  by  the  device  of  measure,  while  chem- 
istry is  the  science  of  natural  orders  of  number. 

Now,  that  which  is  true  in  the  conventional  science 
of  mathematics  finds  its  analogue  in  the  natural 
sciences,  for  all  the  other  properties  of  bodies  are 
reduced  to  kinds  for  the  purpose  of  logic.  Forms 
are  explained  as  kinds,  forces  as  forms  and  then  as 


CLASSIFICATION  115 

kinds,  and  finally  causations  are  reduced  to  forces, 
the  forces  to  forms  and  these  forms  to  kinds.  Thus 
all  the  natural  categories  are  reduced  to  kinds,  as 
quantitative  properties  in  mathematics  are  reduced 
to  conventional  numbers. 

It  is  for  practical  reasons  that  man  has  reduced  all 
other  properties  to  numbers,  for  as  counting  can  be 
accomplished  only  by  classification,  so  properties  can 
only  be  treated  in  mathematics  when  they  are 
reduced  to  number  by  measure.  Counting  serves  to 
determine  the  extent  of  a  conventional  group,  while 
classification  serves  to  determine  the  extent  of  a 
natural  group. 

Language  is  impossible  without  classification,  for 
most  words  are  class  words.  It  therefore  becomes 
necessary  in  the  arts,  both  industrial  and  linguistic, 
to  classify,  and  mankind  through  all  the  history  of 
culture  has  been  engaged  in  classification.  But  the 
reduction  of  the  other  properties  to  kinds  does  not 
reduce  the  whole  of  science  to  classification  any 
more  than  the  reduction  of  quantities  to  number 
reduces  all  verification  to  mathematics.  There  is 
still  a  logical  verification  independent  of  mathemat- 
ical verification,  and  there  are  still  forms,  forces  and 
causations  to  be  considered,  although  for  deductive 
logic  it  is  necessary  to  reduce  them  to  kinds. 

Kinds  as  species  become  orders  of  kinds  or  classes, 
and  are  thus  multiplied.  When  kinds  are  considered 
two  correlates  are  found  which  cannot  be  expunged ; 
likeness  and  unlikeness;  and  when  considered  in 
this  manner  they  are  classes.  A  fundamental  like- 
ness is  discovered  in  all  bodies,  for  all  bodies  are 
composed  of  matter. 

In    mathematics   bodies  are   considered   in   their 


Il6  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

quantitative  properties,  which  are  number,  space, 
motion,  time,  and,  in  animate  bodies,  judgment. 
But  in  systematic  science  bodies  are  treated  as 
categories,  which  are  kinds,  forms,  forces,  causa- 
tions, and,  in  animate  bodies,  concepts.  So,  in 
mathematics,  while  quantitative  properties  are 
reduced  to  number,  in  the  natural  sciences  properties 
are  reduced  to  kinds.  The  analogy  between  syste- 
matic science  and  mathematical  science  is  perfect, 
and  both  are  partly  conventional.  As  it  is  neces- 
sary to  reduce  properties  to  number  in  order  to  treat 
them  mathematically,  so  it  is  necessary  to  reduce 
properties  to  kinds  in  order  to  treat  them  logically. 

Bodies  are  composed  of  particles,  and  the  elemen- 
tary particles  are  probably  alike.  They  have  been 
reduced  to  about  seventy  kinds  by  chemical  analysis. 
Logical  analysis  reduces  them  to  one  kind,  and  if  it 
i$  valid  then  they  are  alike  in  being  composed  of  one 
substance  with  like  properties.  If  only  the  chemical 
analysis  is  valid,  then  there  are  seventy  kinds,  but 
they  are  alike  in  having  the  same  properties,  and 
unlike  only  in  having  different  quantities  or  propor- 
tions of  these  properties.  All  bodies  have  a  funda- 
mental likeness  in  essentials,  and  a  contingent 
unlikeness  in  relations.  Every  physical  body  is  like 
every  other  physical  body  in  its  essentials  and  unlike 
in  its  relations. 

The  natural  classes  which  exist  and  those  which 
have  existed  in  the  past  (for  the  processes  of  extir- 
pation have  always  existed  in  the  world)  have  a 
meaning  for  us  in  expressing  the  agencies  which 
have  been  at  work  in  producing  the  present  stage  of 
the  world,  for  every  gap  represents  some  event  of 
history.  Planes  of  demarcation  are  thus  landmarks 


CLASSIFICATION  1 17 

of  history  to  guide  in  research.  As  bodies  have 
appeared  and  disappeared  upon  the  stage  of  time 
and  the  actors  changed  with  every  act,  a  history  of 
transcendent  interest  is  involved,  for  in  the  dis- 
covery of  classes  we  may  restore  the  history  of  the 
earth. 

It  is  seen  that  classification  is  the  discovery  of 
kinds  in  series.  If  classification  is  discovery,  classes 
are  not  conventional  but  natural.  In  any  stage 
of  classification,  while  yet  all  of  the  attributes  are 
not  known,  there  may  be  imperfections  in  distin- 
guishing kinds  in  series;  the  kinds  depend  upon 
properties,  but  all  the  properties  may  not  be  known, 
and  there  may  be  gaps  in  our  knowledge  of  the 
series,  so  that  imperfect  knowledge  is  imperfect 
recognition  of  kinds  in  series;  therefore,  classifica- 
tion is  always  tentative  by  reason  of  imperfect 
knowledge. 

When  a  classification  is  once  established  upon  a 
logical  basis,  it  need  not  undergo  dissolution  to  be 
reclassified,  for  when  the  germs  of  classification  are 
established  on  a  logical  basis  it  has  but  to  grow  with 
increasing  knowledge. 

While  classification  may  grow  it  will  always  be 
recognized  that  there  is  but  one  system,  as  the  indi- 
vidual is  but  one  individual,  though  he  may  grow 
from  infancy  to  maturity.  The  classification  of 
which  we  speak  is  genetic,  and  while  but  one  may 
exist  that  one  may  undergo  changes  on  the  way  to 
perfection. 

The  test  of  classification  is  this :  First,  within  the 
class  all  of  the  individuals  must  constitute  an 
unbroken  series,  with  a  beginning  and  an  ending, 
each  class  demarcated  by  a  gap  or  discrete  degree. 


Il8  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

Second,  the  classes  themselves  must  be  seriated  with 
the  least  possible  gaps.  Third,  the  series  thus  pro- 
duced must  be  traced  to  convergence.  A  classifica- 
tion guided  by  these  three  laws  is  valid,  when  all  the 
facts  are  known,  and  it  is  relatively  valid  when 
these  laws  are  observed  in  the  consideration  of  the 
known  facts.  The  goal  of  the  science  of  classifica- 
tion is  to  discover  kinds  in  series  and  coordinate 
series  of  kinds  in  systems,  and  systems  again  in 
series. 

In  every  perception  there  is  a  semblance  of 
dichotomous  classification  of  that  of  which  the  ego  is 
aware,  as  distinguished  from  the  environment. 
Such  a  process  is  involved  in  the  first  act  of  judg- 
ment, and  continues  to  the  end,  but  it  is  simply 
distinguishing  the  object  of  judgment  from  its 
environment  or  the  world  outside  of  the  object.  In 
perceiving  the  horse,  the  horse  is  distinguished 
from  the  rest  of  the  environment,  and  in  order  that 
this  may  be  expressed  in  speech  some  logicians 
speak  of  the  horse  and  the  non-horse,  the  tree  and 
the  non-tree,  the  house  and  the  non-house.  This  is 
but  a  method  of  naming,  but  that  which  is  expressed 
is  the  whole  world  except  that  which  is  included 
under  the  positive  name.  By  this  expression  we 
must  not  conceive  that  the  non-object  in  any  way 
negates  the  object,  nor  that  the  object  denies  the 
existence  of  the  non-object,  but  must  consider  the 
particle  "non"  as  a  device  in  naming.  This  method 
of  naming  is  accomplished  by  another  method  in 
modern  biological  science  when  it  speaks  of  the 
individual  and  the  environment.  In  logic  this 
method  of  naming  has  led  to  much  confusion,  and  in 
the  logic  of  Hegel  it  has  led  to  strange  absurdities, 


CLASSIFICATION  119 

all  of  which  are  cleared  away  when  the  non-individ- 
ual is  called  the  environment. 

This  semblance  of  dichotomous.  classification  has 
led  to  many  errors,  for  the  habit  has  been  formed  and 
philosophers  have  sometimes  diverted  the  method 
from  its  use  in  perception  and  attempted  a  dichoto- 
mous  classification  of  the  universe.  It  has  rarely 
been  suggested  as  a  complete  system,  but  it  has  been 
practically  used  by  many  in  this  manner,  and  is  still 
so  used.  Thus,  we  hear  of  space  and  matter  as  if 
space  were  not  one  of  the  properties  of  matter ;  we 
hear  of  motion  and  matter  as  if  motion  were  not  one 
of  the  properties  of  matter;  we  hear  of  time  and 
matter  as  if  time  were  not  one  of  the  properties  of 
matter,  and  we  hear  of  thought  and  matter  as  if 
thought  were  not  one  of  the  properties  of  animate 
matter.  Would  a  sane  person  speak  of  the  horse 
and  head,  the  horse  and  body,  the  horse  and  legs, 
the  horse  and  tail,  and  then  consider  the  horse  as 
one  thing,  the  head,  body,  and  tail  as  other  things? 
Yet  this  is  the  error  of  those  who  consider  matter  as 
one  thing  and  properties  as  other  things.  All  such 
methods  are  not  only  vague  and  idle,  but  pernicious 
in  that  they  deform  all  the  concepts  involved. 

There  is  another  method  of  dichotomous  classifica- 
tion just  as  pernicious,  exhibited  in  the  attempt  to 
classify  the  properties  of  matter  as  dynamic  and 
static,  which  was  Spencer's  classification.  Here 
forces  and  causations  are  classified  in  one  group  as 
dynamics,  and  kinds,  forms,  and  thoughts  as  statics ; 
thus  the  distinction  between  causations  and  force  as 
categories  are  confounded,  as  also  the  distinction 
between  kinds,  forms,  and  thoughts.  For  some  pur- 
poses of  discussion  a  schematization  may  be  of 


I2O  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

more  or  less  value,  but  it  easily  degenerates  into 
illogical  classification,  especially  when  it  becomes 
the  foundation  of  a  philosophy.  This  classification 
is  a  relic  from  an  earlier  stage  of  philosophy  when 
properties  were  confounded  with  qualities,  and  both 
properties  and  qualities  were  classified  as  primary 
and  secondary,  with  sometimes  a  third  class  as 
secundo-primary. 

There  are  only  five  properties,  quantitative  and 
categoric.  As  abstractions  they  are  wholly  unlike 
one  another,  but  in  the  concrete  they  are  identical, 
for  every  particle  of  matter  and  every  body  com- 
pounded of  particles  has  number,  space,  motion, 
time,  and,  if  it  be  an  animate  body,  judgment.  The 
properties,  therefore,  are  phases  of  the  same  body, 
and  their  abstraction  must  be  pentalogic.  In  the 
science  of  mathematics  the  four  properties  are 
always  recognized  by  every  physicist.  During  the 
latter  half  of  the  present  century  the  fifth  property  has 
been  clearly  recognized  in  the  new  science  of  psycho- 
physics,  which  seeks  to  measiire  mental  operations 
and  treat  psychology  mathematically.  In  this  field 
of  modern  research  a  large  body  of  literature  is 
already  developed. 

Mill,  in  his  work  on  Logic,  groups  phenomena  in 
a  dichotomous  scheme  as  the  simultaneous  and  the 
successive;  this  is  not  a  logical  classification  of 
phenomena,  but  simply  a  device  in  naming.  Other 
writers  divide  phenomena  into  the  coexistent  and 
sequent,  using  other  terms  for  Mill's  scheme,  while 
Mill  himself  used  it  as  a  classification,  and  thereby 
fell  into  many  errors  of  logic.  Spencer  used  it  also, 
but  legitimately. 

Names  are  developed  before  classes  are  logically 


CLASSIFICATION  121 

distinguished,  and,  although  naming  involves  a 
mode  of  classification,  many  devices  of  naming  are 
very  illogical  methods  of  classification,  but  still  con- 
venient in  schematization ;  a  schematic  name,  there- 
fore, must  always  be  distinguished  from  a  classific 
name. 

Often  the  term  physical  is  used  to  distinguish  cer- 
tain properties  from  those  which  are  called  intel- 
lectual. This  is  not  a  logical  classification  of 
properties,  but  a  convenient  schematization  which  if 
understood  as  a  classification  leads  to  error.  It 
always  leads  to  error  when  the  abstract  property  of 
judgment  or  conception  is  held  to  be  a  substance, 
and  to  exist  apart  from  time,  motion,  space,  and 
number,  or  from  causation,  force,  form,  and  kind. 
Then  thought  becomes  a  ghost. 

As  classes  are  found  in  nature  and  discovered  by 
science,  so  groups  are  also  produced  by  art  for  a 
purpose.  As  the  products  of  nature  are  used  in  art 
a  regrouping  may  arise  which  has  in  view  only  the 
characteristics  of  the  things  of  nature  and  art  as  they 
are  utilized  in  art.  The  builder  recognizes  the 
group  of  building  materials  as  a  class  of  things  in 
which  he  is  especially  interested;  the  mariner  the 
group  of  stores  which  he  must  provide  for  his  voy- 
age ;  the  traveler  his  outfit  which  he  must  carry  in 
his  trunk.  Such  groups  can  be  illustrated  to  an 
indefinite  extent.  They  are  always  dichotomous  on 
the  plan  of  perception  which  groups  things  into  the 
perceived  this  and  the  not  this,  or  the  individual  and 
the  environment.  The  two  groups  are  composed 
of  heterogeneous  things,  as  they  are  known  in  natural 
classification,  selected  for  a  purpose  and  distin- 
guished from  those  not  selected. 


122  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

In  the  presentation  of  a  theme  the  speaker  or 
writer  is  prone  to  arrange  his  material  in  a  scheme 
which  may  be  very  wise  for  the  purpose  intended  for 
distinct  presentation  and  clear  understanding.  Such 
a  piece  of  valuable  literature  may  live,  and  the 
schematization  may  be  taken  as  a  classification  with 
disastrous  results.  Schematization  is  valuable  for 
ephemeral  purposes,  but  classification  has  enduring 
value.  The  author  who  uses  a  valid  classification  as 
a  schematization  is  always  clear,  while  the  author 
who  uses  a  schematization  which  is  not  a  valid  classi- 
fication thereby  introduces  an  element  of  confusion. 

Before  the  rise  of  science  artificial  and  natural 
classes  were  often  confounded.  This  especially 
appears  in  the  development  of  names.  Among 
many  tribes  of  Indians  things  are  classified  into  the 
standing,  sitting,  and  lying;  or  into  standing,  sit- 
ting, lying,  and  moving,  which  is  a  classification  by 
attitudes.  In  other  languages  things  are  classified 
by  their  states.  A  fundamental  classification  existed 
among  the  Greeks  as  the  four  elements,  earth,  air, 
fire,  and  water. 

As  science  first  develops,  classes  are  based  on 
inadequate  characters;  that  is,  a  few  characters  only 
are  taken  as  the  basis,  as  in  the  Linnean  classifica- 
tion of  plants.  But  as  science  progresses,  classes  are 
discovered  which  more  thoroughly  express  the  facts ; 
to  these  classes  names  are  given,  and  the  names  as 
they  are  thus  classed  are  the  names  of  the  things 
classed  and  the  metaphoric  names  of  the  concepts 
of  the  classes. 

Now  we  must  consider  identity  and  difference. 
Mineral  bodies  are  identical  in  having  the  four 
properties  of  number,  space,  motion,  and  time,  and 


CLASSIFICATION  123 

by  hypothesis,  judgment;  but  they  differ  in  rela- 
tions. An  organic  body  undergoes  a  secular  change 
in  kind,  form,  force,  causation,  and  by  hypothesis, 
conception,  and  differs  from  itself  at  different  times 
in  these  respects.  At  different  times  the  same  body 
in  part  is  identical  in  its  different  phases  and  in  part 
different;  thus  there  is  identity  and  difference  in  the 
individual  at  different  times. 

In  the  plant  there  is  the  same  identity  as  in  the 
mineral,  but  there  is  an  additional  difference,  for  the 
plant  grows  by  minute  increments  through  the  addi- 
tion of  new  matter. 

The  animal  has  the  same  identity  and  difference 
as  the  plant;  but  it  has  other  differences,  for  the 
substance  of  the  animal  grows  and  decays  coinci- 
dently.  The  same  animal  is  not  composed  of  the 
same  identical  substance  from  time  to  time,  but  only 
of  the  same  kind  of  substance,  for  its  food  is  con- 
tinuously assimilated  and  used  in  function  and  dis- 
charged as  new  food  is  absorbed. 

But  there  is  another  identity  to  be  explained, 
namely,  class  identity,  for  the  member  of  a  class  is 
identical  with  every  other  member  of  the  class  in 
some  respects,  and  different  from  every  other  mem- 
ber of  the  class  in  other  respects.  In  minerals  the 
individuals  are  identical  in  being  composed  of  the 
same  substance,  and  different  in  being  composed  of 
different  quantities  of  the  same  substance.  The 
individuals  of  a  class  of  plants  are  identical  in  sub- 
stance, but  different  in  quantity  and  in  history.  In 
animals  the  individuals  are  identical  in  kind  of  sub- 
stance, different  in  quantity  and  history,  and  also 
different  in  that  their  substance  undergoes  a  secular 
change  by  absorbing  new  substance  and  throwing 


124  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

off  the  old.  In  common  ideation  animals  differ  in 
other  respects  from  plants  and  minerals,  in  that 
they  are  animate  bodies,  and  have  the  property  of 
judgment  or  consciousness. 

The  same  body  is  relegated  to  different  classes  in 
a  hierarchy  of  classes  by  the  consideration  of  differ- 
ent degrees  of  identity.  The  fewer  but  more  funda- 
mental the  identities  the  greater  the  number  of  the 
individuals  in  the  class;  the  fewer  the  number  of 
variables  and  the  less  fundamental  the  variables,  the 
smaller  the  number  of  individuals  within  the  class. 
Following  the  methods  of  classification  as  bodies  are 
found  in  nature,  the  same  object  is  found  to  fall 
within  different  classes,  which  constitute  a  hierarchy. 
Thus  every  object  has  its  identities  grouped  in  a 
hierarchy  of  classes.  A  horse  is  identical  with  all 
other  horses  in  certain  attributes,  but  it  is  also  iden- 
tical with  all  animals  in  a  fewer  number  of  attributes, 
though  it  may  be  considered  as  an  object.  No  horse 
exists  solely  as  an  animal ;  but  it  may  be  considered 
only  as  an  animal,  that  is,  we  may  consider  those 
properties  which  make  it  an  animal.  No  horse 
exists  which  is  only  a  vertebrate,  but  we  may  con- 
sider only  those  characteristics  which  make  it  a 
vertebrate.  No  horse  exists  only  as  a  mammal,  but 
we  may  consider  only  those  characteristics  which 
constitute  the  mammal.  No  horse  exists  only  as  a 
horse,  but  we  may  consider  those  characteristics 
which  constitute  the  horse  and  still  there  will  remain 
the  characteristics  which  distinguish  it  from  other 
horses.  Thus,  in  the  different  groups  into  which 
the  horse  is  thrown  in  the  series,  we  may  consider 
its  different  attributes  in  every  class,  but  it  is  only  a 
method  of  consideration.  This  is  a  concrete  world, 


CLASSIFICATION  12$ 

and  objects  are  concrete  in  all  their  classes,  and  no 
entity  or  body  exists  which  corresponds  solely  to  the 
class  to  which  the  object  belongs. 

A  fallacy  has  tainted  philosophy  from  the  early 
history  of  civilization  to  the  present  time  through 
the  entanglement  which  has  arisen  from  considering 
an  object  as  belonging  to  different  classes.  It  has 
been  supposed  that  there  is  an  entity  which  repre- 
sents the  class  as  distinct  from  every  individual  of 
the  class  to  which  the  characteristics  of  the  individual 
adhere.  This  nothing  which  has  been  entertained 
by  philosophers  is  a  fallacy.  It  is  an  easy  thing 
to  be  lost  in  the  maze  of  speculation  about  classes 
in  which  fallacies  fill  the  mind  and  obscure  the  real 
world.  Abstraction  is  simply  a  method  of  considera- 
tion useful  and  necessary  in  cognition,  but  to  sup- 
pose that  the  things  which  we  consider  abstractly 
have  a  disjunct  existence  is  to  enter  the  realm  of 
metaphysical  illusions. 

In  early  society  the  origin  of  names  was  not 
understood,  and  often  names  were  believed  to  be 
properties,  especially  when  properties  were  consid- 
ered as  qualities.  When  the  characteristics  which 
belong  to  a  kind  and  make  it  a  kind  were  considered 
as  the  attributes  of  distinct  entities,  called  essences, 
then  the  name  was  considered  to  be  one  of  these 
essential  attributes  or  properties  by  which  the  class 
was  designated.  Thus  a  fallacy  was  made  to  breed 
a  fallacy,  and  the  two  fallacies  grew  up  together  and 
are  often  connected,  and  how  can  you  dispel  the 
fallacy  of  essence  without  dispelling  the  fallacy  of 
inherent  name?  Thus  a  pair  of  ghosts  stalk  the 
world  together,  and  fight  each  other's  battles.  How 
these  ghosts  waltzed  in  the  dance  of  philosophy 


126  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

seems  a  marvelous  feat — a  Tarn  O'Shanter  dance  of 
warlock  and  witch. 

It  is  not  strange  that  those  who  believe  in  a  sub- 
strate of  substance  should  also  believe  in  an  essence 
of  kind;  then  this  essence  becomes  the  noumenon, 
and  the  characteristics  of  class  become  the 
phenomena ;  this  dream  is  the  reality  of  metaphysic ; 
the  knowledge  of  science  is  the  identification  of 
phenomenon  with  noumenon. 

It  has  already  been  asserted  that  classification  is  a 
tool  of  logic;  and  this  assertion  now  requires  demon- 
stration. The  first  law  of  deduction  may  be  formu- 
lated in  the  following  terms:  whatever  is  true  of 
anything  is  true  of  its  class  identity.  Inductive 
reasoning  is  the  discovery  of  the  members  of  a  class ; 
that  is,  it  is  classification ;  deductive  reasoning  is  the 
application  of  the  first  law  of  reason  as  given  above. 

A  drop  of  water  is  analyzed  and  found  to  be  com- 
posed of  oxygen  and  hydrogen  in  certain  propor- 
tions; other  analyses  verify  this  conclusion.  Now, 
by  the  first  law  of  deduction  every  drop  of  pure 
water  in  the  sea,  on  the  land,  and  in  the  air  has  a 
like  composition ;  but  in  every  drop  of  water  found 
in  nature  there  are  other  substances,  and  for  the 
analysis  of  the  water  these  substances  are  eliminated. 
Now  I  take  water  from  a  spring,  and  though  satis- 
fied that  water  is  oxygen  and  hydrogen  in  certain 
proportions,  yet  in  this  water  there  are  other  sub- 
stances for  which  I  must  seek,  and  by  induction  I 
discover  them.  Induction  is  here  the  discovery  of 
the  nature  of  pure  water  and  other  kinds  of  water, 
and  as  these  facts  are  learned  by  induction  the  sev- 
eral kinds  are  classified,  and  then  the  first  law  of 
deduction  applies  to  each  class.  Induction  is  the 


CLASSIFICATION  127 

discovery  of  class,  and  thus  the  discovery  of  the 
law ;  deduction  is  the  application  of  law. 

All  laws  may  be  reduced  to  this  form,  and  are  but 
variants  of  it.  There  is  nothing  occult  or  wonderful 
in  the  nature  of  law;  law  is  just  as  simple  as  relation, 
just  as  simple  as  persistence,  just  as  simple  as  speed, 
just  as  simple  as  extension,  just  as  simple  as  unity. 
In  scientific  philosophy  the  process  of  reasoning 
reduces  the  complex  to  the  simple.  In  metaphys- 
ical philosophy  the  attempt  is  made  to  explain  the 
simple  in  terms  of  the  complex. 

Many  errors  have  arisen  in  respect  to  the  nature 
of  classification,  of  which  two  are  of  such  importance 
to  our  present  work  as  to  require  elucidation.  It 
has  been  held  by  some  that  classes  are  inventions 
and  not  discoveries,  especially  by  those  who  have 
reified  and  personified  the  world  as  pure  mind. 
Some  who  have  not  fallen  into  this  error  have  still 
considered  classes  as  artificial,  invented  for  the  pur- 
pose of  economizing  thought,  and  that  real  classes 
are  found  only  because  all  of  the  units  are  not 
apprehended,  and  that  classification  is  thus  a  prod- 
uct of  ignorance  and  an  infirmity  of  language.  To 
a  mind  having  infinite  comprehension  classification 
would  be  unnecessary;  the  whole  would  be  grasped 
in  mind  simultaneously.  Now  ideas  are  evolved 
serially,  hence  it  becomes  necessary  to  take  them 
one  by  one  as  they  come  and  to  group  them  and 
regroup  them  in  hierarchies,  for  while  the  bodies  of 
which  they  are  ideas  are  presented  to  the  mind 
serially  of  themselves,  they  exist  in  systems  of 
hierarchies,  and  they  are  thus  presented  in  nature 
in  a  hierarchy  of  bodies  of  different  orders. 

The  things  of  this  world  are  presented  to  the  senses 


128  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

in  a  chaos  of  phenomena.  At  every  glance  of  wak- 
ing life  we  see  a  number  of  heterogeneous  colors  and 
a  number  of  heterogeneous  bodies.  While  this  goes 
on  we  hear  a  number  of  heterogeneous  sounds  arising 
from  heterogeneous  bodies.  At  the  same  time  we 
smell  heterogeneous  odors  from  heterogeneous 
bodies,  and  taste  heterogeneous  flavors  from 
heterogeneous  bodies,  and  touch  heterogeneous 
surfaces  of  heterogeneous  bodies,  and  discover 
heterogeneous  forces  in  heterogeneous  bodies, 
perhaps  all  in  one  second  of  time;  but  as  the 
instances  come  new  sensations  come  in  the  most 
heterogeneous  manner,  and  the  things  presented 
to  the  senses  seem  to  constitute  a  chaos.  Out  of 
this  chaos  a  cosmos  arises,  for  sensation,  which  is 
the  fundamental  faculty  of  the  mind,  is  classification. 
This  classification  is  fundamentally  mechanical. 
The  eye  sees  the  colors  and  classifies  them,  the  ear 
hears  the  sounds  and  classifies  them,  the  nose  smells 
the  odors  and  classifies  them,  the  tongue  tastes  the 
flavors  and  classifies  them,  the  touch  feels  the  sur- 
faces and  classifies  them,  the  muscular  sense  feels 
the  forces  and  classifies  them,  and  behold,  all  of 
these  sensations  are  wrought  into  systems  as  if  by 
magic ! 

In  one  chapter  we  considered  bodies  as  particles, 
and  'found  that  we  were  discussing  quantitative 
properties,  as  number,  space,  motion,  time,  and  judg- 
ment. In  another  chapter  we  considered  particles  as 
incorporated,  and  found  ourselves  to  be  dealing  with 
categoric  properties,  as  kinds,  forms,  forces,  causa- 
tions, and  concepts.  Then  in  another  chapter  we 
discussed  the  reincorporation  of  bodies  as  they  are 


CLASSIFICATION  129 

revealed  in  geonomy,  and  found  ourselves  dealing 
with  both  quantitative  and  classific  properties.  In 
another  chapter  we  discussed  methods  of  reincor- 
poration  in  plants,  or  the  bodies  of  phytonomy,  in 
which  we  were  compelled  again  to  consider  quanti- 
tative and  classific  properties.  Finally,  a  chapter 
was  devoted  to  a  third  method  of  the  reincorpora- 
tion  of  bodies  as  they  are  revealed  in  zoonomy,  and 
again  we  were  led  to  consider  both  quantitative  and 
classific  properties. 

Here  it  becomes  necessary  to  more  clearly  dis- 
tinguish those  bodies  which  we  have  called  molar, 
for  the  term  has  been  used  in  a  somewhat  restricted 
sense  which  should  be  understood.  By  a  molar 
body  we  mean  one  which  is  revealed  to  the  senses 
without  the  use  of  instruments  such  as  the  telescope, 
the  microscope,  the  spectroscope,  or  the  crucible, 
aided  by  computation  and  logical  ideation. 

All  geonomic  bodies  are  molar  bodies,  and  so  are 
plants  and  animals.  Savage  and  barbaric  men  sup- 
posed the  stars  to  be  molar  bodies,  while  ethereal 
bodies  were  wholly  unknown,  their  manifestations 
being  interpreted  as  phenomena  due  to  molar  bodies. 
Thus  the  concepts  of  mankind  were  first  compounded 
of  judgments  about  molar  bodies,  or  such  as  were 
supposed  to  be  molar,  and  intellection  progressed  in 
this  manner  until  the  dawn  of  civilization  and  the 
invention  of  instruments  of  research,  mathematical 
computation  and  logical  ideation. 

Man  seems  to  occupy  a  position  in  the  world  mid- 
way between  extremes  of  magnitude.  On  the  one 
side  there  are  bodies  which  are  vast  systems  of  stars 
like  the  solar  system,  and  these  are  revealed  by  the 
employment  of  instruments  as  aids  to  vision,  and 


I^O  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

are  further  revealed  by  careful  investigation  as 
magnitudes  are  measured  and  computed;  on  the 
other  hand  there  are  magnitudes  that  are  so  minute 
that  they  are  revealed  only  by  the  microscope  and 
other  methods  of  investigation,  especially  in  chem- 
istry where  molecules  and  atoms  appear,  and  are 
further  revealed  when  we  investigate  the  nature  of 
the  ether  and  find  ourselves  immersed  in  the  contem- 
plation of  magnitudes  that  are  lost  in  immeasurable 
numbers.  Between  these  extremes  we  find  molar 
bodies  that  are  revealed  to  the  senses  as  bodies  with- 
out the  supplementary  devices.  Thus  we  use  the 
terms  molar,  stellar,  and  molecular  to  designate  in  a 
general  way  the  magnitude  of  bodies  as  they  are 
compared  with  the  magnitude  of  our  bodies  and  the 
means  by  which  these  comparative  magnitudes  are 
determined. 

When  we  go  on  to  discover  stellar  bodies  we  find 
that  we  observe  them  from  our  standpoint  by  con- 
sidering their  quantitative  properties,  that  is,  con- 
sidering them  as  particles,  and  ultimately  find  that 
these  stellar  particles  are  combined  in  systems. 
Again,  when  we  investigate  the  minute  constitution 
of  bodies  we  also  consider  them  as  particles,  and 
deal  with  quantitative  properties,  and  through  the 
quantitative  properties  discover  their  forms  as  struc- 
ture and  figure.  Thus  it  is  that  in  the  minute  and 
vast  alike,  in  stars  and  in  molecules,  in  systems  and 
ethereal  particles,  science  is  interested  chiefly  in 
quantitative  properties,  and  through  them  classific 
properties  are  revealed. 

Plants  and  animals,  which  are  molar  bodies  by  our 
definition,  first  come  to  be  investigated  in  modern 
or  national  civilization  when  they  are  treated  as 


CLASSIFICATION  131 

kinds  and  classified ;  but  as  we  discover  their  kinds 
we  discover  relations  of  form,  force,  causation,  and 
mentation,  and  a  multitude  of  appliances  for  research 
are  developed. 

In  these  realms  research  deals  with  categoric 
properties,  and  reduces  all  phenomena  to  kinds,  and 
the  ultimate  expression  of  all  knowledge  is  classifica- 
tion verified  by  quantification.  In  plants  bodies  are 
reduced  to  particles  when  a  minimum  of  computa- 
tion can  be  used.  So  animals  are  reduced  to  par- 
ticles by  research,  and  again  computation  can  be 
used.  The  goal  reached  by  research  is  the  particle, 
the  way  traveled  is  by  classific  logic,  while  in 
etheronomy  and  astronomy  the  goal  reached  is  the 
body,  and  the  road  pursued  is  mathematical  compu- 
tation. In  geonomy  both  methods  of  research  are 
used.  The  quantitative  and  categoric  methods  of 
research  are  conventional.  Quantities  are  measured 
by  conventional  or  artificial  methods,  with  artificial 
or  conventional  units.  Kinds  are  also  in  the  same 
sense  and  by  equivalent  processes  selected  as  the 
representative  of  forms,  forces,  causations  and  men- 
tations in  order  that  classification  may  proceed  and 
logical  results  be  reached.  Thus  logic  and  mathemat- 
ics are  reciprocal  methods  of  procedure  in  the  cogni- 
tion of  the  world.  The  mathematical  method  is  chiefly 
deductive,  the  logical  method  is  chiefly  inductive, 
but  they  cannot  be  separated.  There  is  no  deduc- 
tion without  its  reciprocal  induction,  and  there  is  no 
induction  without  its  reciprocal  deduction.  Deduc- 
tion is  abstraction  which  posits  induction,  and  induc- 
tion is  abstraction  when  deduction  is  posited.  Deduc- 
tion and  induction  cannot  be  carried  on  apart,  for 
deduction  is  dependent  upon  induction,  and  induction 


132  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

is  dependent  upon  deduction,  and  the  attempt  to  dis- 
sever them  leads  the  mind  into  a  fog  of  speculation 
where  men  are  lost  on  the  shoreless  sea  of  meta- 
physics or  the  endless  trail  of  unrelated  facts. 


CHAPTER  X 

HOMOLOGY 

Extension  may  be  defined  as  exclusive  occupancy 
of  space.  The  particles  having  extension  exclude 
others  from  that  extension,  and  thus  extension  has 
also  been  called  impenetrability.  The  particle  hav- 
ing motion  changes  its  position  to  occupy  space 
vacated;  hence,  change  of  position  is  always 
exchange  of  position.  As  the  particles  are  all  in 
motion  at  an  inconceivable  rate  of  speed,  one  evacu- 
ates its  position  as  another  enters. 

The  idea  of  a  plenum  of  substance  was  entertained 
by  philosophers  in  the  early  history  of  civilization. 
Gradually  this  was  abandoned  by  many,  but  lately  it 
has  been  revived  as  best  explaining  the  phenomena 
of  the  ether,  and  countenance  is  given  to  the 
hypothesis  by  the  demonstration  that  molecular 
bodies  have  internal  motions  and  interspatial  ether. 

Space  is  the  relation  of  extension  which  particles 
bear  to  one  another  in  position,  when  considered 
without  regard  to  their  incorporation  in  a  higher 
body.  If  the  particles  be  not  ultimate  a  medium  of 
smaller  particles  is  intercalated.  Space,  therefore, 
is  the  extension  of  positions. 

While  space  is  the  relation  of  positions,  positions 
and  relations  must  vanish  if  the  extensions  vanish. 
These  relations  may  be  relations  of  direction,  or  they 
may  be  relations  of  distance,  but  as  particles  are  in 
motion  the  relations  of  direction  are  changed.  In 
the  same  manner  the  relations  of  distance  may 

133 


134  TRUTH   AND  ERROR 

change.  Thus  the  boy  and  the  dog  may  change 
relation  of  direction,  when  one  or  both  move,  and 
they  may  or  may  not  change  relations  of  distance  at 
the  same  time.  These  space  relations  do  not 
change  by  reason  of  intervening  bodies.  The  boy 
may  be  a  yard  from  the  dog  though  a  wall  inter- 
venes. 

When  positions  are  considered  as  established  by 
incorporation,  forms  are  observed  having  the  rela- 
tions of  the  particles  established,  and  these  estab- 
lished relations  constitute  structure  and  figure ;  thus 
form  is  figure  and  structure.  When  space  becomes 
form,  extension  becomes  figure  and  position  becomes 
structure. 

By  incorporation  particles  retain  in  a  qualified 
degree  their  space  relations ;  that  is,  the  space  rela- 
tions must  be  fixed  within  such  limits  that  the  incor- 
poration is  preserved,  for  if  dissolution  supervenes 
form  relations  are  dissolved.  Still,  form  relations 
are  not  fixed  with  such  rigidity  as  to  prevent  internal 
motion.  A  body  may  still  remain  a  body  within 
certain  degrees  of  temperature,  passing  through 
stages  of  bulk  by  contraction  and  expansion,  but  if 
the  expansion  is  increased  beyond  the  critical  point 
the  body  is  dissolved. 

We  consider  bodies  as  particles  when  we  consider 
their  space  relations,  and  we  consider  them  as  forms 
when  we  consider  their  corporeal  relations  as  units. 
Habits  of  thought  are  formed  in  such  a  manner  that 
some  bodies  are  usually  considered  as  particles, 
while  other  bodies  are  usually  considered  as  bodies. 
By  like  habits  of  thought  it  is  customary  to  consider 
the  solar  system,  not  as  a  body,  but  as  an  assemblage 
of  orbs,  for  the  science  of  astronomy  has  not  yet  sue- 


HOMOLOGY  135 

cessf  ully  attacked  the  problem  of  the  relation  of  the 
solar  system  to  other  stellar  systems.  When  a  body 
is  considered  as  an  individual  in  shape  and  structure, 
form  is  presented ;  but  when  a  body  is  considered  as 
a  community  of  particles,  space  is  considered.  Thus 
it  is  seen  that  what  is  called  space  in  the  relations  of 
particles,  is  called  structure  in  the  relations  of  form. 
In  this  treatise  the  term  space  is  never  used  to 
denote  the  void — the  nothing — but  is  always  used  to 
denote  something  real;  so  that  space  relations  are 
the  reciprocals  of  structure  relations. 

When  we  consider  stars  as  such  they  are  bodies, 
the  particles  of  which  are  molecules.  If  we  could 
study  them  as  molecules  they  would  present  rela- 
tions of  structure;  so  we  may  conceive  of  such  rela- 
tions, though  we  cannot  actually  observe  them ;  but 
we  can  observe  the  figures  of  the  bodies.  Stars  are 
embodied  into  systems  when  they,  in  turn,  become 
particles  and  have  space  relations  to  one  another; 
this  is  structure  from  the  standpoint  of  the  system, 
but  the  systems  as  bodies  have  form  as  figure  and 
structure.  Here  in  the  celestial  realm  is  found  a 
series  or  hierarchy  of  individuals  and  communities. 

When  we  come  to  the  study  of  the  earth  as  a 
body,  we  find  it  composed  of  four  particles:  the 
atmosphere,  the  hydrosphere,  the  lithosphere,  and 
the  centrosphere.  When  we  consider  it  as  a  body  we 
consider  form  and  structure ;  when  we  consider  the 
spheres  as  particles  their  relations  are  those  of  space, 
one  above  another;  thus  in  the  body  there  is  form, 
in  the  particles  there  is  position,  and  that  which  is 
position  in  the  particle  constitutes  structure  in  the 
body. 

Again  the  stony  crust  or  lithosphere  may  be  con- 


136  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

sidered  as  a  body  when  its  particles  are  formations 
of  igneous,  aqueous,  aerial,  vegetal,  and  animal 
origin.  Then  as  a  form  its  structure  is  derived  from 
its  formations,  which  are  related  to  one  another  in 
structure. 

The  formations  may  be  considered  as  bodies ;  then 
the  blocks  of  which  they  are  composed,  called  rocks, 
are  particles.  The  structure  of  the  formation  is  the 
arrangement  of  the  rocks ;  the  relations  of  the  rocks 
to  one  another  are  relations  of  structure.  We  may 
consider  rocks  as  bodies,  and  omitting  ill-defined 
granulation  and  incomplete  crystallization  and  also 
omitting  for  the  present  purposes  the  consideration 
of  the  substances  of  which  the  rocks  are  composed, 
we  may  consider  rocks  as  bodies  with  particles  of 
molecules;  then  the  form  of  the  rock  is  its  structure 
of  molecules;  the  relation  of  the  molecules  to  one 
another  in  position  is  structure.  Omitting  various 
molecular  stages  in  the  hierarchy,  we  find  atoms  as 
the  particles  of  molecules,  the  molecules  having 
form  in  figure  and  structure  and  the  atoms  having 
space  in  their  relations  of  positions  to  one  another. 
Thus  in  the  geonomic  realm  there  is  found  a  hierarchy 
of  individuals  and  a  hierarchy  of  communities. 

The  sciences  of  geonomy  are  divided  usually  into 
two  correlative  groups,  called  geography,  in  which 
five  departments  are  pretty  well  recognized,  namely, 
ethereal  geography,  stellar  geography,  aerial 
geography,  hydrographic  geography,  and  land 
geography ;  and  geology,  composed  of  five  well  recog- 
nized sciences:  chemistry,  mineralogy,  dynamics, 
structural  geology,  and  paleontology.  What  I  have 
called  geography  is  approached  from  the  standpoint 
of  quantitative  properties,  while  those  sciences  which 


HOMOLOGY  137 

I  have  called  geology  are  approached  from  the 
standpoint  of  categoric  properties.  This  division 
into  two  groups  is  well  recognized  when  the  one  is 
considered  as  deductive  and  the  other  as  inductive,  or 
when  the  one  is  relegated  to  the  physical  division, 
the  other  to  the  natural  history  division. 

We  may  consider  a  plant  as  a  body;  then  the 
phytons  of  which  it  is  composed  are  particles.  A 
phyton  may  be  considered  as  a  body,  then  the  cells 
are  considered  as  particles ;  in  turn,  the  cell  may  be 
considered  as  a  body,  then  its  blasts  may  be  consid- 
ered as  particles.  Then  a  blast  as  the  nucleus  may 
be  the  body  whose  particles  are  molecules,  and  the 
molecule  as  a  body  has  atoms  for  its  particles.  Thus 
there  is  a  hierarchy  of  bodies  and  of  particles  in  the 
plant  realm  in  which  the  bodies  have  form  while  the 
particles  have  space.  We  do  not  aspire  to  a  treatise 
on  botany,  but  stop  to  consider  only  certain  facts 
which  are  essential  to  this  argument ;  a  consideration 
of  the  higher  plants  will  serve  our  purpose.  Certain 
phytons  are  modified  to  become  roots,  which  are  the 
organs  devoted  to  the  absorption  from  the  earth  of 
the  materials  which  are  to  be  woven  into  the  plant ; 
other  phytons  become  the  stem  for  support;  others 
the  branches  for  expansion;  others  the  leaves  for 
respiration ;  others  pistils  and  stamens  for  reproduc- 
tion, while  others  become  floral  envelopes  for  their 
protection.  Every  group  of  phytons  in  the  plant, 
therefore,  has  a  separate  function,  and  is  an  organ. 
All  of  these  organs,  except  those  for  reproduction, 
have  functions  relating  to  the  metamorphosis  of  the 
individual ;  but  the  floral  envelope  and  seed  organs 
are  devoted  to  reproduction.  This  development  of 
phytons  into  organisms  and  organs  leads  in  the  study 


138  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

of  botany  to  the  consideration  of  the  homologies  of 
the  organs.  Reproduction  in  the  plant  makes  a  vast 
stride  from  ontogeny  to  phylogeny.  Here  we  are 
introduced  to  the  subject  of  heredity.  Plants  are 
multiplied  in  vast  numbers  and  the  offspring  inherit 
likeness  from  parents;  this  inheritance  is  put  at 
usury,  so  that  each  heir  inherits  the  entire  posses- 
sions of  the  legator,  and  wealth  is  multiplied  by 
bequest.  Then  the  legatee  places  his  wealth  at 
usury,  and  with  its  increments  bequeaths  it  to  every 
individual  who  is  a  legatee:  so  organs  and  organisms 
are  developed. 

The  simplest  plants  are  protophytes  and  unicel- 
lular; but  these  unicellular  bodies  are  still  more 
highly  organized  in  the  higher  protophytes  when 
unicellular  bodies  are  connected  with  one  another 
by  vegetal  threads  which  are  themselves  unicellular 
bodies  metamorphosed  by  elongation,  as  in  the 
slimes.  The  protophytes  are  simple  cellate  bodies 
which  multiply  by  fission,  and  growth  itself  becomes 
reproduction. 

The  cells  themselves  are  organized  into  tissues 
and  the  tissues  are  arranged  in  form  as  planes  and 
combinations  of  planes.  In  combining,  the  planes 
are  sometimes  arranged  about  stems  of  trunks. 
These  are  the  thallophytes.  The  entire  thallophyte 
is  a  cell  with  structural  parts  as  nucleus  endoblast, 
mesoblast  and  exoblast. 

In  the  thallophytes  growth  is  chiefly  marginal  to  a 
plane.  Reproduction  is  not  a  division  of  the  whole 
plant  into  new  plants,  but  is  a  division  of  only  por- 
tions of  the  plant  which  are  organs  of  reproduction. 
Spores  are  thrown  off  from  the  surface  of  the  repro- 
ductive organ. 


HOMOLOGY  139 

Systematic  botanists  seem  to  be  agreed  in  placing 
the  bryophytes  below  the  pterodophytes. 

In  the  bryophytes  a  nucleated  cylinder  is  produced 
which  grows  mainly  by  elongation.  Special  organs 
of  reproduction  appear  with  many  devices  for  the 
preservation  of  the  spores  and  their  distribution  over 
the  soil.  In  the  nature  of  these  reproductive  organs 
I  find  evidence  of  high  rank.  The  leaves  also  are 
not  mere  fronds  or  expansions  of  the  body,  but  are 
highly  differentiated  leaves. 

In  the  pterodophytes  the  thallophytic  structure  in 
planes  is  still  predominant,  but  roots  are  developed, 
the  bodies  are  of  more  or  less  cylindrical  form,  and 
thallophytic  leaves  are  often  found  as  fronds.  The 
reproductive  organs  are  more  highly  differentiated. 
In  some  the  margins  of  fronds  are  reflexed  to  make 
seed  vessels,  in  others  segments  of  fronds  or  entire 
fronds  are  transformed  and  there  are  other  methods 
of  forming  seed  vessels.  In  all  a  great  variety  of 
seed  vessels  are  found,  all  exhibiting  comparatively 
simple  transformation;  the  cellate  structure  of  the 
entire  plant  is  still  preserved,  though  greatly 
metamorphosed. 

The  spermatophytes  are  the  flowering  plants.  In 
this  sub-kingdom  the  seeds  are  no  longer  mere  spores, 
but  are  plant  bodies  with  microscopically  developed 
forms.  The  entire  plant  preserves  the  cellate 
structure,  while  all  the  organs  of  the  plant  are  of 
cellular  structure. 

The  forms  of  plants  are  seriated  three  times: 

First,  there  is  the  series  through  which  the  indi- 
vidual plant  passes.  Now  the  forms  exhibited  in  the 
individual  plant  at  different  stages  of  growth  may 
be  compared  with  the  forms  of  plants  of  the  same 


140  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

species  taken  at  different  stages  of  growth,  and  the 
same  results  reached  without  waiting  for  the  growth 
of  one  plant. 

Second,  we  may  study  different  species  of  plants 
and  compare  them  with  some  one  taken  as  a  stand- 
ard ;  but  this  should  be  a  plant  of  the  highest  struc- 
ture. Then  in  comparing  plants  of  lower  structure 
with  it,  it  will  be  found  that  the  stages  marked  in 
the  growth  of  the  higher  plant  are  represented  by 
stages  in  the  order  in  which  the  record  has  been  kept 
in  the  higher. 

Third,  a  record  has  been  kept  in  the  tome  of 
geology  by  which  the  forms  of  plants  have  been 
recorded,  not  in  the  language  of  symbols,  but  in  the 
language  of  the  forms  themselves  as  fossils.  While 
knowledge  of  this  record  is  incomplete,  in  so  far  as 
it  has  been  read,  it  agrees  with  the  individual  records 
and  the  class  records. 

The  cell  of  the  plant  has  a  structure  consisting  of 
a  threefold  capsule  or  wall  and  a  nucleus.  The  seed 
of  the  plant  has  the  same  structure  with  the  three- 
fold wall  or  epidermis  and  nucleus,  and  the  cellular 
structure  is  preserved  in  the  plant  itself,  which 
retains  its  envelope  of  bark  divided  into  three  layers 
which  contain  a  nucleus.  We  have  already  found 
that  the  earth  has  a  cellate  structure,  in  the  air, 
the  sea,  the  land,  and  the  nucleus ;  the  elements  of 
this  structure  we  have  called  spheres  or  cellates. 
We  call  the  structural  elements  of  the  cell,  the  seed 
and  the  plant,  blasts  or  cellates. 

Some  plants  are  single  celled.  These  have  many 
forms,  but  one  form  is  homologous  with  another, 
that  is,  it  is  composed  of  the  same  structural  ele- 
ments. The  cells  are  compounded  into  phytons  and 


grow  into  different  forms,  but  one  phyton  is  homol- 
ogous with  another ;  then  phytons  are  compounded, 
and  still  higher  plants  are  produced  which  are 
metamorphosed  into  different  forms ;  but  one  higher 
plant  is  homologous  with  another.  Phytons  being 
composed  of  cells  are  homologous  with  cells,  and 
higher  plants  being  composed  of  phytons  are  homol- 
ogous with  phytons,  and  thus  with  cells;  that  is  to 
say,  the  discovery  of  homologies  in  plants  is  the 
discovery  of  the  morphologic  elements  of  which  they 
are  compounded.  As  they  are  compounded,  cells 
are  differentiated,  and  when  they  are  compounded 
into  phytons  differentiated  cells  make  differentiated 
phytons,  then  differentiated  phytons  make  differ- 
entiated higher  plants. 

In  plants  there  is  another  set  of  homologies  in  the 
position  of  the  leaves,  which  is  revealed  to  us  in  the 
science  of  phyllotaxy. 

Metamorphosis  is  growth  and  decay.  One  body 
cannot  grow  unless  another  body  decays ;  one  crystal 
cannot  increase  in  size  unless  some  other  yields  its 
particles  for  that  purpose;  one  plant  cannot  grow 
unless  molecules  of  water  and  other  substances  are 
used  to  constitute  the  molecule  of  protoplasm ;  one 
animal  cannot  grow  unless  some  other  animal  or 
some  plant  dies ;  thus  metamorphosis  is  decay  of  one 
and  growth  of  another. 

Development  which  supervenes  upon  metamor- 
phosis is  the  production  of  cooperative  organs  all 
necessary  to  the  life,  growth  and  reproduction  of  the 
individual,  and  these  organs  have  different  powers, 
which  in  physiology  are  called  functions.  The  exer- 
cise of  functions  is  accomplished  by  metabolism, 
which  is  the  recombination  of  chemical  particles  so 


142  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

that  new  particles  come  to  take  the  place  of  those 
rejected.  In  this  exchange  particles  do  not  lose 
speed,  but  all  have  their  directions  changed.  That 
which  is  required  for  present  consideration  is  that 
exercise  stimulates  the  exchange.  Now,  activity  of 
function  increases  metabolism ;  total  rest  from  activ- 
ity retards  metabolism,  and  continued  rest  will  ulti- 
mately cause  atrophy ;  thus  the  form  of  the  animal 
is  transformed,  for  the  slow  changes  that  occur  in 
this  manner  are  transmitted  to  offspring,  and  if  the 
offspring  continue  the  process,  growth  or  decay  are 
continued  in  the  next  generation,  and  on  through  many 
generations,  producing  results  as  varieties  and  fin  ally 
species,  as  organs  are  developed  and  extirpated. 

We  have  now  to  consider  animals  and  the  organs 
of  which  they  are  composed  in  the  transmutations 
through  which  they  pass  as  illustrating  the  subject 
of  morphology. 

There  are  five  great  classes  of  animals:  Protozoa, 
Radiata,  Mollusca,  Articulata,  and  Vertebrata. 
The  Protozoans  are  unicellular  or  simple  combina- 
tions of  cells.  Above  the  Protozoa,  animals  are 
organized  on  four  different  plans  of  structure,  but 
they  are  all  compounded  of  cells,  though  many  of 
the  cells  are  greatly  modified.  In  these  modifica- 
tions the  cellate  structure  reappears  as  a  funda- 
mental homologue  in  every  organ  of  all  of  the  higher 
animals,  and  it  is  still  found  in  the  animals  them- 
selves. The  phytons  of  plants  are  the  homologues 
of  organs  in  animals.  There  may  be  many  phytons 
serving  the  same  functions  in  plants,  as  there  may 
be  many  organs  serving  the  same  function  in  ani- 
mals ;  but  in  animals,  as  functions  are  differentiated, 
kinds  of  organs  are  multiplied  and  the  number  of 


HOMOLOGY  143 

organs  performing  the  same  functions  is  diminished 
from  the  lower  to  the  higher  organism. 

In  animals  the  fundamental  homologies  are  found 
when  we  discover  that  all  organs  are  dermal.  We 
cannot  stop  here  to  make  an  exposition  of  this  sub- 
ject throughout  the  whole  animal  kingdom,  but  will 
confine  ourselves  to  one  small  group  of  vertebrates, 
namely,  the  mammals. 

First,  there  are  organs  of  nutrition,  constituting  all 
those  that  take  part  in  the  digestion,  secretion,  and 
excretion  of  food.  Second,  organs  of  circulation,  by 
which  the  food  when  prepared  for  assimilation  is 
distributed  to  the  tissues.  Third,  organs  of  locomo- 
tion, constituting  the  muscular,  tendonous,  and 
osseous  systems.  Fourth,  the  reproductive  organs. 
Fifth,  the  organs  of  mentation,  constituting  the 
nervous  system. 

The  organs  of  digestion  which  prepare  the  food 
are  severally  sacs  and  tubes,  and  conjointly  they 
constitute  a  system  of  sacs  and  tubes,  but  in  this 
system  locomotion  must  be  accomplished,  and  hence 
a  muscular  system  is  attached  to  the  digestive 
system.  Thus  all  the  organs  of  digestion  are  cellate 
in  that  they  have  the  cellate  elements,  for  they  are 
composed  of  encapsulated  parts,  or  inclosing  or 
inclosed  envelopes. 

The  circulating  organs  are  all  found  to  be  cellate 
as  tubes  or  sacs,  one  or  both.  In  this  system 
extreme  variations  are  found;  in  the  veins  and 
arteries  the  tubular  structure  is  carried  to  its 
highest  development,  while  in  the  gall,  the  liver, 
and  the  lungs,  the  sacate  form  is  observed;  while 
the  heart  is  a  muscular  organ  it  is  still  provided  with 
tubes  and  sacs. 


144  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

In  the  muscular  system  every  distinct  muscle  has 
a  cellate  structure,  and  they  are  compounded  into 
groups  on  the  cellate  plan.  Muscles  when  consid- 
ered in  phytogeny  are  found  to  develop  into  tendons 
and  tendons  into  bones;  the  same  development  is 
discovered  to  a  limited  degree  in  ontogeny,  so  that 
muscles,  tendons  and  bones  are  homologous.  The 
cellate  structure  of  bones  is  conspicuous,  for  they  all 
have  the  periosteum  and  nucleus. 

In  the  reproductive  systems  both  sacs  and  tubes 
are  found,  all  of  cellate  structure. 

In  the  nervous  system  the  differentiation  between 
sacs  and  tubes  is  carried  to  its  highest  degree.  The 
nerves  proper  are  all  tubular  cellates.  In  the  lowest 
units  they  are  cellate,  and  they  are  compounded  as 
cellates.  In  the  ganglia  they  are  sacate,  and  are 
compounded  as  sacs.  Certain  of  the  ganglia  have 
osseous  protection  as  vertebrae,  and  every  vertebra  is 
a  cellate  structure  as  a  bone  with  elaborate  differ- 
entiation in  morphology.  The  vertebrae  that  have 
united  to  form  the  cranium  are  extremely  differ- 
entiated as  morphologic  elements,  but  the  most 
extreme  of  morphologic  elements  is  found  in  the 
organs  of  sense,  every  organ  having  a  distinct  form, 
and  all  preserving  the  cellate  structure. 

Then  the  systems  of  organs  which  we  have  just 
described  are  themselves  compounded  into  systems, 
of  which  hint  has  already  been  given.  While  this 
subject  is  vast  and  tempting,  the  purpose  is  sub- 
served merely  by  giving  a  few  illustrations ;  and  we 
must  forego  systematic  treatment.  In  the  mouth 
there  are  found  elements  of  the  digestive  apparatus : 
the  circulatory  apparatus,  the  muscular  apparatus,  as 
muscles,  tendons,  and  bones,  and  perhaps  elements 


HOMOLOGY  145 

for  reproductive  purposes  and  certainly  apparatus 
for  mental  functions  in  the  sense  of  taste.  Perhaps 
in  all  parts  of  the  body  all  the  five  functions  are  per- 
formed by  apparatus  provided  for  the  purpose. 
Finally,  the  entire  animal  has  a  sacate  and  tubular 
structure,  and  is  thus  a  grand  cellate  of  a  high  order 
of  compounding. 

The  cellate  homologies  of  the  man  are  repeated  in 
all  mammals,  while  the  same  facts  can  be  seen  in 
birds,  reptiles,  batrachians  and  fishes,  for  all  the 
pentalogic  classes  present  a  vast  hierarchy  of  homol- 
ogies, which  illustrate  the  theme  of  morphology. 
Nor  does  the  subject  end  with  vertebrate  morphol- 
ogy, for  the  theme  is  illustrated  in  the  homologies 
found  through  articulates,  mollusks,  radiates,  and 
protozoa.  That  which  we  find  in  the  pentalogic 
classes  of  plants  we  find  also  in  the  pentalogic  classes 
of  animals — a  vast  hierarchy  of  homologies. 

Perhaps  the  great  field  yet  to  be  cultivated  in 
morphology  is  in  the  study  of  the  articulates, 
especially  among  insects.  The  sudden  transforma- 
tions which  they  undergo  in  their  life  history  permit 
the  examination  of  morphologic  stages  to  such  an 
extent  that  morphology  can  be  studied  with  all  its 
multitudinous  phenomena,  and  a  wealth  of  science 
has  already  been  accumulated  as  a  heritage  for  the 
army  of  scientists  necessary  to  give  us  a  complete 
account  of  the  insects  of  the  world,  among  whom 
are  found  tribes  that  vie  almost  with  men  in  demotic 
development. 

We  now  see  how  homologies  are  extended  from 
atom  to  organism.  There  are  homologies  discovered 
in  the  atoms,  which  has  given  rise  to  the  theory  that 
the  atoms  discovered  in  the  seventy  substances  are 


146  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

not  ultimate  particles,  and  it  must  be  remembered 
that  it  rests  only  upon  the  validity  of  reasoning  from 
homologies,  but  that  all  deductive  reasoning  is  based 
on  homologies;  it  may,  therefore,  be  impossible  to 
reach  an  inductive  demonstration  of  the  complete 
homology  of  ultimate  particles,  but  the  deductive 
reasoning  is  perfect.  Then  molecules  which  cannot 
be  seen  and  cannot  be  manipulated  as  individual,  but 
can  be  discovered  only  by  chemical  apparatus,  are 
found  by  analysis  and  synthesis  to  exhibit  many 
homologies,  and  the  science  of  chemistry  undertakes 
this  enterprise. 

The  earth  is  a  cellate  body,  and  from  facts 
revealed  by  astronomy  it  is  confidently  affirmed  that 
the  stars  are  cellate  bodies.  Finally,  homologies 
are  found  in  plants  and  animals;  thus  there  is  a 
hierarchy  of  homologies  throughout  the  universe 
which  constitute  a  continuum,  and  logically  no  plane 
of  demarcation  can  be  discovered  which  constitutes 
an  absolute  gap.  The  continuum  is  not  completely 
demonstrated  by  induction,  but  is  abundantly 
demonstrated  by  deduction. 

Homologies  have  a  high  development  in  the 
organization  of  demotic  bodies  discovered  in  the 
animals,  especially  as  they  are  represented  among 
the  higher  insects,  but  more  fully  illustrated  in  the 
organization  of  human  society.  The  forms  of 
organization  are  various.  In  the  tribes  of  the  world 
families  are  organized  into  clans,  and  clans  into 
phratries,  and  phratries  into  tribes,  and  tribes  into 
confederacies.  In  passing  from  savagery  to  barbar- 
ism, the  clan  becomes  the  gens.  In  all  the  multi- 
tudinous forms  of  tribal  society,  homologies  have 
been  discovered.  In  the  family  husbands  and 


HOMOLOGY  147 

wives,  parents  and  children  are  found,  and  some- 
times grandparents  and  more  remote  kindred  are 
included.  In  the  gens  consanguineal  kinship  is 
reckoned  in  the  female  line ;  in  the  tribe  it  is  reck- 
oned in  both  male  and  female  lines,  and  ties  of 
affinity  are  observed.  In  the  confederacy  conven- 
tional kinship  is  recognized,  and  other  homologies 
exist  in  multitudinous  ways.  For  example,  relative 
age  is  recognized  in  the  family,  in  the  clan  or  in  the 
gens,  in  the  tribe  and  in  the  confederacy,  and  to 
carry  out  the  homology  age  is  often  determined  by 
convention. 

In  national  organizations  another  set  of  homologies 
are  founded  on  those  of  tribal  organization.  Thus, 
in  the  United  States  we  have  the  family,  the  town- 
ship, the  county,  the  state,  and  the  nationality,  and 
homologous  units  are  found  in  all  civilized  govern- 
ments. 

Whenever  two  or  more  bodies  are  homologous 
they  are  identical,  though  they  may  at  the  same  time 
be  different.  Homology  in  form  is  thus  trfe 
reciprocal  of  likeness  in  kind,  so  that  homologies 
fall  under  the  same  law  with  kind,  and  it  may  be 
affirmed  that  whatever  is  true  of  an  object  is  true 
of  its  homologue  in  so  far  as  they  are  identical,  which 
is  but  another  statement  of  the  law  already  given  in 
classification,  that  whatever  is  true  of  a  thing  is  true 
of  its  class  identity.  We  have  seen  that  there  is  a 
vast  system  of  homologies  extending  throughout  the 
universe,  commencing  with  perfect  homology  in  the 
simple  element;  but  gradually  differences  appear, 
becoming  more  marked  as  compounding  proceeds 
and  differentiation  is  more  marked,  that  is,  there  is 
successive  progress  in  variation  from  the  simple  to 


14  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

the  compound,  and  this  variation  appears  as  increas- 
ing complexity.  As  things  become  compound  they 
also  become  complex. 

In  the  foregoing  chapters  an  attempt  has  been 
made  to  show  the  relation  which  exists  between 
extension  and  unity,  position  and  plurality,  space 
and  number,  form  and  kind,  together  with  meta- 
morphosis and  metalogisis.  Now  it  remains  to  show 
the  relation  between  organism  and  class,  together 
with  a  general  statement  of  the  relation  between 
morphology  and  classification.  It  has  been  shown 
that  a  class  is  a  series  of  kinds,  and  as  a  series  it  is  a 
disjunct  group  in  a  more  extended  series.  It  has 
also  been  shown  that  a  form  undergoes  a  meta- 
morphosis, and  that  an  organism  in  its  history  repre- 
sents a  hierarchy  of  metamorphisms  as  exhibited  in 
homology.  Now,  we  must  observe  that  through 
morphology  classes  are  multiplied,  for  not  only  are 
kinds  and  series  classified,  but  forms  are  also  syste- 
matically grouped. 

To  investigate  the  structure  of  plants  we  dissect 
them,  and  find  that  when  the  limit  of  cell  structure 
is  reached  and  molecular  structure  appears,  we  are 
compelled  to  pass  from  dissection  to  chemical 
analysis.  The  highest  molecule  is  protoplasm,  but 
the  protoplasmic  molecule  is  composed  of  molecules 
of  still  lower  orders  until  atoms  are  reached,  when 
chemical  analysis  fails  and  only  logical  anatysis 
seems  possible. 

In  investigating  the  homologies  of  plants  and  plant 
structure  we  are  thrown  back  upon  the  discovery  of 
likeness  and  unlikeness,  or,  in  other  terms,  of 
identity  and  difference ;  and  we  reason  about  plants, 
as  these  identities  and  differences  have  been  dis- 


HOMOLOGY  149 

covered.  The  discovery  of  these  identities  and 
differences  is  induction,  the  application  of  the  laws 
discovered  is  deduction. 

What,  then,  is  the  significance  of  all  these  facts, 
and  why  should  we  gather  them  from  the  highways 
of  morphology  but  for  the  lesson  which  they  teach, 
that  all  forms  of  animals,  plants,  rocks,  and  stars  are 
traced  to  the  substrate  of  extension  in  the  particle? 
Extension  traced  through  all  its  complicated  rela- 
tions of  space,  form,  metamorphosis  and  organism  is 
found  to  be  the  ultimate  substrate  of  them  all. 

Many  extended  particles  incorporated  in  many 
bodies  have  relations  of  position,  space,  form, 
metamorphosis  and  organization,  all  of  which  are 
included  under  the  term  morphology.  These  rela- 
tions cannot  exist  by  themselves,  but  can  only  be 
considered  by  themselves,  for  relations  of  morphol- 
ogy are  concomitant  with  relations  of  classification, 
dynamics  and  evolution  in  the  concrete  world. 
Bodies  can  be  analyzed  only  into  particles,  and  the 
particles  still  retain  their  properties,  which  may  be 
considered  abstractly.  If  I  were  called  upon  to 
nominate  the  fundamental  error  in  the  logic  of 
transcendental  philosophy  I  should  name  it  the  fail- 
ure to  recognize  the  distinction  between  analysis 
and  abstraction.  The  failure  to  see  this  distinction 
seems  to  have  led  Pythagoras  to  found  a  philosophy 
upon  number;  it  surely  led  Plato  to  found  a  philos- 
ophy on  form;  it  seems  to  have  led  Aristotle  to 
found  a  philosophy  on  force,  and  without  doubt 
Spencer  fell  into  this  error ;  while  it  led  the  Scholas- 
tics to  found  a  philosophy  upon  being,  and  finally  it 
led  the  Idealists  to  found  a  philosophy  upon  thought. 
Thus  the  five  properties  of  matter  have  every  one  in 


150  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

turn  been  taken  as  the  substrate  of  a  philosophy,  and 
as  the  substrate  was  an  abstract  the  philosophies 
have  been  abstractions.  Metaphysics  has  been  the 
attempt  to  found  a  philosophy  upon  an  abstract  unit, 
but  science  is  the  attempt  to  found  a  philosophy 
upon  a  concrete  unit. 

In  this  chapter  an  attempt  has  been  made  to  make 
a  summary  exposition  of  the  science  of  morphology, 
for  the  purpose  of  showing  the  certitudes  which 
inhere  in  the  science  as  distinguished  from  the 
illusions  of  mythology  defended  by  speculative 
philosophy.  In  transcendental  metaphysics  the 
realities  of  the  world  are  held  to  be  phenomena  in 
the  sense  that  they  are  illusions,  and  are  distin- 
guished from  noumena,  which  are  the  realities.  Sci- 
ence deals  with  phenomena,  and  scientific  men  hold 
that  phenomena  are  realities  and  noumena  in  the 
sense  of  occult  substrates  are  illusions.  Transcen- 
dental philosophy  deals  with  noumena,  and  holds 
them  to  be  realities,  and  deems  phenomena  to  be 
illusions. 

This  is  the  issue  between  science  and  speculation, 
and  the  contest  is  war  to  the  knife  of  logic  against 
war  to  the  blade  of  dialectic;  but  the  knife  has 
form,  while  the  blade  has  void. 

In  science  one  noumenon  is  space,  the  reciprocal 
of  form ;  the  corresponding  noumenon  in  metaphysic 
is  space  as  void.  Void  space  is  a  natural  fallacy 
to  men  in  savagery,  while  yet  the  presence  of 
the  ambient  atmosphere  is  unknown,  and  the 
surface  of  the  earth  seems  to  be  an  empty  theater 
for  breath,  wind,  and  storm  existing  as  disparate 
bodies  having  a  ghostlike  existence.  Having 
imagined  an  empty  space,  it  still  continues  to  exist 


HOMOLOGY  151 

in  mythology  as  a  void  for  the  theater  of  gravity, 
heat,  light,  electricity  and  magnetism,  after  the  air 
itself  has  been  discovered  and  understood  by  all 
civilized  men.  Now  that  this  notion  is  dispelled 
there  is  no  void  within  the  ken  of  man.  All  known 
interspaces  have  been  resolved  into  forms.  If  in  the 
depths  of  the  infinitesimal  void  spaces  exist  between 
the  particles  of  ether,  it  may  be  well  to  await  their 
discovery  ere  we  characterize  them  by  assigning 
properties  to  nothing. 


CHAPTER  XI 

DYNAMICS 

A  citizen  of  a  township  must  obey  the  laws  of  the 
township.  The  same  person  is  also  a  citizen  of  the 
county  subject  to  the  laws  of  the  county,  a  citizen 
of  the  state  subject  to  the  laws  of  the  state,  a  citizen 
of  the  United  States  subject  to  the  laws  of  the 
United  States,  and  finally  he  is  a  citizen  of  the 
world,  subject  to  international  law.  Thus  a  man 
belongs  to  a  hierarchy  of  governmental  incorpora- 
tions in  which  he  may  demand  rights  and  must  per- 
form duties  of  allegiance. 

In  the  same  manner  every  atom  of  matter  in  the 
lowest  body  exists  in  a  hierarchy  of  bodies.  An 
atom  of  hydrogen  exists  in  the  molecule  of  water. 
The  same  atom  exists  also  in  the  sea,  the  earth- 
moon  body,  the  solar  system,  and  the  galaxy.  Now 
this  atom  of  hydrogen  partakes  in  the  specific  or 
special  mode  of  motion  of  every  body  in  this 
hierarchy.  We  may  consider  the  motion  of  the 
atom  of  hydrogen  in  the  atom  itself,  if  it  is  a  com- 
pound body  as  some  chemists  suppose ;  then  we  may 
consider  it  in  the  molecule,  then  in  the  tide,  then  in 
the  earth  in  rotation,  then  in  the  earth-moon  body 
on  an  axis  within  the  earth,  then  in  the  earth  in  rev- 
olution in  the  solar  system,  and  then  in  the  galaxy 
with  the  solar  system,  and  if  there  be  a  system  of 
galaxies  we  may  consider  it  in  such  body. 

This  atom  has  components  of  path  in  an  atom,  in 
a  molecule,  in  the  tide,  in  the  earth,  in  the  earth- 

152 


DYNAMICS  153 

moon  body,  in  the  solar  system  body,  in  the  galaxy 
body,  and  finally  in  another  system  which  includes 
the  galaxy,  if  there  be  such  a  system.  If  we  con- 
sider the  path  of  an  atom  in  any  one  of  the  incor- 
porations in  the  hierarchy,  we  can  describe  it  in 
terms  of  dimensions  of  space,  as  space  is  limited  by 
the  periphery  of  that  particular  body ;  but  when  we 
attempt  to  describe  its  motion  in  two  different  mem- 
bers of  the  hierarchy,  we  are  compelled  to  enlarge 
our  conception  of  space,  for  the  path  of  a  particle  in 
the  atom  is  modified  by  its  path  in  the  molecule. 
Then  if  we  consider  the  path  of  the  atom  in  the  tide 
we  must  still  further  modify  our  concept  of  it ;  then 
if  we  consider  also  the  path  of  the  atom  in  the  ter- 
restrial motion  about  the  axis  of  the  earth,  we  must 
again  modify  our  concept  of  it ;  then  if  we  consider 
also  its  path  in  the  earth-moon  body,  the  solar  sys- 
tem body,  and  the  galaxy  body,  we  have  at  last  a  con- 
cept of  the  path  of  the  atom  in  a  hierarchy  of  bodies. 
If  we  desire,  therefore,  to  conceive  of  the  path  fol- 
lowed by  the  atom  of  hydrogen  directed  by  all  its 
incorporations  combined,  we  must  imagine  it 
determined  by  all  bodies  of  the  hierarchy,  and  thus 
to  be  spiral  or  vortical.  I  shall  hereafter  call  this 
path  a  hierarchal  path. 

Descartes  conceived  this  path  to  be  vortical,  and 
taught  that  the  ether  in  moving  in  a  vortical  path 
carried  with  it  the  celestial  bodies,  and  thus 
explained  their  revolution.  I  believe  that  he  prop- 
erly conceived  the  nature  of  the  path  which  a  par- 
ticle describes  in  a  hierarchy  of  bodies,  but  of  the 
cause  of  this  path  he  was  in  error  when  he  considered 
that  the  whole  body  of  ether  describes  the  same  path 
in  a  vortex. 


154  TRUTH   AND  ERROR 

We  may  describe  the  motion  of  a  particle  in  any 
one  of  its  incorporations,  neglecting  it  in  the  other 
members  of  the  hierarchy,  and  such  a  description  is 
legitimate  if  it  be  understood  as  motion  in  the  one 
incorporation ;  or  we  may  describe  the  motion  of  a 
particle  in  two  incorporations,  but  in  order  to  do  so 
it  is  necessary  to  use  the  terms  of  the  space  of  the 
higher  incorporation.  This  plan  must  be  continued 
through  all  the  incorporations  if  we  try  to  describe 
all  of  the  deflections  of  path  which  are  experienced 
by  the  atom.  If  we  consider  the  path  of  a  particle 
of  matter  in  every  one  of  the  hierarchy  of  bodies 
severally,  we  get  as  many  systems  of  motion  as  there 
are  bodies,  and  they  seem,  when  thus  narrowly  and 
imperfectly  considered,  to  be  incongruous ;  but  when 
we  consider  all  of  these  paths  concomitantly  as 
hierarchal  motion  in  terms  of  the  space  of  the  high- 
est body,  they  are  made  congruous. 

Every  particle  in  the  universe  is  in  motion,  which 
motion  is  probably  constant  in  rate  of  speed. 
Motion  is  not  only  speed,  but  also  path.  While 
the  speed  in  the  ultimate  particle  is  constant,  the 
path  is  variable  in  direction.  This  is  the  proposi- 
tion I  am  trying  to  maintain. 

Of  ponderable  matter,  as  it  is  found  in  terrestrial 
and  celestial  systems,  all  particles  are  making  a 
grand  excursion  of  the  universe.  There  is  no  star 
that  does  not  proceed  on  this  journey,  nor  is  there 
any  body  of  matter  in  the  earth  which  does  not 
proceed  with  the  earth  in  its  journey.  Ethereal  mat- 
ter does  not  seem  to  proceed  in  this  manner  from 
position  to  position  throughout  the  universe,  but  the 
motion  of  each  particle  seems  to  be  confined  to  an 
environment  of  other  particles,  and  vibrates  back  and 


DYNAMICS  155 

forth  or  around  and  around  within  its  narrow  envi- 
ronment. A  particle  of  ponderable  matter  never 
returns  to  the  position  which  it  occupies  at  any  one 
instant  of  time,  so  far  as  we  can  determine  by  rea- 
soning. Every  position  occupied  by  a  particle  is 
instantaneously  evacuated,  and  another  particle, 
either  of  ponderable  matter  or  of  ethereal  matter, 
takes  its  place. 

As  there  is  a  hierarchy  of  bodies,  and  as  there  is 
a  hierarchy  of  paths  for  every  particle  of  ponderable 
matter,  so  there  is  a  hierarchy  of  freedoms  of  motion. 
Take  three  rods,  fasten  them  together  by  their  cen- 
tral points  so  that  they  extend  in  coordinate  direc- 
tions. The  three  rods  will  constitute  a  body  of  rods, 
and  although  the  three  are  incorporated,  that  is, 
fixed  to  one  another,  the  body  has  three  degrees  of 
freedom.  Fix  the  ends  of  these  rods  to  a  stone 
quarry,  and  the  three-rod  body  becomes  a  com- 
ponent part  of  the  earth  body,  but  still  has  three 
degrees  of  freedom.  Then  the  same  three-rod  body 
has  three  degrees  of  freedom  in  the  earth-moon 
body,  the  solar  system  body,  and  the  galaxy  body. 
Now  we  are  compelled  to  believe,  by  reasoning 
based  on  facts  observed  in  modern  time,  that  the 
molecular  bodies  and  the  atomic  bodies  of  the  three- 
rod  body  have  every  one  three  degrees  of  freedom. 
This  reasoning  in  molecular  science  is  no  less  cogent 
than  that  in  astronomical  science,  for  chemistry 
gives  the  same  freedom  to  atoms  and  molecules  that 
astronomy  gives  to  stars  and  systems. 

We  are  compelled  to  conceive  of  the  rigidity  of  the 
solid  state  as  the  homologue  of  the  astronomical 
state,  and  as  we  know  that  the  rigidity  of  the 
astronomical  state  is  a  mode  of  established  motion, 


156  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

so  we  conclude  that  the  rigidity  of  the  solid  state  is 
a  mode  of  established  motion.  Thus  the  concept  is 
made  that  man  stands  between  two  realms  of  bodies, 
the  vast  or  astronomical  and  the  minute  or  molec- 
ular, and  that  which  is  observed  in  astronomy  is 
repeated  in  chemistry.  The  astronomic  world  is  the 
correlative  of  the  molecular  world.  If  there  is  no 
gap  in  this  reasoning  every  particle  of  matter  has  a 
constant  rate  of  speed  which  is  subdivided  among 
the  paths  of  the  hierarchy  of  incorporations  to  which 
it  belongs.  To  this  form  we  are  compelled  to  reduce 
the  concept  of  the  persistence  of  motion  or  the  cor- 
relation of  forces;  for  if  speed  is  constant  in  the 
atom  the  forces  of  the  universe  are  correlative,  or, 
to  use  a  better  term,  are  reciprocal.  This  conclusion 
that  speed  is  constant  in  the  particle  is  necessitated, 
and  hence  is  valid  if  we  accept  the  fundamental  doc- 
trine of  modern  chemistry  that  bodies  are  composed 
of  discrete  particles. 

Motion  can  be  diverted  in  any  body  of  the 
hierarchy  without  increasing  the  speed  of  the 
particle.  Nature  never  seems  to  add  to  or  to  sub- 
stract  from  the  speed  of  the  particle,  although  the 
motion  of  a  molar  body  may  seem  to  be  derived  from 
another  body  so  long  as  we  consider  only  the  molar 
motion.  But  when  we  consider  the  motion  of  the 
particles  of  the  body  in  their  higher  and  lower  incor- 
porations, we  find  that  the  apparent  added  motion  is 
deflection.  This  is  illustrated  in  the  earth-moon 
body  when  it  rotates  about  its  axis,  and  thus  deflects 
the  motions  both  of  the  earth  and  the  moon  in  their 
common  paths  around  the  sun.  So,  if  a  body  sus- 
pended above  the  earth  falls  to  the  earth,  its  path 
with  the  earth  in  its  course  is  deflected,  and  the  path 


DYNAMICS  157 

of  the  earth  in  its  course  is  also  deflected.  In  a  fall- 
ing body  we  observe  not  only  the  deflection  of  ter- 
restrial motion,  but  the  falling  body  itself  is 
composed  of  molecules  and  atoms  which  are  in 
motion,  and  the  earth  also  is  composed  of  molecules 
and  atoms  in  motion,  and  these  paths  are  also 
deflected  by  the  falling  of  the  body.  The  deflection 
of  their  terrestrial  motion  is  but  the  reciprocal  of  their 
deflection  in  molecular  motion.  When  a  body,  say 
of  water,  loses  heat  it  gains  the  strength  of  structure, 
which  is  a  force,  and  hence  a  mode  of  motion  which 
it  exhibits  as  ice.  The  body  does  not  transmit  its 
speed  of  particle  to  another  body,  but  only  induces  a 
corresponding  change  in  that  other  body  from  solid 
strength  or  rigidity  to  heat  motion  by  deflecting 
molecular  paths.  Thus  motion  as  speed  cannot  be 
dissipated.  When  water  is  evaporated  the  particles 
of  vapor  which  are  produced  still  have  the  same 
amount  of  motion  as  speed,  and  when  water  and 
carbonic  acid  are  built  into  wood,  their  motion 
remains  as  the  solid  strength  of  the  wood  in  another 
mode  of  molecular  path.  Here  we  see  that  rigidity 
or  solid  strength  is  a  mode  of  motion  as  path.  Thus 
it  is  that  motion  as  speed  is  persistent  in  the  particle, 
but  as  path  it  is  variable. 

Every  particle  in  the  wooden  ball  rolling  on  the 
floor  has  astronomical  path,  molecular  path,  and 
molar  path.  Consider  one  of  these  particles  moving 
with  the  three  kinds  of  motion  as  three  constituents 
of  path,  and  we  realize  that  its  speed  is  very 
great,  and  that  the  path  which  it  traverses  is  greatly 
composite ;  that  is,  composed  of  deflected  parts,  in  a 
hierarchy  of  bodies.  If  such  a  particle  had  its  com- 
posite path  straightened  into  a  right-line  path  it 


158  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

would  quickly  pass  out  of  the  sphere  of  the  solar 
system  from  whatever  point  within  the  system  it 
might  start,  and  in  whatever  direction  the  right-line 
path  extended.  But  the  molecule  remains  within 
the  solar  system  because  its  stellar  path  is  composite, 
and  it  remains  within  the  ball  because  its  molar  path 
is  composite,  and  it  remains  within  the  molecule 
because  its  molecular  path  is  composite. 

When  the  ball  was  started  molar  path  was  devel- 
oped, and  when  it  stopped  that  molar  path  was 
ended.  We  must  not  suppose  that  molar  motion 
as  speed  came  out  of  nothing  and  vanished  into 
nothing.  We  resort  to  preexisting  molecular  motion 
to  explain  it.  We  say  that  the  molar  motion  was 
derived  from  the  molecular  motion  of  the  hand  that 
set  the  ball  rolling,  and  that  it  was  transformed  into 
molecular  motion  in  the  wall  which  destroyed  the 
molar  motion.  In  making  this  explanation  we 
assume  that  motion  as  speed  went  out  of  the  hand 
into  the  ball,  and  then  out  of  the  ball  into  the  wall. 
Is  this  true?  Was  the  speed  of  the  molecular  motion 
in  the  hand  diminished  and  the  speed  of  the  molec- 
ular motion  in  the  wall  increased?  Did  motion  as 
speed  go  out  of  the  hand  into  the  ball?  There  was  a 
change  in  the  motion  of  the  hand,  and  a  change  in 
the  motion  of  the  ball.  In  what  did  this  change 
consist?  We  know  that  in  part  at  least  it  consisted 
in  a  change  of  paths.  The  molecular  paths  in  the 
hand  must  have  had  their  directions  changed,  and 
the  molecular  paths  in  the  ball  must  have  had  their 
directions  changed.  Is  this  change  of  direction  all, 
or  is  there  a  transference  of  speed  so  that  one  loses 
while  the  other  gains?  The  whole  problem  is  nar- 
rowed to  this  issue :  That  which  we  call  acceleration 


DYNAMICS  159 

pertains  wholly  to  deflection,  or  in  very  small  part 
to  speed,  as  loss  of  speed  by  one  and  gain  by 
another. 

There  is  still  another  set  of  relations  to  be  con- 
sidered. A  body  is  composed  of  particles ;  in  order 
that  they  should  remain  within  the  sphere  of  the 
body  their  paths  must  be  composite,  and  in  order 
that  their  paths  may  be  composite  there  must  be  a 
sufficient  number  of  internal  collisions  to  deflect 
them  and  retain  them  within  that  sphere.  If  the 
body  itself  is  moved  the  paths  of  the  several  par- 
ticles in  the  average  must  thus  be  rendered  less 
composite ;  that  is,  the  number  of  collisions  must  be 
diminished.  The  motion  of  the  body  as  such,  there- 
fore, is  accomplished  by  diminishing  the  deflections 
within  the  body,  and  thus  straightening  their  paths. 
The  translatory  motion  of  a  body  is  a  straightening 
of  the  paths  of  the  particles  of  which  the  body  is  com- 
posed. 

Imagine  a  man  walking  in  a  circle  of  ten  feet 
radius.  The  sphere  of  his  motion  is  within  the  cir- 
cumference. He  may  soon  walk  a  mile  and  never 
be  more  than  twenty  feet  away  from  any  given  point 
in  the  circumference ;  change  his  direction  so  that 
his  path  is  straightened,  and  he  may  soon  be  a  mile 
away.  A  body  of  men  walking  in  a  circle  remain 
together  as  a  body  within  the  circumference  of  the 
circle  as  it  moves  with  the  earth ;  change  their  paths 
to  a  cycloid  directed  to  a  distant  point,  and  the  body 
of  men  will  move  away  in  that  direction;  change 
their  paths  to  parallel  right  lines,  and  as  a  body  they 
may  soon  be  a  mile  away  and  still  in  a  circle.  A 
division  of  an  army  may  be  maneuvering  in  a  field 
as  divisions,  brigades,  regiments,  battalions,  com- 


l6o  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

panics,  and  platoons,  and  yet  remain  in  the  same 
field  enclosed  by  a  wall ;  without  walking  the  indi- 
vidual men  with  any  greater  speed  you  may  march 
them  to  another  twenty  miles  away,  and  they  will 
lie  down  to  rest  at  night  with  no  less  fatigue 
than  if  they  had  been  maneuvering  in  the  enclosed 
field. 

In  the  same  manner  the  molecules  of  the  wooden 
ball  are  in  motion  within  the  theater  of  the  ball,  so 
that  they  do  not  pass  beyond  its  boundaries;  yet 
impose  upon  each  molecule  a  change  of  direction  in 
such  a  manner  that  they  all  move  a  little  more  in 
one  course,  and  a  translation  of  the  ball  is  affected 
by  a  change  of  direction  in  the  motion  of  its  constit- 
uent molecules,  and  the  ball  still  remains  as  an 
incorporated  body.  It  is  thus  possible  to  explain  the 
molar  motion  of  the  ball  as  a  change  in  direction  of 
the  motion  of  its  molecular  parts,  without  assuming 
an  increase  of  speed  in  the  parts,  but  only  a  develop- 
ment of  speed  in  the  body  by  the  deflection  of  its 
particles.  By  such  an  assumption  the  molar  motion 
perceived  by  vision  would  be  legitimately  derived 
from  the  molecular  motion  known  by  higher  reason, 
and  appear  as  a  change  of  direction  in  the  molecular 
motions  of  the  ball.  No  motion  as  speed  would  be 
created  or  destroyed,  while  the  apparent  molar 
motion  would  be  explained  by  a  change  of  direction 
in  molecular  motions,  very  minute  as  compared  with 
the  composite  paths  of  the  several  molecules  and 
atoms. 

When  we  consider  the  total  motions  of  the  atoms 
of  the  ball  shot  from  a  cannon's  mouth,  an  incon- 
ceivably small  change  of  direction  in  the  motion  of 
every  atom,  as  compared  with  the  complexity  of  its 


DYNAMICS  l6l 

path,  would  fully  account  for  the  flight  of  the  ball  as 
projected  by  dynamite. 

Now  we  know  of  deflection  and  that  it  arises  from 
collision,  and  we  know  of  no  other  change  in  motion. 
Acceleration  as  increase  of  speed  cannot,  in  the 
nature  of  the  case,  be  demonstrated,  for  it  may  always 
be  explained  as  deflection,  and  can  never  be 
explained  without  deflection.  If  acceleration  is 
explained  as  deflection,  it  is  explained  by  referring 
it  to  a  known  cause,  and  adequately  explained. 

It  is  illegitimate  to  assume  an  unknown  and 
unknowable  cause  when  a  known  cause  is  sufficient 
for  the  explanation.  We  may,  therefore,  affirm  that 
the  acceleration  of  a  body  is  the  deflection  of  its 
particles. 

At  the  Brooklyn  meeting  of  the  American  Associa- 
tion for  the  Advancement  of  Science  in  1894,  I  read 
a  paper  on  this  subject,  in  which  I  tried  to  demon- 
strate that  motion  is  constant  in  the  particle.  In 
the  foregoing  statement  I  have  put  this  demon- 
stration in  another  form.  I  now  propose  to  give 
it  in  a  new  form  by  the  method  of  reductio  ad 
absurdum. 

Newton  taught  that  inertia  is  resistance  to  change 
of  state,  either  as  rest  or  direction  of  motion,  and 
Newton  also  referred  to  the  ambiguity  of  the  term 
rest  without  pointing  out  the  nature  of  this  ambi- 
guity. We  have  seen  from  the  foregoing  discussion 
that  rest  is  absence  of  molar  motion,  and  that  molar 
motion  is  created  by  deflecting  molecular  motion. 
Hence  the  acceleration  of  a  body  is  reduced  to  the 
deflection  of  its  particles,  as  we  have  already  seen. 
Following  Newton,  it  is  taught  in  the  text-books  of 
physics  that  inertia  is  resistance  to  deflection  and 


162  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

acceleration;   therefore,    reduced    to    the    simplest 
terms,  inertia  is  resistance  to  deflection. 

PROPOSITION 

When  two  bodies  collide  their  particle  paths  are 
deflected,  but  their  particle  speeds  are  unchanged. 

First,  assume  that  one  body,  A,  has  the  mode  of 
motion  called  rest,  and  that  after  the  collision  it  has 
molar  motion;  then  its  molecular  motions  are 
deflected.  Then  assume  that  their  speeds  are 
accelerated ;  then  the  particle  motions  of  B  also  must 
be  deflected  and  accelerated,  if  action  and  reaction 
are  equal  in  deflection  and  speed.  Therefore, 
motion  as  force  is  created,  which  is  absurd.  But 
Newton's  law  says  that  action  and  reaction  are  equal 
and  in  opposite  directions;  therefore,  action  and 
reaction  result  only  in  particle  deflection. 

Second,  assume  that  A  is  at  rest,  and  that  at  col- 
lision B  is  brought  to  rest,  and  thus  that  B  has  the 
speed  of  its  particles  diminished;  then  motion  as 
force  is  annihilated,  which  is  absurd,  but  action  and 
reaction  being  equal  as  deflection  no  speed  is  lost  to 
either. 

Third,  assume  that  the  particles  of  A  are  deflected 
and  their  speed  accelerated,  and  that  the  increase  of 
particle  speed  in  A  is  derived  from  the  particle 
speed  of  B ;  then  action  and  reaction  as  speed  are 
not  equal,  but  while  both  are  equally  deflected  A 
has  more  speed,  B  less,  and  the  more  equals  the  less, 
with  opposite  signs.  Then  A  after  collision,  having 
more  speed  than  B  after  collision,  has  more  inertia, 
which  is  absurd ;  therefore,  when  bodies  collide  their 
particle  paths  are  deflected,  but  their  particle  speeds 
are  unchanged. 


DYNAMICS  163 

Let  this  argument  be  stated  in  brief: 

First,  the  tendency  of  modern  investigation  is  to 
explain  all  forces  as  derived  from  modes  of  motion. 
Great  progress  has  been  made  in  this  direction,  and 
the  theory  is  widely  accepted. 

Second,  all  understood  forces  are  collisions. 

Third,  if  all  forces  are  collisions  the  motions  from 
which  they  result  obey  the  third  law  of  motion,  that 
action  and  reaction  are  equal  and  in  opposite  direc- 
tions. By  this  law  it  is  seen  that  no  motion  as  speed 
can  be  lost  or  gained  by  any  particle  of  matter. 

Fourth,  by  collision  paths  can  be  changed,  but 
motion  as  speed  cannot  be  transmitted  by  one  par- 
ticle to  another. 

Fifth,  in  starting  or  stopping  molar  motion  there 
is  an  apparent  creation  and  annihilation  of  motion, 
but  this  appearance  is  known  to  be  an  illusion.  It 
is  known  to  be  in  part  deflection,  and  can  all  be 
thus  explained ;  and  if  the  third  law  of  motion  is 
valid  it  is  thus  explained. 

It  must  clearly  be  understood  that  the*  above  argu- 
ment does  not  deny  that  molar  motion  as  speed  can 
be  created  or  destroyed ;  it  simply  affirms  that  molar 
motion  cannot  be  created  from  nothing,  and  that  it 
cannot  be  annihilated,  but  that  it  comes  from  molec- 
ular motion  and  returns  to  molecular  motions.  Every 
particle  of  which  we  have  knowledge  is  a  constituent 
of  many  bodies  in  a  hierarchy  of  bodies,  and  what  is 
here  affirmed  is  that  the  acceleration  of  a  body  in 
speed  is  deflection  of  its  particles,  that  the  particles 
themselves  are  not  accelerated  in  speed,  and  further 
that  embodiment  itself  is  always  a  result  of  deflec- 
tion in  the  particle  embodied.  A  molar  body  may 
have  its  molar  motion  increased  or  diminished  in 


164  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

speed  by  deflecting  its  molecular  motions.  If  the 
speed  of  a  molar  body  be  changed,  the  direction  of 
its  molecular  particles  must  necessarily  be  changed. 
This  proposition  is  self-evident.  The  third  law  of 
motion  is  equally  simple.  The  law  here  demon- 
strated affirms  that  acceleration  in  one  embodiment 
is  deflection  in  another,  and  it  makes  valid  Newton's 
law,  which  would  be  an  absurdity  were  the  law  here 
demonstrated  untrue ;  and  if  untrue,  the  persistence 
of  motion  is  an  absurdity,  and  with  it  the  persistence 
of  energy  falls  to  the  ground. 

When  the  concept  of  persistence  of  speed  in  the 
particle  is  once  gained,  there  follows  from  it  a  series 
of  corollaries  which  are  demonstrations  of  axioms  of 
scientific  experience,  but  which  otherwise  have  no 
demonstration.  The  following  are  examples: 

PROPOSITION 

Gravity,  as  inversely  proportional  to  the  square  of 
the  distance,  is  persistent  in  the  mass. 

Assuming*  that  force  is  motion  and  gravity  force, 
then  if  the  particle  can  lose  any  of  its  speed  it  can 
lose  gravity,  which  is  absurd ;  and  if  in  the  collision 
of  a  body  speed  is  transferred  from  its  particles  to 
the  particles  of  another  body,  then  the  other  body 
must  weigh  more,  which  also  is  absurd;  therefore, 
gravity,  as  inversely  proportional  to  the  square  of  the 
distance,  is  persistent  in  the  mass. 

Speed  is  not  a  property  which  can  run  away  by 
leaping  from  one  particle  to  another  and  from  one 
body  to  another;  it  is  not  an  occult  something — a 
mystery,  a  nothing.  It  is  the  speed  of  a  particle. 

We  have  seen  that  when  particles  in  motion  have 
incident  paths  they  collide  and  their  paths  are 


DYNAMICS  165 

deflected;  hence,  all  motion  is  directed  motion. 
Collision  or  impulse  is  the  first  mode  of  force  in 
which  action  and  reaction  are  exhibited.  Then  we 
note  how  right-line  paths  are  divided  into  com- 
ponents by  collision,  becoming  deflected  paths; 
then  how  by  systematic  collisions  they  may  be 
developed  into  revolution.  Then  we  consider  that 
particles  may  be  incorporated  in  a  body  with  their 
several  particles  revolving  around  a  common  center, 
and  this  revolution  of  the  particles  is  rotation  of  the 
body.  Thus  by  incorporation  the  motions  of 
particles  may  be  correlated  by  rotation  and  revolu- 
tion, as  exhibited  in  celestial  bodies. 

In  the  case  of  two  stellar  orbs  revolving  about  a 
common  center,  as  the  earth  and  the  moon,  it  is  plain 
that  gravity  causes  the  deflection  of  both  bodies 
inversely  proportional  to  their  masses.  Here 
acceleration  is  chiefly  deflection,  being  positive  at 
perigee  and  negative  at  apogee.  So,  in  the  revolu- 
tion of  the  sun  and  the  earth  about  a  common  axis, 
acceleration  is  chiefly  deflection,  being  positive  at 
perihelion  and  negative  at  aphelion.  Thus  we  have 
a  well-known  astronomical  example  of  acceleration, 
and  find  it  deflection  and  increase  or  decrease  of 
bodily  speed,  and  now  we  must  refer  this  accelera- 
tion of  speed  in  the  body  to  deflection  in  the  par- 
ticles of  which  it  is  composed. 

It  is  taught  in  astronomy  that  in  the  revolution  of 
a  planet  the  area  of  the  radius  vector  is  equal  for 
equal  times.  This  doctrine  is  made  simple  and  plain 
when  the  nature  of  acceleration  is  understood. 

In  an  ethereal  medium  of  particles  moving  with  a 
persistent  speed,  two  bodies  will  mutually  intercept 
collisions  with  the  ethereal  medium  inversely  pro- 


l66  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

portional  to  the  square  of  their  distance  apart,  which 
is  an  explanation  of  the  law  of  gravity,  and  is  the 
theory  of  La  Sage  in  terms  of  motion. 

On  page  642,  Vol.  iv,  article  22,  of  Bowditch's 
translation  of  La  Place's  Mechanique  Cdeste  it  is 
stated : 

"If  gravitation  be  produced  by  the  impulse  of  a  fluid 
directed  towards  the  center  of  the  attracting  body,  the  preced- 
ing analysis,  relative  to  the  impulse  of  the  solar  light,  will  give 
the  secular  equation  depending  on  the  successive  transmission 
of  the  attractive  force." 

After  proving  this  proposition  and  obtaining  the 
secular  equation  of  the  attracting  body  from  the 
successive  transmission  of  gravity,  the  cause  of 
the  moon  is  discussed,  and  La  Place  decides  that: 

"We  must  suppose  that  the  gravitating  fluid  has  a  velocity 
which  is  at  least  a  hundred  millions  of  times  greater  than  that 
of  light;  or  at  least  we  must  suppose,  in  its  action  on  the  moon, 
that  it  has  at  least  that  velocity  to  counteract  her  gravity 
towards  the  earth.  Therefore,  mathematicians  may  suppose, 
as  they  have  heretofore  done,  that  the  velocity  of  the  gravi- 
tating fluid  is  infinite." 

The  theory  of  La  Sage  is  stated  in  terms  of  a  fluid 
transmitted  from  one  body  to  another.  We  now 
know  that  waves,  not  fluids,  are  transmitted  in  the 
case  of  heat  and  light,  and  in  a  like  manner  gravity 
as  deflection  must  be  considered  as  wave  action  or 
vibration  in  some  form.  With  these  principles  the 
instantaneous  action  of  gravity  is  simple  and  self- 
evident,  for  speed  is  not  transmitted,  but  only 
deflection  is  caused. 

Every  particle  has  constant  motion  as  speed  which 
cannot  be  increased  or  diminished,  and  the  absurdity 
of  perpetual  motion  should  be  called  the  absurdity 


DYNAMICS  167 

of  perpetual  collision  between  two  bodies  without 
other  deflection.  The  particles  collide  because  of 
impinging  paths ;  they  are  deflected  and  their  paths 
are  turned  apart,  and  they  cannot  be  made  to  collide 
again  until  other  external  collisions  bring  their 
paths  together.  If  the  particle  A  is  deflected  after 
one  collision,  to  be  once  more  deflected,  another  col- 
lision is  necessary.  It  is  thus  that  the  absurdity  of 
perpetual  collision  can  be  simply  demonstrated. 

After  such  an  analysis  the  doctrine  of  virtual 
velocities  is  self-evident ;  and  there  are  many  other 
consequences  of  this  law  which,  properly  under- 
stood, would  make  many  propositions  of  physics  self- 
evident. 

Motion  as  speed  is  constant  in  the  particle.  The 
particle,  of  whatever  order  it  may  be  in  the  mem- 
bers of  the  hierarchy,  is  accelerated  by  deflecting  its 
particles.  The  principles  or  laws  of  dynamics  are 
all  corollaries  of  this  fundamental  law ;  hence  dynam- 
ics may  be  taught  as  a  deductive  science.  Thus 
we  have  the  mathematics  of  number,  the  mathe- 
matics of  space,  and  the  mathematics  of  motion,  all 
fundamentally  deductive  sciences. 


CHAPTER  XII 

COOPERATION 

We  have  already  discovered  the  nature  of  motion 
in  its  absolute  as  speed  and  its  relative  as  path.  The 
speed  of  the  ultimate  particle  has  never  been 
measured;  but  bodies  as  such  have  their  specific 
speeds  and  one  is  greater  than  another.  Speed  of 
a  body  is  the  rate  at  which  it  changes  its  position, 
regardless  of  the  change  of  position  of  its  particles 
to  one  another.  The  speed  of  one  body  may  be 
taken  as  the  measure  of  the  rate  of  speed  of  another, 
and  the  process  used  gives  rise  to  the  formula  of 
L-j-T.  The  length  of  path  is  divided  by  the  time  in 
which  it  is  traversed.  Thus  to  convert  motion  into 
number  it  must  first  be  converted  into  terms  of 
space. 

We  have  discovered,  in  preceding  chapters,  the 
transmutations  which  motions  undergo  by  incor- 
poration when  they  become  forces.  In  order  that 
they  may  be  treated  mathematically,  it  is  necessary 
that  they  should  be  resolved  into  the  quantitative 
categories  and  expressed  in  numbers.  This  resolu- 
tion is  accomplished  by  measurement,  and  different 
formulae  are  employed  which  in  mathematical  science 
are  called  the  equations  of  acceleration,  force, 
impulse,  energy  and  power.  They  are  all  devices 
for  reducing  force  to  motion  and  motion  to  number. 

In  molecular  bodies  motions  are  correlated  in  a 
manner  yet  unknown,  but  molecules  are  known  to 
have  interior  motions  exhibited  in  response  to 

1 68 


COOPERATION  169 

motions  in  the  ether  as  its  particles  impinge  on 
ponderable  matter.  The  correlated  structural 
motions  of  the  molecule  may  be  transmuted  by  col- 
lision with  ethereal  particles  and  be  converted  into 
heat — a  mode  of  motion — so  that  which  is  structural 
motion  will  appear  as  heat,  and  if  the  transmutation 
is  carried  to  a  sufficient  degree  the  structure  of  a 
molecular  body  will  be  destroyed,  for  by  heat  mol- 
ecules are  reduced  to  lower  molecules  or  to  atoms. 
Thus  what  appears  in  the  molecule  as  structural 
motion  appears  in  the  particle  as  heat ;  and  when 
disparate  particles  are  incorporated  in  a  molecule 
heat  becomes  molecular  or  structural  motion.  This 
may  be  stated  in  another  way.  By  incorporation 
vibratory  motion  becomes  structural  motion;  by 
decorporation  structural  motion  becomes  vibratory 
motion.  We  know  that  in  stellar  systems  that  which 
is  structural  motion  in  the  system  is  vibratory  or 
rhythmic  motion  in  the  particle ;  and  we  may  con- 
ceive that  stellar  rhythms  might  be  so  modified  in 
elongation  or  other  ways  that  the  structure  of  the 
system  would  be  destroyed.  Hence  we  may  con- 
jecture that  in  the  molecule  the  rhythms  of  the 
particles  become  the  structure  of  the  molecule  when 
these  rhythms  are  systematic.  There  is  much  in  the 
phenomena  of  motion  which  suggests  that  such  is  the 
case.  In  a  previous  chapter  a  brief  statement  was 
made  to  exhibit  the  universality  of  rhythm.  That 
structural  motion  is  always  systematic  vibration 
seems  worthy  of  acceptation  as  a  working  hypothesis. 
The  form  of  force  known  as  energy  may  appear 
in  another  phase  as  a  succession  of  distinct  forces 
impinging  upon  a  single  body  producing  effects  which 
remain  with  that  body.  Energy  in  this  phase  is 


I  70  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

called  process;  thus  a  succession  of  waves  of  air  may 
beat  upon  a  tree  and  then  action  and  reaction  are 
successively  involved  in  vibration.  It  is  a  process 
by  which  gravity  deflects  the  stars  into  revolutions 
and  it  must  always  be  a  process  by  which  particles 
are  deflected  while  they  are  incorporated  in  bodies. 
A  multitude  of  processes  appearing  in  inorganic 
nature  have  already  been  exhibited,  while  processes 
which  appear  in  the  vegetal  realm  were  noted. 

In  nature  processes  are  developed  into  modes  of 
force  known  as  powers.  The  meteor  falls  upon  the 
earth  and  acts  as  a  hammer.  Boulders  are  carried 
by  streams  and  act  as  hammers  and  produce  effects 
as  such  which  the  particles  acting  separately  could 
not  produce.  Thus  collisions  which  might  result 
simply  in  deflection  if  the  particles  acted  severally, 
produce  fracture  when  they  act  conjointly.  Particles 
may  produce  pressure  when  they  act  separately,  but 
when  they  act  conjointly  pressures  may  lead  to 
rupture.  By  the  device  of  the  lever  forces  are 
multiplied  in  effect  without  increase  or  diminution 
of  force  as  such ;  the  same  is  true  in  the  pulley,  the 
wedge  and  the  screw. 

All  directed  motions  are  motions  subjected  to  con- 
ditions. These  conditions  are  causes  which  produce 
effects,  so  that  the  consequent  condition  differs 
from  the  antecedent  condition;  that  is,  the  effect 
differs  from  the  cause.  Two  bodies  collide  and  their 
paths  are  deflected ;  the  antecedent  direction  differs 
from  the  consequent  direction.  Thus  forces  are 
motions  subjected  to  causes  which  produce  changes 
of  condition  which  we  call  effects.  Here  we  see 
again  that  there  can  be  no  motion  without  causation, 
and  while  they  cannot  exist  apart,  they  can  be 


COOPERATION  171 

considered  separately;  but  the  separation  is  only 
ideal. 

It  is  now  proposed  to  give  an  outline  of  the  forces 
as  they  appear  in  the  different  realms  of  nature  to 
exhibit  the  universality  of  cooperation. 

In  the  ethereal  realm  we  recognize  light,  magnet- 
ism, heat,  gravity  and  electricity.  These  are  usually 
known  as  motions  which  are  measured  in  amplitude 
and  rate,  and  the  kinds  are  distinguished  as  numeri- 
cally different  rates  of  vibration.  Thus  classification 
is  directly  resolved  into  enumeration,  and  again  num- 
ber is  kind.  This  is  illustrated  in  the  classification  of 
light  as  colors  which  depend  upon  rates  of  vibration. 

Something  more  than  motion  is  manifested  by  the 
ether. 

Light  is  the  expression  of  ether  as  number  and 
kind  in  the  colors.  Magnetism  is  the  expression  of 
space  and  form  in  position  and  direction.  Heat  is 
the  expression  of  motion  as  force.  Gravity  is  the 
expression  of  time  as  causation.  Electricity  is  the 
expression  of  affinity  as  electrolysis.  When  the 
electric  discharge  is  manifested  by  the  electric 
sparks  or  the  flash  of  lightning,  it  is  manifested  as 
light.  Thus  ether  manifests  the  pentalogic  con- 
comitants both  in  quantitative  and  classific  properties. 

It  manifests  these  properties  by  producing  effects 
on  ponderable  matter,  which  effects  appear  to  the 
senses  and  to  the  reasoning  faculties  as  exhibiting 
quantitative  and  categoric  properties ;  for  example, 
light  exhibits  number  to  the  mind,  and  when  analyzed 
by  the  prism  it  exhibits  color  or  kinds  of  light. 
Magnetism  exhibits  space  relations  in  polarity  and 
form  relations  in  attraction.  Heat  exhibits  motion 
in  the  particles  of  bodies  as  vibrations  which  may  be 


172  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

increased  in  amplitude  until  the  incorporation  of  the 
body  is  destroyed,  when  only  space  relations  appear. 
Gravity  manifests  itself  in  pressure  as  continuous 
action,  which  appears  as  acceleration  of  speed  in  the 
falling  body  and  as  the  cause  of  the  fall.  Electrol- 
ysis exhibits  decorporation  or  the  dissolution  of  the 
bonds  of  affinity,  and  reincorporation  6r  the  estab- 
lishment of  new  bonds  of  affinity. 

In  the  ethereal  realm  particles  in  inconceivable 
numbers  cooperate  in  the  production  of  effects  in 
multiplied  ways. 

In  the  stellar  realm  the  ethereal  forces  are  found, 
for  the  stars  exhibit  the  phenomena  of  light,  mag- 
netism, heat,  gravity  and  electricity  through  the 
medium  of  the  ether,  not  only  because  the  ether 
surrounds  the  stellar  bodies,  but  also  that  it  seems  to 
permeate  them. 

There  are  molecular  forces  believed  to  exist  in 
stars  as  chemism ;  but  the  theater  upon  which  their 
action  may  be  studied  is  on  the  surface  of  the  earth. 

The  forces  exhibited  in  stars  and  in  the  systems  of 
which  the  stars  are  particles  are  centripetal  and 
centrifugal,  as  rotatory  and  revolutional.  Gravity 
is  a  force  which  acts  upon  stellar  bodies  through  a 
medium  and  which  is  transmuted  into  rotation  and 
revolution  and  is  again  manifested  in  the  figures  of 
the  bodies  of  the  solar  system,  for  they  have  the 
spheroidal  form. 

Thus  the  ether  cooperates  with  the  stellar  orbs  by 
transmitting  light,  magnetism,  heat,  gravity  and 
-electricity  from  one  to  another.  These  transmis- 
sions are  made  not  by  extracting  them  from  one  orb 
and  transporting  them  to  another  as  if  they  were 
bodies,  but  by  inducing  the  motions  in  ether  by  which 


COOPERATION  173 

they  are  expressed,  which  in  turn  are  induced  by  the 
ether  in  the  body  receiving  them  as  an  effect  the 
cause  of  which  is  in  the  emitting  body.  In  the 
language  of  the  sciences  of  the  ether  the  five  ethereal 
concomitants  are  called  radiant  forces,  but  perhaps  it 
would  conduce  to  sound  reasoning  if  they  were  des- 
ignated radiant  causations. 

So  also  in  the  celestial  realm  body  cooperates  with 
body.  The  orbs  of  the  solar  system  cooperate  with 
one  another  in  producing  the  solar  system  itself  as  a 
body,  and  they  cooperate  with  one  another  through 
the  medium  of  the  ether  in  radiant  causation  as 
reciprocal  cause  and  effect. 

In  the  terrestrial  realm  the  spherical  bodies  coop- 
erate with  one  another  in  producing  strains  and 
stresses  which  induce  chemical  reaction,  and  thus  are 
the  cause  of  the  special  mode  of  motion  which  we 
call  chemism.  So  sphere  cooperates  with  sphere, 
formation  with  formation,  roc"k  with  rock,  molecule 
with  molecule  in  the  reincorporation  of  mineral  sub- 
stances, which  is  a  reincorporation  of  forces  as  well 
as  of  forms. 

Molecules  of  air  cooperate  with  molecules  of  air 
in  a  wind.  Molecules  of  water  cooperate  with  mole- 
cules of  water  in  a  rain ;  molecules  of  air  and  water 
cooperate  in  a  storm,  while  molecules  of  air,  water 
and  particles  of  dust  cooperate  with  one  another  that 
vapor  may  be  transformed  into  water  antecedent  to 
the  storm.  Molecules  of  water  cooperate  with 
molecules  of  water  to  constitute  the  stream,  the  cur- 
rent, the  wave  and  the  glacier,  while  molecules  of 
rock  cooperate  in  the  boulder  as  it  grinds  its  way, 
cooperating  with  other  rocks  in  corrading  the 
channel. 


174  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

The  terrestrial  spheres  cooperate  with  one  another 
in  all  geological  processes.  Upheaval  and  sub- 
sidence with  flexure  and  faulting  are  produced  by 
the  cooperation  of  the  nucleus  in  yielding  to  pressure 
derived  from  the  building  of  formations  with  material 
transported  by  the  river,  which  was  disintegrated  by 
the  action  of  rain  which  fell  as  storm  blown  by  the 
wind  caused  by  unequal  temperatures  induced  by  the 
ether  caused  by  the  heat  of  the  sun.  Endless  illus- 
trations can  be  given  of  cooperation  in  the  terrestrial 
realm. 

In  the  vegetal  realm  by  the  cooperation  of  pro- 
toplasmic particles  chemical  force  is  transformed 
into  vital  force  and  processes  cooperate  with  one 
another  in  the  same  body.  The  process  of  absorp- 
tion by  the  rootlets  cooperates  with  the  process  of 
transportation  to  the  leaves,  and  here  they  both 
cooperate  with  the  process  of  transpiration,  and 
these  cooperate  with  the  processes  of  osmosis  in  the 
redistribution  of  the  materials  to  the  growing  parts, 
and  these  again  cooperate  with  the  process  of 
assimilation  where  the  growth  takes  place,  and  all 
of  these  processes  cooperate  with  the  process  of 
reproduction  by  which  the  seed  is  formed. 

Beside  the  cooperation  in  production  above  noticed, 
an  additional  cooperation  is  discovered  in  the  higher 
forms,  where  individuals  cooperate  as  sexes  in  their 
reproductive  function.  The  vegetal  forces  cooperate 
with  terrestrial  forces  in  the  disintegration  of  rocks 
into  soils,  in  which  function  they  also  cooperate  with 
chemism,  gravity,  and  ethereal  force.  Thus  coopera- 
tion in  the  vegetal  realm  extends  throughout  the 
universe. 

In  the  zoonomic  realm  all  other  forces  of  nature 


COOPERATION  175 

cooperate  with  the  forces  of  animal  life  to  accomplish 
motility.  That  the  organism  itself  is  a  system  of 
cooperating  powers  in  which  the  function  of  every 
organ  is  necessary  to  the  continuance  of  the  func- 
tion of  the  others  is  commonplace  doctrine. 

First  we  note  that  metabolism  consists  of  two 
correlative  systems,  one  of  anabolism,  the  other  of 
catabolism ;  that  is,  the  one  builds  up,  the  other  tears 
down.  They  are  not  only  correlative,  but  to  a  large 
extent  they  are  contemporaneous.  In  fact,  there  can 
be  no  building  up  without  tearing  down ;  that  is,  no 
placement  which  is  not  displacement,  except  that 
material  may  be  stored  adjacent  to  organs  as  fatty 
substances,  to  be  used  as  needed  after  it  has  thus 
been  stored. 

In  the  animal  body  functional  cooperation  becomes 
still  more  efficient  by  more  thorough  specialization, 
when  multiple  like  organs  of  like  functions  are 
eradicated. 

In  animal  life  the  body  is  moved  by  the  differ- 
entiated movements  of  its  component  parts.  The 
body  as  a  particle  moves  by  impact  from  external 
influences  in  the  higher  incorporation  of  the  earth, 
but  it  also  moves  as  an  individual  by  the  differentia- 
tion of  its  own  internal  movements  ideally  deter- 
mined. This  force  is  motility  as  it  is  exhibited  in 
all  locomotion,  by  which  we  mean  all  motions  of  the 
parts  of  the  body  which  are  directly  related  to  the 
environment  by  which  the  whole  body  or  any  part 
of  the  body  may  be  carried  from  one  place  to 
another. 

Through  motility  the  property  of  judgment 
becomes  the  guide  of  the  animal  body,  determining 
the  movements  of  the  parts,  stimulating  the  function 


176  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

of  one  organ,  inhibiting  the  function  of  another  and 
causing  them  all  to  cooperate  to  a  mentally  deter- 
mined end.  Judgment  thus  controls  function  and 
through  it  produces  locomotion,  by  which  the  parts 
of  the  body  are  changed  in  relation  to  one  another, 
and  by  this  power  of  changing  the  place  of  parts 
the  power  of  changing  the  place  of  the  whole  is 
accomplished  in  the  more  restricted  sense  expressed 
by  the  term  locomotion.  Thus  we  make  a  distinc- 
tion between  vitality  as  a  method  of  molecular 
motion  and  motility  as  a  method  of  organic  motion 
directed  by  opposing  or  correlative  muscles,  motility 
being  thus  directed  by  contraction  and  relaxation, 
which  results  in  all  forms  of  locomotion.  In  this 
manner  food  is  masticated,  swallowed,  and  moved 
along  the  intestinal  canal  and  delivered  to  the  cir- 
culatory system  by  appropriate  muscles ;  then  it  is 
taken  up  by  the  circulatory  system  and  moved  by 
the  heart  with  certain  accessory  muscles,  and  as 
the  circulation  proceeds  excretory  materials  are 
discharged,  all  by  appropriate  muscles.  There  are 
also  muscles  for  the  movement  of  the  limbs,  all 
adapted  to  locomotion.  Then  there  are  muscles 
necessary  for  the  reproductive  functions  and  finally 
there  are  muscles  for  the  movement  of  organs  of 
sense.  All  of  the  motions  thus  indicated  in  a  sum- 
mary manner  are  the  result  of  the  forces  which  we 
call  motility  to  distinguish  it  from  vitality,  which  is 
molecular  force.  Motility  is  controlled  by  metab- 
olism, and  is  the  metabolism  of  opposing  muscles 
where  one  contracts  and  the  other  relaxes.  The 
reason  for  explaining  contraction  and  relaxation  in 
this  manner  was  set  forth  in  a  previous  chapter. 
We  thus  see  how  the  processes  of  metabolism  and 


COOPERATION  177 

motility  cooperate.  We  also  see  that  all  of  the 
organs  of  one  system,  as  that  of  digestion,  or  that  of 
circulation  and  excretion,  cooperate.  We  also  see 
that  systems  cooperate  with  systems.  Finally  it 
must  be  noted  that  all  of  the  other  systems  cooperate 
under  the  direction  of  the  nervous  system,  and  are 
thus  obedient  to  mind,  being  under  the  control  of 
volition,  which  is  choice  of  activity,  which  is  the  choice 
of  affinity — the  mutual  selection  of  particles  of 
matter  for  molecular  association.  If  all  of  this 
reasoning  is  valid,  affinity  is  molecular  choice  in  the 
animate  body,  and  we  may  hence  conclude  that  all 
affinity  is  molecular  choice,  as  it  seems  to  be,  for 
chemists  who  do  not  ignore  affinity  never  find  any 
other  way  of  rendering  the  facts  into  language.  So 
that  affinity  is  practically  synonymous  with  selection. 
I  will  to  cross  the  street,  I  will  to  walk,  I  will  to  set 
the  organs  of  walking  in  motion,  and  I  accomplish 
it  by  controlling  the  affinities  of  molecules  in  metab- 
olism. Thus  a  system  of  organs  has  been  developed 
by  which  muscular  metabolism  may  be  accomplished 
by  a  constant  supply  of  new  material  for  anabolism, 
and  a  constant  discharge  of  waste  material  by  catab- 
olism. 

We  cannot  conceive  or  express  these  facts  in  any 
way  except  by  teleologic  concepts.  It  is  now  a 
fundamental  doctrine  of  evolution  that  the  organism 
is  developed  through  the  accumulation  of  effects  by 
individuals  in  successive  generations.  Not  that  each 
individual  in  the  hereditary  line  has  such  a  concept 
of  the  future  that  he  could  foretell  the  ultimate  result, 
but  that  he  had  such  a  concept  of  the  immediate 
future  that  he  purposely  planned  and  executed 
immediate  action,  and  while  a  perfect  state  was  not 


178  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

known  so  that  every  action  was  the  right  action  for 
the  ultimate  benefit  of  the  race,  yet  the  judgments 
of  action  were  usually  judgments  of  immediate 
benefit  to  be  derived,  and  these  judgments  resulted 
in  action,  whether  good  or  evil,  for  of  necessity  they 
were  followed  by  action  without  waiting  for  their 
verification  by  experience.  We  have  already  seen 
that  judgments  of  intellection  do  not  become  judg- 
ments of  cognition  until  they  are  verified.  Judg- 
ments of  action  result  in  immediate  action,  and  are 
verified  after  the  act  only  when  they  appear  as  senti- 
ments of  good  or  evil  to  control  the  will. 

Let  us  see  how  this  control  of  the  functions  is 
accomplished,  and  what  part  the  different  portions 
of  the  system  take  in  the  mental  activities  as  they 
control  the  mechanical  action.  The  brain  seems  to  be 
the  organ  of  mentation,  but  there  are  ganglia  in  the 
different  mechanical  organs  which  take  a  subordinate 
part  in  the  general  system  of  mentation  in  locally 
controlling  motility  by  exciting  or  inhibiting  activity. 
It  is  not  necessary  that  the  brain  should  deal  with 
every  muscle,  but  only  with  general  ideas  of  action, 
while  the  ganglia  control  the  details  of  activity,  for 
there  is  a  hierarchy  of  authorities  which  ramify  to 
every  cell  particle  in  the  system.  Thus  the  brain 
has  the  means  of  inciting  metabolism  in  every 
particle  of  the  body.  This  is  the  machinery  of  habit 
by  which  customary  actions  are  rendered  apparently 
automatic.  By  an  analogous  process  of  reasoning 
we  must  conclude  that  every  particle  of  matter  in  the 
system  has  judgment  as  consciousness  and  inference, 
and  that  these  judgments  are  transmitted  by  the 
sensory  nerves  to  ganglia  in  a  collecting  hierarchy 
which  finally  reaches  the  brain.  The  organs  of  sense 


COOPERATION  179 

sending  their  judgments  by  the  sensory  nerves  from 
the  exterior,  the  organ  of  feeling  from  the  interior, 
and  we  are  compelled  to  infer  that  every  particle  of 
matter  in  the  animate  body  has  judgment ;  and  that 
in  the  organs  of  sense  they  have  judgments  of  cog- 
nition, but  in  the  mechanical  organs  they  have  judg- 
ments of  good  and  evil.  Then  we  may  consistently 
infer  that  the  ganglia  are  organs  of  conception,  and 
we  come  back  to  the  statement  that  the  brain  is  the 
organ  of  mentation,  which  does  not  deal  with  judg- 
ments individually,  but  only  witlj  concepts. 

In  reaction  animals  cooperate  with  plants,  rocks, 
orbs  and  ethereal  bodies.  The  systems  of  coopera- 
tion of  which  we  have  made  mention  are  developed 
into  a  higher  sphere,  and  a  new  mode  is  discovered 
in  human  activities,  as  every  man  cooperates  with 
his  environment.  We  have  seen  how  in  motility  the 
internal  motions  of  the  body  are  converted  into 
external  motions  by  deforming  the  body  itself.  By 
motility  as  expressed  in  locomotion,  the  animal  body 
can  change  the  relation  of  its  parts,  and  thus  of  the 
whole  body  in  relation  to  external  parts,  while  all 
such  changes  of  relation  are  in  obedience  to  mind. 
The  animal  body,  therefore,  can  move  itself  in  rela- 
tion to  external  bodies  in  a  limited  manner,  and  can 
thus  impinge  upon  them  and  cooperate  with  external 
bodies  at  will. 

In  the  cooperation  of  animal  with  animal,  societies 
are  organized.  These  societies  are  highly  developed 
and  best  illustrated  in  human  life.  Men,  through 
activities,  cooperate  with  other  men.  We  thus  have 
a  vast  assemblage  of  cooperations,  but  in  these  activi- 
ties the  man  must  necessarily  cooperate  with  plants, 
rocks,  orbs,  and  ether  as  well  as  with  other  men. 


l8o  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

The  activities  in  which  men  engage  are  all  designed 
to  accomplish  purposes,  and  in  order  that  these  ends 
may  be  reached,  man  invents  by  minute  increments 
sundry  agencies  by  which  they  may  more  adequately 
be  reached.  In  order  that  we  may  understand  this 
subject,  consider  the  purposes  to  be  accomplished. 
By  a  careful  examination  of  all  human  activities  and 
the  purposes  directly  subserved,  it  will  be  found  that 
they  are  naturally  grouped  in  five  classes.  First, 
man  pursues  pleasure,  and  those  things  which  give 
him  pleasure  are  sought.  These  are  the  ambrosial, 
decorative,  athletic,  divinatory,  and  fine-art  pleas- 
ures. Second,  man  naturally  pursues  welfare  in  length 
of  life  and  abundance  of  health,  and  seeks  to  avoid 
disease  and  death.  By  these  are  produced  those 
activities  which  are  called  industries.  Under  indus- 
tries we  have  to  consider  kind,  form,  force,  history 
and  purpose.  Third,  for  pleasure  and  welfare  man 
has  found  it  well  to  associate,  and  to  promote  these 
associations  he  finds  it  necessary  to  regulate  conduct. 
He  therefore  naturally  pursues  justice,  and  that 
gives  rise  to  institutions  which  are  constitutive, 
legislative,  executive,  operative,  and  judicative.  This 
leads  to  a  fourth  form  of  activity,  which  again  divides 
into  two  forms,  activity  of  expression  and  activity  of 
reception.  Thus  it  is  that  man  invents  languages 
which  are  emotional,  gestural,  oral,  written,  and 
technical.  Fifth ;  but  man  in  the  pursuit  of  pleasure, 
welfare,  justice  and  expression  discovers  that  he 
makes  many  mistakes,  and  that  pain,  misery,  injus- 
tice and  misunderstanding  are  secured  instead  of  the 
desired  ends.  He  thus  finds  it  advisable  to  pursue 
wisdom,  and  organizes  the  necessary  agencies. 
Therefore  these  are  the  agencies  for  the  increase  and 


COOPERATION  l8l 

diffusion  of  knowledge,  observation,  acculturation, 
education,  publication  and  research ;  for  this  diffusion 
it  becomes  necessary  to  teach  and  to  learn;  so 
research  and  instruction  appear  and  become  pursuits 
of  life  for  wisdom.  These  pursuits  of  wisdom  imply 
both  teaching  and  learning. 

Now,  we  have  pleasure,  welfare,  justice,  expres- 
sion, and  wisdom  as  the  purpose  of  the  five  grand 
classes  of  activities.  These  activities  are  indis- 
solubly  associated,  for  it  is  found  that  one  end 
cannot  be  accomplished  without  accomplishing  them 
all.  The  act  which  is  designed  for  pleasure  becomes 
pain  if  it  does  not  conduce  to  welfare;  the  act 
designed  for  welfare  may  decrease  life  if  justice  is 
not  secured.  The  pursuit  of  justice  may  result  in 
injustice  if  truth  is  neglected.  The  end  pursued  for 
truth  may  lead  to  error  if  wisdom  is  not  reached. 
All  of  the  permutations  between  pleasure,  wel- 
fare, justice,  expression  and  wisdom  may  be  ex- 
amined, and  forever  it  will  be  found  that  they 
are  indissolubly  connected,  and  must  cooperate 
in  order  that  the  end  may  be  reached  by  the  in- 
dividual. 

At  the  same  time  the  individuals  have  their 
activities  differentiated,  so  that  the  labors  of  every 
man  are  to  a  greater  or  less  extent  distinguished 
from  the  labors  of  every  other  man  in  every  organ- 
ized society.  All  of  this  differentiation  of  labor  upon 
which  the  highest  civilization  depends  illustrates  in 
the  most  forcible  manner  the  nature  of  cooperation, 
for  society  itself  is  organized  upon  the  theory  of 
cooperating  activities. 

In  these  activities  men  not  only  cooperate  with 
one  another,  but  they  individually  and  collectively 


l82  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

cooperate  with  nature,  and  thus  external  nature  is 
made  to  assist  man. 

The  club  is  but  an  instrument  to  cooperate  with 
the  hand  to  increase  its  efficiency.  The  flail  is  biit 
a  club  with  a  handle  for  increased  efficiency.  The 
thresher  is  but  a  group  of  clubs  placed  upon  a 
cylinder  and  made  to  revolve  to  increase  efficiency. 
The  snow-shoe  is  but  an  addition  to  the  foot  to 
increase  its  efficiency.  The  sled  is  but  an  improved 
snow-shoe.  The  wagon  is  but  an  improved  sled, 
and  the  railroad  train  but  an  improved  wagon.  The 
lens  is  but  an  improvement  to  the  eye,  and  the 
telescope  is  but  an  improved  lens,  and  the  microscope 
still  another  improved  lens.  There  would  be  no  end 
to  the  illustrations  which  could  be  cited  to  show  the 
manner  in  which  the  arts  of  man  cooperate  with  one 
another  and  with  man  himself. 


CHAPTER   XIII 

EVOLUTION 

We  are  now  to  consider  what  happens  to  particles 
with  the  passage  of  time.  At  the  outset  we  must 
consider  what  it  is  that  has  persistence  and  change. 
The  particle  has  five  manifestations  as  five  essential 
concomitants  or  constituents:  unity,  extension, 
speed,  persistence,  and  consciousness.  As  all  the 
concomitants  inhere  in  one  particle  and  the  particle 
is  unity,  extension,  speed,  persistence,  and  conscious- 
ness, the  concept  of  a  particle  not  having  all  of  these 
essentials  is  a  pseudo-idea.  If  any  one  of  them  is 
taken  away  from  a  particle  it  is  annihilated,  for  there 
is  nothing  else  in  the  particle  but  these  essentials. 
They  constitute  the  particle. 

By  abstraction  we  consider  essentials  severally,  and 
when  we  consider  the  relation  of  particles  we  still 
consider  the  relation  of  essentials  severally.  The 
relations  of  essentials  are  properties.  One  con- 
comitant in  one  particle  cannot  be  related  to  the 
same  concomitant  in  another  particle  without  a 
relation  existing  between  the  other  concomitants  of 
the  particles ;  that  is,  there  cannot  be  a  relation  of 
one  unity  to  another  without  a  relation  of  one  exten- 
sion to  another,  one  speed  to  another,  one  persistence 
to  another,  and  one  consciousness  to  another,  if  the 
particles  be  animate.  If  we  go  on  to  consider  per- 
sistence abstractly,  we  must  still  remember  that  the 
persistence  is  the  persistency  of  a  unity,  an  extension, 
a  speed,  and  a  consciousness.  But  between  these 

183 


184  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

persistent  concomitants  there  are  relations,  and  these 
relations  are  changeable ;  so  when  we  consider  per- 
sistence and  change,  it  is  the  persistence  of  particles 
of  essentials  and  change  of  relations  of  particles  of 
essentials.  Only  relations  are  changeable,  essentials 
are  persistent. 

By  abstraction  we  consider  essentials  severally, 
and  when  we  consider  the  relation  of  particles  we 
still  consider  the  relation  of  essentials  severally.  If 
we  go  on  to  consider  persistence  abstractly,  we  must 
still  remember  that  the  persistence  is  the  persistence 
of  a  unity,  an  extension,  a  speed,  and  a  con- 
sciousness. 

He  who  cannot  distinguish  between  concomitancy 
and  relativity  cannot  follow  this  argument  and  cannot 
understand  its  fundamental  doctrines.  He  who  can- 
not follow  up  this  distinction  in  all  of  its  logical 
results  under  the  conditions  of  complexity  which  are 
exhibited  in  the  various  bodies  of  the  universe  con- 
sidered by  scientific  men,  had  better  devote  his  time 
to  metaphysical  speculation  where  logical  distinctions 
are  confused  and  fine-spun  theories  of  the  unknown 
are  the  substance  of  philosophy;  for  scientific  men 
deal  with  simple  facts,  though  they  may  be  tangled  in 
relations,  while  metaphysicians  confessedly  deal  in 
speculation  about  the  unknown  and  boldly  affirm 
that  realities  are  fallacies.  When  a  scientific  man 
speaks  of  phenomena,  he  speaks  of  the  manifestations 
of  reality;  when  a  metaphysician  speaks  of  phe- 
nomena he  speaks  of  manifestations  of  the  unknown 
reality  of  which  he  dreams,  while,  he  deems  that 
the  realities  of  the  scientific  man  are  creations  of 
fancy.  In  science  all  knowledge  is  verity  and  all 
fallacies  are  false  inferences.  In  metaphysics  all 


EVOLUTION  185 

knowledge  is  illusion  which  manifests  in  a  vague 
way  an  unknown  reality. 

If  particles  could  exist  without  speed  there  would 
be  no  change  and  no  motion ;  or  if  there  was  but  one 
particle  with  speed  there  would  be  only  rectilineal 
motion,  but  as  there  are  many  particles  with  speed 
they  collide  and  deflect  one  another ;  deflected  speed 
is  directed  motion.  The  first  phase  of  directed 
motion  is  thus  change  of  direction  in  free  particles. 
Here  we  have  persistence  in  speed  and  change  in 
direction  by  which  persistence  is  divided  into 
portions  by  events  of  collision,  and  this  manifests 
time.  There  could  be  no  time  without  motion,  and 
no  motion  without  space,  and  no  space  without 
number.  The  first  or  simplest  manifestation  of 
time  is  the  division  of  motion  into  parts  by  events. 
This  gives  us  the  simplest  concept  of  time  known  to 
science,  and  whenever  in  science  time  is  considered, 
some  motion  is  divided  into  parts  by  events.  Thus 
the  motion  of  the  earth  about  the  sun  is  divided 
into  annual  parts  by  events,  and  the  motion  of 
the  earth  on  its  axis  is  divided  into  daily  parts  by 
events. 

By  the  incorporation  of  particles  into  bodies  the 
speed  of  the  particle  is  divided  into  parts,  one  part 
of  the  speed  inhering  in  the  particle  as  internal 
motion,  another  part  inhering  in  the  particle  as 
external  motion  of  the  body.  The  speed  of  the 
particle  is  composed  of  internal  speed  and  external 
or  corporeal  speed. 

In  bodies  we  consider  the  corporeal  speed,  and  one 
body  may  have  greater  speed  than  another,  although 
one  ultimate  particle  cannot  have  greater  speed  than 
another.  It  is  the  speed  of  one  body  measured  in 


l86  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

terms  of  the  speed  of  another  by  which  time  is 
usually  determined. 

Particle  speed  is  persistent  or  eternal.  Corporeal 
speed  can  continue  only  while  the  body  remains 
incorporate.  So  essentials  are  co-eternal  in  the 
particle,  but  are  co-etaneous  in  the  body. 

When  we  consider  the  collision  of  one  body  with 
another  we  may  consider  the  action  as  a  force,  and 
if  the  particles  remain  without  change  of  incorpora- 
tion, action  and  reaction  are  exhibited  as  mutual 
deflection.  "When  we  neglect  the  nature  of  this 
deflection  we  are  considering  the  forces  involved, 
but  if  we  consider  results  and  compare  the  paths  of 
the  bodies  before  collision  with  the  paths  after 
collision,  we  pass  from  the  consideration  of  force  to 
/  causation,  for  the  cause  of  their  collision  was  their 
incident  paths  and  the  effect  of  collision  their 
reflected  paths. 

Thus  the  study  of  time  as  exhibited  by  bodies 
leads  to  the  study  of  causation.  So  in  causation 
we  have  more  highly  related  time.  If  we  consider 
relations  of  persistence  and  change  in  the  particle, 
we  consider  it  as  time,  but  if  we  consider  it  in  the 
body  we  consider  it  as  causation.  Time  and  causa- 
tion are  thus  reciprocal. 

-  There  are  different  kinds  of  natural  bodies  besides 
the  one  ethereal  body  of  all  ethereal  particles ;  (i) 
the  celestial  bodies  of  molecular  particles;  (2)  the 
te'rrestrial  bodies  or  spheres  of  petrologic  particles, 
in  which  certain  of  the  molecular  particles  are  for- 
ever undergoing  reincorporation ;  (3)  vegetal  bodies 
which  are  still  more  ephemeral  and  reincorporated 
from  the  mineral  kingdom  to  exist  only  for  a  time  and 
then  to  be  returned  to  the  mineral  kingdom ;  (4)  ani- 


EVOLUTION  187 

mal  bodies  which  are  incorporated  from  the  vegetal 
kingdom ;  (5)  societies  which  are  ideally  incorporated. 

In  this  incorporation  they  exhibit  successions  of 
causations;  but  causations  are  processes,  and  one 
abstract  process  cannot  exist  without  the  concomitant 
processes — that  is,  there  can  be  no  processes  of 
causation  without  processes  of  force,  form,  and  kind, 
together  with  processes  of  mind. 

We  know  little  of  the  reincorporation  of  stars,  but 
we  know  much  about  the  reincorporation  of  rocks, 
plants,  animals,  and  societies.  The  study  of  incor- 
poration and  reincorporation  is  evolution  from  the 
standpoint  of  causation,  which  in  turn  is  the  study 
of  time. 

The  consideration  of  the  totality  of  changes  occur- 
ring in  the  universe  is  evolution.  These  changes  can 
all  be  resolved  into  changes  in  the  position  of  the 
ultimate  particle  of  matter.  Directed  changes  in 
position  lead  to  incorporation,  then  incorporation  is 
succeeded  by  reincorporation,  and  the  totality  of 
these  changes  is  the  totality  of  evolution.  Starting 
with  this  concept  we  may  be  able  to  redefine  evolu- 
tion in  a  more  satisfactory  manner  at  a  later  stage. 

If  there  were  no  motion  there  would  be  no  time 
but  only  persistence.  If  there  were  no  incorporation 
and  reincorporation  there  would  be  no  evolution  but 
only  time  as  it  is  exhibited  in  the  ethereal  particle. 
At  the  very  outset,  then,  we  have  to  consider  incor- 
poration in  the  association  of  one  chemical  particle 
with  another. 

The  theater  of  the  motion  of  every  ethereal  particle 
must  be  circumscribed  by  the  theater  of  the  adjacent 
particles ;  we  are  logically  prohibited  from  any  other 
conclusion.  When  particles  unite  with  one  another 


l88  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

in  constituting  a  body,  so  that  the  speeds  are  divided 
into  internal  and  external  motions,  by  virtue  of  the 
external  motion,  they  may  change  their  space  rela- 
tions to  external  particles.  In  order  that  there  may 
be  bodies  with  changeable  environment  the  particles 
must,  by  some  means  or  another,  associate.  The 
first  cause  or  method  of  evolution  is  choice ;  the  first 
effect  of  evolution  is  change  of  environment. 
From  this  datum  point  we  may  go  on  to  dis- 
cuss the  evolution  of  the  laws  or  methods  of 
evolution. 

Affinity  is  choice  of  association  in  atoms  and 
molecules  by  which  new  kinds  are  developed  by  the 
development  of  new  orders  of  units  through  their 
incorporation  into  one  body.  This  is  illustrated  in 
the  conventional  numbers  where  the  ten  units  of 
one  order  constitute  one  of  a  higher  order.  Again, 
the  bricks  of  a  house,  thousands  in  number,  con- 
stitute one  house  in  a  body  of  a  higher  order.  Now 
the  atoms  of  a  molecule  are  associated  by  affinity, 
which  surely  resembles  choice  of  association,  though 
it  may  be  the  choice  of  dominant  particles  or  mutual 
choice ;  but  in  the  bricks  which  constitute  the  house 
their  association  is  the  choice  of  volition  in  the 
builder,  by  the  choice  of  activities  in  the  control  of 
his  muscles.  This  choice  of  activity  still  relates 
back  to  a  choice  in  the  reciprocal  processes  of  me- 
tabolism, which  again  is  affinity.  Thus  external 
choice  is  controlled  by  mind  through  internal  choice. 

The  primal  law  of  evolution  seems  to  be  psychic. 
We  shall  call  it  the  law  of  affinity  and  define  it  as 
the  choice  of  particles  to  associate  in  bodies.  The 
facts  observed  in  the  chemical  incorporation  of 
particles  into  bodies  are  explained  by  this  hypothesis, 


EVOLUTION  189 

but  they  remain  the  same  whether  the  explanation 
be  valid  or  invalid,  that  is,  whether  we  consider 
affinity  to  be  due  to  psychic  choice  or  to  some 
unknown  mechanical  property. 

By  the  incorporation  of  atoms  into  molecules 
particles  become  bodies  which  react  in  collisions 
with  the  environment  in  a  new  manner;  thus  bodies 
can  perform  functions  which  particles  cannot  perform. 
This  leads  us  to  the  consideration  of  incorporation  as 
organization,  when  functions  and  organs  as  con- 
comitants are  transmuted  together.  Molecules, 
because  they  are  incorporated  numbers,  are  organ- 
ized numbers,  or  in  other  terms,  chemical  organiza- 
tion by  incorporation  is  numerical  organization. 
Now  we  must  see  what  these  new  functions  or 
reactions  are. 

Molecules  of  substances  are  aggregated  into  stellar 
bodies  by  their  mutual  reactions  through  the  gravitat- 
ing medium — the  ether.  Thus  a  second  method  of 
evolution  is  developed  which  is  known  as  adaptation 
to  environment.  By  this  method  not  only  are  the 
celestial  bodies  incorporated  into  higher  units,  but 
their  forms  are  subsequently  controlled  by  the  same 
law  when  they  yield  to  the  forces  of  the  environ- 
ment as  spheroidal  figures,  rotating  and  revolving  as 
fluid  bodies.  Stars  are  evolved  under  the  law  of 
adaptation  to  environment  and  remain  under  its 
control  in  their  changing  figures  through  the  history 
of  their  revolutions. 

Under  this  law  stars  change  their  environment, 
passing  through  a  succession  of  positions  in  a  cycle 
of  revolution.  This  seems  to  be  a  valid  statement 
of  the  changes  brought  about  by  the  incorporation 
of  atoms  into  molecules,  and  their  further  incorpora- 


TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

tion  into  stars,  and  their  still  further  incorporation 
as  stars  into  systems. 

In  celestial  bodies  we  know  only  of  the  fluid  state 
of  matter  as  revealed  by  astronomy.  While  there  may 
be  solid  bodies  in  the  other  orbs,  as  in  the  earth, 
astronomical  investigation  does  not  reveal  them  to 
research  as  solids;  such  solid  bodies  are  recognized 
to  be  studied  only  in  the  earth,  where  they  are 
revealed  as  rocks,  and  if  they  may  exist  in  the  other 
orbs  the  science  of  astronomy  does  not  deal  with 
them.  The  forms  of  the  stellar  bodies  are  those 
assumed  by  fluids  under  the  force  of  gravity.  The 
stars  themselves  are  particles  in  systems  which  are 
bodies  of  a  higher  order.  Events  are  discovered  in 
the  motions  of  the  celestial  orbs  and  exhibited  in  a 
great  variety  of  ways  as  set  forth  in  the  science  of 
astronomy. 

Thus  states  of  motion  are  divided  into  events  of 
motion.  The  states  are  represented  by  rotation  of 
body,  which  is  the  revolution  of  particles,  while 
events  are  marked  by  phenomena  which  attend  the 
rotation  and  revolution.  These  are  phenomena  of 
time,  or  persistence  and  change.  Then  the  heavenly 
bodies  are  constantly  changing  their  relations  to  one 
another,  and  a  vast  system  of  perturbations  are 
discovered.  Motion  at  apogee  differs  from  motion 
at  perigee,  motion  at  aphelion  differs  from  motion 
at  perihelion,  and  a  great  variety  of  perturbations  of 
path  are  revealed.  Here  we  study  causation. 
Finally,  the  genesis  of  the  heavenly  bodies  is  studied 
as  their  evolution. 

LaPlace  was  the  founder  of  this  department  of 
astronomy.  The  researches  in  this  realm  had 
revealed  the  common  direction  of  motion  in  the  orbs 


EVOLUTION  191 

of  the  solar  system,  the  small  eccentricities  of  path, 
the  inclination  of  the  orbits,  and  the  conservation  of 
areas.  Reasoning-  that  contraction  would  accelerate 
rotation  and  hence  oblateness,  he  conceived  the 
hypothesis  of  the  evolution  of  the  solar  system  on 
the  theory  of  the  radiation  of  heat  into  solar  space 
from  a  nebulous  mass.  He  conceived  that  this  mass, 
revolving  in  an  orbit,  constantly  accelerating  and  thus 
constantly  increasing-  its  oblateness,  would  thus 
gradually  retire  by  attraction  from  an  external  ring 
of  matter  which  would  ultimately  break  up  into  one 
or  more  orbicular  bodies. 

Since  the  time  of  LaPlace  his  method  of  account- 
ing for  satellites  as  a  breaking  up  of  rings  has  been 
questioned,  and  facts  have  been  discovered  that  give 
ground  to  the  conjecture  that  other  methods  of 
separation  into  bodies  by  fission  are  not  only  possible 
but  even  probable.  This  new  doctrine  arises  from 
the  investigation  of  binary  stars.  It  will  be  observed 
that  LaPlace 's  theory  was  an  attempt  to  harmonize 
many  diverse  laws  discovered  by  induction  and 
verified  by  deduction,  by  accounting  for  them  all  by 
one  fundamental  doctrine  of  evolution,  which  is  no 
other  than  the  adaptation  of  every  particle  of  matter 
to  the  conditions  imposed  upon  it  by  every  other 
particle  in  the  environment.  Under  this  hypothesis 
LaPlace  promulgated  a  doctrine  of  evolution  which, 
in  its  fundamental  elements,  has  remained  to  the 
present,  notwithstanding  the  tests  of  observation  and 
recomputation  to  which  it  has  been  submitted, 
though  minor  components  of  the  doctrine  are  ques- 
tioned. 

There  is  still  another  assumption  of  LaPlace  that 
must  now  be  questioned,  as  it  is  unnecessary  to  his 


IQ2  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

argument  and  incongruous  with  facts  herein  demon- 
strated; his  assumption  is  that  heat  is  radiated  into 
space  and  that  it  leaves  the  cooling  body  to  join 
external  bodies.  All  of  this  was  quite  compatible 
with  the  concept  in  vogue  in  his  time,  when  heat 
corpuscles  were  supposed  to  be  itinerant  from  body 
to  body.  Now  we  know  that  heat  is  not  a  special 
form  of  matter,  but  is  only  a  deflection  of  the 
motions  of  the  particles  of  matter  whose  speeds  are 
constant,  and  that  one  body  causes  heat  in  another 
but  does  not  yield  heat  as  speed  of  particles  so  that 
it  loses  what  the  other  gains.  While  the  heat  of  one 
body  induces  heat  in  another,  no  motion  as  speed 
leaves  the  cooling  body,  but  its  reaction  transmutes 
the  heat  motion  into  the  structural  motion  of  the 
body  and  that  reaction  which  we  call  the  transfer  of 
heat  from  one  body  to  another  is  in  fact  its  equili- 
bration through  mutual  transmutation. 

Thus,  by  the  theory  of  LaPlace,  the  chemical 
changes  proceeding  in  the  combination  of  atomic 
particles  existing  in  the  nebulous  mass  were 
accelerated  by  gravity  until  they  were  consolidated 
into  stellar  bodies,  the  process  being  a  succession  of 
recombinations  in  molecules  of  higher  orders. 

In  the  geonomic  realm  three  so-called  states  of 
substance  are  found:  the  ethereal,  the  fluid,  and  the 
solid.  All  of  these  states  are  conditions  of  incorpora- 
tion. Gases  may  become  liquids  and  liquids  may 
become  solids,  and  vice  versa,  by  progressive  incor- 
poration and  reincorporation.  These  states  of  sub- 
stance often  exhibit  interesting  critical  points  in  which 
secular  changes  are  accelerated  by  sudden  meta- 
genesis, especially  at  critical  points  of  temperature 
and  pressure.  Thus  changes  of  state  are  secular 


EVOLUTION  193 

metageneses  accelerated  in  sudden  metageneses. 
Everywhere  and  forever  the  states  are  changing  by 
events  and  the  geonomic  realm  is  forever  in  flux. 
The  winds  are  in  motion,  the  waters  are  in  waves, 
tides  and  currents,  and  the  waters  themselves  are 
evaporated  and  move  in  clouds  through  the  air  and 
are  condensed  into  streams  that  flow  into  the  great 
bodies  of  water  and  into  the  ocean  itself.  The  fluid 
waters  are  transformed  into  solid,  and  the  solid  are 
gathered  at  high  altitudes  and  high  latitudes  into 
great  bodies  of  ice  that  are  forever  growing,  melt- 
ing, and  moving  forward.  The  solid  rocks  are  forever 
undergoing  geologic  changes  under  the  stress  and 
strain  produced ;  thus  molar  metamorphosis  is  forever 
in  progress.  The  rocks  are  carried  from  the  land 
to  the  sea  and  the  sea-bottoms  are  upheaved,  while 
mechanical  changes  are  forever  in  progress  through- 
out the  solid  envelope.  States  appear  to  be  changed 
into  other  states  only  by  events  which  come  in 
winds,  storms,  earthquakes,  and  fires. 

That  which  we  are  to  note  as  germane  to  this  argu- 
ment is  that  there  are  three  states  of  matter  involved 
in  the  study  of  geonomy :  the  ethereal  state  in  which 
the  phenomena  of  heat  and  electricity  are  observed, 
the  fluid  state,  and  the  solid  state  in  which  the 
especial  phenomenon  of  the  geonomic  orb — the  earth 
— is  observed.  As  in  the  stars  we  are  compelled  to 
discuss  ethereality,  terrestrial  heat,  light,  electricity, 
magnetism,  and  gravity,  together  with  centripetal  and 
centrifugal  force  and  fluidity,  so  in  the  geonomic 
realm  we  must  study  not  only  the  same  subjects, 
but  must  also  consider  the  solid  condition  with  the 
stresses  and  strains  involved  and  the  metageneses 
that  appear  through  chemism. 


194  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

In  the  ethereal  realm  we  know  of  the  ethereal 
state ;  in  the  stellar  realm  we  know  of  the  ethereal 
and  the  fluid  states ;  in  the  geonomic  realm  we  know 
of  the  ethereal,  the  fluid,  and  the  solid  states. 

In  the  study  of  the  earth  a  differentiation  is  found 
in  the  air,  the  sea,  the  land,  and  the  nucleus.  They 
are  also  integrated  by  the  rotation  of  the  earth,  which 
is  the  revolution  of  its  particles.  The  air  is  imper- 
fectly differentiated  into  winds.  The  waters  are 
differentiated  into  seas  with  gulfs,  lakes  with  bays, 
and  rivers  with  creeks,  brooks,  and  rills.  Then  the 
waters  are  evaporated  and  differentiated  into  vapor, 
and  these  vapors  become  clouds  and  the  clouds 
become  rains.  Then  the  waters  that  were  evapo- 
rated into  vapor  and  condensed  into  rain  are  also 
frozen  into  snow  and  ice,  and  ice  itself  plays  an 
important  part  in  the  mechanical  changes  wrought 
upon  the  surface  of  the  earth.  Then  the  solid 
sphere  is  differentiated  into  formations,  and  the 
formations  into  rocks  or  blocks,  and  these  again  into 
crystals  and  grains;  then  the  rocks  are  ground  by 
the  running  waters  and  blown  by  the  winds  and 
distributed  through  the  air  and  over  the  land  as  dust. 
They  are  also  carried  by  the  waters  into  the  sea  and 
deposited  in  formations,  and  finally  they  are  carried 
in  solution  by  the  interpenetrating  waters  into  the 
crevices  of  the  rocks,  by  which  blocks  are  parted. 
Finally,  fluid  masses  from  the  molten  interior  are 
thrust  into  the  rocks  in  dykes,  chimneys,  and 
lacolites,  and  spread  over  the  surface  in  coulees, 
cinders,  and  dust.  All  of  this  commingling  of 
materials  results  in  a  recombination  of  substances 
ever  found  to  be  more  and  more  highly  com- 
pound. At  the  surface  of  the  earth  these  changes 


EVOLUTION  195 

are  still  further  multiplied  in  the  production  of 
soils,  which  is  accomplished  by  the  wash  of  rains, 
the  grinding  of  ice,  the  chemical  decomposition 
of  the  rock,  especially  aided  by  heating  and 
cooling,  together  with  the  disintegration  that 
arises  from  the  action  of  plants  and  animals  upon 
the  soil,  and  by  the  commingling  of  their  bodies 
with  it,  so  that  a  highly  compound  mass  of  particles 
is  produced,  known  as  the  soil.  This  soil  is  the 
theater  of  chemical  changes  by  which  the  more 
highly  compound  molecules  are  developed,  necessary 
directly  to  vegetation  and  indirectly  to  animal  life. 
As  chemical  compounds  are  more  sensitive  to  change, 
mineral  forms  are  more  sensitive  to  metamorphosis, 
and  as  mineral  and  molar  forms  are  changed  proc- 
esses are  multiplied  and  become  more  efficient  in 
the  production  of  change.  Thus  the  new  law  of 
evolution  which  we  find  in  the  geonomic  realm,  is 
the  acceleration  of  change  by  increasing  hetero- 
geneity. Tt  may  be  called  the  method  of  hetero- 
geneity. 

The  law  of  affinity  and  the  law  of  adaptation 
found  in  the  astronomic  realm  also  pertain  to  the 
geonomic  realm.  But  to  them  there  is  added  this 
new  law  of  heterogeneity.  Thus  an  incessant  meta- 
logosis,  metamorphosis,  and  metaphysisis  results 
in  universal,  constant,  and  multifarious  metageneses. 

As  substances  become  more  compound  they 
become  less  stable,  and  acceleration  of  heterogeneity 
is  the  acceleration  of  metagenesis. 

In  the  phytonomic  realm,  that  is,  in  plants,  a 
fourth  state  of  substance  is  found.  This  is  the  vital 
state,  for  plants  have  life.  Substance  in  the  fluid 
and  solid  states  is  taken  up  by  the  plant  through  the 


196  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

medium  of  the  ethereal  state  exhibited  in  light  and 
heat  and  metagenetically  changed  into  the  fourth 
state  as  vitality.  These  metagenetic  changes  are 
known  as  assimilation,  by  which  the  plant  is  pro- 
duced. Plant  growth  is  secular,  and  the  materials 
pass  through  the  fluid  state  into  the  living  state, 
which  is  growth;  the  plant  may  then  dissolve 
secularly  by  decay,  or  by  sudden  change  in  com- 
bustion. 

We  cannot  understand  the  plant  without  a  con- 
sideration of  all  the  four  states  of  matter  and  all  the 
four  changes  of  matter  which  occur  therein  as  events. 
As  the  plant  grows,  minute  molecules  are  added ;  as 
the  plant  decays,  minute  molecules  are  taken  away, 
as  the  vital  changes  observed. 

Vitality  as  a  state  first  finds  expression  in  the 
continued  growth  of  the  plant,  and  a  still  higher 
expression  in  the  heredity  of  the  species,  for  the  state 
is  continued  from  plant  to  germ  through  the  germ  in 
life  and  growth  to  reproduction,  where  it  again 
appears  in  the  new  germ.  Thus  we  are  compelled  to 
consider  the  vital  conditions  of  heredity.  The  meta- 
genetic changes  of  the  individual  are  bequeathed  to 
its  posterity,  and  the  environmental  changes  of  the 
individual  are  wrought  into  its  structure  and  these 
again  are  bequeathed  within  more  or  less  restricted 
limits.  Thus  in  the  study  of  the  plant  we  study  a 
new  state  of  substance,  and  new  changes  are  here 
events  in  the  history  of  the  individual,  transferred 
by  heredity  to  its  offspring.  In  the  consideration 
of  the  development  of  germs  into  adult  individuals, 
the  accomplishment  of  the  process  is  ontogeny. 
In  the  consideration  of  the  development  of  indi- 
viduals in  generations  by  which  the  race  is 


EVOLUTION  197 

evolved,  we   may  consider   the   result    reached   as 
phylogeny. 

In  this  realm  the  law  of  the  acceleration  of  evolu-  v 
tion  is  the  one  discovered  by  Darwin  and  known  as  the 
survival  of  the  fittest  in  the  struggle  for  existence. 
Plants  multiply  by  germs,  and  more  germs  are 
produced  than  can  possibly  find  room  on  the  surface 
of  the  earth  when  developed  into  adults.  Plants 
multiply  by  hundreds,  thousands,  hundreds  of  thou- 
sands and  perhaps  even  millions;  some  must  perish 
by  inexorable  conditions,  and  the  few  that  arrive  at 
maturity  are  those  best  adapted  to  the  local  environ- 
ment where  they  live;  but  the  germs  themselves 
have  their  environments  changed  by  mechanical 
agencies,  as  on  winds,  waves  and  streams,  and  they 
are  often  carried  about  by  animals.  This  change  of 
environment  modifies  the  plants  themselves  in  such 
a  manner  that  varieties  are  developed  which  ulti- 
mately  become  species. 

The  evolution  of  plants  is  fundamentally  chemical 
under  the  law  of  affinity;  it  is  accelerated  by 
adaptation  to  environment;  it  is  then  subject  to  the 
law  of  acceleration  by  heterogeneity,  and  evolution 
is  still  further  accelerated  by  the  survival  of  the 
fittest. 

In  animal  life  a  fifth  state  of  substance  is  found 
which  I  call  motility.  In  this  state  all  the  other 
states  are  found:  ethereal,  fluid,  solid,  and  vital. 
Changes  which  occur  as  events  in  the  history  of 
motility  are  collisions  and  metageneses  in  the 
ethereal,  fluid,  solid,  and  vital  states,  but  to  them  is 
added  a  series  of  changes  which  are  expressed  in 
motility.  In  the  animal,  anabolism  and  catabolism 
are  contemporaneous,  as  the  animal  has  coeval 


198  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

growth  and  decay;  anabolism  and  catabolism  then 
become  metabolism.  The  dual  processes  of  meta- 
geneses,  which  are  evolution  and  dissolution,  are  now 
combined  so  long  as  life  lasts.  In  rest,  and  especially 
in  sleep,  anabolism  may  progress  at  a  greater  rate 
than  catabolism;  in  exercise,  and  especially  in  violent 
exercise,  catabolism  may  prevail,  but  neither  can 
wholly  cease  while  the  motile  state  endures.  Here, 
in  the  state  of  motility,  ontogeny  appears  in  the 
individual  and  phylogeny  in  the  race. 

In  attempting  to  define  the  states  of  substance  a 
precaution  is  necessary.  It  must  be  understood  that 
the  states  of  matter  do  not  always  appear  to  be 
separated  by  hard  and  fast  planes  of  demarcation ; 
and  so  far  as  we  can  assert  with  confidence,  there 
seems  to  be  a  gap  between  ether  and  ponderable 
matter,  though  a  complete  recognition  of  the  ether 
is  but  an  event  of  the  present  day.  The  gaseous 
and  liquid  states  are  included  in  the  fluid  state. 
Between  the  fluid  and  the  solid  states  intervening 
conditions  are  found. 

It  is  known  that  no  perfect  distinction  can 
be  made  between  the  solid  and  the  vital  state. 
There  are  those  who  believe  that  an  impassable 
barrier  exists  between  them,  but  this  doctrine  is 
rapidly  being  dispelled;  indeed  it  is  no  exaggeration 
to  say  that  scientific  men  rather  confidently  believe 
that  the  barrier  is  soon  to  be  thrown  down.  That 
the  barrier  between  vitality  and  motility  has  been 
overthrown  is  believed  by  many  biologists,  though 
there  are  still  those  who  believe  that  the  apparent 
consciousness  of  plants  as  exhibited  in  a  great 
variety  of  phenomena  can  be  explained  as  mechanical 
phenomena.  If  this  lingering  belief  be  true,  the 


EVOLUTION  199 

barrier  still  exists ;  but  there  is  no  ontogenic  barrier 
even  if  there  be  a  phylogenic  barrier. 

In  the  motile  state  of  matter  the  special  law  of 
evolution  was  discovered  by  Lamarck.  It  is  the  law 
of  effort,  and  may  be  stated  as  the  development  of 
organs  by  exercise  and  their  extirpation  by  disuse. 
It  must  be  remembered  that  all  the  other  laws  of 
evolution  apply  to  the  animal  and  that  this  new  law 
is  added  in  the  motile  state.  Sometimes  the  law  of 
heredity  is  called  a  law  of  evolution,  but  in  fact  it 
is  the  law  of  the  continuation  of  species  both  vegetal 
and  animal,  and  is  not  a  law  of  evolution. 

In  the  animal  the  law  of  'affinity  still  appears 
in  metabolism  as  fundamental,  for  by  metabolism 
the  development  of  the  organ  is  accomplished  and 
without  it  there  could  be  no  effort. 

The  animal  is  adapted  to  environment  by  many 
ways,  especially  in  the  development  of  agencies  for 
accommodation  to  climate,  as  in  the  down  of  birds, 
the  fur  of  animals,  and  in  various  protective  devices  as 
external  coverings  exhibited  in  the  shells  and  shards 
of  the  lower  animals.  But  the  animal  adapts  itself  to 
environment  in  another  manner:  endowed  with 
locomotion,  it  seeks  a  favorable  environment  best 
adapted  to  protection  and  best  adapted  to  supply 
stores  of  food. 

The  animal  is  still  subject  to  the  law  of  hetero- 
geneity, for  the  multiplication  of  heterogeneous 
characteristics  adapts  it  to  heterogeneous  conditions 
of  environment,  and  so  the  limitations  to  the  multi- 
plication of  adults  are  largely  thrown  down. 

The  animal  also  is  subject  to  the  law  of  survival, 
for  notwithstanding  the  utilization  of  every  possi- 
ble environment  for  every  variety,  there  is  yet 


200  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

an  overmultiplication  of  individuals,  which  must 
perish. 

Upon  these  laws  supervenes  the  law  of  effort 
by  which  organs  are  developed  on  various  lines  for 
various  conditions  of  environment,  and  the  result  of 
this  organic  evolution  leads  to  the  survival  of  those 
best  adapted.  In  animal  life  evolution  is  by  affinity, 
adaptation,  heterogeneity,  survival,  and  effort. 
The  first  of  these  methods  is  the  basis  while  the 
others  are  successive  accelerations,  so  that  the 
changes  wrought  in  the  animal  are  progressive  in 
geometrical  ratio  by  the  compounding  of  all  the 
factors. 

Another  factor  in  evolution  appears  in  the  organ- 
ization of  demotic  life  which  may  be  observed  among 
those  of  the  lower  animals  in  which  societies  are 
found,  appearing  among  mankind  and  becoming  the 
chief  factor  in  civilized  life.  It  is  a  method  of 
evolution  to  which  inadequate  attention  has  been 
given,  and  the  failure  to  recognize  it  has  led  to  mis- 
apprehension of  the  nature  of  human  evolution  and 
to  preposterous  claims  for  the  efficiency  in  mankind 
of  the  laws  of  evolution  found  among  lower  animals. 
This  mode  of  evolution,  therefore,  needs  more 
elaborate  presentation  than  that  which  we  have 
already  given  for  the  other  laws.  By  man  in 
civilization  the  law  of  effort  is  transmuted  into  the 
law  of  culture,  the  method  of  invention;  that  is, 
the  effort  is  designed  effort  for  the  purpose  of 
improving  human  conditions.  The  chemical  law 
still  remains  valid,  but  the  exercise  of  organs  is  ever 
from  age  to  age.  century  to  century,  and  even 
decade  to  decade  concentrated  upon  one  special 
system  of  organs.  Of  the  five  systems,  that  which 


V 


EVOLUTION  201 

has  the  function  of  thought  and  which  is  the  nervous 
system  is  ever  more  and  more  exercised,  until  metab- 
olism itself  is  accelerated  to  such  a  degree  that  the 
changes  in  the  nervous  system  are  far  more  rapid 
than  in  either  of  the  other  four  systems.  Thus 
human  evolution  comes  to  be  mental  evolution,  and 
this  mental  evolution  is  the  product  of  culture  by 
invention. 

The  law  of  culture  transforms  and  then  absorbs 
the  law  of  adaptation,  the  law  of  heterogeneity,  the 
law  of  survival,  and  finally  the  law  of  effort.  In 
what  manner  this  transformation  and  absorption 
are  effected  must  be  explained.  In  man  adaptation 
to  environment  is  transmuted  into  the  adaptation  of 
environment  to  man.  Man  is  not  adapted  to  food, 
but  food  is  adapted  to  man  by  culture.  New  foods 
are  developed  until  many  are  used.  The  animals 
which  furnish  food  are  cultivated  and  multiplied 
under  the  direction  of  man.  Vegetal  foods  are 
in  like  manner  multiplied  and  cultivated  in  vast 
fields,  vineyards,  orchards,  and  gardens,  and  new 
varieties  are  forever  developed  by  the  skill  of  man. 

Man  is  not  adapted  to  the  environment  of  climate, 
but  he  adapts  the  climate  to  himself;  when  it  is  too 
cold  he  kindles  a  fire,  and  he  protects  himself  when 
away  from  the  fire  by  clothing ;  when  it  is  too  wet 
he  covers  himself  with  a  roof ;  when  it  is  too  windy 
he  protects  himself  with  walls;  thus  man  does  not 
develop  down  like  the  birds,  or  wool  like  the 
mammals,  or  carapaces  like  the  turtles.  Man  does 
not  develop  fins  for  life  in  the  water,  but  he  con- 
structs boats  that  he  may  dwell  on  the  sea.  Man 
does  not  become  a  climber  to  live  on  the  trees,  but 
he  ascends  the  trees  on  ladders  and  he  fells  the  trees 


202  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

for  temples.  Man  does  not  seek  shelter  among  the 
rocks,  but  he  quarries  the  rocks  and  builds  palaces. 
Man  does  not  burrow  in  the  ground,  but  he  molds 
and  burns  the  clay  and  constructs  marts  of  trade. 
Man  does  not  develop  eyes  that  he  may  live  in  the 
dark,  but  he  invents  lightning  light  that  night  may 
become  day.  The  illustrations  of  the  change  of 
adaptation  from  man  himself  to  the  environment 
may  be  found  in  endless  profusion.  There  is  a 
change  wrought  in  man  by  all  these  agencies,  but  it 
is  a  change  in  his  mind  exhibited  in  the  develop- 
ment of  the  organ  of  mind  and  the  concomitant 
development  of  thought. 

The  law  of  heterogeneity  undergoes  a  like  trans- 
formation. Upon  the  things  in  the  environment 
which  are  useful  to  man  the  law  of  heterogeneity  is 
concentrated.  Domestic  animals  are  multiplied  in 
variety,  and  cultivated  plants  are  changed  until  their 
native  forms  are  lost  and  the  new  forms  are  multi- 
plied beyond  enumeration.  Fabrics  for  clothing 
are  produced  and  garments  are  made ;  materials  for 
house  structure  are  differentiated  from  the  materials 
of  nature,  and  dwellings,  storehouses,  marts,  and 
temples  are  constructed  in  a  multiplicity  of  forms. 
Tools  and  machines  are  differentiated  from  natural 
material;  all  the  powers  of  nature  are  specialized 
for  man's  purposes;  the  whole  progress  of  mankind 
is  a  succession  of  differentiations  or  specializations  of 
the  materials  of  nature  to  become  the  works  of  art. 

The  law  of  survival  also  undergoes  a  profound 
modification.  Men  are  no  longer  subject  to  the 
vicissitudes  of  natural  environment  where  winds 
may  congeal  their  limbs,  where  floods  may  over- 
whelm them  with  death,  and  where  disease  may 


EVOLUTION  203 

carry  them  away  in  multitudes.  These  agencies 
still  act  and  have  their  victims,  but  the  inventions  of 
man  are  ever  becoming  more  potent  for  the  pres- 
ervation of  life.  There  was  a  time  when  drought 
in  a  narrow  belt  of  country  might  produce  a  famine 
and  when  the  people  of  such  regions  might  perish ;  but 
no  more  famines  can  occur,  for  railroads  link  all 
fields  to  every  man's  farm.  There  was  a  time  when 
a  blizzard  might  destroy  a  tribe ;  but  now  a  storm 
may  sweep  in  vain  from  the  boreal  zone  about  the 
dwellings  of  civilized  men,  for  man  constructs  his 
home  against  these  vicissitudes. 

Human  providence  is  more  potent  than  flood, 
more  potent  than  drought,  more  potent  than  wind. 
The  man  of  intellect  wields  a  power  that  giants 
cannot  exercise. 

The  differentiation  of  animal  species  found  in  the 
lower  world  is  replaced  as  a  new  method  of  progress 
is  evolved.  The  animals  differentiate  into  biotic 
species.  This  tendency  seems  to  have  prevailed  in 
the  early  and  more  animal  history  of  mankind,  for 
the  records  of  these  forms  are  still  preserved  in 
types  of  men,  as  exhibited  in  the  conformation  of 
the  skeleton  and  especially  in  the  cranium ;  it  is  also 
exhibited  in  the  color  of  the  skin,  the  structure  of 
the  hair,  the  attitude  of  the  eyes,  the  conformation 
of  the  face,  and  in  other  ways.  But  there  is  no 
black,  or  white,  or  tawny  species,  there  is  no  straight 
or  woolly-haired  species,  there  is  no  horizontal  or 
oblique-eyed  species,  there  is  no  blue-eyed  or  black- 
eyed  species,  there  is  no  broad  or  long-skulled 
species,  but  these  characteristics  are  now  inter- 
mingled in  inextricable  confusion — the  result  of  the 
admixture  of  streams  of  blood.  Thus  the  method  of 


204  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

differentiation  of  animal  species  has  been  reversed 
in  the  case  of  man.  That  in  which  men  now  differ 
is  intellectual  power,  but  fools  are  not  necessarily 
blue-eyed  and  wise  men  black-eyed.  The  traits  in 
which  men  differ  are  moral,  but  honest  men  are  not 
necessarily  broad-skulled  or  rogues  long-skulled. 

The  law  of  adaptation  in  the  lower  animals  and 
in  plants  was  made  efficient  by  a  high  rate  of 
multiplication,  but  in  civilization  this  rate  is 
diminished,  so  that  man  has  not  even  yet  crowded  the 
earth  and  no  land  has  been  inhabited  so  densely  as 
to  press  upon  the  capacity  of  the  land  to  produce 
food.  Famines  have  occurred  only  by  improvidence, 
and  the  poor  starve  by  neglect.  The  effort  of 
mankind  for  sanitation,  the  healing  of  wounds  and 
the  curing  of  diseases,  is  the  endeavor  of  mankind  to 
repeal  the  law  of  nature  when  the  environment  is  his 
destruction ;  thus  this  law  of  adaptation  to  environ- 
ment for  the  preservation  of  the  few  among  the  lower 
animals,  is  made  inefficient  by  the  slow  rate  of  the 
multiplication  of  men  and  is  replaced  by  human 
effort  to  preserve  and  prolong  life. 

There  is  an  environment  to  which  men  are 
adapted;  it  is  the  environment  of  culture.  Most 
men  speak  the  language  of  the  people  among  whom 
they  were  born.  Every  man  seeks  a  vocation  to 
adapt  himself  to  the  vocations  of  others,  that  by  his 
special  labor  he  may  acquire  the  most  of  the  special 
labors  of  others;  so  he  adjusts  himself  to  the 
industrial  conditions  by  which  he  is  surrounded. 
From  the  cradle  to  the  grave  his  intellectual  advance- 
ment is  dependent  largely  upon  his  intellectual 
environment,  and  he  suits  that  environment  to  his 
purpose. 


EVOLUTION  205 

Man  cultivates  his  physical  powers  by  exercise 
in  the  industries  and  in  a  variety  of  athletic  sports,  in 
the  same  manner  as  do  the  lower  animals,  and  he 
invents  new  methods  of  physical  training;  but  he 
also  and  chiefly  develops  methods  of  intellectual 
training,  instruction  and  research,  to  which  the 
schools,  the  libraries,  the  journals,  and  the  systems 
of  research  abundantly  attest.  No,  the  laws  of 
brute  evolution  have  been  repealed  by  substitution 
and  the  new  ways  are  methods  of  culture.  The 
laws  of  nature  unmodified  by  man  produce  horns, 
claws,  fangs,  and  poisons  for  attack,  with  armor, 
cowardice,  and  deceit  for  defense.  Culture  replaces 
these  brutal  devices;  smiling  fields,  cheerful  homes, 
and  all  the  products  of  civilization  are  derived  from 
the  inventions  of  man  himself.  As  the  generations 
come  each  inherits  from  his  predecessor  and  adds  to 
the  patrimony  by  self-activity.  That  which  the  self 
can  accomplish  is  multiplied  by  all  which  the 
social  environment  produces.  Man  is  not  only  an 
heir  to  the  past  generations,  but  he  cooperates  in  the 
activities  of  the  present,  and  when  he  dies  he 
bequeaths  the  intellectual  wealth  which  his  self- 
activity  has  acquired  in  cooperation  with  all  his 
contemporaries  of  the  world. 

In  the  natural  world  evolution  is  primarily  by 
incorporation  and  reincorporation.  This  incorpora- 
tion is  by  affinity.  We  have  shown  that  affinity  is 
explained  as  the  consciousness  and  choice  of  ulti- 
mate particles.  When  we  reach  animate  beings  in 
which  affinity  is  mind,  the  Lamarckian  law  of  effort 
becomes  potent  in  evolution  until  men  are  developed 
and  the  five  forms  of  culture  are  invented.  Molec- 
ular reincorporation  by  heredity  now  goes  hand  in 


206  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

hand  with  culture  or  self-activity  modified  by  social 
environment. 

Evolution  as  a  process  is  the  development  of  new 
kinds  with  their  concomitant  forms,  forces,  causa- 
tions and  ideations  by  the  multiplication  of  the 
relations  of  causation. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

SENSATION 

We  must  here  recall  the  distinction  between  feel- 
ing and  sensation  set  forth  in  a  former  chapter. 
Feeling  is  cognition  of  effect  upon  self  and  gives 
rise  to  the  emotions,  while  sensation  is  the  cognition 
of  the  external  cause  of  a  sense  impression  and  gives 
rise  to  intellection. 

I  feel  light  as  an  effect,  but  I  see  its  cause  in  the 
luminant  or  the  reflector.  I  attend  to  its  effect,  if 
it  is  too  brilliant,  or  I  attend  to  its  cause,  if  I  am 
interested  in  the  cause.  When  I  attend  to  the  effect, 
it  is  a  feeling;  when  I  attend  to  the  cause,  it  is  a 
sense  impression.  An  explosion  occurs;  the  effect 
upon  my  ear  is  painful.  If  I  attend  to  it  I  have  a 
feeling,  but  if  I  wish  to  know  its  cause  and  attend  to 
it,  I  have  a  sensation.  Thus  feeling  and  sensation  are 
reciprocal.  The  more  the  feeling,  the  less  the 
sensation;  the  more  the  sensation,  the  less  the 
feeling.  This  is  an  old  doctrine  in  a  new  form. 
The  old  doctrine  of  psychology  is  this:  that  feeling 
and  cognition  are  inversely  proportional;  as  we  go 
on  the  old  statement  will  be  found  faulty,  and  the 
new  statement,  that  feeling  and  sensation  are 
reciprocal,  will  be  found  correct. 

An  object  impinges  upon  my  organ  of  taste.  If 
its  taste  is  pleasant  or  unpleasant  and  I  attend  to  that 
as  an  effect,  it  is  a  feeling,  but  if  I  attend  to  the 
object-  as  a  cause,  it  is  a  sensation.  The  organ  of 

taste  is  in  the  portal  to  the  metabolic  organs.     The 

207 


208  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

taste  of  the  object  is  pleasant  or  unpleasant,  as  I 
perceive  by  eating.  Now,  suppose  that  I  am  select- 
ing apples  for  the  purpose  of  putting  the  sweet  in 
one  basket  and  the  sour  in  another.  I  am  attending 
now  to  a  property  of  the  object  through  its  effect 
upon  the  subject.  Its  effect  upon  the  subject  is 
emotional,  but  considered  as  a  property  of  the 
object,  it  is  intellectual.  It  is  thus  that  an  organ 
of  feeling  is  transmuted  into  an  organ  of  sense 
which  reveals  the  property  of  the  body. 

The  feeling  of  the  circulation,  which  is  variable 
by  temperature  and  thus  a  feeling  of  heat,  is  devel- 
oped into  the  sense  of  touch,  and  the  sense  of  touch, 
which  reveals  the  property,  performs  the  vicarious 
function  of  revealing  the  body  touched. 

The  feeling  of  strain  is  developed  into  the  sense 
of  stress,  and  the  sense  of  stress  reveals  the  body 
producing  the  stress. 

A  feeling  of  vibration  occurs  when  the  medium,  as 
water  or  air,  is  agitated  in  such  manner  as  to  pro- 
duce sound.  This  feeling  is  especially  produced  in 
the  self  by  speech ;  the  origin  of  speech  is  the  calling 
of  the  mate,  which  call  is  made  by  one  and  heard 
by  the  other,  and  hence  heard  by  both. 

Thus  the  feeling  of  sound  develops  into  the  sense 
of  hearing,  which  is  the  sense  of  causation ;  for  the 
primordial  ego,  in  the  race  and  in  the  individual 
alike,  first  cognizes  causation  as  speech  and  dis- 
tinguishes it  from  force,  for  it  can  cause  another  to 
act  by  speech  and  it  is  conscious  that  it  can  be  caused 
to  act  by  speech. 

The  feeling  of  motion  in  self  results  whenever  we 
are  conscious  of  the  will  to  move.  Thus  the  Will  to 
move  is  the  cause  of  the  feeling  of  molar  motion 


SENSATION  209 

itself,  and  the  feeling  of  motion  is  developed  into 
the  sense  of  vision  by  which  motion  is  primordially 
and  naively  interpreted  as  the  sense  of  conception. 
The  feeling  of  motion  is  developed  into  the  sense 
of  seeing,  for  we  feel  molar  motion  and  feel  that 
that  is  caused  by  will,  and  primitive  man  naively 
infers  that  all  molar  motion  is  caused  by  will ;  hence 
he  infers  that  all  molar  bodies  have  will. 

The  senses  are  vicarious  feelings.  * 

I  have  already  defined  consciousness  in  the  particle 
as  awareness  of  self,  as  a  unit,  an  extension,  a  speed, 
and  a  persistence,  for  this  is  the  hypothesis  upon 
which  I  am  working.  For  human  psychology  it 

*  In  this  work  only  such  a  review  of  science  is  intended  as  is  necessary 
for  the  development  of  an  epistomology.  In  order  to  accomplish  this  I  have 
attempted  to  set  forth  the  properties  of  bodies  in  their  reciprocal  aspect  as 
bodies  and  particles,  or  as  internal  and  external  relations.  I  have  not  con- 
sidered it  necessary  or  appropriate  to  enter  into  a  minute  discussion  of  the 
facts  and  principles  of  all  the  sciences  severally.  For  example,  the  develop- 
ment of  the  senses  from  the  feelings  receives  but  brief  mention.  To  set 
forth  the  ontogeny  and  philogeny  of  the  senses  would  require  a  separate 
work.  In  my  consideration  of  the  development  of  the  sense  of  hearing  I 
have  followed  Frederic  S.  I^ee,  more  perhaps  than  any  other  physiologist, 
though  I  have  consulted  several  other  authors  on  the  subject.  In  stating 
my  conclusions  I  have  necessarily  refrained  from  citing  authorities,  as  I  do 
not  enter  into  these  subjects  except  to  make  broad  generalizations.  But 
since  this  chapter  was  written  I  have  received  an  abstract  of  a  paper  read 
by  Dr.  I,ee  before  the  British  Association  (published  in  the  Report  of  that 
Association  for  1897) ,  in  which  I  find  that  he  briefly  but  clearly  propounds 
the  doctrine  that  the  feeling  of  equilibrium  is  developed  into  the  sense  of 
hearing.  I  quote  the  abstract  in  full. 

THE  EAR  AND  THE  I,ATERAI,  I,INE  IN  FISHES. 

BY  FREDERIC  S.  I*BE,  PH.D. 

The  chief  morphological  facts  upon  which  the  theory  of  the  origin  of  the 
ear  from  the  system  of  the  lateral  line  is  based  are  similarity  in  structure 
of  the  adult  organs,  in  innervation,  and  in  ontogeny.  Physiology  seems 
able  to  present  at  least  circumstantial  evidence  in  favor  of  this  theory.  The 
author  has  investigated  the  functions  of  the  ear  and  the  sense-organs  of 
the  lateral  line  in  fishes. 
The  Ear.— The  results  may  be  tabulated  as  follows  :— 

Functions  of  the  Ear.  Sense-organs. 

I.    Dynamical  functions  in  )1.     Rotary  movements.     Cristae  acusticee 

recognition  of. J  2.    Progressive  movements.  Maculae  acusticae 


2IO  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

needs  not  that  the  theory  be  extended  to  the  ulti- 
mate chemical  particle,  but  the  doctrine  is  demon- 
strated to  the  extent  that  the  animate  cellular 
particle  is  conscious.  Now  I  wish  to  consider  con- 
sciousness as  awareness  of  the  part  which  a  particle 
takes  as  a  cause  or  effect  in  the  production  of  a 
judgment. 

When  a  sapid  substance  impinges  upon  my  organ 
of  taste  I  am  conscious  of  an  effect.  When  a  body 
touches  me  I  am  conscious  of  an  effect.  When  a 
sound  impinges  on  my  ear  I  am  conscious  of  an 
effect.  When  a  body  presses  upon  my  muscles  I 
am  conscious  of  an  effect,  and  when  a  color  strikes 


"»-    Position  in  space.     Macula  acustic*. 

The  above  functions  are  divisions  of  the  general  function  of  equilibration: 
the  sense-organs  of  the  ear  deal  with  the  equilibrium  of  the  body  under  all 
circumstances,  both  in  movement  and  at  rest. 

In  vertebrates  above  the  fishes  we  must  add  to  the  above  : 
III.    Auditory  functions  in  £4.    Vibratory     motions.       Papilla     acustica 
recognition  of.  .....  )  basilaris. 

Experiments  by  the  author  and  by  Kreidl  prove  that  fishes  do  not 
possess  the  power  of  audition.  Hence  the  ear  in  fishes  is  purely  equilibra- 
tive  in  function. 

2.  The  Lateral  Line.—  Simple  cutting  of  the  lateral  nerve  or  destruction 
of  the  lateral  organs  does  not  seem  to  affect  equilibrium.  But  destruction 
of  the  organs,  combined  with  removal  of  the  pectoral  and  pelvic  fins,  causes 
marked  lack  of  equilibrium,  manifested  by  uncertain,  ill-regulated  move- 
ments ;  removal  of  fins  alone  has  no  pronounced  effect. 

Central  stimulation  of  the  lateral  nerve  causes  the  same  compensating 
movements  of  the  fins  as  does  stimulation  of  the  acoustic  of  the  opposite 
side.  These  results  make  it  probable  that  the  organs  of  the  lateral  line  are 
equilibrative  in  function,  and  are  employed  in  the  recognition  of  currents 
in  the  water  and  of  movements  of  the  body  through  the  water.  The  results 
of  Bonnier  and  of  Fuchs  are  in  harmony  with  this. 

This  was  probably  the  primitive  function.  By  the  inclosure  within  the 
skull  of  a  bit  of  the  lateral  line  and  the  differentiation  and  refinement  of 
its  sense-organs,  a  more  perfect  organ  of  appreciation  of  movement,  and 
hence  of  equilibrium,  was  evolved  in  the  ear.  Along  with  the  appearance 
of  laud  animals  a  portion  of  this  organ  became  still  more  differentiated  and 
refined,  and,  as  the  papilla  acustica  basilaris,  acquired  the  power  of 
appreciating  the  movements  that  we  call  sound.  Thus  equilibration  and 
audition  became  associated  in  the  same  organ. 


SENSATION  211 

my  eyes  I  am  conscious  of  an  effect.  In  these 
cases  consciousness  in  a  judgment  is  awareness  of 
effect  on  itself,  but  it  is  the  consciousness  of  the 
particle  which  is  transmitted  to  the  cortex. 

See  how  this  is  developed.  Consciousness  is 
awareness  of  the  part  which  self  takes  in  the  pro- 
duction of  a  judgment,  either  as  a  cause  or  as  an 
effect.  Thus  I  am  conscious  of  the  cause  when  I 
act  upon  another,  and  I  am  conscious  of  the  effect 
when  another  acts  upon  me,  and  I  am  conscious  of 
both  cause  and  effect  when  I  act  upon  myself,  as 
when  I  touch  my  head  with  my  hand.  Here  there 
are  two  pairs  of  correlates,  self  and  other,  together 
with  cause  and  effect,  and  we  must  distinguish  an 
active  consciousness  from  a  passive  consciousness. 
I  call  it  an  active  consciousness  when  I  am  con- 
scious of  being  a  cause,  and  a  passive  consciousness 
when  I  am  conscious  of  experiencing  an  effect. 
This  distinction  must  be  firmly  held. 

Consciousness  in  this  stage  is  awareness  of  the 
terms  of  causation,  but  they  are  not  immediately 
related,  for  cases  of  active  and  passive  consciousness 
occur  usually  at  different  times  and  under  different 
circumstances.  But  there  are  some  occurrences 
where  the  active  and  the  passive  elements  are 
immediately  connected  in  succession;  this  hap- 
pens when  I  act  on  myself.  In  this  manner  the 
primitive  mind  learns  of  causation  as  composed  of 
cause  and  effect,  in  the  order  of  antecedent  and 
consequent. 

When  I  am  conscious  of  an  effect  I  infer  a  cause 
as  an  external  object.  When  I  taste  I  infer  that  I 
taste  some  other  thing  or  object;  when  I  smell  I 
infer  that  I  smell  some  external  thing;  when  I  am 


212  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

touched  I  infer  that  I  am  touched  by  some  external 
thing;  when  I  am  pressed  I  infer  that  I  am  pressed 
by  some  external  thing;  when  I  hear  I  infer  that 
I  hear  some  external  thing,  and  when  I  see  I  infer 
that  I  see  some  external  thing.  This  something 
we  call  the  object,  and  the  mental  act  we  call 
inference.  A  consciousness  and  an  inference  pro- 
duce what  I  call  a  judgment,  but  this  is  an  imperfect 
account  of  the  process ;  let  us  know  it  all. 

A  sense  impression  does  not  constitute  a  sensation, 
but  a  sensation  is  compounded  of  sense  impressions. 
Let  us  say  that  I  have  had  many  sense  impressions 
of  different  kinds.  Now  suppose  that  I  have  one  of 
taste;  how  shall  I  classify  it  with  former  sense 
impressions?  Evidently  they  must  be  recalled  and 
compared,  and  I  choose  one  for  this  purpose.  This 
choosing  of  a  past  sense  impression  and  comparing 
it  with  a  present  sense  impression  and  deciding  that 
they  are  alike,  I  call  a  judgment. 

These  things  are  necessary  to  a  primitive  judg- 
ment. First,  a  sense  impression;  second,  a  con- 
sciousness of  that  impression;  third,  a  desire  to 
know  its  cause;  fourth,  a  choice  of  a  cause;  fifth, 
a  consciousness  of  the  concept  of  that  cause ;  sixth, 
a  comparison  of  one  conscious  term  with  the  other ; 
and  seventh,  a  judgment  of  likeness  or  of  unlikeness. 
Stated  in  another  manner,  the  judgment  has  these 
elements,  a  consciousness  of  a  sense  impression  on 
the  one  hand,  and  a  consciousness  of  another  which 
is  chosen,  and  the  two  are  compared  and  found  to  be 
alike  or  unlike  as  the  case  may  be,  and  a  judgment 
is  made.  In  still  another  manner  a  judgment  may 
be  defined  as  the  comparison  of  a  present  event 
with  a  past  event  in  which  consciousness  is  twice 


SENSATION  213 

involved ;  in  the  first  an  impression  causes  conscious- 
ness; in  the  second  a  choice  causes  consciousness, 
when  the  two  are  compared  and  a  judgment  made  of 
likeness  or  unlikeness,  which  is  identification  and 
discrimination. 

Choose  a  taste  and  you  will  recollect  a  taste; 
choose  an  odor  and  you  will  recollect  an  odor; 
choose  a  touch  and  you  will  recollect  a  touch ;  choose 
a  pressure  and  you  will  recollect  a  pressure ;  choose 
a  sound  and  you  will  recollect  a  sound;  choose  a 
color  and  you  will  recollect  a  color. 

To  choose  is  to  revive  in  memory,  for  choice  is  the 
cause  of  the  revival  which  is  the  effect.  You  cannot 
think  of  all  sense  impressions  or  sensations  at  one 
time,  but  choose  any  one  of  them  and  you  will 
recollect  that  one.  Inference,  therefore,  is  guessing 
or  choosing,  or  in  another  light  it  may  be  called 
interpreting.  We  shall  hereafter  see  that  this 
choosing  is  not  random  guessing. 

The  babe  tastes  milk ;  tastes  it  again  and  makes  a 
judgment  that  the  milk  which  it  tastes  now  is  like 
the  milk  which  it  tasted  before;  then  it  tastes 
vinegar  and  makes  a  judgment  that  it  is  unlike  the 
previous  taste.  It  continues  to  taste  milk  and 
vinegar  and  discriminates  between  the  two.  Its 
judgment  of  likeness  is  repeated  in  the  case  of  the 
milk  and  repeated  in  the  case  of  the  vinegar  and 
these  judgments  are  consolidated,  so  that  the  present 
judgment  of  likeness  is  a  judgment  of  likeness  to 
some  of  the  previous  cases  and  of  unlikeness  to  others. 
The  mind  does  not  recall  every  example  to  con- 
sciousness and  compare  them  severally  with  the 
present  one,  but  it  recalls  the  like  in  a  consolidated  or 
fused  group  if  the  judgment  is  that  of  likeness. 


214  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

This  process  of  consolidating  or  fusing  judgments 
I  call  conception. 

It  has  been  said  that  an  inference  is  not  a  random 
guess.  The  guess  is  always  dictated  by  something 
in  experience  as  some  collateral  circumstance, 
expectation,  or  interest.  We  shall  hereafter  see 
that  interest  is  the  chief,  if  not  the  sole,  agency  in 
determining  the  choice. 

But  some  judgments  are  not  valid.  A  taste  may 
be  subjective,  due  to  some  disease  of  the  organ  of 
taste ;  then  the  judgment  is  a  fallacy. 

Suppose  that  my  skin  is  diseased,  and  that  I  have 
a  feeling  which  I  mistake  for  a  sensation  and  infer 
that  something  touches  me;  this  subjective  effect, 
which  I  here  call  a  feeling,  must  be  distinguished 
from  a  sense  impression  or  it  will  lead  to  an  erro- 
neous judgment.  I  may  have  a  feeling  in  the  ear,  as 
when  I  take  an  overdose  of  quinine,  and  if  it  is  con- 
founded with  a  sense  impression  a  fallacy  is 
produced.  Feelings  of  this  kind  are  sometimes 
known  as  subjective  sensations,  and  they  must 
always  be  clearly  distinguished  from  sense  impres- 
sions. 

Here  we  reach  a  dilemma ;  a  judgment  has  been 
formed,  but  it  may  be  a  fallacy  or  a  certitude.  How 
shall  we  know?  Something  else  is  needed;  this  is 
verification.  In  sensation  verification  is  accom- 
plished by  repetition.  But  this  is  an  imperfect 
method,  for  in  abnormal  conditions  repeated 
erroneous  judgments  may  be  made.  While  the 
method  usually  serves  the  purpose,  sometimes  it  fails 
and  a  higher  verification  is  dependent  upon  another 
faculty  of  judgment  by  another  sense. 

Verification  depends  upon  the  ability  of  a  judg- 


SENSATION  215 

ment  to  coalesce  with  other  judgments  in  concepts ; 
that  is,  it  depends  on  its  conceivability.  If  a  judg- 
ment is  incongruous  with  previous  judgments  it  can- 
not be  conceived  and  is  held  for  confirmation  or 
rejection.  The  class  may  at  once  be  discovered  and 
the  right  concept  enlarged,  or  it  may  wait  until 
another  like  judgment  is  made,  when  a  new  concept 
will  be  generated. 

Primary  consciousness  is  in  the  end  organ,  but  it  is 
transmitted  by  fibrous  nerves  to  the  ganglion  and 
finally  to  the  cortex ;  when  it  comes  to  the  cortex, 
the  individual,  or  the  ego,  is  conscious  of  the  same 
impression.  Each  ganglion  in  the  hierarchy  forms 
a  distinct  judgment.  The  cortex  certainly  forms 
judgments  for  itself  and  combines  them  with  con- 
cepts. The  action  of  the  cortex  must  be  concomitant 
with  the  making  of  a  judgment,  and  as  the  judgment 
must  coalesce  with  the  concept,  the  part  of  the  cortex 
involved  must  be  structurally  modified  thereby. 
Thus  it  is  that  a  record  is  made  of  a  judgment  when 
it  coalesces  with  a  concept.  The  record  then  is 
physiological,  as  memory  is  physiological,  and  judg- 
ment and  conception  are  thus  the  psychological 
abstracts  of  concomitant  processes  of  the  brain. 

A  judgment  once  formed  remains  in  memory  as 
an  effect  on  the  organ  of  mind ;  another  like  judg- 
ment revives  it,  or  in  more  common  language,  it  is 
recollected.  Memory  as  retention  is  not  a  phenom- 
enon of  the  fifth  property  called  judgment,  but  of  the 
fourth  property  called  time;  but  recollection  is 
revival  in  consciousness  and  is  an  intellectual  proc- 
ess. To  distinguish  the  fifth  property  from  all  the 
others  we  may  call  judgment  intellectual  and  the 
other  properties  mechanical.  It  must  be  remem- 


2l6  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

bered  that  the  judgment  cannot  exist  without  the 
mechanical  properties,  that  is,  there  can  be  no  judg- 
ment without  retention  or  memory.  A  judgment 
cannot  persist  as  a  pure  judgment,  for  its  duration, 
which  is  called  memory  or  retention,  depends  upon 
the  time  property  of  a  body  which  must  also  have 
motion,  space,  and  number. 

In  experimental  psychology  the  mechanical  con- 
comitants are  the  units  with  which  judgments  are 
measured.  The  science  also  deals  in  experiment 
with  the  conditions  in  the  object  under  which  judg- 
ments are  formed.  It  may  be  that  here  it  finds  its 
most  fruitful  field  as  a  co-worker  with  introspection. 
Experimentation,  physiology,  and  introspection  are 
the  methods  of  psychology.  Alone  they  fill  the 
world  with  fallacies;  cooperating  they  give  a  valid 
psychology.  Introspection  has  had  the  field  to  itself 
since  the  days  of  Aristotle  and  has  filled  the  world  with 
hallucinations.  In  these  later  days  science  comes 
with  two  new  methods  which,  conjoined  with  the  old, 
give  promise  of  a  new  and  better  psychology. 

In  the  compounding  of  judgments  by  sensation,  if 
one  consciousness  is  inferred  to  be  like  another  then 
the  present  sense  impression  recalls  that  other. 
Thus  the  judgment  of  sensation  is  the  judgment  of 
likeness.  A  succession  of  judgments  of  this  kind 
are  consolidated  in  a  concept  and  every  additional 
sense  judgment  verifies  the  past  sense  judgment. 
When  the  present  sense  impression  revives  a  past 
like  sensation,  it  usually  recalls  it  as  integrated  and 
differentiated.  For  example,  I  hear  a  sound  and 
cognize  it  as  a  sound  by  recalling  past  sounds  in  a 
consolidated  group,  but  in  this  case  it  may  be  a  shrill 
cry.  Another  sensation  of  the  same  character  may 


SENSATION  217 

occur,  the  two  being  separated  by  a  longer  or  a  shorter 
interval ;  in  this  case  I  not  only  recognize  the  sound 
as  such  but  also  recall  the  former  cry,  so  that  I  not 
only  classify  the  cry  among  sounds,  but  also  classify 
the  cry  among  cries. 

Every  sense  mechanically  abstracts  the  impressions 
which  it  receives  as  distinguished  from  the  impres- 
sions received  from  other  senses.  The  eye  abstracts 
sense  impressions  of  light,  the  ear  abstracts  sense 
impressions  of  sound,  the  nose  abstracts  sense  impres- 
sions of  odor,  the  mouth  abstracts  sense  impressions 
of  taste,  the  skin  abstracts  sense  impressions  of 
touch,  the  muscles  abstract  sense  impressions  of 
force,  as  stress  and  strain,  etc. 

It  does  not  comport  with  our  present  purpose  to 
examine,  either  anatomically  or  physiologically,  the 
nature  of  the  senses  themselves ;  we  are  simply  trying 
to  find  out  what  a  sensation  is  when  we  consider  it 
as  one  of  a  group  of  like  judgments  forming  a 
concept. 

We  see  that  the  sensations  are  abstracted  in  that 
every  sense  organ  recognizes  a  single  property  and 
that  for  every  organ  there  is  a  fundamental  property. 
Then  we  see  that  the  sense  impression  coming  into 
one  organ  is  classified  as  like  or  unlike ;  thus  the  eye 
recognizes  distinctions  of  light,  the  ear  recognizes 
distinctions  of  sound,  the  nose  recognizes  distinctions 
of  odor,  the  mouth  recognizes  distinctions  of  flavor, 
and  the  touch  recognizes  distinctions  of  texture. 
The  muscular  sense,  or  sense  of  strain,  recognizes 
distinctions  of  force,  and  it  is  thus  that  sensation  is 
abstraction  and  classification. 

Kind  is  directly  cognized  by  the  sense  of  taste 
and  odor.  The  same  objects  that  are  cognized  by 


2l8  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

these  senses  may  also  be  cognized  by  the  other 
senses,  and  while  they  do  not  give  direct  deliver- 
ances of  kind,  they  give  deliverances  which  become 
symbols  of  kind.  We  cannot  taste  the  kind  when 
we  touch  the  pear,  but  we  can  recollect  it.  We  do 
not  taste  the  pear  when  we  weigh  it  in  the  hand, 
but  we  may  recollect  its  taste.  When  standing 
under  the  pear-tree  we  hear  the  pear  fall ;  we  cannot 
taste  it,  but  we  may  recollect  its  taste.  When  we 
see  the  pear  upon  the  tree  we  do  not  taste  it,  but  we 
may  recollect  its  flavor.  Thus  the  primary  sense  of 
kind  is  taste,  and  the  other  senses  become  vicarious 
senses  of  taste.  We  need  a  term  for  this  faculty  and 
shall  use  apperception  to  signify  this  cognition  of 
different  properties  by  one  sense.  Like  all  other 
terms  of  psychology,  this  one  has  been  used  in 
many  senses  with  a  tendency  to  universal  meaning, 
but  I  shall  use  apperception  to  signify  the  union  of 
judgments  of  disparate  properties  discovered  by 
disparate  senses.  I  have  used  concomitancy  and 
comprehension  to  signify  the  union  of  disparate 
properties  in  one  particle  or  body;  in  the  same 
manner  I  use  apperception  to  signify  the  union  of 
judgments  of  disparate  properties  in  one  particle  or 
body.  This  may  be  stated  in  another  way.  The 
development  of  taste  is  only  the  development  of  a 
cognition  of  an  attribute,  but  all  the  five  attributes 
or  properties  of  bodies  are  concomitant,  and  though 
primarily  recognized  by  disparate  senses  they  are 
finally  recognized  as  concomitants  in  bodies,  and 
when  a  body  is  cognized  by  one  sense  it  recognizes 
all  of  the  properties  of  the  body  primarily  discovered 
by  the  other  senses.  Thus  in  cognizing  the  property 
of  a  body  by  taste  or  smell,  we  may  re-cognize  the 


SENSATION  219 

body  itself  with  all  its  properties.  In  this  manner 
one  sense  becomes  vicarious  for  the  others.  This 
faculty  we  have  called  apperception. 

We  may  consider  a  being  so  lowly  that  all  its 
judgments  are  confined  within  the  sphere  of  good  or 
evil  in  the  objects  of  the  environment  as  they  are 
related  to  itself  as  food.  But  if  its  fixed  life  were 
developed  into  a  freely  moving  life,  it  would  be 
guided  in  its  search  for  food  by  an  auxiliary  sense 
of  kind;  this  is  the  sense  of  smell.  The  primary 
sense  is  the  sense  of  taste,  but  it  has  an  auxiliary 
sense  by  which  it  discovers  the  same  properties,  for 
odors  and  flavors  are  the  same,  though  gathered 
from  the  environment  by  disparate  organs. 

Verified  judgments  of  sensation  are  cognitions  of 
kind.  Sense  impressions  of  a  kind  are  consolidated ; 
this  consolidation  comes  by  experience  and  produces 
a  concept;  thus  we  have  a  concept  of  a  particular 
color  as  distinguished  from  sound,  or  of  sound  as 
distinguished  from  strain,  or  of  strain  as  distin- 
guished from  touch,  or  of  touch  as  distinguished 
from  taste.  Sensation,  therefore,  produces  concepts 
of  kind,  and  the  correlates  of  likeness  and  unlikeness 
are  involved.  We  may  define  sensation  as  the 
cognition  of  properties  as  kinds  in  their  effects,  and 
it  is  a  compound  of  judgments;  and  a  judgment  is  a 
combination  of  a  sense  impression,  a  consciousness, 
a  choice,  a  concept,  and  a  comparison. 

Such  judgments  as  we  have  hitherto  considered  in 
this  chapter  are  not  the  only  judgments  of  kind 
which  are  formed  by  the  mind.  When  a  judgment 
is  once  formed  and  recorded  in  the  structure  of  the 
brain,  it  may  be  recalled  as  a  collateral  suggestion 
of  a  sense  impression,  or  by  the  will  itself,  and  when 


220  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

thus  recalled  it  may  be  compared  with  other  concepts, 
and  other  new  judgments  of  kind  may  thus  be  pro- 
duced. The  elements  of  a  judgment  of  this  kind 
are,  first,  the  choice  of  a  past  concept;  second,  the 
consciousness  of  it;  third,  the  choice  of  another 
concept;  fourth,  a  consciousness  of  it;  fifth,  the 
comparison  of  one  with  the  other.  The  products  of 
these  five  factors  will  constitute  a  new  judgment. 
Thus  the  constitution  of  the  judgment  still  remains 
the  same,  but  it  begins  with  a  recollection  instead  of 
with  a  sense  impression.  Thus  judgments  of  kind 
are  presentative  and  representative.  Presentative 
judgments  are  inductive;  representative  judgments 
are  deductive.  By  presentative  judgments  we  accu- 
mulate facts;  by  representative  judgments  we  gener- 
alize them  under  the  law  that  whatever  is  true  of  an 
object  is  true  of  its  serial  or  class  identity. 

An  apple  has  the  taste  of  an  apple,  the  odor  of  an 
apple,  the  texture  of  an  apple,  the  pressure  of  an 
apple,  the  sound  of  an  apple  when  it  falls  on  the 
ground,  and  the  color  of  an  apple  when  it  is  seen. 
Thus  we  have  five  methods  of  distinguishing  an 
apple  from  a  stone,  a  bush,  or  a  bird.  It  will  be 
noticed  that  I  consider  taste  and  smell  not  as 
disparate  senses  to  distinguish  disparate  properties, 
but  as  varieties  of  one  sense  for  the  sake  of  dis- 
tinguishing the  same  property.  Thus  we  have  five 
senses  for  discovering  a  body  as  a  kind,  and  when  a 
body  is  discovered  as  a  kind  by  one  of  the  senses 
this  discovery  may  be  verified  by  one  or  all  of  the 
other  senses. 

First  we  may  verify  a  judgment  of  one  sense 
impression  by  repeating  the  same  impression,  and 
finally  we  may  verify  what  one  sense  impression 


SENSATION  221 

successively  affirms  by  an  appeal  to  another  sense. 
In  deductive  or  representative  reasoning  the  method 
of  verification  is  at  first  by  congruity  of  concepts, 
but  when  concepts  are  not  congruous  they  may  be 
referred  back  to  presentative  reasoning;  this  is 
experimentation.  All  generalizations  or  deductive 
conclusions  may  be  referred  back  to  experimentation 
for  verification. 

We  may  now  give  a  more  adequate  definition  of 
sensation.  Sensation  is  a  process  of  forming  a 
judgment  of  number  or  of  kind  and  of  verifying  the 
same.  Verification  is  accomplished  by  repetition  of 
the  sense  impression,  or  by  referring  the  impression 
made  on  one  sense  to  the  court  of  another  sense. 
In  a  case  of  judgment  of  number  as  distinguished 
from  its  correlate  kind,  man  has  devised  a  special 
method  of  verification  known  as  measurement,  which 
gives  rise  to  the  psychologic  science  of  mathe- 
matics, which  is  also  defined  as  the  science  of 
quantity.  The  judgment  of  number  is  verified  by 
enumeration  or  counting. 

We  have  found  five  classific  properties:  kind, 
form,  force,  causation,  and  conception,  derived  from 
the  essentials  by  incorporation,  and  that  the  kind  is  a 
relative  unit,  the  form  a  relative  extension,  the  force 
a  relative  speed,  the  causation  a  relative  persistence 
and  the  conception  a  relative  consciousness. 

There  are  no  particles  which  are  not  found  in 
bodies,  and  all  bodies  are  composed  of  particles.  The 
quantitative  properties  are  found  when  we  consider 
particles.  Classific  properties  are  found  when  we 
consider  bodies.  Thus  quantitative  properties  and 
classific  properties  are  reciprocals,  and  in  each  set 
there  are  five  concomitants.  The  logician  considers 


222  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

classes,  the  mathematician  quantities;  they  thus 
view  the  universe  from  reciprocal  sides;  the  one 
classifies,  the  other  computes.  Four  of  the  categories 
are  found  in  inanimate  bodies,  unless  our  hypothesis 
is  valid.  All  five  are  certainly  found  hi  animate 
bodies.  They  all  coexist  and  cannot  be  dissevered, 
so  that  when  one  is  cognized  the  others  are  implied, 
and  when  they  are  all  considered  as  kind  they  are 
subject  to  logical  reasoning.  In  order  that  they 
may  be  subject  to  mathematical  reasoning,  kind 
must  be  resolved  into  number,  form  into  space, 
force  into  motion,  causation  into  time  and  concept 
into  judgment,  and  then  as  properties  they  can  all 
by  substitution  be  represented  by  number,  and  thus 
computation  is  possible.  It  is  only  in  the  new 
science  of  psycho-physics  that  judgments  are  treated 
mathematically. 

We  may  speak  of  a  body  without  overtly  affirming 
its  properties,  but  they  are  implicitly  affirmed  or 
posited.  The  term  posit  is  here  used  to  mean  the 
indirect  assertion  of  something  by  directly  asserting 
some  other  thing  essential  to  it  and  in  whose  exist- 
ence it  is  involved. 

The  word  matter  is  the  name  of  a  collection  of 
particles  and  every  particle  is  a  combination  of 
essentials.  The  concept  of  matter  has  passed  through 
the  crucible  of  human  experience  and  the  most 
thorough  and  profound  scientific  investigation.  All 
human  knowledge,  all  scientific  research,  all  ideation, 
and  all  logical  expression  are  founded  on  this  con- 
cept. To  deny  the  reality  of  matter  is  to  murder 
reason. 

It  may  be  well  to  recapitulate  what  has  here  been 
taught  concerning  substrates. 


SENSATION  223 

First,  we  have  shown  that  the  essentials  of  prop- 
erties are  their  substrates  severally;  unity  is  the 
substrate  of  number,  extension  is  the  substrate  of 
space,  speed  is  the  substrate  of  motion,  consciousness 
is  the  substrate  of  judgment. 

Second,  we  have  shown  that  the  quantitative 
properties  are  the  substrates  of  the  categoric  proper- 
ties; number  is  the  substrate  of  kind,  space  is  the 
substrate  of  form,  motion  is  the  substrate  of  force, 
time  is  the  substrate  of  causation,  and  judgment  is  the 
substrate  of  conception. 

Third,  it  has  been  shown  that  a  particle  and  its 
essentials  are  one  and  the  same  thing,  and  that 
ultimate  particles  constitute  the  substrate  of  bodies. 
These  self-evident  propositions  make  the  concept 
of  substrate  simple  and  clear. 

The  doctrine  of  bodies  and  properties  herein 
expounded  is  simple.  When  it  is  compared  with  the 
metaphysical  discussions  of  number,  space,  motion, 
time,  and  judgment,  and  the  categories  derived  from 
them,  which  are  kind,  form,  force,  causation  and 
conception,  it  will  be  a  surprise  to  discover  how 
tomes  have  been  reduced  to  pages  by  eliminating 
fallacies.  Censorious  persons  have  sometimes 
accused  the  vender  of  beverages  of  adding  water 
to  wine.  Brokers  use  this  dilution  of  wine  as  a 
metaphor  and  speak  of  watered  stock.  It  is  astonish- 
ing how  the  vintage  of  science  has  been  watered  by 
the  venders  of  speculation. 

When  the  similar  sense  impressions  come  to  an 
organ,  relations  of  likeness  are  discovered;  but  when 
dissimilar  sense  impressions  act  upon  the  same  sense 
their  unlikeness  appears.  In  this  manner  the  sense 
impressions  coming  to  the  same  organ  are  classified. 


224  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

Then  disparate  sense  impressions  come  to  disparate 
organs,  as  light  to  the  eye,  taste  to  the  mouth,  etc. 
The  same  object  may  produce  disparate  sense  im- 
pressions to  disparate  organs,  so  that  at  one  time  the 
object  is  a  color,  at  another  time  it  is  a  sound,  at 
another  it  is  an  odor,  at  another  it  is  a  pressure,  at 
another  it  is  a  touch,  and  at  still  another  it  is  a 
taste.  In  this  manner  different  manifestations  of 
the  same  object  are  brought  to  the  senses  and 
integrated  or  unified  as  coming  from  one  object,  that 
is,  the  self  learns  that  one  object  may  have  different 
manifestations;  thus  the  apple  exhibits  color,  sound, 
pressure,  touch,  taste,  and  odor.  In  this  manner 
concepts  are  formed  of  different  manifestations  of 
the  same  body;  thus  sensation  is  the  cognition  of 
different  properties  in  one  body  which  is  considered 
as  a  kind. 

The  self,  having  discovered  the  union  of  these 
manifestations  in  one  body  or  particle,  quickly  learns 
that  when  one  property  is  observed  the  others  may 
be  expected;  thus  the  color  becomes  the  symbol  of 
the  apple  and  it  is  known  by  sight,  or  the  sound 
becomes  the  symbol  of  the  apple  and  it  is  known  by 
sound,  the  texture  becomes  the  symbol  of  the  apple 
and  it  is  known  by  touch,  the  flavor  becomes  the 
symbol  of  the  apple  and  it  is  known  by  taste,  the 
odor  becomes  the  symbol  of  the  apple  and  it  is  known 
by  smell.  This  is  the  recognition  of  an  object  by 
some  one  of  its  properties  manifested  to  a  sense  and 
taken  as  the  symbol  of  the  object  itself  with  its 
other  manifestations  and  known  as  the  cause  of  a 
sense  impression.  As  the  particle  can  be  designated 
by  naming  any  one  of  its  essentials,  so  the  body  can 
be  named  by  any  one  of  its  properties,  and  so  also 


SENSATION  225 

it  can  be  recollected  by  any  one  of  its  properties. 
In  perception  a  form  becomes  the  nucleus  of  a  con- 
cept which  is  recollected  when  a  sense  impression 
recalls  it. 

The  lower  animal,  desiring  to  gather  food  for  its 
offspring,  and  having  the  sense  of  touch  as  well  as 
taste,  could  utilize  its  sense  of  touch  in  gathering 
food  by  the  cognition  of  its  form  without  resort  to 
the  sense  of  taste  and  yet  it  could  verify  touch  by 
taste. 


CHAPTER  XV 

PERCEPTION 

It  has  been  shown  that  there  is  a  faculty  of  the 
mind,  by  which  judgments  and  concepts  of  kind  are 
produced,  which  has  been  called  sensation.  It  is 
now  proposed  to  demonstrate  that  there  is  a  faculty 
of  the  mind  by  which  judgments  and  concepts  of 
form  are  produced  which  will  be  called  perception. 
It  is  difficult  to  select  a  term  for  this  purpose.  It 
might  be  best  to  coin  one,  but  the  term  perception 
seems  to  be  more  often  used  in  this  sense  than  in 
any  other.  There  is  a  general  sense  in  which  it  is 
used  to  denote  all  intellections,  and  there  is  a  general 
sense  in  which  it  is  used  to  designate  all  presentative 
judgments,  but  I  use  it  to  designate  the  making 
of  judgments  both  presentative  and  representative, 
and  also  of  concepts  of  form. 

We  must  now  set  forth  the  process  of  perception 
as  judgment.  Here  again  we  have  a  sense  impres- 
sion, a  consciousness,  a  choice,  a  concept,  and  a 
comparison  as  the  foundation  of  a  judgment.  The 
judgment  or  inference  is  that  the  two  compared 
are  caused  by  objects  having  the  same  or  a  similar 
form.  In  making  the  judgment  there  must  be  a 
discrimination  and  an  identification.  The  mind 
having  an  object  presented  to  it  by  a  sense  impres- 
sion must  choose  some  other  concept  of  a  form  sup- 
posed to  be  like  this  form  and  compare  the  two  and 

226 


PERCEPTION  227 

make  a  judgment  of  likeness  or  of  tmlikeness  as  the 
case  may  be.  We  thus  see  that  the  external  form 
determines  the  internal  judgment  of  form. 

Like  a  judgment  of  sensation,  a  judgment  of  per- 
ception may  be  a  certitude  or  a  fallacy.  If  it  is 
a  fallacy  it  must  be  corrected,  and  if  a  certitude  it 
must  be  verified.  If  the  form  were  determined  by 
consciousness  there  would  be  no  need  of  verification, 
but  as  it  is  external,  verification  is  necessary.  A 
judgment  of  perception  is  imperfectly  verified  by 
repetition,  for  if  the  likeness  is  discovered  a  second 
time  the  judgment  may  be  supposed  valid,  though 
the  same  conditions  for  error  may  still  exist. 

In  perception,  as  in  sensation,  one  judgment  is 
certified  by  another  of  a  disparate  sense.  If  I  taste 
and  touch  the  apple  I  am  sure  that  it  is  an  apple,  or 
if  I  taste,  touch,  and  see  the  apple  there  is  still 
further  verification. 

A  sense  impression  of  light  falls  on  my  eye  and  I 
infer  that  it  was  caused  by  a  horse  of  which  I  had  a 
previous  concept.  The  inference  or  choice  of  this 
cause  recalls  this  concept  and  I  conclude  that  the 
impression  and  the  memory  consciousness  are  alike. 
The  concept  of  the  horse  was  the  concept  of  a  form ; 
thus  the  cause  was  conceived  as  a  form.  Perception 
is  cognition  of  the  cause  of  a  sense  impression,  con- 
sidered as  a  form. 

When  we  have  recognized  an  object  many  times, 
the  process  of  judging  seems  to  be  abbreviated  by 
the  cancellation  of  the  act  of  choice;  certain  it  is 
there  is  no  conscious  act  of  choice  and  apparently 
the  judgment  follows  immediately  upon  the  con- 
sciousness of  the  sense  impression.  This  cancella- 
tion of  some  of  the  elements  of  a  judgment  is 


228  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

particularly  observable  with  sense  impressions  of 
vision  when  introspection  seems  to  reveal  no  inter- 
mediate elements.  It  is  only  in  cases  where  original 
judgments  are  made  and  those  where  there  is  some 
obscurity  in  the  sense  impression,  that  all  of  the 
elements  of  the  judgment  are  revealed.  This 
phenomenon  of  apparent  cancellation  of  elements  of 
judgment  that  are  made  in  the  act  of  perception 
cannot  too  strongly  be  emphasized.  Not  only  are 
elements  frequently  obscure  or  entirely  lost,  but 
whole  groups  of  judgments  seem  to  be  canceled  in 
the  stream  of  thought. 

That  which  has  been  called  the  choice,  the  guess, 
or  the  hypothesis,  is  not  a  random  choice  but  is  a 
choice  which  arises  from  experience. 

I  am  wandering  on  the  shore  of  the  lake.  Weary 
with  a  long  walk,  I  climb  to  the  summit  of  a  rock, 
from  which  vantage  ground  I  hope  to  obtain  a 
better  view  while  resting.  In  climbing  I  grasp  the 
angle  of  a  boulder  over  my  head  and  immediately 
feel  a  pain  thrilling  through  my  nerves.  From  the 
sensation  of  touch  I  gather  other  knowledge,  as  I 
think  that  I  have  cut  my  finger  on  the  sharp  edge  of 
a  crystal.  From  where  I  stand  I  cannot  see  the 
crystal,  but  my  knowledge  of  these  rocks  is  such 
that  I  know  that  sharp  crystals  of  feldspar  sometimes 
protrude  from  them,  and  I  think  of  it  as  such.  My 
mind  neglects  the  effect  upon  myself  to  discover  its 
cause — a  sharp  crystal  on  the  rock — and  I  have  made 
a  discovery.  It  is  my  present  knowledge  of  boulders 
and  crystals  that  guides  me  to  this  discovery. 
Without  knowledge  of  this  kind  I  might  give  some 
other  interpretation  to  the  sensation.  If  a  moment 
ago  I  had  seen  a  rattlesnake  crawling  over  the  grass, 


PERCEPTION  229 

I  might  have  made  a  false  interpretation  and  fancied 
myself  wounded  by  the  fang  of  a  serpent.  Or  sup- 
pose I  had  seen  a  sweet-brier  growing  over  the 
rock ;  then  I  might  have  concluded  that  my  wound 
was  from  a  thorn.  This  same  sense  impression, 
under  different  conditions  of  knowledge,  may  have 
different  interpretations.  The  true  interpretation 
is  reached  only  because  there  already  exists  in  my 
mind  the  related  facts  necessary  to  correct  inter- 
pretation. The  inference,  therefore,  is  controlled  by 
previous  knowledge,  and,  in  this  case,  guided  to  the 
truth. 

Sitting  upon  the  rock  and  gazing  around  the  lake, 
my  eye  follows  the  meandering  of  the  shore,  and 
I  readily  distinguish  the  blue  waters  from  the  green 
banks.  This  perception  is  much  like  that  by  which 
the  crystal  was  discovered.  Let  us  see  in  what 
respect  it  is  the  same  and  in  what  respect  it  is 
different.  In  the  one  there  was  a  sense  impression 
of  touch  and  a  feeling  impression  of  pain  in  my  ringer 
when  the  nerve  was  pricked,  and  in  the  other  a 
sense  impression  on  my  eye  when  the  nerves  were 
touched  by  light,  but  no  feeling  of  pain.  The  light 
reflected  from  the  waters  beats  upon  my  eye  and 
produces  an  effect,  but  I  do  not  think  of  the  sense 
impression  as  an  effect,  but  only  of  its  cause.  The 
mind  goes  out  beyond  the  consciousness  to  the  object 
which  produces  it. 

In  the  group  of  mental  operations  by  which  the 
crystal  is  recognized  the  particular  feeling  of  pain 
is  conspicuous ;  but  in  the  operations  by  which  the 
water  is  discovered,  the  beating  of  light  does  not 
cause  a  feeling  as  a  pleasant  or  as  an  unpleasant  effect. 
The  discovery  of  blue  waters  and  green  banks  can- 


230  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

not  be  made  without  previous  knowledge.  Suppose 
that  I  have  never  seen  water — that  I  have  suddenly 
been  transported  from  some  mythic  land  where 
basins  of  glass  are  embosomed  in  the  landscape; 
with  only  such  knowledge  in  my  mind  I  think  of  a 
beautiful  sheet  of  glass,  and,  though  erroneous,  the 
interpretation  is  believed  as  true,  unless  I  submit  it 
to  verification. 

Or  suppose  that  I  climb  to  the  top  of  a  mountain, 
where  bays  and  inlets  are  thrust  into  the  land.  On 
arriving  at  the  summit  I  look  about,  and  the 
mountain  seems  to  be  an  island.  From  the  foot  of 
the  mountain  on  every  side  there  seems  to  be  a 
stretch  of  gray  water.  After  a  time  a  breeze  starts 
up,  and  the  water  seems  to  be  agitated  in  great 
waves,  and  at  last  the  waves  are  driven  away  in 
tumultuous  cloudlets.  Now  the  blue  lake  stretches 
from  the  foot  of  the  mountain  on  one  side  and 
valleys  and  hills  from  the  other.  My  first  inference 
was  a  fallacy;  my  second  inference  is  a  certitude. 

I  look  along  the  shore  again,  and  I  see  a  white 
object  on  the  water.  What  really  happens  is  that 
arranged  light  reflected  from  the  distant  object  beats 
upon  the  nerve  of  my  eye,  which  differs  from  other 
light  entering  it.  I  do  not  stop  to  observe  the  effect 
on  me,  but  my  mind  is  occupied  with  the  external 
cause.  I  am  just  from  the  seaside,  and  have  been 
watching  the  gulls  soaring  through  the  air  and 
gathering  flotsam.  I  interpret  the  beating  of  this 
white  light  as  caused  by  the  reflection  of  light  by  a 
gull.  I  believe  I  see  a  gull ;  but  it  moves  not,  and 
I  doubt  the  veracity  of  my  vision.  Looking  again 
with  care,  I  believe  that  the  cause  of  this  beating  is 
a  white  boulder  with  its  crest  emerging  from  the 


PERCEPTION  231 

water.  Satisfied  with  this  interpretation,  my 
attention  is  directed  to  a  boy  coming  down  to  the 
shore.  As  a  sansculotte  he  wades  into  the  water 
and  follows  the  floats  of  a  net  until  he  comes  to  the 
white  object  which  was  to  me  first  a  bird  and  then 
a  boulder.  Now  I  make  the  true  inference  and  see 
that  the  white  object  is  a  white  cloth — a  signal  on 
the  top  of  a  stake  to  mark  the  fishing  ground — and 
verify  it.  The  facts  uppermost  in  my  mind  caused 
me  to  make  false  interpretations,  each  of  which  I 
could  not  verify,  and  rested  satisfied  only  when  I 
made  an  inference  that  was  verified.  As  perception 
by  touch  is  the  interpretation  of  a  sense  impression, 
so  perception  by  sight  is  the  interpretation  of  a  sense 
impression.  Here  again  we  have  an  interpretation 
which  gives  a  judgment  of  the  external  cause  of  the 
sense  impression. 

Still  sitting  on  the  rock,  I  hear  a  noise.  It  is  but 
waves  of  air  beating  upon  the  nerves  of  my  ear; 
but  I  go  beyond  the  consciousness  and  turn  my  head 
in  the  supposed  direction  of  the  sound,  expecting 
to  see  a  man  coming  in  the  distance ;  for  have  I  not 
heard  his  voice?  At  this  I  am  disappointed;  and 
yet  it  does  not  seem  strange,  for  I  have  made  erro- 
neous interpretations  many  times.  I  continue  to 
watch  the  fisherboy  in  the  river  below.  The  noise 
is  heard  again,  and  this  time  it  is  the  caw  of  a  raven 
in  a  distant  tree.  I  have  chosen  the  right  cause. 
I  muse  on  this  error.  Why  is  the  voice  of  a  crow 
mistaken  for  the  voice  of  a  man?  Because  I  am 
expecting  my  friend  who  stopped  by  the  way  where 
blooming  plants  attracted  his  interest.  A  false 
interpretation  of  a  consciousness  often  comes  from 
expectancy.  In  this  manner  the  deluded  victims  of 


232  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

the  thaumaturgic  seance  are  made  to  see  and  often 
to  hear  the  very  spirits  of  the  dead  and  to  find  con- 
firmation of  fond  belief.  The  human  mind  can 
discover  any  wonder  the  imagination  can  picture, 
however  unreal  or  impossible  it  may  be,  if  expect- 
ancy first  be  wrought  to  the  requisite  intensity. 
All  perception  is  by  interpretation,  but  the  data  by 
which  we  interpret  are  memories,  and  correct  inter- 
pretation depends  upon  the  right  guessing  in  the 
first  instance  and  ultimately  on  verification;  once 
more  we  have  verification  necessary  to  cognition. 

Inductive  or  presentative  perception  having  been 
set  forth,  it  is  now  required  to  explain  deductive  or 
representative  perception.  A  concept  of  perceptive 
judgments  may  be  brought  into  consciousness  by  an 
effort  of  the  will  or  adventitiously  by  association, 
and  this  concept  of  form  may  be  compared  with 
other  concepts  of  form  and  a  representative  judg- 
ment made  about  two  concepts,  both  of  which  are 
recalled  from  memory. 

Thus  from  the  storehouse  of  memory  we  may  take 
up  by  choice  the  innumerable  concepts  therein  and 
make  new  judgments  and  combine  them  into  con- 
cepts. These  representative  concepts  can  all  be 
traced  back  to  presentative  elements. 

A  representative  judgment  of  perception,  like  that 
of  sensation,  has  five  elements.  Instead  of  the  con- 
sciousness of  the  sense  impression  we  have  the 
consciousness  of  a  concept  brought  about  by  an  act 
of  choice  arising  from  association  or  exercise  of  the 
will.  Then  a  second  concept  must  be  chosen  or 
recollected,  and  then  we  must  have  a  consciousness 
of  this  second  concept,  and  when  the  one  concept  is 
compared  with  the  other  a  judgment  is  formed. 


PERCEPTION  233 

In  presentative  judgments  we  compare  an  impres- 
sion consciousness  with  a  memory  consciousness. 
In  a  representative  judgment  we  compare  a  memory 
consciousness  with  another  memory  consciousness. 
In  both  cases  we  judge  of  likeness  or  unlikeness 
between  the  terms  compared.  In  presentative  judg-  • 
ments  we  discover  facts  and  classify  them;  hence 
presentative  judgments  are  inductive.  In  making 
representative  judgments  we  discover  laws  and  apply 
them ;  hence  representative  judgments  are  deductive. 

We  may  now  more  adequately  define  perception 
as  the  process  of  making  a  judgment  about  form  or 
its  reciprocal  space,  and  of  verifying  the  same  so  as 
to  produce  a  cognition.  Verification  is  accomplished 
by  repetition,  by  the  same  sense,  by  submitting  the 
judgment  to  another  sense,  that  is,  by  congruity  of 
judgments  or  by  submitting  it  to  experimentation, 
which  is  also  by  congruity  of  judgments,  or  by 
submitting  the  judgment  of  form  as  its  reciprocal 
space  to  measurement  and  computation,  which  is 
only  another  method  of  verification  by  congruity  of 
concepts. 

A  strange  confusion  is  found  among  some  meta- 
physical writers  in  confounding  the  presentative 
judgment  with  image  forming.  Touch  is  the  primal 
sense  of  form,  but  other  senses  perform  the  same  task 
vicariously.  As  taste  and  odor  are  the  senses  by 
which  we  discover  kind  and  the  concept  of  form 
becomes  the  symbol  of  the  kind,  so  on  the  other 
hand  while  touch  gives  us  form  the  kind  may  become 
the  symbol  of  the  form.  Now  the  sense  of  vision  is 
highly  adapted  to  the  performance  of  this  symbolic 
or  vicarious  function.  The  image  which  is  cast  upon 
the  retina  is  but  arranged  color  with  an  outline 


234  TRUTH  .AND  ERROR 

which  is  interpreted  by  vision  to  be  the  mark,  sign, 
or  symbol  of  a  form,  and  the  perceived  image  is  a 
judgment.  It  is  thus  from  vision  that  we  derive 
symbolic  judgments  of  form,  and  the  judgment  which 
we  make  is  the  image  of  the  form.  In  vision  the 
judgment  of  form  is  but  one  of  the  judgments  we 
make ;  and  there  are  as  many  kinds  of  judgments  of 
form  as  there  are  organs  of  sense.  Now  the  meta- 
physical doctrine  which  makes  images  and  ideas  to 
mean  the  same  thing  as  presentative  and  representa- 
tive judgments  doubly  confuses  the  subject,  for 
thought  is  a  succession  of  judgments  of  all  kinds  and 
image  making  is  a  presentative  judgment  of  vision. 

We  more  often  make  the  form  the  symbol  of  the 
other  properties  of  a  body  than  any  of  its  other 
properties.  While  form  is  primordially  cognized  by 
touch,  and  touch  is  the  final  arbiter  in  verification  of 
judgments  of  form,  yet  vision  is  more  facile  in 
making  such  judgments  and  multitudes  of  judgments 
of  form  are  made  through  the  sense  of  vision  where 
one  is  made  by  the  sense  of  touch ;  notwithstanding 
this  the  judgments  of  vision  are  greatly  subject  to 
error  and  often  require  verification. 

It  is  due  to  facile  cognition  and  recognition  of  form 
by  vision  that  the  forms  of  bodies  become  symbols 
of  all  their  properties.  Bodies  through  their  forms 
subserve  many  purposes,  but  they  also  subserve 
many  purposes  through  their  kinds  and  through  the 
other  properties  which  inhere  in  them,  as  forces, 
causes,  and  concepts.  But  we  seem  often  to  cognize 
them  first  as  form.  We  see  the  forms  of  a  thousand 
apples,  peaches,  or  pears,  where  we  taste  but  one,  and 
so  we  habitually  know  apples,  peaches,  and  pears  by 
their  forms;  so  we  know  all  plants  by  their  forms, 


PERCEPTION  235 

but  few  by  their  tastes  and  odors;  so  also  we  know 
all  animals  by  their  forms  and  but  few  by  their 
tastes  and  odors,  though  it  would  seem  that  the  dog 
knows  many  more  things  by  their  odors ;  most  rocks 
are  known  by  their  forms,  few  by  their  tastes; 
altogether  bodies  are  known  as  forms  much  more 
than  as  kinds,  forces,  causes,  and  concepts,  all  of 
which  is  due  to  the  fact  that  vision  reveals  form  with 
such  marvelous  rapidity,  while  the  medium  of  ether 
is  unrecognized  in  making  presentative  judgments, 
and  is  discovered  only  through  a  long  course  of 
history  in  the  development  of  representative  judg- 
ments. It  is  not  strange,  therefore,  that  early 
metaphysical  reasoning  made  such  a  profound  dis- 
tinction between  impressions  and  ideas  and  confused 
judgments  of  form  with  images  by  reaching  the  con- 
clusion that  all  presentative  judgments  are  images 
pictured  upon  the  retina.  We  paint  images  and  the 
art  is  coetaneous  with  human  culture.  What  we  do 
by  art  in  painting  it  was  supposed  that  nature  does 
in  light  upon  the  retina,  and  this  is  true  within 
certain  limitations,  but  the  picture  upon  the  retina 
must  be  judged  like  the  picture  upon  the  canvas, 
and  in  both  cases  the  arranged  colors  are  but  symbols 
of  form  which  is  primarily  learned  by  touch. 

In  forming  deductive  judgments  of  perception, 
that  is,  judgments  of  form,  we  may  find  that  our 
concepts  are  incongruous,  that  one  judgment  con- 
tradicts the  other.  When  this  is  the  case  one  or  the 
other  must  be  erroneous;  we  are  then  thrown  back 
upon  experimentation  for  a  verification  of  the  past 
judgments  of  which  these  concepts  are  composed. 
Experimentation  thus  becomes  the  great  agency  in 
time  for  clarifying  concepts  and  for  purging  them 


236  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

from  error,  that  the  inductive   basis  for  deductive 
reasoning1  may  be  sound. 

It  has  been  seen  how  a  stream  of  sense  impres- 
sions pours  into  consciousness  a  body  of  symbols, 
which  are  there  organized  into  systematic  knowl- 
edge. Clouds  assemble,  change  their  hues  and 
vanish ;  storms  devastate  the  land  and  tempests  vex 
the  sea;  the  waters  of  the  sea  are  lifted  into  the 
clouds,  and  the  clouds  themselves  gather  about  the 
mountains  and  roll  as  river  torrents  in  return  to  the 
sea;  continents,  islands,  and  mountains  are  up- 
heaved, rains  and  rivers  carve  them  into  wonderful 
forms ;  volcanoes  endeluge  the  land  and  trouble  the 
sea;  geologic  formations  are  built  and  destroyed; 
the  mountains,  hills,  plateaus,  plains,  and  valleys  are 
covered  with  the  verdure  of  life ;  the  air,  the  land, 
and  the  waters  teem  with  animal  forms;  man  him- 
self is  distributed  over  all  land  between  the  ice- 
formed  walls  of  the  polar  regions — all  the  multitudi- 
nous objects  of  the  cosmos  are  forever  signalling  to 
the  human  soul  through  vision  and  demanding  its 
attention.  Now  one  is  seen,  and  now  another ;  now 
one  is  heard,  and  now  another;  now  one  signals  with 
fragrance,  and  now  another;  now  one  signals  with 
flavor,  and  now  another ;  and  now  one  beckons  with 
tactual  signs,  and  now  another ;  and  the  human  soul 
gathers  all  these  symbols  into  one  gigantic  body 
known  as  the  human  mind.  The  external  world  is 
thus  coined  into  symbols,  and  of  these  symbols  the 
foundations  of  mind  are  laid,  and  of  these  symbols 
the  walls  are  constructed,  and  of  these  symbols  the 
dome  is  reared,  until  the  temple  of  the  soul  is  per- 
fected— a  symbol  structure  built  in  every  soul  by 
the  phenomena  of  the  universe. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

APPREHENSION 

It  has  been  shown  that  there  is  a  faculty  of  the 
mind  by  which  bodies  are  cognized  as  kinds,  which 
has  been  called  sensation.  It  has  further  been 
shown  that  there  is  a  faculty  of  the  cognition  of 
bodies  as  forms,  which  has  been  called  perception. 
It  is  now  designed  to  demonstrate  that  there  is 
a  faculty  of  the  mind  by  which  bodies  are  cognized  as 
forces,  and  this  faculty  I  shall  call  apprehension. 

A  satisfactory  term  for  this  faculty  is  not  found 
in  the  language.  The  term  understanding  has  vaguely 
been  used  in  this  manner,  but  so  many  meanings 
for  the  term  are  in  use  that  it  cannot  well  be 
employed.  The  term  apprehension  also  has  several 
meanings,  the  most  common  of  which  is  a  synonym 
for  fear,  as  when  I  affirm  that  I  apprehend  danger. 
I  shall  use  the  term  apprehension  as  restricted 
solely  to  the  judgment -of  force.  Apprehension, 
then,  is  the  name  of  the  mental  process  of  cognizing 
force  in  all  its  modes.  In  order  that  my  argument 
may  proceed  I  must  have  a  term  which  will  be 
taken  with  this  meaning  and  with  it  alone. 
'Whether  I  choose  the  term  wisely  or  unwisely  is 
another  question. 

Man  is  conscious  of  his  own  force,  and  he  infers 
force  of  other  bodies  because  of  their  effects  when 
they  impinge  upon  himself,  being  conscious  of  these 
effects.  Then  he  discovers  the  forces  of  molar 
bodies  in  the  change  wrought  by  their  impinging 

upon  one  another. 

337 


238  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

It  has  already  been  shown  that  man  is  primarily 
interested  in  the  environment.  The  primitive  man 
first  becomes  interested  in  what  he  supposes  to  be 
the  environment  of  molar  bodies  by  which  he  is 
surrounded.  A  vast  multitude  of  these  bodies  are 
molar,  and  stellar  bodies  are  at  first  supposed  to  be 
molar,  while  molecular  bodies  are  unknown,  and  the 
world  is  supposed  to  be  composed  of  molar  bodies. 
Then  human  concepts  are  all  of  molar  bodies  and 
their  properties. 

In  a  judgment  of  apprehension,  there  are  the 
same  pentalogic  elements  that  hitherto  we  have 
observed  in  judgments,  namely,  a  consciousness  of 
a  sense  impression,  a  choice  of  a  concept,  a  conscious- 
ness of  that  concept,  a  comparison  of  one  con- 
sciousness with  the  other,  and  a  judgment  which 
identifies  or  discriminates  in  affirming  them  to  be 
alike  or  unlike  as  the  case  may  be.  The  concept 
chosen  is  a  concept  of  force.  A  judgment  of 
apprehension  must  primordially  follow  a  judgment 
of  perception,  just  as  a  judgment  of  perception  must 
primordially  follow  a  judgment  of  sensation.  This 
is  the  primordial  order  in  which  these  judgments 
occur. 

If  we  judge  of  external  force  in  two  bodies,  before 
there  can  be  a  judgment  of  apprehension,  there 
must  be  a  plurality  of  judgments  of  perception  as  in 
perception  there  must  be  a  plurality  of  judgments  of 
sensation.  When  two  bodies  act  upon  each  other  a 
change  occurs  in  both.  In  order  that  a  judgment  of 
their  actions  upon  each  other  may  be  formed,  there 
must  be  judgments  of  perception ;  the  two  bodies 
must  be  perceived.  Then  their  action  is  inferred 
from  the  changes  which  they  undergo;  but  it  is 


APPREHENSION  239 

impossible  to  have  this  judgment  without  the  ante- 
cedent perceptions. 

Let  us  consider  a  judgment  of  apprehension  in 
what  seems  to  be  its  simplest  form.  A  pressure  on 
self  is  experienced.  Here  there  must  be  a  sense 
impression  which  produces  a  consciousness,  a  dis- 
crimination, a  choice,  a  recollection,  and  a  conscious- 
ness of  a  concept  out  of  which  arises  a  judgment  of 
simple  sensation.  Then  we  consider  the  cause  as  a 
form,  and  judgment  of  it  is  a  perception.  Then  we 
consider  it  as  a  force  in  a  process,  and  it  is  a  judg- 
ment of  apprehension.  Thus  a  judgment  of  appre- 
hension is  one  of  a  series  of  judgments,  the  first  of 
sensation,  the  second  of  perception,  and  the  third  of 
apprehension. 

We  become  expert  in  making  judgments.  Hav- 
ing made  and  verified  them,  cognition  becomes 
recognition,  and  recognition  seems  to  be  a  very 
simple  process,  for  the  pentalogic  elements  do  not 
arise  in  the  cortical  consciousness.  The  fact  is  well 
known  that  judgments  of  intellection  as  well  as 
judgments  of  action  are  made  instantaneously  with 
precision,  when  they  have  previously  been  made 
with  halting  labor,  occupying  much  time;  still  we 
are  compelled  to  the  conclusion  that  judgments  of 
apprehension  can  occur  only  after  judgments  of 
perception,  and  these  only  after  judgments  of  sensa- 
tion, although  these  several  judgments  all  have 
pentalogic  elements. 

There  seems  to  be  in  the  mind  or  cortex  a  power 
by  which  logically  antecedent  judgments  are  can- 
celled after  they  have  once  been  made,  thus  saving 
time  and  thought.  This  cancellation  of  the  ele- 
ments of  judgment  we  have  hitherto  observed, 


240  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

and  shall  be  reminded  of  it  hereafter.  This  is  the 
psychical  phenomenon  known  as  intuition. 

Judgments  of  energy  and  work  are  primarily 
derived  from  muscular  sensation  or  the  sense  of 
stress  and  strain.  There  is  consciousness  of  stress 
when  other  bodies  press  upon  us,  and  a  conscious- 
ness of  strain  when  our  bodies  press  upon  others. 
The  consciousness  is  but  a  consciousness  of  change 
in  self,  but  there  is  always  an  inference  in  a  judg- 
ment. When  I  act  I  am  conscious  of  the  action  as  a 
cause,  and  infer  the  effect ;  when  another  acts  upon 
me  I  am  conscious  of  the  effect  and  infer  the  cause. 
But  here  we  do  not  pause  to  treat  of  the  conscious- 
ness of  strain,  but  only  the  consciousness  of  stress. 

The  faculties  of  intellection,  which  we  have 
called  sensation,  perception,  and  apprehension,  are 
connate ;  that  is,  they  are  contemporaneous  growths 
as  concepts,  but  not  contemporaneous  judgments. 
The  judgments  of  sensation  must  precede  the  judg- 
ments of  perception,  and  these  precede  the  judg- 
ments of  apprehension.  The  last  judgment  formed 
may  seem  to  follow  upon  the  sense  impression  itself. 
It  is  the  power  which  seems  magical  to  the  untrained 
psychologist ;  the  power  of  reaching  a  conclusion  by 
previously  gained  knowledge.  It  is  the  power 
which  we  call  habit  in  another  realm  of  psychology, 
as  when  the  trained  pianist  strikes  many  notes 
simultaneously  in  rapid  succession.  Here  we 
observe  that  the  successions  of  the  mind  are  more 
rapid  than  the  fingers,  for  the  successive  acts  of  will 
for  every  finger  are  interpreted  by  simultaneous 
muscular  acts.  It  is  the  power  by  which  the  intel- 
lect considers  many  judgments  in  such  rapid  suc- 
cession that  they  appear  to  be  simultaneous. 


APPREHENSION  241 

Heretofore,  in  discussing  sensation,  perception, 
and  apprehension,  the  effect  has  been  subjective 
and  the  cause  objective,  but  in  apprehension  these 
relations  of  cause  and  effect  are  sometimes  reversed, 
and  the  cause  may  be  subjective  and  the  effect 
objective.  I  am  conscious  not  only  when  another 
strikes  me,  but  I  am  conscious  when  I  strike  another. 
Here  we  have  a  consciousness  of  cause,  and  the 
effect  is  inferred.  I  am  conscious  of  a  flavor  when 
I  eat  an  apple,  and  I  am  conscious  of  an  act  per- 
formed by  myself  when  I  bite  it.  I  was  conscious  of 
an  effect  of  color  when  I  saw  it,  and  I  was  conscious 
of  an  effect  upon  myself  when  I  touched  it;  I 
was  conscious  of  an  act  when  I  turned  my  eye  to  it, 
and  I  was  conscious  of  an  act  when  I  grasped  it. 
Thus  there  is  always  an  emotion  connected  with  an 
intellection  and  there  is  always  an  intellection  with 
an  emotion.  But  we  are  not  now  considering  emo- 
tions; we  are  considering  intellections  only.  We 
cannot  consider  intellection  without  positing  emo- 
tion. With  this  statement  we  go  on  to  consider  the 
subject  of  the  intellections,  our  present  purpose 
being  simply  to  discover  an  epistomology  for  the 
intellections.  In  another  book  we  shall  treat  of  the 
epistomology  of  the  emotions. 

Here  again  we  must  call  attention  to  another  very 
important  fact,  viz.,  that  the  individual  mind  is 
only  one  of  many  minds,  and  that  it  is  only  one  of  a 
still  greater  number  of  bodies — that  there  is  myself 
and  the  environment,  and  that  there  is  yourself  and 
the  environment,  and  that  you  are  a  part  of  my 
environment,  and  that  I  am  a  part  of  your  environ- 
ment. Thus  every  body  in  turn  is  a  self  with  an 
environment.  The  wind  acts  on  me,  and  I  act  on 


242  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

the  wind,  the  tree  acts  on  me,  and  I  act  on  the 
tree ;  but  the  wind  acts  on  the  tree  and  the  tree  on 
the  wind,  and  these  actions  are  all  processes.  The 
action  of  the  wind  on  the  tree  and  the  tree  on  the 
wind  come  into  my  judgment,  and  these  processes 
are  cognized ;  but  the  cognition  of  the  action  of  the 
wind  on  the  tree  and  that  of  the  tree  on  the  wind  is 
inferred  by  their  actions  severally  upon  me.  I  see 
the  leaves  on  the  tree  stir  in  the  wind,  but  I  am  not 
conscious  that  the  wind  stirs  the  leaves.  I  am 
conscious  that  the  light  from  the  tree  impinges  upon 
my  eye,  and  infer  the  tree  and  the  wind  with  all  the 
processes  involved.  Thus  it  is  that  the  cognition  of 
action  and  reaction  between  objects  in  the  environ- 
ment is  a  very  complex  process  of  reasoning,  for 
cognition  of  the  interactions  of  the  objects  of  the 
environment  are  composed  of  a  vast  congeries  of 
judgments. 

Force  must  not  be  confounded  with  causation, 
although  there  can  be  no  causation  without  force, 
nor  can  there  be  force  without  form,  nor  can  there 
be  form  without  kind;  but  abstractly  causation  and 
force  are  wholly  disparate.  A  sledge  impinges  on  a 
tree ;  the  sledge  strikes  the  tree  and  the  tree  strikes 
the  sledge;  action  and  reaction  are  equal,  and 
in  both  vibrations  are  set  up  which  are  visible  in 
the  tree  but  invisible  in  the  sledge,  though  none 
the  less  real.  Now,  when  I  consider  action  and 
reaction,  I  am  considering  force;  but  the  sledge 
makes  a  visible  indentation  on  the  tree.  When  I 
am  considering  this  indentation,  I  am  considering 
an  effect;  perhaps  the  sledge  changes  some  of  the 
relations  of  its  particles  in  crystallization;  when  I 
consider  this  effect  upon  the  sledge  I  am  consider- 


APPREHENSION  243 

ing  causation.  Suppose  that,  instead  of  striking  the 
tree  with  a  sledge,  I  strike  it  with  an  ax,  then  the 
blow  produces  a  cut;  and  when  I  consider  the 
difference  between  a  cut  of  a  sharp  ax  and 
the  indentation  of  a  sledge,  I  am  compelled  to  con- 
sider differences  of  causation,  and  though  the  force 
of  the  blows  are  equal,  the  forms  of  the  cause  are 
unequal.  The  blow  on  the  tree  causes  both  vibra- 
tion and  indentation.  Thus  there  are  two  effects, 
but  only  one  blow.  The  blow  on  the  sledge  is 
vibration  and  crystallization;  but  there  are  two 
effects,  but  only  one  blow.  When  we  consider  the 
nature  of  the  blow  as  action  and  reaction,  we  are 
considering  force ;  but  when  we  consider  the  effect 
we  are  considering  causation.  Action  and  reaction 
are  simultaneous,  cause  and  effect  are  sequent. 

All  intellection  is  abstraction;  he  who  cannot 
accomplish  and  hold  firmly  an  abstraction  cannot 
psychologize. 

Apprehension  is  both  presentative  and  represent- 
ative, or  inductive  and  deductive.  If  we  look  upon 
apprehension  from  the  standpoint  of  its  initial 
element,  it  is  either  presentative  or  representative ; 
but  if  we  look  upon  it  from  the  standpoint  of  result 
as  reason,  it  is  inductive  or  deductive.  The  choice  of 
a  concept  of  deduction  is  always  initiated  by  chpice 
of  another  concept  instead  of  a  sense  impression. 
This  choice  of  a  concept  may  be  the  one  made  in  a 
presentative  or  other  judgment,  for  judgments  may 
follow  judgments  in  extended  succession,  all  initi- 
ated by  one  sense  impression,  but  connected  in  the 
succession  by  links  of  recollection.  From  one  point 
of  view  these  may  be  called  discursive  judgments, 
and  from  another  associated  judgments.  In  waking 


244  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

hours  the  mind  cannot  cease  to  make  judgments. 
If  sense  impressions  are  neglected,  recollected  con- 
cepts take  their  place.  The  mind  may  be  turned 
loose  to  make  excursions  by  steps  of  judgments  into 
a  field  where  fancy  leads ;  but  the  path  of  the  mind 
in  making  judgments  may  be  directed  by  the  will  to 
the  accomplishment  of  a  purpose,  in  which  case  the 
judgments  instead  of  being  discursive  are  volitional. 
Representative  judgments,  therefore,  are  discursive 
or  volitional. 

I  see  a  bird  flit  from  one  bough  to  another.  If 
my  mind  is  free  to  pursue  my  meditations,  I  may 
recall  the  bird  that  I  saw  yesterday,  and  this  may 
recall  a  nest  of  blue  eggs,  and  this  may  recall  the 
blue  scarf  of  my  little  daughter,  and  I  may  go  on  in 
this  manner  to  make  discursive  judgments;  but  I 
may  be  watching  the  movements  of  the  bird  for  the 
purpose  of  studying  its  habits,  and  my  judgments 
may  be  controlled  by  my  will.  In  experience  we 
pass  from  presentative  to  representative  judgments, 
back  and  forth,  with  instantaneous  rapidity  and 
great  irregularity.  So  we  pass  from  discursive  to 
volitional  judgments  instantaneously  and  irregularly. 

Judgments  become  cognitions  only  when  they  are 
verified.  Judgments  of  sensation  are  verified  by 
submitting  them  to  other  senses,  and  then  they  are 
subjected  to  perception  for  further  arbitrament. 
Judgments  of  perception  are  submitted  to  appre- 
hension for  verification,  but  judgments  of  appre- 
hension are  verified  by  a  faculty  which  we  have 
hitherto  not  discussed.  We  must  now  set  forth  the 
office  of  apprehension  in  verifying  judgments  of 
perception. 

Forms  are  not  properly  conceived  until  we  know 


APPREHENSION  245 

their  function.  We  may  have  a  vague  concept  of  a 
form  without  knowing  its  function,  but  the  elements 
of  its  structure  are  not  fully  grasped  until  we  dis- 
cover their  relations  to  function.  Thus  our  per- 
ceptions of  form  are  not  only  verified  by  our 
apprehensions  of  function,  but  the  observation  by 
which  it  is  discovered  is  often  dependent  upon  the 
effort  to  apprehend  function.  An  obscure  stigma 
on  the  pistil  of  a  plant  might  be  wholly  unobserved 
by  the  man  who  is  not  acquainted  with  the  office  of 
the  pistil,  but  the  botanist  is  sure  to  perceive  it.  The 
painter  perceives  muscles  with  certainty  when  he 
observes  them  in  action.  It  is  thus  that  perception 
is  verified  by  apprehension. 

In  the  human  race,  knowledge  commences  by 
the  cognition  of  molar  bodies;  as  culture  advances 
knowledge  is  extended  to  stellar  bodies  in  the 
direction  of  the  vast,  and  to  molecular  bodies 
in  the  direction  of  the  minute.  On  the  other 
hand,  knowledge  has  not  only  been  extended  into 
the  vast  and  the  minute,  but  it  has  also  been  ex- 
tended into  the  compound  and  complex  as  exhibited 
in  plants  and  animals.  This  distinction  has  long 
been  recognized  in  a  vague  way  by  including 
certain  sciences  under  the  term  natural  history, 
and  other  sciences  under  the  term  physics.  The 
real  distinction  between  these  sciences,  however,  is 
this:  that  the  natural  history  sciences  consider 
quantities  or  properties  that  can  be  measured.  In 
ethronomy  and  astronomy  we  consider  properties 
that  can  be  measured,  and  ultimately  arrive  at  classi- 
fication; but  in  phytonomy  and  zoonomy  we  first 
consider  properties  that  can  be  classified,  and  finally 
resort  to  their  measurement.  In  geonomy  the 


246  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

sciences  are  broadly  grouped  into  two  classes, 
namely,  geography  and  geology;  the  geographic 
sciences  are  sciences  of  measurement,  the  geologic 
sciences  are  sciences  of  classification.  Thus  we 
have  quantitative  and  classific  sciences.  This  is  the 
old  distinction  of  metaphysics  between  quantitative 
and  qualitative  things  when  properties  are  con- 
sidered as  qualities.  We  have  already  seen  in  the 
chapter  on  qualities  the  nature  of  this  error  and  are 
ready  to  rescue  the  term  quality'from  the  ambiguity 
into  which  it  fell  when  it  was  considered  as  synony- 
mous with  class,  kind,  or  category. 

The  so-called  qualitative  sciences,  therefore,  are 
more  properly  designated  as  the  classific  sciences. 
This  broad  distinction  between  the  classific  and  the 
quantitative  sciences  deserves  some  further  consider- 
ation. In  the  deductive  sciences  there  must  be  some 
reason  why  we  first  look  for  quantity — why  we  come 
to  study  the  ether,  the  stars,  and  geography  quantita- 
tively, and  geology,  plants,  and  animals  classifically 
or  categorically.  We  know  absolutely  nothing  of 
kinds  of  ether,  but  only  of  the  properties  of  ether 
as  belonging  to  one  kind.  We  know  of  no  method 
by  which  we  can  change  the  particles  of  ether  into 
kinds.  We  know  of  but  few  kinds  of  stars,  and  we 
know  of  no  method  by  which  we  can  change  the 
kinds  of  stars.  There  are  but  few  kinds  of  air  and 
of  water,  and  these  differences  are  only  varietal,  not 
specific,  and  the  elements  of  mathematical  geog- 
raphy are  established  mainly  beyond  the  interfer- 
ence of  man.  We  wish  to  adjust  our  conduct  to 
these  established  facts,  and  hence  we  wish  to  know 
the  facts.  I  do  not  propose  to  change  the  rising  and 
setting  of  the  sun,  but  I  do  wish  to  measure  the 


APPREHENSION  247 

times  when  they  may  be  expected  and  the  length  of 
the  day  and  the  night.  I  do  not  propose  to  change 
the  gravity  inherent  bet  ween  the  several  stars  of  the 
solar  system,  but  I  do  wish  to  measure  the  force  of 
gravity  between  star  and  star,  that  I  may  adjust  my 
conduct  to  established  facts  when  I  make  the  ephem- 
eris  for  the  guidance  of  the  navigator.  I  do  not  pro- 
pose to  change  the  atmosphere,  but  I  measure  it  by 
determining  its  barometric  quantities,  the  pressure 
of  its  winds,  and  the  quantity  of  moisture  which  it 
contains.  In  the  same  way  I  measure  the  super- 
ficial extent  of  the  sea  and  the  depths  at  which 
the  rocks  are  found,  that  I  may  adjust  my  conduct 
while  navigating  the  sea  to  the  facts  therein  discov- 
ered. Now,  we  could  go  on  to  illustrate  these  facts 
in  a  multitude  of  ways,  and  in  an  endless  procession, 
and  find  in  all  those  realms  of  science,  which  I  have 
indicated  by  calling  them  physical  or  quantitative, 
that  I  am  interested  in  quantities  as  a  dweller  upon 
the  earth. 

In  the  quantitative  sciences  there  are  few  kinds, 
but  many  of  a  kind.  Induction  is  the  discovery  of 
a  kind ;  deduction  is  the  application  of  the  laws  of  a 
kind  to  the  individuals  which  are  included  in  the 
kind.  The  quantitative  sciences  are  deductive,  for 
deduction  predominates  in  their  study.  It  is  thus 
that  the  physical  sciences,  ethronomy,  astronomy, 
and  geography  are  quantitative  and  deductive,  and 
that  which  interests  us  most  in  these  realms  of 
bodies  is  their  quantities,  for  though  it  is  impossible 
to  change  their  kinds,  it  is  possible  to  adjust  our- 
selves advantageously  to  their  quantities. 

In  geology,  phytonomy,  and  zoonomy  there  are 
many  kinds;  thus  there  are  many  mineral  species 


248  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

and  few  individuals  of  a  species  as  compared  with 
the  individuals  of  air  and  water;  there  are  also 
many  kinds  of  plants  and  comparatively  few  of  a 
kind.  Deduction  is  based  upon  the  law  that  what  is 
true  of  one  of  a  kind  is  true  of  all  of  a  kind,  but 
where  there  are  many  kinds  and  few  individuals, 
attention  must  be  given  more  to  the  discovery  of 
the  kinds  than  to  the  application  of  the  laws  to  indi- 
viduals; hence  in  these  sciences  our  attention  must 
relatively  be  occupied  with  the  discovery  of  kinds 
and  less  occupied  with  the  application  of  laws.  But 
more :  Man  by  culture  undertakes  to  change  kinds, 
forms,  forces,  causes,  and  concepts.  By  the  arts  of 
constructive  or  synthetic  chemistry  and  metallurgy, 
he  makes  many  new  kinds.  By  a  great  variety  of 
arts  he  makes  many  new  forms,  shaping  the  rocks, 
plants,  and  animal  substances  into  a  variety  of  tools, 
utensils,  machines,  and  fabrics.  In  a  vast  multi- 
tude of  ways  he  seeks  to  change  the  forms  of  bodies 
which  he  discovers  in  rocks,  plants,  and  animals, 
and  can  accomplish  his  purpose  only  by  changing 
the  kinds. 

So  man  tries  to  change  the  forces  of  nature  into 
modes  which  he  can  control,  and  all  of  these 
changes  which  he  brings  about  upon  the  face  of 
nature  depend  upon  his  recognition  of  causes  and 
the  wisdom  of  his  selection  of  the  nature  of  the 
cause;  while  he  is  thus  employed  in  changing  the 
kinds  of  things  in  nature,  he  is  forever  building  up 
and  changing  his  concepts,  and  all  of  this  change 
when  resolved  to  its  simplest  statement  is  change  of 
kinds.  Thus  in  the  geologic,  phytonomic,  and 
zoonomic  realms,  man  is  primarily  interested  in 
kinds  and  only  secondarily  in  quantities;  in  the 


APPREHENSION  249 

products  of  his  cultural  activities  he  is  equally  inter- 
ested in  kinds  and  quantities.  It  is  here  that  induc- 
tion and  deduction  meet  on  equal  grounds,  for  the 
arts  are  equally  inductive  and  deductive. 

Presentative  reasoning  is  thus  chiefly  classific  and 
inductive,  while  representative  reasoning  is  chiefly 
quantitative  and  deductive. 

Now  we  see  why  bodies  are  symbolized  as  kinds 
rather  than  as  forces,  for  forces  are  recognized  as 
processes.  We  think  of  the  force  of  a  form  rather 
than  of  the  form  of  a  force.  All  of  the  senses  are 
under  the  control  of  and  associated  with  muscles,  so 
that  we  cannot  taste  an  object  without  employing 
the  muscles  of  the  mouth,  and  when  we  designedly 
smell  an  object  we  must  imbibe  its  vapor  in  the  air 
through  the  action  of  our  muscles  by  inhalation.  We 
cannot  touch  an  object  without  employing  our 
muscles  by  extending  the  organs  of  locomotion,  as 
hands  or  feet,  though  the  object  may  touch  us 
independently  of  our  self-activity.  So  pressure  is 
apprehended  by  us  as  stress  or  strain ;  the  muscles 
of  the  ear  are  strained  when  we  intently  listen ;  the 
eye  is  especially  under  the  control  of  a  system  of 
muscles,  so  that  it  becomes  the  special  organ  for 
the  cognition  of  motion.  We  do  not  see  motion 
chiefly  because  of  the  passing  of  the  image  across 
the  retina,  but  because  the  eye,  through  its  muscular 
apparatus,  adjusts  the  point  of  vision  of  the  image 
upon  the  retina  to  the  moving  body.  Thus,  while 
force  is  primordially  cognized  by  the  muscular 
sense,  even  motion  comes  to  be  cognized  by  the  mus- 
cular sense  when  it  adjusts  the  organ  of  vision  to  mo- 
tion. This  is  one  of  the  characteristics  of  vision  which 
eminently  adapts  the  sense  to  vicarious  faculties. 


250  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

We  may  now  give  a  more  adequate  definition  of 
apprehension.  Apprehension  is  the  process  of  form- 
ing a  judgment  about  force,  or  its  reciprocal,  motion, 
and  of  verifying  it  so  as  to  produce  a  cognition. 
The  difference  between  a  cognition  of  motion  and  of 
force  inheres  mainly  in  the  method  of  verification. 
The  various  methods  of  verification  are  funda- 
mentally dependent  upon  congruity  of  concepts. 
Again,  apprehension  as  a  process  of  intellection  may 
be  defined  as  the  cognition  of  force. 


CHAPTER   XVII 

REFLECTION 

We  have  now  to  describe  that  faculty  of  the  intel- 
lect by  which  concepts  of  causation  are  produced. 
It  will  be  remembered  that  the  essential,  constant, 
or  absolute  of  this  property  is  persistence,  that  the 
relative  is  change,  and  from  the  two  time  is  derived; 
then,  as  motion  becomes  force  through  the  collision 
of  particles,  time  becomes  causation  as  antecedent 
and  consequent,  or  cause  and  effect ;  then,  causation 
becomes  metagenesis,  and  metagenesis  becomes 
heredity,  and  heredity  becomes  evolution. 

Words  are  used  with  many  meanings,  but  in 
science  we  are  compelled  to  use  them  with  one 
meaning.  All  psychological  words  are  singularly 
ambiguous,  because  they  are  used  as  tropes  to  such 
an  extent  as  to  conceal  their  fundamental  meaning. 
It  is  necessary  to  select  a  word  to  signify  the  cogni- 
tion of  causation,  or  cause  and  effect,  in  the  various 
phases  of  time  and  evolution,  and  I  select  the  term 
reflection  for  this  purpose.  The  term  may  also  have 
a  meaning  synonymous  with  contemplation,  but  I 
select  it  with  the  meaning  which  is  involved  in  it  as 
a  sign  for  the  cognition  of  causation. 

Once  more  it  may  be  well  to  remind  the  reader 
of  the  total  unlikeness  of  the  properties  of  matter, 
so  that  they  can  not  be  classified.  Things  can  be 
classified  that  are  partly  alike  and  partly  unlike,  but 
properties  are  totally  unlike.  We  may  consider 

properties    separately,  but  this  is  abstraction,  not 

251 


252  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

classification,  and  we  may  schematize  the  properties. 
Fundamentally,  we  reason  by  abstraction  because  we 
consider  properties  severally.  By  reason  of  the  total 
unlikeness  of  disparate  properties,  the  most  funda- 
mental and  clearest  distinctions  in  psychology  are 
those  which  we  make  when  we  call  a  faculty  the 
cognition  of  a  property.  Reflection  is  one  of  those 
faculties  because,  as  the  term  is  here  defined,  it  is 
the  cognition  of  the  property  of  causation. 

Reflection,  also,  has  the  pentalogic  elements,  but 
in  the  inference  the  choice  is  of  a  concept  of  causa- 
tion. These  pentalogic  elements  are  a  conscious- 
ness of  a  sense  impression,  a  choice,  a  concept,  a 
comparison,  and  the  judgment  of  likeness  or  of 
unlikeness. 

Reflection  is  one  of  a  series  of  judgments,  and  by 
its  place  in  the  series  others  are  presupposed  or 
posited.  The  series,  so  far  as  it  has  been  built  up, 
is  composed  of  sensation,  perception,  apprehension, 
and  reflection.  I  see  an  oak,  and  may  make  a  judg- 
ment of  sensation  and  conclude  that  it  is  green.  I 
see  an  oak,  and  I  may  make  a  judgment  of  percep- 
tion and  conclude  that  it  is  a  tree.  I  see  an  oak, 
and  may  make  a  judgment  of  apprehension,  and 
conclude  that  its  leaves  and  branches  are  in  motion ; 
I  see  an  oak,  and  make  a  judgment  of  reflection  and 
conclude  that  the  motion  in  the  tree  is  caused  by 
the  wind.  These  judgments  differ  from  one  another 
in  the  nature  of  the  concept  recalled,  and  these 
concepts  differ  in  degrees  of  compounding. 

Why  do  I  make  a  judgment  of  sensation?  Because 
I  wish  to  note  the  color  which  I  am  painting.  Why 
do  I  make  a  judgment  of  perception?  Because  I 
wish  to  seek  the  shade  of  the  tree?  Why  do  I  make 


REFLECTION  253 

a  judgment  of  apprehension?  Because  I  am  looking 
for  birds.  Why  do  I  make  a  judgment  of  reflec- 
tion? Because  I  wish  to  note  the  direction  of  the 
wind.  Here  again  we  see  that  the  particular 
inference  which  we  make  depends  upon  the  choice 
of  a  concept,  and  that  this  choice  of  the  concept 
depends  upon  our  purpose. 

The  concepts  of  reflection  are  compounded  of 
judgments  of  causes  and  effects  of  events.  Thus 
by  reflection  the  relations  of  time  are  compounded 
into  the  relations  of  causation,  and  then  these  are 
compounded  into  relations  of  metagenesis,  and  these 
are  compounded  into  relations  of  heredity,  and 
these  are  compounded  into  relations  of  develop- 
ment, and  these  are  compounded  into  relations  of 
evolution. 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  concepts  of  causation  are 
exceedingly  compound.  In  the  practical  affairs  of 
life,  events  are  of  profound  importance,  for  the 
events  of  yesterday  affect  the  events  of  today,  and 
those  of  toda^-  will  have  a  consequence  in  the 
events  of  tomorrow;  thus  life  is  a  constant  dis- 
cipline. 

The  time  of  which  we  speak  is  not  void  time,  but 
the  time  of  states  and  events,  for  of  void  time  we 
know  absolutely  nothing,  and  language  fails  to 
express  any  concept  of  void  time,  and  any  reifica- 
tion  of  it  is  a  pseudo-idea — a  mythological  notion. 

It  must  be  understood  that,  as  the  cognition  of 
form  comes  by  experience,  so  cognition  of  force 
comes  by  experience.  Cognition  of  form  antedates 
the  cognition  of  energy  only  in  the  sense  that  the 
full  knowledge  of  form  is  necessary  before  there  is 
full  knowledge  of  force ;  the  experience  upon  which 


254  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

they  both  depend  is  contemporaneous.  This  may 
be  stated  in  another  way  to  be  made  clear.  Cogni- 
tion of  kind  by  sensation  arises  with  a  certain  degree 
of  experience;  cognition  of  form  arises  with  a 
higher  degree  of  experience;  cognition  of  force 
arises  with  a  still  higher  degree  of  experience ;  but 
judgments  of  kind,  judgments  of  form,  and  judg- 
ments of  force  are  accumulated  contemporaneously. 
So  concepts  of  causation  succeed  concepts  of  force ; 
but  the  judgments  of  causation  are  contemporaneous 
with  the  judgments  of  force,  form,  and  kind,  and 
there  can  be  no  judgments  of  causation  without 
judgments  of  force,  form,  and  kind. 

Here  we  arrive  at  a  paradox,  as  it  seems,  to  those 
who  fail  to  comprehend  the  nature  of  causation. 
Consider  a  valley  down  which  a  river  runs.  There 
can  be  no  river  without  a  valley,  yet  the  river  has 
caused  the  valley.  You  affirm  that  the  river  has 
carved  the  valley,  which  seems  to  be  a  paradox; 
there  must  have  been  a  valley  in  order  that  the 
water  should  be  gathered  into  a  stream;  and  that 
the  river  presupposes  or  posits  the  valley. 

You  explain  that  a  small  tract  of  land  is  gradually 
left  bare  by  the  retiring  sea,  that  is,  the  land  is  slightly 
upheaved;  the  rain  falls  upon  the  land  and  carves 
channels,  the  tract  of  land  is  extended,  new  chan- 
nels are  formed  and  the  old  channels  are  deepened ; 
still  the  upheaval  goes  on  with  increasing  dry  land, 
multiplication  of  channels,  deepening  of  channels, 
and  the  widening  of  channels  into  valleys,  and  this 
continues  until  at  last  a  great  area  of  land  is  upheaved 
from  the  sea,  and  the  rains  have  carved  channels 
and  the  channels  have  coalesced  again  and  again 
until  a  great  valley  is  formed  through  which  a  river 


REFLECTION  255 

rolls.  The  river  in  the  process  of  its  growth  has 
carved  a  valley,  and  the  enlarging  land  has  at  last 
caught  water  enough  to  fill  a  river;  the  growth  of 
the  valley  and  of  the  river  are  contemporaneous,  but 
the  forming  of  the  valley  logically  succeeds  to  the 
falling  of  the  rain  and  the  flowing  of  the  river  with 
its  lateral  streams ;  that  is,  effect  succeeds  cause. 

This  is  the  metaphysical  fallacy  which  mistakes 
an  effect  for  a  primordial  cause,  and  practically  says 
that  the  valley  existed  before  the  river,  for  it  gathers 
the  rain  which  constitutes  the  river.  The  valley 
was  from  the  first,  but  the  river  is  caught  by  the 
valley  from  the  rain  which  falls.  Examine  the 
doctrine  of  presupposition  in  metaphysics,  and  in 
every  case  a  fallacy  will  be  found. 

In  this  manner  the  experiences  of  sensation,  per- 
ception, and  apprehension  are  connate,  they  spring 
up  together,  and  yet  concepts  of  sensation  precede 
concepts  of  understanding,  and  concepts  of  appre- 
hension precede  concepts  of  reflection.  One  part  of 
the  doctrine  of  presupposition,  as  it  is  put  in 
metaphysics,  is  a  fallacy,  and  is  replaced  by  the 
doctrine  of  causation,  which  explains  that  that  which 
was  supposed  to  be  antecedent  is  consequent,  or  that 
which  was  supposed  to  be  cause  is  effect.  This  is 
the  great  contribution  made  by  science  in  demon- 
strating the  laws  of  evolution.  Another  part  of  the 
metaphysical  doctrine  is  erroneous  in  assuming  that 
the  concomitants  or  properties  are  derived  one  from 
another,  one  school  affirming  that  all  of  the 
properties  are  derived  from  force,  the  other  that 
they  are  all  derived  from  intellection. 

There  is  a  valid  concept  involved  in  the  use  of  the 
term  presupposition,  so  often  occurring  in  meta- 


256  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

physics,  for  when  one  property  is  considered 
abstractly  the  others  are  known  to  exist ;  though  not 
overtly  affirmed,  they  are  implied,  and  presup- 
position used  in  this  manner  and  understood  in  this 
manner  would  be  just  as  good  a  term  as  implication 
or  concomitancy ;  the  term  presupposition  leads 
astray  when  it  suggests  the  further  idea  that  the 
things  implied  are  antecedent  things,  instead  of 
antecedently  known  things. 

Judgments  of  evolution  are  constituted  in  the 
same  manner  as  other  judgments,  and  to  become 
certitudes  they  must  also  be  verified.  But  judg- 
ments are  consolidated  as  habits  of  thought;  thus 
we  come  across  the  phenomena  of  intuition.  When 
the  mind  makes  one  judgment  and  uses  other 
knowledge  which  was  derived  by  previous  judgment 
to  make  a  new  judgment  apparently  far  remote 
from  the  first,  this  new  judgment  is  said  to  be  a 
judgment  of  intuition,  for  the  steps  seem  to  be 
cancelled  in  reflection,  and  the  long  course  of 
reasoning  is  made  to  appear  as  a  direct  result. 

I  see  the  track  of  a  man  in  the  sand.  The  left 
track  is  full,  the  right  track  shows  only  the  impres- 
sion of  the  toe.  I  see  the  one  and  then  the  other, 
and  I  infer  that  the  man  was  lame  and  walked  upon 
his  right  toe.  John  Smith  is  lame,  and  I  infer  that 
John  Smith  has  walked  along  the  trail.  John  Smith 
lives  at  a  distance;  I  have  heard  that  his  mother  is 
ill,  and  that  he  has  been  sent  for,  and  I  infer  that 
he  has  passed  along  the  trail  to  the  home  of  his 
mother.  Thus  a  series  of  judgments  flash  through 
my  mind  when  I  see  the  half  footprint,  and  so 
speedily  do  these  judgments  arise  in  succession  that 
the  intervening  steps  seem  to  be  cancelled  from 


REFLECTION  257 

intellection,  and  I  appear  to  infer  from  the  foot- 
print directly  to  the  visit  of  John  Smith  to  his 
mother;  but  in  fact  I  have  carried  on  a  series  of 
judgments  derived  from  elements  of  knowledge  that 
have  been  recalled  by  the  sight  of  the  footprint. 

This  reasoning  in  series  by  unrecognized  steps  is 
intuition.  It  is  the  same  old  story  of  habit.  Cer- 
tain kinds  of  reasoning,  like  certain  kinds  of  mus- 
cular activity,  come  by  frequent  repetition  to  be  so 
easily  accomplished  that  the  processes  involved  are 
unrecognized  by  the  mind.  Perhaps  this  can  be 
explained  by  the  theory  that  in  recalling  one  con- 
cept we  recall  others  with  which  it  is  associated, 
reviving  them  as  they  are  woven  into  the  structure 
of  the  cortex  by  the  act  of  choice.  All  judgments 
of  causation  are  more  or  less  serial  in  this  manner, 
and  as  most  of  them  are  habitual  they  become 
intuitive.  For  this  reason  it  is  often  more  difficult 
to  analyze  judgments  of  reflection  than  judgments 
of  apprehension ;  and  more  difficult  to  analyze  judg- 
ments of  apprehension  than  judgments  of  percep- 
tion ;  but  by  careful  attention  to  the  subject  and  by 
the  acquisition  of  skill  in  introspection,  it  can  always 
be  discovered  that  every  judgment  of  reflection  is 
founded  upon  a  consciousness  and  involves  an  infer- 
ence which  recalls  a  compound  concept,  and  to 
reach  the  stage  of  certitude  it  must  be  verified. 
Finally,  it  must  be  remembered  that  intuition, 
which  is  supposed  by  careless  thinkers  to  be  occult, 
is  in  fact  developed  by  experience.  Such  is  the 
nature  of  presentative  judgments  of  reflection. 

We  have  yet  to  consider  representative  judgments 
of  reflection.  Again,  we  see  that  as  presentative 
judgments  follow  upon  sense  impression,  so  repre- 


2$8  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

sentative  judgments  follow  upon  choice,  and  the 
choice  may  be  discursive  or  volitional.  The  dis- 
cursive choice  is  sporadic,  and  by  following  such 
concepts  the  stream  of  thought  is  directed  in  a 
meandering  course  that  flows  to  nowhere ;  but  the 
choice  for  a  fixed  purpose,  in  which  there  is  an 
interest,  leads  to  results  that  influence  the  conduct 
of  life.  The  presentative  judgments  of  reflection 
are  removed  from  the  sense  impression  by  intui- 
tional or  by  more  deliberate  judgments  of  sensation, 
perception,  and  understanding,  so  that  the  judg- 
ments of  reflection,  both  presentative  and  repre- 
sentative, are  more  deliberative  than  of  the  lower 
faculties. 

When  both  cause  and  effect  are  external,  the 
judgments  of  them  are  mediated  by  other  judgments, 
the  causes  of  which  are  external  and  the  effects 
internal ;  hence  the  judgments  of  external  cause  and 
effect  are  still  further  removed  from  sense  impres- 
sion, so  that  there  is  again  another  degree  of  delib- 
eration. It  is  this  characteristic  that  has  led  to  the 
selection  of  the  term  reflection  to  designate  the 
faculty,  and  although  the  reflective  judgment  may 
never  have  been  defined  as  it  has  been  here,  yet  this 
definition  will  serve  to  reveal  the  unconscious  wis- 
dom of  the  selection  of  the  term  in  current  speech. 
In  judgments  of  original  cognition  the  pentalogic 
elements  can  always  be  discovered  by  introspection, 
but  in  the  judgments  of  recognition  it  is  difficult  to 
discover  them  in  the  cortical  consciousness.  When 
cognition  is  fairly  accomplished  recognition  there- 
after becomes  instantaneous. 

Audition  is  the  primordial  sense  of  causation. 
Sound  comes  to  us  through  a  medium,  and  primor- 


REFLECTION  259 

dial  man  has  no  knowledge  of  this  medium ;  he  does 
not  recognize  the  ambient  air.  Thus  he  thinks  that 
sound  is  something  emitted  from  bodies,  just  as 
Newton  believed  that  light  was  something  emitted 
from  bodies,  and  Plato  that  forms  were  emitted  from 
bodies.  So  the  savage  looked  about  him  for  the 
cause,  and  often  the  cause  as  a  form  he  could  not  see, 
and  as  he  knew  nothing  of  molecular  force  he  formed 
no  concepts  of  force  in  relation  to  sound ;  so  his  con- 
cepts of  sound  were  concepts  of  cause  until  he  could 
discover  the  cause  as  a  form.  It  was  thus  that  con- 
cepts of  cause  were  primitively  generated  in  the 
mind  of  man.  Hearing  is  also  the  sense  by  which 
time,  the  reciprocal  of  cause,  is  first  conceived. 
We  must  remember  that  properties  are  concomitant, 
and  though  the  faculties  operate  abstractly  in  that 
they  primarily  conceive  properties  as  abstract,  yet 
the  indissolubility  of  the  concomitants  compels  us  to 
consider  the  manifestation  of  one  property  as  the 
symbol  of  all  others.  In  this  manner  the  senses  all 
become  vicarious,  and  we  make  judgments  with  one 
sense  that  we  might  make  with  another.  Of  all  the 
primordial  senses  we  have  hitherto  discussed  as  the 
primal  sense  of  a  faculty,  that  of  hearing  is  the  most 
facile  to  perform  the  functions  of  the  others,  though 
we  shall  hereafter  observe  that  seeing  is  the  grand 
vicar  of  the  senses. 

Judgments  of  reflection  are  verified  by  the  judg- 
ments of  a  higher  faculty,  but  they  themselves  are 
used  to  verify  the  judgments  of  lower  faculties. 
Motion  and  force  are  expressed  in  rapidly  passing 
events,  but  causes  produce  effects  that  remain; 
causes  and  effects  are  states ;  forces  are  events  that 
separate  states;  hence  it  is  that  the  judgments  of 


260  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

understanding  are  relegated  to  those  of  reflection 
for  verification. 

I  suppose  that  I  see  a  woodpecker  tapping  a  tree. 
I  look  and  see  the  fresh  pit  made,  and  my  judgment 
is  confirmed.  I  obtain  the  glimpse  of  an  animal 
running  through  the  forest,  and  think  it  to  be  a 
wolf.  I  come  to  the  spot  where  it  was  supposed  to 
be,  and  the  tracks  of  a  deer  are  seen,  and  so  I  cor- 
rect my  judgment.  Thus  a  higher  judgment  will 
serve  as  a  verification  of  a  lower. 

Judgments  may  be  measured.  I  judge  of  a  dis- 
tance, and  find,  when  the  distance  is  measured,  the 
error  of  the  judgment.  I  do  not  find  the  error  of 
the  line  measured,  but  only  the  error  of  the  judg- 
ment made.  So,  whenever  we  make  a  judgment  of 
length  or  distance  or  size  or  weight  or  mass,  or 
what  not,  we  measure  our  judgments  by  measuring 
the  what-nots  judged.  All  judgments  are  liable  to 
error,  and  cognition  comes  only  with  verification. 
In  quantitative  judgments  the  liability  to  error  is 
infinite  as  that  term  is  used  by  mathematicians,  and 
all  judgments  must  be  verified  unless  the  amount 
of  error  may  be  neglected. 

In  scientific  research  verification  is  often  by 
measurement.  Counting  itself  is  measuring,  and 
the  sum  is  the  number  of  units  which  the  measured 
body  contains,  and  these  units  are  units  of  a  kind. 
It  is  only  in  counting  that  the  units  are  natural ;  all 
other  units  are  conventional  in  that  something  other 
than  the  thing  measured  is  taken  as  the  unit  or 
standard.  I  measure  time  by  the  revolution  of  the 
earth,  by  the  revolution  of  a  hand  on  the  dial  of 
a  clock,  or  by  the  flow  of  water  from  a  clepsydra. 
Thus  one  measurement  is  mediated  by  another,  and 


REFLECTION  261 

different  standards  are  taken.  The  nature  of 
measurement  is  well  understood  except  in  so  far  as 
it  relates  to  psychological  phenomena;  in  this 
realm  metaphysicians  seem  wholly  to  misconceive 
its  nature.  I  cannot  measure  the  number  of  the 
ultimate  particles  of  a  body  by  counting  them,  but  I 
may  measure  the  relative  number  of  its  atoms  by 
weighing  it.  I  do  not  determine  its  force,  but  its 
mass  only,  when  I  weigh  the  body,  for  the  total 
force  in  the  body  is  the  sum  of  its  motion  in  all  its 
incorporations.  A  pound  of  powder  has  much  more 
force  than  that  which  is  measured  as  a  pound. 
What  we  really  arrive  at  in  weighing  a  body  is  the 
proportionate  number  of  its  particles.  I  may  meas- 
ure the  length  of  the  wall  by  counting  the  brick 
lengths  in  the  wall.  I  cannot  measure  this  stick  by 
counting  the  number  of  particles  as  atoms,  mole- 
cules, or  cells  which  constitute  its  length,  but  I  use  a 
conventional  unit,  say  an  inch,  and  I  find  it  ten 
inches  long.  Had  I  taken  some  natural  unit  I 
might  have  found  it,  say,  ten  million  molecules  in 
length.  Now,  what  have  I  measured?  Only  the 
distance  which  separates  the  positions  of  the  mole- 
cules in  its  termini,  but  I  have  not  measured  the 
extension  of  any  of  the  molecules,  for  probably  they 
are  separated  by  interspaces  filled  with  ether,  and 
may  be  with  air.  It  is  thus  that  I  measure  space. 
I  cannot  measure  form,  for  form  is  internal  structure 
and  external  shape. 

I  have  a  body  which  is  of  very  irregular  shape, 
and  hence  I  cannot  well  determine  its  extension  in 
three  dimensions,  but  I  put  it  into  a  beaker  of 
water,  and  determine  how  much  it  displaces,  and 
measure  that;  thus,  while  I  do  not  measure  the 


262  TRUTH  AND   ERROR 

body  itself,  I  measure  its  equivalent.  Now  this 
leads  us  logically  to  the  statement  that  of  the  five 
concomitants  in  every  particle  or  body  every  one 
can  be  measured,  and  it  is  only  necessary  to  meas- 
ure one  property  to  have  a  measure  of  them  all. 
But  more  than  this,  I  must  measure  one  property  in 
terms  of  another;  thus,  I  measure  motion  in  terms 
of  space  or  length,  and  I  measure  speed  in  terms  of 
length  and  time.  We  must  remember  that  meas- 
urement is  always  a  conventional  process  to  serve  a 
purpose,  and  the  way  in  which  we  measure  a  thing 
is  by  some  device  for  the  purpose,  and  the  purpose  is 
always  the  relation  of  the  thing  measured  to  some 
other  thing.  I  measure  force  as  motion,  so  I  meas- 
ure the  force  of  the  cause  in  its  effect,  and  measure 
the  effect  in  space  elements.  I  measure  a  judgment 
by  measuring  the  thing  of  which  the  judgment  is 
made ;  thus,  I  judge  of  a  distance,  and  may  measure 
the  distance  to  determine  the  amount  of  error  in  my 
judgment.  It  is  in  this  manner  that  I  can  measure 
judgments. 

I  cannot  longer  dwell  on  this  subject  to  set 
forth  the  devices  by  which  judgments  are  meas- 
ured, but  must  content  myself  with  the  statement 
that  the  attempt  to  measure  judgments  has  but 
recently  been  made,  and  that  already  there  are 
many  devices.  All  of  the  properties  can  be  reduced 
to  or  considered  as  number.  Space  can  be  con- 
sidered as  number,  when  its  elements  are  counted 
in  natural  units,  or  it  can  be  considered  as  num- 
ber when  its  elements  are  measured  in  conven- 
tional units.  Motion  can  be  considered  as  space, 
and  then  as  number.  Time  may  also  be  considered 
as  motion,  then  as  space,  and  finally  as  number; 


REFLECTION  263 

judgments  may  be  considered  as  time,  and  time  as 
motion,  and  motion  as  space,  and  space  as  number. 
The  device  by  which  the  other  properties  are  con- 
sidered as  number  is  measurement,  and  measure- 
ment is  experimentation. 

We  are  prepared  to  give  a  more  adequate  defini- 
tion of  reflection.  Reflection  is  the  faculty  of 
cognizing  causation.  Again,  we  may  define  it  as 
the  process  of  making  a  judgment  about  causation 
or  its  reciprocal,  time,  which  judgment  must  be  veri- 
fied to  become  a  cognition. 


CHAPTER   XVIII 

IDEATION 

We  have  seen  that  consciousness  is  one  of  the 
essentials  of  an  animate  particle ;  that  sensation  is 
the  first  mental  property  or  faculty  of  an  animate 
body ;  that  perception  is  the  second  mental  property 
or  faculty  of  an  animate  body;  that  apprehension  is 
the  third  mental  property  or  faculty  of  an  animate 
body;  and  that  reflection  is  the  fourth  mental  prop- 
erty or  faculty  of  an  animate  body.  Now,  we  have 
to  consider  the  fifth  mental  property  or  faculty  of 
an  animate  body.  We  form  judgments  about  con- 
sciousness and  choice,  and  about  judgments  and 
concepts;  that  is,  we  cognize  mind.  We  need  a 
term  to  express  the  forming  of  judgments  about 
judgments,  or  of  cognizing  cognitions.  For  this 
purpose  I  shall  use  the  term  ideation.  Ideation, 
therefore,  as  the  term  is  here  used,  is  the  act  of 
making  judgments  about  judgments  which,  when 
verified,  are  cognitions. 

We  are  conscious  of  our  own  judgments,  but  we 
infer  the  judgments  of  others.  We  may  find  the 
judgments  of  others  to  be  like  those  we  have  already 
formed,  or  we  may  find  that  they  are  new  to  us. 
These  new  judgments  we  may  accept  or  reject. 
When  speech  is  developed  and  education  is  insti- 
tuted, acception  comes  to  play  a  very  important  role 
in  mental  acquisition. 

Judgments  of  ideation  are  connate  with  all  other 
judgments,  but  they  are  compounded  of  them  and 

264 


IDEATION  265 

represent  higher  degrees  of  relativity;  hence  it  is 
more  difficult  to  trace  them  into  their  constituent 
judgments,  yet  trained  introspection  accomplishes 
this  feat. 

Before  the  laws  of  evolution  were  discovered  and 
an  absolute  difference  between  man  and  the  lower 
animal  was  supposed  to  exist,  it  was  often  affirmed 
that  this  distinction  consists  in  the  absence  in  the 
brute  of  knowledge  about  mind,  that  only  man 
knows  himself  to  be  a  thinking  being,  or,  as  we  are 
here  using  the  term,  only  man  has  the  faculty  of 
ideation.  This  is  one  of  the  affirmations  which  men 
are  ready  and  prone  to  make  before  they  learn  that 
cognition  is  verified  judgment,  and  that  our  judg- 
ments are  guesses,  while  guesses  are  often  more 
current  than  certitudes.  With  this  idea  was  associ- 
ated another,  namely,  that  animals  do  not  reason, 
but  have  instinct,  there  being  no  realization  of  the 
fact  that  certain  practical  judgments  are  repeated 
so  often  that  they  become  intuitive  as  acts  become 
habitual.  Instinct  or  intuition  and  habit  will 
require  further  consideration  in  a  subsequent  book. 

We  must  now  develop  a  little  further  the  nature 
of  the  faculty  of  ideation,  by  considering  the  process 
of  forming  judgments  of  ideation.  I  hear  a  voice, 
and  by  experience  know  that  its  tone  expresses 
surprise.  Thus  I  form  a  judgment  of  an  emotion  in 
another.  I  am  confronted  with  an  antagonist  on  a 
field  of  battle,  and  see  him  point  his  howitzer  at  the 
column  of  troops  in  which  I  move,  and  infer  that  he 
has  a  deadly  purpose.  The  lower  animal  makes 
judgments  of  ideation  in  this  manner,  and  uses 
these  judgments  in  guiding  its  own  conduct.  With 
mankind  in  higher  culture  this  faculty  is  greatly 


266  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

developed.  All  words  are  signs  of  concepts,  and  all 
combined  words  that  express  thought  are  judgments, 
and  the  symbols  of  ideas,  both  spoken  and  written, 
constitute  the  pabulum  of  higher  culture.  Thus  we 
not  only  cognize  the  intellections  of  others,  but  at 
the  same  time  we  accept  their  judgments  as  judg- 
ments of  our  own. 

Ideation,  as  the  term  is  here  used,  is  a  cognition  of 
intellections  in  that  manifestations  of  intellections 
are  cognized  by  forming  concepts  of  them.  In  sensa- 
tion manifestations  are  conceived  as  expressions  of 
kind.  In  perception  they  are  conceived  as  expres- 
sions of  form;  in  apprehension  they  are  conceived 
as  expressions  of  force ;  in  reflection  they  are  con- 
ceived as  expressions  of  cause  and  effect;  in  idea- 
tion they  are  conceived  as  expressions  of  mind. 

The  constitution  of  the  judgment  which  has 
already  been  exhibited  four  times  must  here  be 
repeated.  It  appears  as  a  consciousness  of  a  sense 
impression,  a  choice,  a  reproduction  of  a  conscious- 
ness of  a  concept  of  ideation,  which,  by  comparison, 
make  a  judgment  of  ideation.  The  concept  which 
is  reproduced  by  the  choice,  is  still  more  highly  com- 
pound than  in  the  lower  grades  of  cognition,  for  the 
acts  which  animate  bodies  perform  are  first  inter- 
preted as  kinds,  then  as  forms,  then  as  forces,  then 
as  causations,  and  finally  as  concepts.  The  series  is 
complete  when  the  judgment  of  ideation  is  made. 

Like  all  other  judgments,  those  of  ideation  are 
presentative  and  representative;  representative 
judgments  are  discursive  and  volitional.  There  is 
no  need  to  repeat  the  discussion  setting  forth  the 
nature  of  judgments  in  these  respects. 

Vision  is  the  primordial  sense  of   ideation.     We 


IDEATION  267 

see  the  motions  in  others,  which  I  have  heretofore 
called  self-activity,  and  interpret  them  as  symbols 
of  soul.  By  soul  I  mean  all  intellectual  and  emo- 
tional judgments  made  by  the  animate  being.  The 
individual  is  conscious  of  the  judgments  made  by 
himself,  but  he  infers  the  judgment  made  by  others. 
The  judgments  that  others  make  are  inferred  from 
the  signs  which  others  make.  I  see  the  leaves 
tremble,  the  clouds  move,  the  rain  fall,  the  river 
flow,  and  innumerable  motions  in  the  mineral  world ; 
but  I  do  not  consider  them  as  signs  of  intellect  and 
emotion.  There  are  other  signs,  however,  which  I 
observe  in  animate  beings,  and  especially  in  human 
activities,  which  I  do  interpret  as  marks  of  soul. 
These  signs  are  those  which  are  produced  only  by 
those  bodies  which,  being  animate,  have  motility. 
The  nature  of  this  motility  we  have  elsewhere 
explained  and  we  have  called  it  self-activity,  which 
must  not  be  confounded  with  self-motion,  for  self- 
motion  is  inherent  in  every  particle,  while  self- 
activity  is  self -directed  motion  in  a  body. 

Only  animate  bodies  have  this  self-activity.  But 
according  to  our  hypothesis  the  ultimate  particles  of 
inanimate  bodies  have  self-activity  in  so  far  as  they 
manifest  choice  or  affinity,  while  plant  bodies  seem 
to  have  self-activity  in  their  cells.  Neglecting  this 
hypothesis,  animate  bodies  certainly  have  conscious- 
ness and  choice  in  their  cells.  Now,  as  one  inanimate 
body  has  inherent  motion  in  its  several  particles, 
which  are  organized  in  a  hierarchy  of  bodies,  the 
inanimate  body  cannot  be  deflected  except  by  col- 
lision with  another  body,  but  the  animate  body  can 
deflect  its  own  motion  as  a  body  by  metabolism,  and 
by  deflecting  its  own  motion  as  a  body  it  can  deflect 


268  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

the  motion  of  others.  It  is  this  power  in  the  ani- 
mate body  of  deflecting  its  own  motion  at  will  and  of 
deflecting  the  motions  of  others  by  colliding  against 
them  at  will,  which  is  the  sign  or  mark  of  mind  in 
those  bodies  to  which  we  attribute  mind,  and 
which  exhibit  more  and  more  the  purpose  and 
ability  to  convey  concepts  to  others,  until  among  the 
higher  animals  a  conventional  sign  language  is  pro- 
duced, which  becomes  oral  in  the  higher  animals,  but 
oral  and  written  speech  in  man.  Without  words 
only  emotions  can  be  conveyed,  whereas  with  words 
intellection  can  be  exchanged.  Gesture  language 
may  become  gesture  speech,  oral  language  oral 
speech,  and  picture  writing  written  speech.  It  is 
with  this  higher  condition  of  language  as  speech 
that  we  are  chiefly  interested  in  ideation.  Every- 
thing in  nature  has  manifestations  which  may  be 
interpreted,  but  only  animate  beings  purposely  con- 
vey concepts  to  one  another. 

Ideation  is  reenforced  by  other  demotic  agencies 
than  those  of  speech.  The  pleasures,  the  industries, 
the  institutions,  and  the  opinions  of  mankind,  are  all 
expressed  as  human  activities,  and  manifest  the  con- 
cepts by  which  they  are  produced;  but  we  need  not 
dwell  on  the  subject  here. 

Through  the  agency  of  language  we  discover  the 
fifth  property  of  bodies.  When  we  are  interested  in 
them  and  interest  grows  apace  we  may  wish  to 
know  what  those  bodies  say  instead  of  what  they 
are ;  it  is  then  that  language  becomes  speech,  but 
culture  continues  to  advance  and  speech  becomes 
designed  or  purposeful  instruction.  Then  all  the 
appliances  of  instruction  are  developed  until  one  of 
the  principal  occupations  of  mankind  is  the  giving 


IDEATION  269 

and  receiving  of  instruction  and  the  acquiring  of 
concepts  from  one  another,  in  which  process  the 
instructor  is  more  instructed  than  the  pupil,  for  the 
speaker  in  the  organization  of  that  which  is  spoken 
learns  more  than  the  hearer. 

Now  the  eye,  by  its  peculiar  construction  with 
apparatus  for  accommodation  to  distance  and  direc- 
tion, is  especially  adapted  to  the  reception  of  sense 
impressions  that  imply  self-activity,  hence  it  is  the 
primary  sense  organ  for  the  faculty  of  ideation.  While 
its  fundamental  function  is  ideation,  by  reason  of  the 
concomitance  of  properties  it  becomes  a  vicarious 
organ  for  others. 

Every  one  of  the  sense  organs  becomes  an  organ 
for  and  of  the  faculties.  In  the  first  stage  of  mind, 
while  the  organs  of  taste  and  smell  are  primarily 
the  organs  of  sensation,  the  other  organs  interpret 
the  sense  impressions  coming  to  them  as  symbols 
of  flavor.  In  the  second  stage,  while  touch  is  the 
primary  organ  of  form,  the  sense  impressions  coming 
to  the  other  organs  are  interpreted  as  symbols  of 
form.  In  the  third  stage  the  muscular  sense  is  the 
primary  organ  of  understanding,  but  all  the  other 
organs  interpret  the  sense  impression  coming  to 
them  as  symbols  of  forces.  In  the  fourth  stage,  while 
the  organ  of  audition  is  the  primary  organ  of  reflec- 
tion, all  the  other  organs  interpret  the  sense  im- 
pressions coming  to  them  as  symbols  of  causation. 
In  the  fifth  stage,  while  the  eye  is  the  primary 
organ  of  ideation,  all  the  other  organs  may  interpret 
the  sense  impressions  coming  to  them  as  if  they 
were  symbols  of  concepts. 

We  have  seen  how  the  judgments  of  the  lower 
faculties  are  verified  by  the  higher,  but  now  ideation 


270  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

is  the  court  of  last  resort.  In  the  structure  of  the 
mind  incongruous  judgments  throw  the  machinery 
of  reason  out  of  gear.  So  many  judgments  have 
been  found  fallacious  by  every  individual  in  the  race 
of  men,  and  fallacious  judgments  have  led  to  such 
dire  disasters,  and  have  been  repeated  so  often  in 
matters  of  profound  moment,  as  well  as  in  matters 
of  superficial  consequence,  that  there  has  grown  up 
a  habit  of  mind  by  which  incongruity  of  judgments 
is  taken  as  a  signal  that  danger  lurks  in  the  way. 
The  mind  cannot  rest  content  with  an  incongruity. 
It  is  the  ultimate  spur  to  all  intellectual  activity,  for 
we  may  forego  the  pleasures  of  the  mind  when  we 
know  that  others  may  be  enjoyed,  but  of  tentimes  we 
cannot  neglect  the  dangers  of  false  judgments.  We 
must  make  a  practical  solution  of  every  incongruous 
judgment  at  the  time,  but  every  intelligent  man 
yearns  for  an  ultimate  solution,  thus  the  world  is  on 
the  qui  vive  for  knowledge  as  for  the  breath  of  life. 
Those  who  teach  the  doctrine  of  the  unknowable 
offer  stones  for  bread  and  vipers  for  fish. 

All  our  concepts  must  be  congruous ;  the  demand 
for  congruity  is  inexorable.  A  man  may  accept  a 
verbal  explanation  of  the  facts  of  science  and  believe 
that  he  has  a  world  of  congruous  concepts,  but 
experience  will  find  incongruity,  which  he  may  con- 
ceal for  himself  in  a  jugglery  of  words,  but  others 
will  detect  it  when  they  are  announced. 

This  final  faculty  in  verification  resorts  to  the 
multitudinous  concepts  of  which  the  mind  is  pos- 
sessed and  when  one  is  incongruous  with  others  it 
demands  a  reinvestigation  of  that  one.  Sometimes 
the  one  is  right  and  the  many  are  wrong,  and  the 
multitude  must  be  made  to  establish  congruity  with 


IDEATION  271 

one,  but  meanwhile  the  one  multiplies  until  it 
becomes  the  many  and  the  fallacious  judgments  the 
few. 

All  scientific  research  is  a  process  of  reinvesti- 
gating  our  concepts  and  of  adjusting  them  to  the  light 
which  has  been  shed  upon  them  by  some  broader 
generalization  than  we  have  been  wont  to  make. 
We  gain  a  concept  by  induction  and  immediately 
we  apply  it  in  a  multitude  of  ways  by  deduction,  and 
in  making  these  applications  we  discover  our  fal- 
lacious judgments  and  go  on  forever  to  readjust  our 
concepts.  Thus  there  is  trial  and  failure,  trial  and 
failure,  until  at  last  there  is  trial  and  success ;  then 
a  new  vista  is  opened  into  the  universe. 

The  sensations,  perceptions,  apprehensions,  reflec- 
tions, and  ideations  of  the  individual  are  not 
exhausted  by  an  enumeration  of  these  derived  by 
the  individual  in  his  converse  with  nature.  From 
his  ancestors  he  inherits  the  powers  of  thought,  with 
his  organism,  which  is  expectant  and  apt  in  judg- 
ment and  conception.  It  is  ready  for  this  work,  as 
it  has  been  developed  through  untold  generations  of 
ancestral  life,  and  apt,  as  it  has  been  trained  by  the 
experience  of  untold  ages.  With  the  power  and 
skill  thus  developed  it  is  able  to  deal  with  and 
rationally  idealize  an  immeasurable  body  of  facts 
which  it  cannot  discover  for  itself — facts  gathered 
in  other  lands  by  other  minds  and  conveyed  to  it  by 
the  agency  of  language. 

The  landsman  may  learn  from  the  mariner,  the 
dweller  in  the  valley  from  the  mountaineer,  the 
denizen  of  the  forest  from  the  denizen  of  the  prairie, 
and  he  who  dwells  where  tropical  hurricanes  wash 
the  coral  reefs  with  the  waves  of  the  sea,  may  learn 


272  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

from  him  who  dwells  among  the  cliffs  of  ice  and 
sees  the  bergs  of  crystal  plunged  from  their  glacial 
homes  into  the  depths  of  the  sea.  This  process  of 
forming  judgments  we  call  acception. 

In  converse  with  nature,  man  transforms  or  inter- 
prets symbols  of  sense  impressions  into  concepts  of 
sensation,  perception,  apprehension,  reflection,  and 
ideation.  In  contact  with  these  natural  symbols  he 
devises  a  new  world  of  symbols  with  which  he  inter- 
prets concepts  of  others.  Still  they  are  judgments 
founded  upon  the  five  factors  or  constituents  of 
bodies,  and  nothing  more  enters  into  them.  So  we 
still  find  mind  dealing  with  number,  space,  motion, 
time,  and  judgment,  or  their  reciprocals  kind,  form, 
force,  causation,  and  concept. 

Words  themselves  are  of  great  assistance  to  idea- 
tion in  that  they  symbolize  with  one  word  great 
groups  of  judgments  which  we  call  concepts.  Thus 
it  is  that  the  ego  is  diverted  from  the  material  world 
to  the  ideal  world,  and  caused  to  dwell  abstractly 
upon  judgments  and  their  compounds.  Perhaps 
abstraction  is  more  nearly  complete  in  the  considera- 
tion of  judgments  and  their  compounds  than  in  the 
consideration  of  times  and  their  compounds,  motions 
and  their  compounds,  spaces  and  their  compounds, 
and  numbers  and  their  compounds.  In  fact,  this 
abstraction  is  so  thorough  that  conception  is  often 
supposed  to  have  perfect  independence  of  matter, 
although  no  conception  or  judgment  is  known  which 
is  not  a  concomitant  of  matter. 

A  crude  speech  is  developed  by  all  animal  life — 
a  general  sign  language  by  which  every  animal 
holds  converse  with  the  members  of  its  own  species. 
This  general  sign  language  is  inherited  by  man  and 


IDEATION  273 

gradually  developed  by  him ;  but  oral  speech  soon 
leads  the  way  in  the  development  of  a  still  higher 
language.  This  oral  language  is  invented  by  minute 
increments  born  of  experience;  finally,  written 
language  is  developed  from  lowly  beginnings  in 
picture  writings — first,  words  are  developed,  and 
these  words  are  grouped  in  sentences,  and  this  group- 
ing reacts  upon  the  words  themselves  until  parts  of 
speech  are  developed,  for,  in  primeval  languages, 
there  are  no  parts  of  speech  as  organs  of  the  sentence, 
as  we  now  understand  this  term. 

Words  are  signs  of  concepts,  not  of  judgments, 
for  every  word  stands  for  an  assemblage  of  judg- 
ments, and  to  express  a  judgment  it  is  necessary  to 
formulate  a  proposition.  Yet  we  cannot  get  away 
from  sensation,  perception,  apprehension,  reflection, 
and  ideation.  The  words  themselves  are  spoken  or 
written,  and  sense  impressions  are  necessary  to  pro- 
duce the  changes  in  self  upon  which  consciousness 
is  founded,  for  consciousness,  as  we  use  the  term,  is 
awareness  of  change  in  self.  Thus  the  spoken  word 
is  a  sound  impression  upon  the  organ  of  hearing; 
the  written  word  a  light  impression  upon  the  organ 
of  vision,  and  the  impression  becomes  a  symbol  for 
sensation,  or  a  symbol  for  perception,  or  a  symbol  for 
apprehension,  or  a  symbol  for  reflection,  or  a  symbol 
for  ideation.  So  all  words  are  symbols  for  ideation, 
but  the  symbols  are  conventional — invented  by  man- 
kind for  the  purpose  as  an  addition  to  the  natural 
symbols.  Not  that  languages  are  invented  as  fully 
developed,  but  the  elements  of  every  language  and 
the  combinations  of  these  elements  are  invented  by 
minute  increments.  To  understand  the  word  itself 
it  is  necessary  that  there  shall  be  a  consciousness 


274  TRUTH   AND  ERROR 

and  an  inference  leading  to  a  judgment  that  the 
word  is  such  or  such,  as  a  sound  or  a  written  symbol, 
and  the  whole  process  by  sensation  and  perception 
must  be  repeated  with  every  word  in  order  to  dis- 
tinguish it  as  a  word.  Then  perception,  apprehen- 
sion, and  reflection  are  all  employed  in  confirming  a 
judgment  about  the  meaning  of  the  word,  and  no 
word  has  any  meaning  until  it  is  interpreted  into 
concepts  of  number,  space,  motion,  time,  or  judg- 
ment, one  or  all. 

Here  we  have  especially  to  note  that  acception 
becomes  not  the  sole  but  the  chief  agency  for  the 
development  of  the  concepts  of  mind. 

And  now  on  symbol  wings  as  magical  words,  the 
soul  flies  to  all  the  realms  of  the  universe,  learning 
not  only  of  the  worlds  of  space  and  time,  but 
penetrating  into  the  arcana  of  other  souls. 

By  the  invention  of  speech  man  has  acquired  an 
inexhaustible  resource  from  which  to  draw  ideas, 
but  by  this  artificial  method  dangers  are  involved. 
Imagination  often  outruns  the  ideas  expressed  in 
words,  producing  illusions,  but  usually  harmless 
illusions.  My  friend  tells  me  of  a  cove  carpeted 
with  rare  flowers.  I  listen  and  in  my  mind  a  brook 
tumbles  in  a  cascade  from  a  cliff  above  and  the  cove 
seems  a  deep  narrow  gorge  with  fringing  rocks  and 
trees  standing  at  the  foot  of  the  cliffs.  I  even  per- 
ceive in  my  fancy  the  pathway  by  which  it  is  reached, 
and  measure  off  its  distance  in  my  mind's  eye. 
Unexpectedly  we  come  upon  the  brook.  I  had 
imagined  it  to  be  much  farther  off.  Thus  I  had 
misinterpreted  the  statement  of  my  friend.  We 
turn  up  by  its  bank  into  the  glen.  As  we  enter  the 
cove,  instead  of  finding  a  narrow  glen,  with  tower- 


IDEATION  275 

ing  walls  and  overhanging  rocks,  I  see  a  stretch  of 
pasturage  land  inclosed  by  rocks  that  are  broken 
back  in  hills,  and  up  the  valley  beyond  the  pasturage 
lands  there  is  a  deserted  cabin.  Near  the  cabin  a 
great  spring  gushes  from  the  foot  of  the  rock,  and 
about  it  trees  grow.  While  my  companion  gathers 
flowers  I  muse.  How  strange  that  his  words  created 
so  vivid  a  picture  in  my  mind,  and  that  this  picture 
should  be  wholly  the  creation  of  my  own  imagina- 
tion, having  no  counterpart  in  the  reality !  I  fancied 
a  narrow  cove  with  towering  cliffs,  tall  trees,  and  a 
cataract.  It  is  a  semicircular  glen  with  broken 
walls  of  rock,  grass-land  and  a  great  spring. 

Words  are  signs  of  ideas  to  be  interpreted  by  the 
imagination  of  the  hearer,  and  a  true  or  a  false  inter- 
pretation may  be  given  them,  depending  upon  the 
knowledge  already  existing  in  the  mind  of  the 
hearer. 

There  is  a  constant  tendency  to  learn  words  with- 
out meanings,  or  words  with  vague  meanings, 
and  to  use  them  with  a  semblance  of  expressing 
ideas.  No  word  is  properly  understood  when  it 
does  not  stand  for  an  idea  about  one  or  more  of 
the  concomitants  of  body  or  about  the  relations 
of  these  concomitants.  Here  we  have  a  crucial  test 
for  the  legitimate  use  of  a  word;  if  it  does  not 
express  a  number,  a  space,  a  motion,  a  time,  or  a 
judgment,  or  their  reciprocals  as  kind,  form,  force, 
causation,  or  concept  of  a  body  or  a  relation  of  one 
body  to  another,  it  expresses  a  pseudo-idea.  A 
word  used  to  express  an  idea  of  an  unknown  thing 
may  become  legitimate  by  the  unknown  becoming 
known,  but  a  word  used  to  express  an  unknowable 
thing  is  blank  voice.  The  habit  of  learning  words 


276  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

without  learning  the  ideas  for  which  they  stand  is 
worse  than  an  inanity — it  is  a  vice,  for  the  mind 
is  irresistibly  led  into  the  practice  of  informing  such 
words  with  vague  and  misleading  meanings.  Select 
any  word  in  common  usage  to  express  the  leading 
ideas  in  the  metaphysical  discussion  of  the  nature 
of  the  universe,  and  follow  it  where  it  occurs  many 
times,  and  you  can  invariably  discover  that  it  is  used 
with  many  meanings  wholly  incompatible  with  one 
another,  and  the  foundation  of  these  meanings  will 
be  discovered  to  be  something  unknowable — a  noth- 
ing, an  abstract  attribute  reified  as  having  concrete 
existence.  Teach  the  word  cat  to  a  child  who  has 
never  seen  a  cat  and  it  will  imagine  a  hobgoblin. 

Words  often  have  many  meanings;  learn  these 
many  meanings  of  many  concepts,  put  them  together 
as  one  compound  idea  and  you  have  an  absurdity; 
but  such  is  often  the  method  of  metaphysical  reason- 
ing. Akin  to  this  is  to  use  the  word  as  a  metaphor 
and  then  to  forget  the  metaphor.  See  how  Hegel 
uses  the  word  mediation.  A  mediator  is  one  who 
comes  between  others ;  the  ether  mediates  the  light 
between  the  sun  and  the  earth ;  the  air  mediates  the 
sound  between  the  voice  and  the  ear;  so  the  messen- 
ger mediates  the  message,  and  the  term  properly 
means  to  bear  from  one  to  another.  A  man  may 
bear  his  own  letter  to  his  friend  and  by  a  figure  of 
speech  may  be  said  to  be  his  own  mediator.  But 
when  you  forget  the  figure  of  speech  and  call  the 
man  a  mediator  who  acts  upon  another  you  have 
used  the  word  illegitimately,  and  when  you  go  still 
further  to  speak  of  the  action  of  a  person  upon  him- 
self as  mediation,  you  have  reduced  the  term  to  an 
absurdity.  Such  are  the  methods  of  ontologic 


IDEATION  277 

reasoning  as  distinguished  from  scientific  reasoning, 
which  holds  words  to  single  and  invariable  mean- 
ings. "If  thine  eye  be  single  the  whole  body  is  full 
of  light."  It  is  not  strange  that  Hegel  rendered 
the  world  into  terms  of  multitudinous  contradictions. 
It  was  the  trick  of  tricks,  the  juggle  of  juggles,  to 
play  such  pranks  with  the  terms  of  philosophy. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

INTELLECTIONS 

I  shall  now  review  the  doctrines  set  forth  in  these 
chapters  on  the  five  faculties  and  make  a  more  com- 
prehensive statement  of  certain  fundamental  prin- 
ciples. 

In  this  volume  psychology  is  treated  only  as  a 
system  of  intellections,  while  the  emotions  are 
neglected.  The  subject  matter  is  the  beginning  of 
an  epistomology  or  theory  of  cognition,  which  will 
require  another  volume  for  its  completion,  when  a 
volume  of  psychology  will  follow. 

It  has  been  set  forth  that  consciousness  is  self- 
consciousness.  When  the  self  is  conscious  of  an 
effect  on  self  it  infers  a  cause,  and  when  it  is  con- 
scious of  being  a  cause  it  infers  an  effect.  In  the 
simplest  judgment  causation  is  involved — one  of  the 
terms  being  a  cause,  the  other  an  effect.  When  con- 
sciousness is  of  the  effect,  the  inference  is  of  the 
cause,  and  we  have  a  judgment  of  intellection. 
When  the  consciousness  is  of  the  cause,  the  inference 
is  of  the  effect,  and  we  have  a  judgment  of  emotion. 
When  the  cause  and  the  effect  are  both  internal  we 
have  an  emotion.  I  use  the  term  consciousness  solely 
as  awareness  of  self  and  not  in  its  general  significa- 
tion as  cognition.  We  cannot  be  conscious  of  an  ex- 
ternal object,  but  we  are  conscious  of  our  judgments 
of  external  objects.  In  the  case  of  the  animate  body, 
which  has  conscious  particles  acting  on  one  another,  it 

may  be  conscious  of  both  cause  and  effect  in  the 

278 


INTELLECTIONS  279 

body,  because  the  particles  of  the  body  are  external 
to  one  another,  and  the  ganglia,  with  their  con- 
necting fibrous  nerves,  constitute  the  organism  by 
which  the  consciousness  of  the  particles  is  ultimately 
transmitted  to  the  cortex.  Thus  there  is  a  con- 
sciousness of  the  cortex,  a  consciousness  of  the  sub- 
ordinate ganglia,  and  a  consciousness  of  the  particles ; 
so  that  when  the  self  acts  on  self  there  are  both  con- 
sciousness and  inference. 

The  cause  at  one  time  is  considered  as  a  kind,  at 
another  time  as  a  form,  at  another  a  force,  at 
another  a  causation,  and  at  another  time  as  a  concept, 
giving  rise  to  five  faculties  of  intellection,  as 
follows :  First,  cognition  of  kind,  which  is  the  faculty 
of  sensation;  second,  cognition  of  form,  which  is 
the  faculty  of  perception ;  third,  cognition  of  force, 
which  is  the  faculty  of  apprehension;  fourth,  cog- 
nition of  causation,  which  is  the  faculty  of  reflection ; 
and,  fifth,  cognition  of  conception,  which  is  the 
faculty  of  ideation. 

If  this  doctrine  is  true  then,  fundamentally,  we 
cognize  by  properties  which  we  find  to  be  concom- 
itant in  particles  and  bodies,  and  thereby  reach  a 
cognition  of  particles  or  bodies.  It  will  be  seen 
that  judgments  are  fundamentally  abstractions,  but 
that  comprehension  gives  them  concrete  validity. 
In  the  first  stage  they  are  judgments,  in  the  second 
stage  they  are  cognitions. 

A  judgment  is  a  process  of  elements.  First, 
there  is  a  consciousness  of  a  sense  impression.  Second, 
there  is  a  desire  to  know  its  cause;  that  is,  what 
produced  it;  what  can  the  impression  signify? 
Third,  there  is  a  guess  or  a  choice  of  some  external 
object  as  its  cause,  which  revives  the  consciousness 


280  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

of  the  concept  of  the  object  chosen.  Fourth,  this 
second  consciousness  is  compared  with  the  first.  Fifth, 
a  judgment  is  made  of  likeness  or  unlikeness 
between  the  terms  compared.  The  first  cause,  when 
it  is  sense  impression,  is  an  act  of  something  in  the 
environment,  but  when  it  is  a  reproduction  it  is  a 
self-activity.  The  second  cause  is  always  a  self- 
activity. 

All  judgments  are  judgments  of  cause  and  effect. 
The  consciousness  may  be  of  the  effect  and  the 
inference  of  the  cause,  or  the  consciousness  may  be 
of  the  cause  and  the  inference  of  the  effect,  or  the 
consciousness  may  be  of  the  effect  and  of  the  cause 
when  self  acts  on  self,  and  then  the  inference  is  of 
their  relation,  one  to  the  other.  Again,  both  cause 
and  effect  may  be  external,  when  there  will  be  two 
judgments,  each  one  of  which  will  contain  a  con- 
sciousness and  an  inference,  and  their  relation  to 
each  other  as  cause  and  effect  will  be  by  inference. 
Thus  inference  may  be  in  the  second,  or  higher 
degree. 

There  are  two  of  the  psychic  elements  in  a  judg- 
ment that  demand  further  consideration.  These  are 
consciousness  and  choice.  Here  consciousness  is 
awareness  of  an  effect,  the  cause  of  which  is  an  act 
of  the  external  world  thrust  upon  self  at  the  present 
time,  or  upon  self  at  sundry  past  times.  The 
inference,  or  interpretation,  is  a  choice  of,  or  guess 
at,  the  cause.  Thus  consciousness  is  of  self,  but 
choice  or  inference  is  of  the  object. 

.  I  have  spoken  of  the  choice  as  a  guess  or  an 
hypothesis,  but  in  cognition  it  is  always  an  invention, 
and  as  an  invention  it  requires  the  conscious  time 
of  deliberation.  The  mind  always  invents  the  cause, 


INTELLECTIONS  281 

and  it  is  because  it  is  an  invention  that  it  must  be 
verified;  but  in  recognition  the  invention  is  already 
made  and  the  process  of  judgment  no  longer  requires 
deliberation.  It  is  this  absence  of  deliberation  which 
makes  multitudes  of  judgments  practically  instan- 
taneous, or  intuitive.  No  scientific  man  can  make 
practical  additions  to  knowledge  who  is  not  an 
inventor  of  hypotheses.  One  of  the  sine  qua  non 
conditions  of  successful  research  is  the  power  of 
inventing  hypotheses ;  another  of  these  sine  qua  non 
conditions  is  verification,  but  experimental  verifica- 
tion also  requires  invention. 

That  a  primitive  judgment  requires  much  time  is 
learned  only  by  careful  introspection.  So  many  of 
our  judgments  are  recognitional  instead  of  being 
cognitional,  that  judgments  usually  appear  to  be 
instantaneous.  In  defense  of  this  doctrine  I  may  be 
permitted  to  cite  my  personal  experience.  For 
many  years  I  was  engaged  on  an  exploring  expedition 
where  all  the  features  of  the  landscape  were  new  to 
me  and  my  companions.  Mountains,  hills,  rocks, 
plains,  valleys,  streams,  all  were  new.  I  was  con- 
stantly discoverng  new  plants,  new  animals,  and 
strange  human  beings,  as  Indians.  During  all  these 
years  the  fundamental  doctrines  of  psychology  often 
constituted  the  theme  of  my  thoughts  and  the  sub- 
ject with  which  I  beguiled  the  weariness  of  travel. 
It  was  thus  that  I  learned  to  distinguish  the  elements 
of  a  primordial  judgment  and  to  distinguish  cogni- 
tional from  recognitional  judgments.  In  later  years 
reconnoissance  was  developed  into  survey,  and  my 
time  was  devoted  largely  to  structural  geology.  For 
every  phenomenon  there  was  always  a  hypothetical 
explanation,  and  such  guesses  were  all  found  value- 


282  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

less  unless  verified.  Thus  it  was  that  the  doctrine 
of  a  primary  judgment  and  the  doctrine  of  verifica- 
tion grew  up  with  me.  More  than  that,  I  discovered 
that  my  associates  in  the  work  of  research  depended 
upon  hypothesis  and  verification ;  and  before  my  field 
work  was  done  the  universal  doctrine  of  cognition 
herein  presented  was  abundantly  confirmed. 

Let  us  look  further  into  the  judgment  relating  to 
cause  and  effect  in  the  external  world.  A  judgment 
about  an  object  may  be  combined  with  another 
judgment  about  another  object,  and  a  third  judg- 
ment of  causation  arises,  which  is  about  things  objec- 
tive. For  example,  I  see  a  man  strike  another  and 
cause  pain  in  that  other.  I  must  make  two  judg- 
ments of  perception  to  see  the  men,  a  judgment  of 
understanding  to  see  the  force,  a  judgment  of  reflec- 
tion to  see  the  effect,  and  perhaps  another  judgment 
of  perception  to  realize  the  pain.  While  this  maneu- 
ver is  passing  in  the  field  many  other  events  are 
occurring  under  the  eye,  the  ear,  and  other  senses, 
and  the  many  judgments  combine  in  the  verification 
of  the  judgment  formed  of  the  maneuver.  Thus 
judgments  are  verified.  See  what  a  number  of 
concepts  are  aroused  in  this  case  and  how  much 
more  complex  it  is  than  a  simpler  judgment  of 
sensation,  or  even  of  perception. 

What  we  have  to  note  here  is  the  distinction  which 
has  to  be  made  between  a  judgment  of  causation, 
which  is  a  highly  compound  judgment,  and  the  part 
which  causation  plays  in  all  judgments — even  the 
simplest. 

A  judgment  of  causation  is  a  very  distinct  thing 
from  the  property  of  causation  in  the  formation  of 
a  judgment.  In  a  judgment  of  sensation  I  reach  a 


INTELLECTIONS  283 

conclusion  about  a  property,  say  of  taste,  but  I  do 
not  consider  the  cause  as  a  cause  but  as  a  kind.  So, 
in  a  judgment  of  perception  I  consider  the  cause  as 
a  form ;  in  a  judgment  of  apprehension  I  consider  the 
cause  as  a  force ;  but  in  the  judgment  of  causation  I 
consider  the  cause  as  a  cause.  Now,  the  very  same 
phenomenon  may  be  considered  in  any  one  of  these 
lights,  but  the  inference  in  the  several  cases  will  be 
different  and  the  concepts  aroused  will  be  different. 
Which  one  of  the  judgments  will  be  made  will 
depend  on  my  interest  or  the  line  of  thought  on 
which  I  am  engaged.  The  reader  can  not  be  too 
careful  in  thoroughly  mastering  the  distinctions 
between  the  five  classes  of  judgment,  and  between 
the  role  of  causation  in  making  a  judgment,  and  a 
judgment  of  causation.  In  the  judgment  of  sensation 
I  think  about  the  kind ;  in  the  judgment  of  perception 
I  think  about  the  form ;  in  the  judgment  of  appre- 
hension I  think  about  the  force ;  but  in  the  judgment 
of  reflection  I  think  about  the  causation  as  cause  or 
effect. 

Let  us  now  see  how  cognition  is  judgment  and 
verification.  What  things  are  necessary  that  I  may 
know  that  a  body  has  touched  me?  First,  I  must 
be  conscious  of  an  effect  on  self;  second,  I  must 
infer  that  something  exercises  a  force  that  must 
have  produced  this  change  by  collision,  and  the 
something  is  a  cause  and  I  have  a  judgment.  This 
judgment  may  then  be  verified  by  my  vision  when 
I  see  the  body.  The  change  in  self  may  have  been 
produced  by  an  irritation  of  the  skin  due  to  some 
disease.  What  I  supposed  to  have  been  touch  might 
have  been  an  illusion,  but  seeing  the  body  as  it 
touched  me  the  verification  is  made  and  a  certitude 


284  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

is  produced.  Again,  I  might  have  seen  the  body 
approach  and  feared  that  it  would  touch  me,  and 
expectant  of  the  touch,  I  might  have  inferred  the 
touch  when  really  the  touch  was  not  accomplished. 
In  this  case  there  was  a  consciousness  by  the 
sense  impression  in  vision,  but  an  inference  which 
was  only  an  illusion.  Two  or  more  acts  of  conscious- 
ness producing  the  same  judgment  verify  one  another. 

How  must  I  know  that  a  knife  has  cut  me?  First, 
I  am  conscious  of  a  change  or  effect  in  self;  second, 
I  infer  that  something  has  produced  that  effect  as  a 
force  and  I  have  a  judgment.  In  order  that  the 
cognition  may  be  complete  this  hypothesis  must  be 
verified.  I  may  verify  the  cutting  by  seeing  that 
the  gash  is  made,  and  I  may  verify  the  knife  by  see- 
ing or  touching  the  knife.  In  the  one  case  I  have  a 
certitude  that  I  have  been  cut,  and  in  the  second 
case,  a  certitude  that  I  have  been  cut  with  the  knife, 
and  these  certitudes  verify  each  other.  I  might 
have  seen  the  knife  move  near  to  my  hand  and 
inferred  that  it  cut  me,  and  an  illusion  might  thus 
have  arisen  that  I  was  cut ;  but  the  consciousness  of 
the  effect  of  the  knife  upon  my  hand,  together  with 
the  consciousness  of  the  knife  by  vision,  produce 
judgments  that  confirm  each  other. 

How  do  I  recognize  that  some  one  has  spoken? 
First,  I  am  conscious  of  a  change  in  my  organ  of 
hearing.  I  infer  that  it  is  the  sound  of  a  voice.  I  see 
the  person's  lips  move,  and  it  is  confirmed  and  I  have 
a  certitude.  I  might  have  seen  the  lips  move  without 
hearing  the  sound,  and  inferred  that  a  sound  was 
made,  which  would  have  been  an  illusion ;  but  in  the 
hearing  of  the  sound  and  the  seeing  of  the  move- 
ment of  the  lips,  each  verifies  the  other. 


INTELLECTIONS  285 

How  do  I  cognize  the  flavor  of  an  apple?  My  taste 
and  my  vision  of  the  apple  verify  each  other.  How 
do  I  cognize  the  odor  of  a  rose?  By  smelling  and 
seeing,  and  the  common  judgment  is  verified. 

In  these  cases  judgments  verify  one  another.  All 
verification  is  founded  on  congruence  of  judgments. 
It  is  thus  that  one  sense  verifies  another.  Now, 
that  which  we  have  specially  to  note  at  this  stage  of 
the  argument  is  that  verification  is  founded  on  con- 
gruence of  judgments.  Every  cognition  involves  a 
judgment  and  its  verification,  and  the  verification 
is  founded  on  the  congruence  of  judgments,  one  with 
another  of  a  higher  grade. 

In  the  lower  stages  of  the  development  of  mind, 
verification  is  sometimes  by  repetition,  oftener  by 
submitting  the  judgment  to  verification  by  another 
sense ;  but  in  the  higher  stages  of  the  development 
of  mind,  verification  is  by  experimentation.  We 
go  on  from  generation  to  generation  with  unverified 
judgments  and  suppose  that  our  concepts  are  com- 
posed of  cognitions,  when  in  fact  they  are  composed 
of  fallacious  judgments.  For  untold  generations 
men  believed  the  earth  to  be  flat,  and  that 
bodies  fall  to  the  earth  in  a  line  normal  to  this  flat 
plain.  But  there  were  certain  phenomena  which 
were  inexplicable,  and  men  invented  the  hypothesis 
that  the  earth  is  a  spheroid  and  that  bodies  fall 
toward  the  center  of  the  earth,  and  it  accounted  for 
so  many  facts  relating  to  the  motions  of  the  heavenly 
bodies  that  the  hypothesis  led  to  a  vast  amount  of 
scientific  research,  and  was  verified.  Now  at  last 
we  cognize  the  motion  of  the  heavenly  bodies  in 
part  at  least.  For  ages  man  believed  the  heavenly 
bodies  to  be  molar,  that  is,  to  be  movable  by  man  at 


286  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

his  will,  moving  from  east  to  west  along  the  face  of  a 
solid  domed  sky,  and  they  supposed  them  to  return 
from  west  to  east  under  the  ground,  and  it  required 
ages  to  invent  another  hypothesis — that  of  a  system 
of  spheres  revolving  in  orbits  concentric  to  the  sun. 
This  hypothesis  was  an  invention  made  by  many 
men.  It  was  a  demotic,  not  an  individual  invention. 

The  various  judgments  formed  about  an  external 
object  are  combined  into  a  concept  of  that  object, 
and  this  concept  is  aroused  from  memory  by  infer- 
ence whenever  a  sense  impression  is  received  and 
attention  is  paid  to  it  in  judgment.  One  sense  impres- 
sion becomes  an  agency  for  reviving  many  judg- 
ments previously  made  about  the  object  causing  the 
sense  impression.  It  is  thus  that  a  sense  impression 
becomes  symbolic,  and  judgment  in  such  cases  is 
symbolic.  The  concomitant  properties  of  an  object 
severally  manifest  themselves  to  different  senses, 
and  when  one  property  is  manifested  by  one  sense 
impression,  it  becomes  the  symbol  of  all  other 
properties  inhering  in  the  object  and  known  by  the 
observer.  Properties  can  not  exist  apart,  as  the 
constant  multitudinous  experiences  of  each  indi- 
vidual attest.  There  is  no  one  who  can  form  a 
judgment  who  does  not  take  it  for  granted  that  the 
concomitants,  however  unlike  they  may  be,  can  not 
exist  apart.  Symbolism  is  not  mere  poetry  that 
obscures  reason,  but  it  is  a  logical  method  of  time- 
saving  thought.  Judgment  itself  is  by  symbolism, 
in  which  the  manifestation  of  one  property  is  inter- 
preted as  a  symbol  of  all  the  properties  known  about 
the  object. 

A  force  is  manifested  as  a  force  and  it  is  also 
manifested  as  a  cause,  for  there  can  not  be  a  force 


INTELLECTIONS  287 

without  it  also  being  a  cause,  any  more  than  there 
can  be  a  force  which  is  not  a  form,  or  a  form  which 
is  not  a  kind.  In  nature  forces  are  often  observed 
in  multitudes.  There  are  many  particles  of  air  that 
stir  the  leaf  and  there  are  many  leaves  that  are 
stirred  by  one  wind,  but  in  the  particles  of  the  wind 
one  multitude  follows  another  in  succession.  So 
there  are  many  drops  of  rain  that  fall  on  many 
grains  of  soil,  and  a  succession  of  a  multitude  of  rain- 
drops constitute  the  rain.  Process  in  its  simplest 
form  is  the  collision  of  two  bodies  that  meet  and 
act  on  each  other  in  action  and  reaction,  but  this 
action  and  reaction  is  also  cause  and  effect;  thus 
causation  and  force  are  concomitant.  But  in  appre- 
hension we  consider  only  force ;  another  intellectual 
faculty  is  engaged  when  we  consider  causation. 

When  one  body  collides  with  another,  different 
things  may  happen.  First,  both  may  be  deflected; 
second,  both  may  be  deformed ;  third,  both  may  be 
broken;  fourth,  both  may  be  heated;  fifth,  both 
may  chemically  be  changed.  Usually  the  total 
effect  is  two  or  more  of  these  changes.  Finally,  any 
one  of  these  effects  may  be  experienced  by  one  body 
and  not  by  the  other.  Thus  we  see  that  although 
action  and  reaction  are  equal,  cause  and  effect 
can  not  be  equal,  as  they  are  not  of  the  same  kind. 

Judgments  of  reflection  seem  to  be  especially 
subject  to  error  and  as  such  to  be  compounded  into 
false  concepts  and  to  be  long  entertained  as  such. 
In  the  act  of  making  the  judgment  there  must  be 
judgments  of  bodies  impinging  on  one  another,  lead- 
ing to  judgments  of  apprehension.  Then  one  of 
many  effects  must  be  considered  as  due  to  one  of 
many  causes,  and  the  many  effects  referred  to  the 


288  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

many  causes  in  turn,  in  order  that  all  of  the  effects 
may  properly  be  distributed  to  all  of  the  causes. 
Thus  reflection  is  an  exceedingly  complex  subject. 

The  process  is  comparatively  simple  when  one 
body  collides  with  another,  but  when  a  multitude 
of  bodies  collide  with  one,  the  process  is  not  so 
readily  understood,  and  when  a  multitude  of  bodies 
collide  against  a  multitude  of  bodies,  as  of  winds 
against  leaves,  the  process  of  disentangling  causes 
and  effects  or  antecedents  and  consequents,  is  still 
more  involved.  The  difficulty  may  not  appear  at 
first  glance,  but  an  investigation  into  historical 
instances  shows  that  frequently  cause  is  mistaken 
for  effect  and  effect  for  cause.  It  is  not  uncommon  in 
savagery  to  attribute  winds  to  trees.  A  common 
error  of  this  kind  is  discovered  in  the  minds  of  most 
persons,  for  it  is  widely  believed  that  forests  are  the 
cause  of  rains.  An  interesting  book  has  been 
written,  widely  read,  and  popularly  approved,  which 
is  based  on  the  assumption  that  the  aridity  of  desert 
lands  is  due  to  the  absence  of  forests. 

A  stream  of  judgments  flow  through  the  mind. 
As  the  ego  has  self -activity  it  changes  its  position 
in  the  environment  at  will  and  a  different  environ- 
ment plays  on  the  senses  at  every  change  in  the 
position  of  the  ego.  Then  by  different  senses  the 
environment  solicits  the  attention  simultaneously  by 
all.  Thus  attention  is  solicited  by  more  sense 
impressions  than  it  can  attend  to,  and  it  chooses  for 
attention  those  which  serve  a  temporary  or  more 
sustained  purpose.  Those  serving  a  temporary 
purpose  give  rise  to  what  has  been  called  by  Kant, 
the  practical  reason ;  those  serving  a  sustained  pur- 
pose, the  pure  reason. 


INTELLECTIONS  289 

Presentative  judgments  that  originate  in  sense 
impressions,  are  often  followed  by  representative 
judgments,  and  these  are  either  discursive  or  voli- 
tional. Hence  we  see  that  the  judgments  which 
we  make  are  exceedingly  multitudinous  and  hetero- 
geneous. But  all  of  these  judgments  are  assembled 
in  concepts  by  more  temporary  or  more  permanent 
purposes.  What  judgments  can  be  made  are  deter- 
mined by  the  environment;  but  what  judgments 
the  mind  selects  to  make  are  determined  by  the 
purpose.  Thus  the  ego  is  the  creature  of  environ- 
ment and  self-activity.  The  stream  of  judgments 
is  thought,  and  thought  is  controlled  by  self-activity 
and  environment. 

It  may  be  well  to  further  consider  the  process  of 
combining  judgments  by  reflection. 

I  am  wandering  by  the  river.  Why  should  the 
river  here  suddenly  pass  from  a  narrow  gorge  to  a 
wide-spread  plain  and  be  transformed  from  a  narrow 
to  an  expansive  stream?  And  why  should  the  turbu- 
lent waters  above  become  so  quiet  below? 

I  climb  a  rock  to  study  the  problem.  The  bluffs 
standing  back  from  the  river,  converge  at  this  point 
and  seem  as  if  they  would  join  hands  across  the  chasm 
through  which  the  river  plunges.  Here  the  bluff  is 
a  cliff  and  the  edges  of  sandstone  strata  outcrop  in 
the  escarpment,  and  I  observe  with  care  the  suc- 
cession of  rocks  from  the  bottom  to  the  top  of  the 
cliff.  But  a  robin  flies  down  and  perches  on  a 
willow  near  by,  and  in  an  instant  cliff  and  geology 
vanish  from  my  thought ;  I  see  a  turkis  egg  and  a 
nest  in  the  apple-tree  of  my  garden,  and  my 
daughter  is  shouting  a  song  of  childish  joy  in  my 
mind's  ear,  for  this  she  did,  not  many  weeks  ago. 


290  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

In  thought  I  am  at  home  once  more.  Then  home 
vanishes  and  I  see  the  robin  again  flitting  from 
bough  to  bough,  and  as  it  moves  my  eyes  follow  it 
until  it  is  in  a  line  between  myself  and  the  cliff,  and 
the  sight  of  the  cliff  brings  back  my  geologic 
problem.  I  see  the  red  sandstone  below,  the  brown 
shales  between  and  the  white  sandstones  above,  and 
recognize  the  succession  as  being  similar  to  one  seen 
before.  If  so,  the  summit  of  the  cliff  must  be 
crowned  by  a  limestone.  Yes,  there  is  the  limestone 
with  its  angular  outlines,  in  contrast  with  the  round 
reliefs  of  the  sandstone.  I  am  one  step  farther  in 
my  problem.  I  put  the  facts  of  the  succession 
together  and  say  this  is  a  Carboniferous  cliff.  I 
know  these  rocks. 

In  climbing  I  hear  a  noise.  In  an  instant  I  inter- 
pret it  as  the  voice  of  a  friend,  and  turning  about, 
find  I  am  right.  I  hasten  to  announce  my  discovery, 
but  he  holds  a  flower  aloft,  waving  it  in  triumph. 
That  wand  banishes  the  cliff  with  its  succession  of 
beds  from  my  mind,  and  I  see  a  bluebell  drooping 
from  its  delicate  stem  and  ringing  a  chime  of 
cerulean  beauty.  In  a  twinkling  of  an  eye  my  mind 
travels  a  thousand  miles,  and  I  am  climbing  the 
gray  sandstone  cliff  which  rises  in  the  midst  of  the 
valley  of  Illinois  river  and  is  known  as  "Starved 
Rock."  The  miles  my  soul  has  traveled  are  only 
equaled  by  the  time  over  which  it  has  returned.  I 
am  a  young  man  again,  and  I  burst  into  a  song: 

"It's  rare  to  see  the  morning  bleeze 
Like  a  bonfire  frae  the  sea." 

Why  do  I  sing  that  song?  It  was  on  my  tongue 
when  I  found  my  first  bluebell  on  "Starved  Rock." 


INTELLECTIONS  291 

My  friend  bids  me  follow  him.  At  one  moment 
I  am  thinking  of  the  cove,  at  another  I  am  listening 
to  the  voice  of  my  friend,  and  at  still  another  I  am 
watching  the  way  over  which  we  walk;  and  now 
and  then  my  mind  wanders  away  home  and  where 
not.  Now  my  attention  is  attracted  to  a  footprint 
in  the  sand.  From  its  shape  I  know  it  was  made 
by  a  deer.  Thus  I  make  an  inference  beyond  my 
perception.  The  track  is  the  sign  of  something 
else.  I  see  other  tracks;  they  are  arranged  along 
our  course  in  pairs  several  feet  apart.  By  this 
arrangement  I  infer  that  the  deer  was  leaping,  as  if 
fleeing  from  danger,  and  I  imagine  that  the  deer 
has  been  startled  at  our  approach.  This  is  an 
erroneous  inference,  for  my  friend  tells  me  that  he 
roused  the  deer  as  he  came  down  the  path  some 
time  ago.  And  as  we  still  walk  I  study  the  rocks, 
and  discover  that  a  limestone  forms  the  floor  of  the 
valley  below ;  and  then  I  discover  by  its  contained 
fossils  that  it  is  the  same  formation  as  the  one  which 
crosses  the  summit  of  the  cliff.  The  valley  lime- 
stone was  broken  from  the  cliff  limestone  and 
dropped  down  by  what  geologists  call  a  fault,  and 
the  fall  or  throw  of  the  fault  is  more  than  a 
thousand  feet.  And  now  I  discover  the  origin  of 
the  cascades  in  the  canyon  above  and  the  broad  and 
quiet  flow  of  the  river  below.  The  last  dropping  of 
the  sandstone  by  the  fault  decreased  the  declivity  of 
the  stream  in  the  valley  and  increased  the  declivity 
of  the  stream  above  the  valley,  where  it  comes  down 
through  the  canyon.  All  this  is  reasoning.  It  is  a 
series  of  judgments  controlled  by  will  for  a  course 
of  reasoning  on  a  theme  for  which  I  have  a  per- 
manent interest,  interrupted  by  a  multitude  of 


292  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

adventitious  judgments  that  are  made  by  reason  of 
temporary  interest. 

We  sit  down  by  the  spring  and  my  friend  spreads 
the  lunch  on  a  fallen  tree  trunk,  and  away  goes  my 
mind  to  the  bank  of  the  Grand  river  in  central 
Colorado,  and  I  see  a  prostrate  pine,  and  an  emerald 
lake  near  by,  and  on  the  shore,  cliffs  of  granite, 
and  beyond,  a  snow-clad  mountain,  and  about  its 
summit  the  gathered  clouds,  and  the  sheen  of  clouds 
and  snow-fields  blends  with  stretches  of  forest  and 
crags  and  peaks  of  towering  grandeur.  Years  ago 
I  was  there,  and  the  feast  on  this  log  brings  back  the 
feast  on  that  log,  with  its  attendant  glories  of 
mountain  scenery.  From  that  scene  I  am  called 
back  by  the  bidding  of  my  friend  to  eat.  Then  a 
bird  comes  down  to  the  fountain,  and  I  am  engaged 
in  watching  its  coy  advances  to  the  water.  And  so 
my  mind  passes  instantaneously  from  one  object  to 
another — now  engaged  in  observing  things  present, 
now  listening  to  the  voice  of  my  friend,  now  occupied 
in  expressing  my  thought  to  him,  now  calling  up 
some  scene  from  afar ;  but  ever  thinking.  On  goes 
the  stream  of  thought. 

I  eat  of  the  turnover,  and  observe  from  the  taste 
that  it  is  made  of  blackberries ;  and  then  I  think  of 
the  blackberry  patches  over  which  I  strayed  in  child- 
hood on  the  hills  of  southern  Ohio,  and  of  my  com- 
panion, Charles  Isham,  who  was  killed  at  the  battle 
of  Shiloh.  And  I  talk  of  battles,  till  my  friend  speaks 
of  bread  and  butter.  Thirst  causes  me  to  go  to  the 
spring,  and'  I  quaff  from  its  crystal  fountain,  and 
listen  to  the  jests  hurled  at  me  by  my  friend,  and 
laugh  at  his  wit.  Still  on  goes  the  stream  of 
thought. 


INTELLECTIONS  293 

We  have  eaten  the  lunch  and  gathered  the  plants, 
and  return  home.  On  the  way  a  sharp,  buzzing 
sound  thrills  me  with  horror.  I  know  it  as  the 
warning  of  a  rattlesnake.  It  is  a  familiar  sound  to 
me,  for  I  have  found  many  of  these  serpents  in  the 
wilderness.  I  look  about,  and  there  it  is,  coiled  in 
the  grass.  With  my  cane  I  strike  it  a  blow,  and  then 
another,  until  it  stretches  its  length  on  the  ground, 
dead.  From  the  inanimate  reptile  I  pluck  the  rattles. 
There  are  nine  on  its  tail,  which  it  was  wont  to  ring 
when  danger  approached — discordant  bells  whose 
ringing  is  a  symbol  to  the  woodsman  that  reptilian 
hell  is  lurking  near  the  pathway. 

We  have  reached  the  river  bank,  and  separate ;  I 
climb  about  it  in  search  of  fossils.  Soon  I  discover 
carboniferous  fossils  in  the  rock  at  the  foot  of  the 
cliff,  and  climbing  up  beside  the  stream  I  discover 
limestone  rocks  which  have  come  down  from  the 
summit  of  the  cliff,  and  see  the  same  fossils.  My 
explanation  of  the  origin  of  the  cliff,  the  rapid 
descent  of  the  river  from  above,  the  narrow  channel 
through  which  it  runs,  the  valley  below,  and  the 
broad  expanse  of  quiet  water,  is  verified.  Now,  in 
my  reasoning  about  the  fall  of  a  river  into  a  quiet 
reach,  I  used  concepts  of  form  in  the  nature  of  the 
channel,  and  concepts  of  form  in  the  structure  of 
the  rocks.  I  also  used  concepts  of  time  in  the 
succession  of  the  rocks,  and  I  reached  a  conclusion 
or  judgment  as  to  the  cause  of  the  rapid  which  was 
a  judgment  of  causation,  and  I  confirmed  this  judg- 
ment by  reaching  the  same  conclusion  from  the 
story  of  the  fossils  that  I  had  reached  from  the  story 
of  the  geological  structure ;  so  concepts  verify  con- 
cepts. On  careful  examination  it  will  always  be 


294  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

found  that  judgments  of  causation  are  verified  by 
the  congruence  of  concepts. 

The  stream  of  thought  is  composed  of  a  series  of 
widely  diverse  elements,  or  mentations,  that  are 
judgments,  all  differing  among  themselves.  Now, 
it  is  impossible  for  the  mind  to  dwell  on  any  one  of 
these  elements.  You  cannot  think  of  a  scratch  long ; 
the  mind  immediately  passes  to  something  else — 
another  sight  or  sound.  Consciousness,  which  is 
awareness  of  a  change  in  self,  is  the  absolute,  the 
independent  of  thought  and  that  on  which  inferences 
are  founded;  and  consciousness  is  awareness  of  a 
succession  of  impulses  on  self  or  by  self,  that  flow 
with  the  rapidity  of  thought  that  seems  almost  to 
vie  with  the  rapidity  of  air  collisions  in  sound. 
Hence  consciousness  is  serial,  and  inferences  are 
serial,  and  judgments  are  necessarily  serial;  but 
thought  must  go  on.  Gaze  into  the  eye  of  my  lady 
and  think  of  its  sapphirine  hue ;  in  a  moment  you 
think  of  something  else — the  sable  curtain,  the  coy 
glance,  perchance  the  cerulean  heaven,  or  the  deep 
blue  sea.  It  is  impossible  to  hold  your  mind  for 
more  than  a  moment  on  the  blueness  of  the  eye; 
the  thought  must  go  on.  But  on  to  what?  is  the 
question.  Tell  me  in  the  case  of  any  individual  the 
laws  which  govern  the  procession  of  his  thought, 
and  I  will  tell  his  name,  be  it  sage  or  fool.  There 
is  always  a  nexus  between  contiguous  elements  in 
the  stream  of  thought.  Sometimes  it  is  mere 
adventitious  association.  The  thing  seen  or  heard 
has  at  some  previous  time  been  associated  with 
something  else.  The  touch  is  associated  with  the 
mother's  stroke  on  childish  curls;  the  taste  of  that 
particular  fruit  is  associated  with  an  occasion  of 


INTELLECTIONS  295 

joy;  the  perfume  of  smoke  is  associated  with  the 
burning  forest;  the  song  is  associated  with  some 
scene  of  glee;  the  robin  is  associated  with  the 
cottage  home.  But  the  nexus  of  association  is  not 
always  adventitious.  It  is  often  controlled  by  an 
established  design.  With  the  fool,  adventitious 
relation  is  the  principal  nexus  of  thought  in  the  pro- 
cession; with  the  sage,  logical  relation  is  the  chief 
nexus. 

The  links  of  relation  in  the  chain  of  thought  are 
not  always  apparent  to  the  thinker  himself.  Steps 
in  the  procession  of  reasoning  are  often  canceled ; 
the  mind  passes,  by  great  bounds,  from  one  to 
another.  When  the  steps  in  the  course  of  logical 
reasoning  have  been  taken  many  times,  the  mind 
finds  it  unnecessary  to  tread  the  ground  again  and 
again,  with  slow  and  measured  pace,  but  it  springs 
from  point  to  point,  and  the  greater  reasoners  make 
the  greater  leaps.  This  is  a  fact  well  known  to 
scientific  men,  but  it  gives  to  the  procession  of 
mentations  those  characteristics  which  cause  the 
greatest  wonder  to  men,  and  which  have  led  to 
many  of  the  errors  of  psychology. 

By  reflecting  on  the  past  and  comparing  it  with 
the  present,  we  prophesy  of  the  future  and  often 
our  prophecies  are  confirmed.  By  day  we  prophesy 
of  the  night,  and  the  night  comes;  at  night  we 
prophesy  of  the  morning,  and  the  morning  comes. 
As  the  days,  weeks,  months,  and  years  go  by  we 
learn  by  experience  of  the  changes  wrought  in  self 
and  infer  changes  yet  to  be  wrought.  By  experience 
we  discover  the  changes  wrought  in  others,  and  by 
inference  judgments  are  formed  of  changes  yet  to 
be  wrought.  It  is  by  experience  that  -we  learn  of 


296  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

all  the  changes  in  environment.  The  skies  change ; 
the  seasons  change ;  the  river  was  low  yesterday,  it 
is  a  raging  torrent  today.  The  acorn  bourgeons 
with  leaflets,  it  sends  rootlets  into  the  earth  and 
stem  and  branch  into  the  air;  it  grows  from  week 
to  week,  month  to  month,  year  to  year,  and  under 
our  experience  it  becomes  a  tree.  The  child  is 
born,  it  grows  to  be  a  lad,  a  youth,  a  young  man,  a 
vigorous  adult,  an  old  man,  and  the  judgments 
formed  are  compounded  into  ideas  of  becoming.  It 
is  thus  by  reflection  that  a  vast  multitude  of  judg- 
ments are  compounded  into  ideas  of  the  changes 
wrought  by  time,  and  reflection  becomes  the  special 
process  of  cognizing  metagenesis.  As  on  the  wings 
of  perception  all  lands  are  viewed,  so  on  wings  of 
reflection  all  times  are  conned.  The  illimitable 
past  and  the  illimitable  future  are  all  painted  on 
the  canvas  of  now  by  the  artist  of  reflection. 
Things  that  have  been  and  things  to  be  are 
emblazoned  on  the  panorama  of  reflectional  concept. 

Thus  we  have  ideas  of  sensation  or  classification, 
ideas  of  perception  or  integration,  ideas  of  under- 
standing or  cooperation,  and  ideas  of  reflection  or 
history,  all  derived  from  the  germs  of  sense  impres- 
sion as  they  have  been  made  on  the  mind  of  the 
individual  in  moments,  hours,  days,  and  years. 

A  boulder  cannot  move  from  the  bank  into  the 
swift  channel  in  order  that  it  may  journey  down  the 
stream,  but  a  man  may  travel  from  the  distant  hill 
to  voyage  on  the  river.  The  leaf  cannot  flutter  in 
the  air  unless  the  air  is  sweeping  by,  and  the  air 
cannot  move  as  a  breeze  without  antecedent  con- 
ditions of  temperature.  Every  action  is  self-action 
and  every  passion  is  self-passion,  but  the  action  of 


INTELLECTIONS  297 

one  must  have  its  correlate  in  the  action  of  another, 
and  the  passion  of  one  must  have  its  correlate  in 
the  passion,  of  another.  In  this  respect  animate 
bodies  have  a  property  which  separates  them  from 
inanimate  bodies,  in  that  they  perform  actions 
which  are  self-directed,  and  in  that  they  have 
passions  that  are  self-chosen.  The  animal  may 
choose  to  enter  the  current  or  it  may  choose  to 
expose  itself  to  the  wind,  and  it  may  act  for  these 
purposes  by  placing  itself  under  the  proper  condi- 
tions. Heretofore  we  have  attempted  to  use  the 
term  activity  in  this  sense  as  a  chosen  act.  By  such 
activities  design  or  purpose  is  expressed.  I  see  a 
bird  fly  from  tree  to  tree  and  think  of  it  as  an 
activity  prompted  by  design.  I  see  a  leaf  blown 
from  one  tree  to  another  and  I  see  an  act  not 
determined  by  choice.  All  this  is  intended  to  make 
clear  the  distinction  between  activities  and  acts  and 
to  show  that  activities  are  manifestations  of  mind. 
The  animate  body  is  conscious  of  mind,  and  through 
the  manifestations  of ,  mind  with  others  it  is  led  to 
infer  that  they  also  have  minds. 

In  the  history  of  metaphysical  philosophy  the 
doctrine  of  presentative  and  representative  judg- 
ments has  undergone  some  strange  vicissitudes. 
The  distinction  seems  first  to  have  been  formulated 
by  the  terms  impressions  and  thoughts,  presentative 
judgments  being  called  impressions  and  representa- 
tive judgments  thoughts.  Spencer  refers  to  the 
same  distinction  when  he  speaks  of  vivid  impres- 
sions and  faint  impressions.  Others  have  considered 
presentative  judgments  as  instinctive  or  intuitive, 
for  such  judgments  are  often  made  instantaneously 
and  without  apparent  consciousness  of  previous 


2p8  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

judgments.  The  nature  of  intuition  we  have 
already  set  forth.  Kant  also  believes  that  repre- 
sentative judgments  are  controlled  by  forms  of 
thought  preexisting  in  the  mind  and  not  derived 
from  experience,  in  which  all  judgments  are  molded. 
He  supposes  the  mind  to  be  endowed  with  the 
knowledge  of  space  as  empty  space  and  of  time  as 
empty  time,  and  that  the  ego  fills  the  empty  space  and 
empty  time  with  forms  of  thought.  Thus  the  meta- 
physicians have  always  failed  to  discover  the  nature 
of  a  judgment  with  its  pentalogic  elements,  in  which 
both  consciousness  and  choice  appear  with  compari- 
son, which  completes  the  judgment.  They  also  fail 
to  discover  that  a  present ative  judgment  is  only 
initiated  by  a  sense  impression,  and  that  the  ego  must 
still  recall  past  impressions  in  a  concept  to  make 
the  judgment  complete,  and  they  also  fail  to  discover 
that  the  representative  judgment  is  initiated  by 
recalling  a  past  concept  and  comparing  it  with 
another  concept  of  past  judgments. 

I  see  a  worm  crawling  on  the  ground ;  the  worm 
causes  a  sense  impression.  I  might  stop  to  consider 
its  color  and  have  a  judgment  of  sensation,  or  I 
might  consider  its  form  and  have  a  judgment  of 
perception,  or  I  might  consider  its  motion  and  have 
a  judgment  of  understanding,  or  I  might  consider 
its  cause  as  an  egg  and  have  a  judgment  of  reflec- 
tion, or  I  might  consider  that  the  motion  itself  is 
directed  molar  motion  and  hence  manifests  mind  in 
the  worm ;  then  I  would  have  a  judgment  of  idea- 
tion. Any  one  of  these  judgments  can  be  made  from 
the  same  sense  impression,  and  my  interest,  my  pur- 
pose, my  choice  determines  the  nature  of  the  judg- 
ment made.  But  when  made  it  needs  verification. 


INTELLECTIONS  299 

If  the  judgment  as  a  sensation  is  valid  and  there  is  a 
color,  if  the  judgment  of  perception  is  valid  and 
there  is  a  form,  if  the  judgment  of  understanding 
is  valid  and  there  is  a  motion,  if  the  judgment  of 
causation  is  valid  and  there  is  an  object  developed 
from  an  egg,  then  there  is  left  for  consideration  the 
validity  of  the  judgment  of  ideation,  for  the  worm 
may  not  be  moving  by  its  own  volition  but  it  may 
be  dragged  by  an  ant.  Its  motion  must  be  due  to 
an  animate  and  designing  cause,  which  may  inhere 
in  the  worm  itself  or  in  another  which  is  unknown 
to  me,  for  it  is  molar  motion  caused  by  mind,  and  in 
order  that  I  may  verify  my  judgment  of  mind  in  the 
worm  I  must  determine  that  it  is  living  and  free 
to  use  its  own  judgment;  such  verification  comes 
only  by  the  comparison  of  concepts.  As  ideation 
is  the  compounding  of  concepts,  so  verification  in 
ideation  is  the  comparison  of  concepts. 

In  sensation,  perception,  understanding,  and 
reflection,  concepts  are  developed  by  the  consolida- 
tion of  judgments.  In  ideation  we  have  a  faculty 
by  which  judgments  are  added  to  judgments  to  con- 
stitute concepts  and  which  then  continues  its  power 
of  forming  judgments  by  combining  concepts  with 
concepts  and  forever  forming  new  concepts  thereby, 
while  at  the  same  time  the  power  thus  developed 
of  comparing  concepts  with  concepts  is  leading  to  a 
re-formation  of  the  concepts  themselves  by  the 
elimination  of  fallacies,  for  when  concepts  by  com- 
parison with  concepts  are  found  to  be  incongruous, 
the  mind  refuses  to  accept  them  as  valid  and  seeks 
for  the  source  of  error.  We  must,  therefore,  dis- 
cover the  means  by  which  concepts  are  compared 
with  concepts. 


300  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

We  must  now  shoulder  the  task  of  explaining  the 
laws  of  symbolism  or  association,  which  have  been 
assumed  from  time  to  time  and  partially  explained 
in  this  discussion. 

It  has  been  shown  how  concepts  are  formed  as 
groups  of  judgments  in  sensation,  perception, 
apprehension,  and  reflection,  and  how  ideas  develop 
simultaneously.  We  are  now  to  show  how  they  are 
compounded  with  one  another,  and  how  in  this 
process  incongruous  ideas  are  adjusted  by  the 
elimination  of  judgments  that  are  fallacies,  for  judg- 
ments must  ultimately  die  if  they  do  not  fit  in  their 
proper  places. 

That  which  I  have  sometimes  called  symbolism 
and  that  which  I  have  sometimes  called  association 
are  the  same  thing.  When  a  sensation  which  is 
the  result  of  a  sense  impression  caused  by  one 
attribute  of  a  body,  is  taken  as  a  symbol  of  the  body 
itself  with  all  its  attributes,  it  becomes  a  symbol  of 
all  with  which  it  is  associated.  When  a  sense 
impression  gives  rise  to  a  judgment  of  force  it  recalls 
many  other  judgments  of  force  and  thus  becomes  a 
symbol  of  other  things.  When  a  judgment  of  cause 
is  formed  it  also  becomes  a  symbol  of  other  causes. 
Sense  impressions  are  directly  used  by  the  mind  in 
this  manner  in  sensation,  perception,  apprehension, 
reflection,  and  ideation,  and  it  is  thus  that  ideas 
are  primarily  associated.  The  memories  of  judg- 
ments are  recalled  by  other  judgments,  as  we  have 
seen,  so  that  not  only  do  judgments  which  arise 
from  sensations  recall  other  judgments,  but  these 
other  judgments  recall  still  other  judgments,  and 
thus  there  is  recollection  in  the  second  degree ;  and 
these  revivals  may  go  on  from  degree  to  degree  to 


INTELLECTIONS  30! 

an  indefinite  extent.  All  of  these  facts  have  been 
illustrated. 

As  we  judge  by  comparing-  concepts  with  other 
concepts  or  with  impressions,  one  judgment  by  a 
faculty  is  associated  with  other  judgments  by  the 
same  faculty,  and  as  one  property  is  concomitant  with 
all  the  others,  one  property  becomes  a  symbol  of 
all  the  others,  so  that  there  is  association  by  com- 
parison of  concepts  and  association  by  symbolism. 
Hence  all  our  judgments  are  associated. 

The  quantitative  properties  are  the  reciprocals  of 
the  categoric  properties,  for  the  one  is  the  reciprocal 
of  the  many  which  compose  the  one.  The  one  is  a 
kind,  and  the  many  is  another  kind,  and  the  one  kind 
is  the  reciprocal  of  the  many  kinds.  So  the  one 
form  of  the  body  is  the  reciprocal  of  the  many 
extensions  of  the  particles.  The  one  motion  of  the 
body  is  the  reciprocal  of  the  many  motions  of  the 
particles,  hence  the  one  force  of  the  body  is  the 
reciprocal  of  the  many  motions  of  the  particles,  for 
the  force  of  the  body  is  the  reciprocal  of  the  motion 
of  the  particles.  The  one  time  of  the  body  is  the 
reciprocal  of  the  many  times  of  a  particle,  hence  the 
one  causation  of  the  body  is  the  reciprocal  of  the 
many  times  of  the  particles.  The  one  judgment  of 
the  body  is  the  reciprocal  of  the  many  judgments 
of  the  particles,  hence  the  one  concept  of  the  body 
is  the  reciprocal  of  the  many  judgments  of  the 
particles. 

Judgments  of  quantitative  bodies  are  reciprocal 
judgments  of  classific  bodies,  hence  they  are 
associated  by  reciprocality.  Judgments  of  one 
property  are  concomitant  with  judgments  of  another 
property,  therefore  they  are  associated  by  con- 


3O2  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

comitancy.  Now  judgments  associated  by  concomi- 
tancy  are  often  intuitive  in  the  sense  in  which  that 
term  is  used  here ;  so  judgments  associated  by 
reciprocality  are  often  intuitive.  But  there  are 
many  judgments  that  are  associated  not  by  con- 
comitancy  or  reciprocality,  because  they  are  chosen 
when  we  make  judgments ;  of  those  chosen  some  are 
volitional,  some  discursive.  The  discursive  associa- 
tions are  those  usually  recognized  as  such,  and  again 
we  have  association  by  kind  or  likeness,  by  form,  by 
force,  by  causation,  and  by  concept.  Thus  it  is  that 
the  ego  remembers  by  pentalogic  properties.  Thus 
association  is  the  law  of  memory. 

Units  are  associated  with  units,  numbers  with 
numbers,  kinds  with  kinds,  series  with  series,  classes 
with  classes,  and  all  are  associated  in  nature  and 
considered  in  classification.  Then  extensions  are 
associated  with  extensions,  spaces  with  spaces, 
forms  with  forms,  metamorphoses  with  meta- 
morphoses, organisms  with  organisms,  and  all  these 
are  interassociated  and  these  associations  are  con- 
sidered in  morphology.  Then  speeds  are  associated 
with  speeds,  motions  with  motions,  forces  with 
forces,  energies  with  energies,  powers  with  powers, 
cooperations  with  cooperations,  and  all  of  these 
modes  of  motion  are  interrelated  or  associated  and 
all  are  considered  in  dynamics.  Again  persistencies 
are  associated  with  persistencies,  times  with  times, 
causations  with  causations,  metageneses  with  meta- 
geneses,  developments  with  developments,  and  they 
are  all  interrelated  and  considered  in  evolution. 
Finally,  sensations  are  associated  with  sensations, 
perceptions  with  perceptions,  apprehensions  with 
apprehensions,  reflections  with  reflections,  and  idea- 


INTELLECTIONS  303 

tions  with  ideations,  and  all  are  considered  in  intel- 
lection and  are  represented  by  words.  Then  numbers, 
spaces,  motions,  times,  and  judgments  are  associated, 
and  kinds,  forms,  forces,  causations,  and  concepts 
are  associated,  and  the  quantitative  properties  are 
associated  with  the  categoric  properties.  There  is 
a  congeries  of  associations  in  which  all  of  the  con- 
tents of  the  mind  are  associated  as  fast  as  we  cognize 
the  bodies  of  the  universe  in  their  properties  and 
relations. 

Certain  special  associations  of  discursive  thought 
have  received  special  attention  and  various  attempts 
have  been  made  to  account  for  them,  while  the 
multitudinous  associations  of  thought  have  been 
neglected.  This  partial  discussion  of  the  subject 
has  led  to  the  classification  of  the  associations  of 
memory  and  two  laws  have  been  formulated: 
the  one  called  the  law  of  likeness,  and  the  other 
the  law  of  contiguity.  They  have  also  been 
formulated  as  three  or  more;  but  the  essential 
nature  of  association  has  failed  to  receive 
attention  because  the  five  associated  properties 
of  matter  have  not  clearly  been  understood;  all 
of  these  methods,  about  which  scarcely  two  psycholo- 
gists agree,  have  been  inadequate  to  properly  set 
forth  the  subject.  Especially  do  we  notice  that 
contiguity  in  space  has  been  confounded  with  im- 
mediate succession  in  time  by  the  habit  of  using  a 
word  with  two  meanings,  and  thus,  confounding 
succession  with  position.  Particularly  intensive 
associations  by  which  striking  events  are  recalled, 
because  of  the  deep  effects  made  on  the  mind,  have 
been  observed  by  thoughtful  men  for  more  than 
twenty  centuries.  In  moods  of  contemplation  a 


304  TRUTH   AND  ERROR 

judgment  recalls  some  remote  judgment  which  was 
startling  at  the  time,  and  as  we  go  on  from  moment 
to  moment,  recalling  a  multitude  of  things  by  a 
multitude  of  associations,  this  special  instance  is 
thrust  on  the  mind  and  we  stop  to  consider  it.  I 
see  a  rock  which  more  or  less  resembles  another 
which  I  once  saw  and  now  recall,  together 
with  an  event  which  at  that  time  made  an 
impression  on  my  mind;  a  man  fell  over  the 
cliff.  I  smell  the  odor  of  burning  brush  in  the  way- 
side field  and  T  suddenly  recall  the  odor  of  the  fire 
which  I  kindled  for  burning  brush-piles  on  my 
father's  farm.  I  taste  the  flavor  of  a  nut  and  I  recall 
the  time  when  I  threw  to  my  shouting  companions 
the  walnuts  from  a  wayside  tree.  Such  startling 
revivals,  often  repeated,  challenge  attention,  and 
though  thoughtful  men  have  given  much  attention 
to  the  phenomena,  it  has  resulted  in  a  very  imperfect 
psychology  of  association  and  symbolism. 

Once  more  the  attention  of  the  reader  is  called  to 
the  relations  which  exist  between  the  five  essentials 
and  which  are  then  found  in  the  five  properties, 
then  found  in  the  five  categories,  then  found  in  the 
five  properties  of  change,  then  in  the  five  properties 
of  life,  then  in  the  five  properties  of  mind.  Kinds 
are  not  alone  classified,  but  forms,  forces,  qualities, 
and  concepts  are  classified.  Morphology  considers 
not  only  forms,  but  it  also  considers  kinds,  forces, 
causes,  and  concepts.  Dynamics  considers  not  only 
forces,  but  it  also  considers  kind,  forms,  causes,  and 
concepts.  Evolution  considers  not  only  causes,  but 
it  considers  kinds,  forms,  forces,  and  concepts ;  and 
ideation  considers  not  only  concepts,  but  it  also 
considers  kinds,  forms,  forces,  and  causes,  and  the 


INTELLECTIONS  305 

difference  between  these  five  concomitants  is  the 
point  of  view  when  every  one  of  the  essentials  and 
its  derivatives  is  considered  abstractly.  As  they 
cannot  exist  abstractly,  the  mind  cannot  overtly  con- 
sider an  abstraction  without  tacitly  informing1  it 
with  concrete  existence. 

The  error  of  metaphysic  is  the  confounding  of 
abstraction  with  analysis  by  assuming  that  abstrac- 
tions have  separate  existence.  If  the  argument  has 
not  made  this  point  clear  it  has  failed  of  its  purpose. 
The  habits  of  thought  engendered  by  the  study  of 
abstract  mathematics  often  leads  the  mathematician 
into  the  very  same  pitfalls  into  which  the  meta- 
physician stumbles. 

The  manifestations  of  properties  are  symbols, 
because  one  becomes  the  representative  of  all  the 
others  in  the  body  manifested.  When  animate  beings 
develop  the  faculty  of  reading  these  symbols,  they 
are  said  to  be  able  to  read  the  expression  of  the 
emotions  and  are  themselves  expert  in  the  expres- 
sion of  emotions.  Gradually  these  expressions 
become  more  and  more  artificial  as  animals  advance 
in  culture,  until  at  last  a  conventional  language  is 
devised.  This  is  speech,  which  is  practiced  by  the 
lower  animals,  but  which  is  much  more  highly 
developed  in  man.  Natural  symbolism  thus  becomes 
conventional  symbolism,  and  words  are  signs  of  con- 
cepts. A  wholly  conventional  symbolism  is  thus 
devised,  the  symbols  being  symbols  of  concepts. 
Now,  men  practically  and  overtly  consider  their 
concepts  and  a  language  is  a  vast  reservoir  of  con- 
ventional symbols  used  for  this  purpose.  There  is 
no  human  language  so  crude  that  it  does  not  have 
tens  of  thousands  of  such  symbols,  which,  put  together 


306  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

in  propositions  or  sentences,  have  the  power  of 
expressing  all  the  judgments  which  the  people  who 
use  the  language  are  able  to  make.  We  now  see 
the  enormous  development  of  ideation  which  man 
has  accomplished  by  the  invention  of  language. 

A  judgment  is  expressed  in  a  proposition  by  con- 
ventional language.  Unfortunately,  in  grammar, 
subject  and  object  have  a  different  meaning  from 
that  which  they  have  in  psychology.  In  grammar 
the  subject  means  that  something  about  which  an 
affirmation  is  made,  and  the  predicate  means  that 
which  is  affirmed  of  the  subject,  while  object  has 
various  meanings  in  grammar.  Until  the  terms  of 
grammar  are  made  to  conform  with  the  terms  of 
psychology,  there  must  always  be  some  confusion. 
Formal  logic  is  the  logic  of  grammar,  and  the  pur- 
pose for  which  it  was  devised  was  success  in  dis- 
putation. Scientific  logic  is  the  logic  of  kinds,  and 
it  is  of  scientific  logic  that  we  speak  in  this  essay. 
The  logic  of  which  we  speak  is  the  logic  of  reason- 
ing, not  the  logic  of  grammar. 

The  methods  of  comparing  judgments  and  con- 
cepts are  innumerable,  and  every  judgment  is  an  act 
of  comparison,  and  we  are  forever  judging  for  the 
purposes  of  discovering  congruities ;  an  incongruous 
judgment  acts  upon  a  healthy  mind  as  a  moral 
irritant.  If  this  and  this  judgment  do  not  agree,  it 
is  an  evidence  of  ignorance  and  a  suggestion  of 
imbecility.  There  is  no  other  motive  that  clings  to 
man  so  long  as  the  desire  for  wisdom. 


CHAPTER  XX 

FALLACIES  OF  SENSATION 

The  certitudes  which  we  have  tried  to  demonstrate 
have  given  rise  to  a  host  of  fallacies  which  have 
played  a  strange  role  in  the  history  of  opinions  and 
which  from  time  to  time  have  vitiated  science  itself. 
Civilization  began  with  science  when  it  commenced 
with  verification  by  experimentation.  Verification 
soon  led  to  the  dissipation  of  fallacies ;  then  it  was 
discovered  that  things  are  something  more  than 
what  they  seem  to  be  to  our  simplest  judgments. 
Kinds  are  something  more  than  kinds,  they  arex 
forms;  forms  are  something  more  than  forms,  they  x 
are  forces ;  forces  are  something  more  than  forces,  v 
they  are  causations ;  in  animate  bodies  causations  are  x 
something  more  than  causations,  they  are  concepts.  ^ 
When  we  know  all  about  a  body  we  must  know  all 
of  its  properties  and  these  can  only  be  discovered 
by  investigation,  and  science  is  the  result  of  this 
investigation ;  but  before  we  acquire  knowledge  we 
entertain  fallacies.  The  early  philosophers,  discover- 
ing that  partial  knowledge  is  inadequate  to  the 
expression  of  the  whole  truth,  thought  to  characterize 
the  whole  truth  by  calling  it  noumenon,  and  they 
thought  to  characterize  partial  truth  by  calling  it 
phenomenon.  This  was  a  wise  and  legitimate  dis- 
tinction, but  the  time  came  when  certain  delusions 
were  held  to  be  sacred'and  a  belief  in  them  necessary 
to  a  good  life ;  so  they  thought  by  the  legerdemain  of 
language  to  prove  that  delusions  were  the  noumena 

307 


308  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

and  all  knowledge  only  phenomena.  But  scientific 
men  took  up  the  phenomena  or  unexplained  proper- 
ties of  bodies  and  by  investigation  increased  knowl- 
edge as  science,  and  reduced  phenomena  or  partially 
explained  properties  to  noumena  or  more  fully 
explained  properties.  To  a  great  extent  they 
dropped  the  term  noumenon  and  held  to  the  term 
phenomenon,  and  expressed  the  opinion  tacitly  or 
overtly  that  a  phenomenon  is  but  still  a  phenomenon 
whether  it  be  properly  or  improperly  explained,  and 
they  held  it  their  province  to  explain  phenomena  and 
they  called  the  explanation  of  phenomena,  science. 
In  modern  times  those  who  hold  that  noumena  are 
inexplicable,  that  is,  unknown  and  unknowable 
properties,  call  themselves  metaphysicians.  Those 
who  hold  that  phenomena  are  knowable  and  seek  by 
investigation  to  know  them,  call  themselves  scientists. 
Such  schematizing  of  philosophers  as  metaphysicians 
and  scientists  is  necessarily  imperfect,  for  some 
philosophers  are  both  metaphysicians  and  scientists. 
There  are  many  who  are  metaphysicians  when  they 
wear  their  holiday  dress,  and  scientists  when  they 
wear  the  garb  of  labor.  Metaphysical  reasoning  can 
be  more  clearly  demarcated  from  scientific  reasoning, 
for  scientific  reasoning  may  always  be  known  by  its 
demand  for  verification.  We  may  make  a  mistake 
in  sensation  because  of  its  obscurity  or  by  referring 
it  to  a  wrong  sense.  The  sense  impression  may  be 
obscure  itself,  as  when  a  sound  barely  passes  the 
threshold  of  consciousness,  or  a  sight  which  is 
obscure  by  reason  of  the  twilight,  or  it  may  be 
obscure  by  reason  of  preoccupied  attention;  thus  I 
may  fail  to  attend  to  a  sound  or  a  sight  because  my 
attention  is  elsewhere  engaged.  I  do  not  hear  the 


FALLACIES  OF  SENSATION  309 

speaker  because  I  am  attending  to  a  sight,  or  I  do 
not  see  a  sight  because  I  am  listening  to  what  another 
person  is  saying.  All  of  such  missensations  are 
easily  corrected  by  ordinary  methods  of  verification, 
but  often  we  neglect  them,  as  we  deem  them  of  no 
importance.  I  shall  call  all  such  errors  of  judgment, 
missensations,  and  group  them  in  a  higher  class 
which  I  shall  call  illusions. 

When  a  youth,  as  I  was  breaking  prairie  with  an 
ox  team,  my  labor  was  interrupted  by  a  rattlesnake, 
and  during  the  day  I  saw  and  killed  several  of  these 
serpents.  At  one  time  the  lash  of  my  whip  flew 
off.  In  trying  to  pick  it  up  I  grasped  a  stick.  The 
fear  of  being  bitten  by  a  snake  and  the  degree  of 
expectant  attention  to  which  I  was  wrought,  caused 
me  to  interpret  the  sense  impression  of  touch  as 
caused  by  a  rattlesnake.  This  was  a  missensation  of 
touch.  At  the  same  time  I  distinctly  heard  the  rattle 
of  the  snake ;  this  was  a  missensation  of  audition. 

I  make  a  distinction  between  a  sense  impression 
and  a ,  feeling  impression.  A  sense  impression  is 
one  made  upon  the  end  organ  of  a  sense  by  an 
object  exterior  to  the  body;  a  feeling  impression 
is  one  made  upon  an  organ  of  feeling  which  is 
metabolic,  circulatory,  motor,  reproductive,  or 
cognitional.  A  feeling  impression  arises  as  a 
result  of  the  functioning  of  the  organ  and  is  usually 
distinguished  as  being  subjective.  The  mind  may 
err  in  considering  a  subjective  impression  as  objec- 
tive, when  an  hallucination  will  be  produced.  We 
thus  divide  fallacies  of  sensation  into  two  groups, 
missensations  and  hallucinations.  Missensations  are 
easily  corrected ;  hallucinations  cannot  be  corrected 
while  the  person  who  makes  them  is  in  the  condition 


310  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

of  mind  tinder  which  they  originate,  for  they  are 
produced  under  abnormal  conditions  and  so  long  as 
these  conditions  prevail  similar  hallucinations  will 
occur,  for  hallucinations  occur  in  the  dream  state, 
the  intoxication  state,  the  disease  state,  or  other 
abnormal  states.  We  will  see  the  significance  of  this 
statement  when  we  proceed  to  discuss  hallucinations. 
Missensations  are  at  first  presentative  and  they 
remain  only  until  corrected  by  verification ;  hallucina- 
tions are  false  presentations  and  cannot  be  tested 
by  the  verification  of  the  persons  who  make  them. 
To  the  mind  that  forms  the  habit  of  believing  in 
hallucinations  they  come  to  the  persons  as  recog- 
nitions and  have  the  instantaneous  effect  of  recog- 
nitions. 

Here  we  must  distinguish  clearly  between  a  fallacy 
of  sensation  and  a  fallacy  of  feeling.  A  soldier  in 
the  suspense  which  precedes  the  battle,  when  sharp- 
shooters are  now  and  then  picking  off  a  man,  may 
have  his  gun  or  his  clothing  touched  by  a  rifle  ball 
and  in  the  suspense  of  the  occasion  may  imagine 
that  he  has  received  a  severe,  perhaps  a  deadly 
wound,  and  may  shriek  with  pain.  The  fallacy  of 
being  struck  is  a  fallacy  of  sensation,  but  the 
fallacy  of  having  pain  is  a  fallacy  of  feeling. 
Similar  cases  are  often  witnessed  on  the  frontier, 
where  men  experience  an  adventurous  life.  Now, 
we  are  not  treating  of  fallacies  of  feeling,  but  of  those 
of  sensation.  An  hallucination  is  the  antithesis  of 
the  one  -I  have  just  given;  it  is  the  error  which 
arises  by  interpreting  a  feeling  impression  as  if  it 
were  a  sense  impression;  but  a  fallacy  of  feeling 
consists  of  interpreting  a  sense  impression  as  a  feel- 
ing impression. 


FALLACIES  OF  SENSATION  31! 

In  a  former  chapter  it  was  explained  that  a  judg- 
ment of  intellection  is  a  judgment  of  the  cause  of  a 
sense  impression,  and  that  a  judgment  of  emotion  is 
a  judgment  of  the  effect  of  an  impression.  The 
feelings,  therefore,  tell  of  effects  upon  self,  and  the 
senses  tell  of  the  causes  of  these  effects.  This  dis- 
tinction is  important  to  a  clear  understanding  of  the 
nature  of  fallacies. 

Parish  has  assembled  a  great  body  of  "Hallucina- 
tions and  Illusions,"  which  are  in  convenient  form 
for  reference.  As  his  treatment  of  the  subject  is 
better  than  any  I  have  elsewhere  seen,  I  shall  liberally 
avail  myself  of  the  material  which  he  has  gathered. 
Notwithstanding  Parish's  disclaimer,  he  still  exhibits 
a  tendency  to  explain  psychological  phenomena  by 
a  reference  to  its  physiological  concomitant.  As 
there  can  be  no  psychology  without  its  concomitant 
physiology,  this  is  quite  legitimate,  but  the  practical 
conclusions  at  which  he  arrives  still  require  explica- 
tion in  terms  of  abstract  mind.  He  uses  a  geomet- 
rical scheme  for  the  purpose  of  setting  forth  the 
facts  of  physiology.  Such  a  scheme  may  have  an 
expositional  value  to  make  us  realize  the  facts  which 
have  been  discovered  in  the  anatomy  of  the  nervous 
system,  but  it  is  easily  abused.  We  know  that  the 
nervous  system  is  composed  of  ganglia  of  cells,  con- 
nected by  nerves  composed  of  bundles  of  fibers, 
and  that  the  ganglia  are  found  in  hierarchies 
connected  by  these  nerve  fibers,  which  finally 
terminate  in  the  organs  of  life,  where  they  are 
distributed  throughout  the  system,  and  also  at 
the  periphery,  where  they  terminate  in  end  organs 
supplied  with  various  mechanical  devices.  The 
nerve  fibers  that  connect  with  a  ganglion  are  not 


312  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

structurally  continuous  with  the  cells  of  the  ganglion, 
so  that  a  sense  impression  or  a  feeling  impression  is 
conveyed  from  one  ganglion  to  another  by  fibers 
which  are  discontinuous  at  the  ganglion.  This 
permits  of  a  shunting  or  diversion  of  an  impulse  in 
many  directions  through  the  nervous  system,  a 
ganglion  being  a  shunting  or  diverting  mechanism. 
The  paths  of  which  Parish,  together  with  many 
other  authors,  speaks,  are  the  fibers  and  cells.  Now, 
I  submit  that  a  simple  statement  of  the  fact  is  much 
more  readily  comprehensible  than  any  geometric 
scheme  which  any  physiologist  has  devised.  The 
concept  of  a  nervous  system  composed  of  sensory  and 
vital  organs  connected  by  nervous  fibers  with  nervous 
cells  for  a  shunting  apparatus,  is  one  easily  realized 
by  the  mind.  It  must  be  remembered  that  this 
discovery  was  not  available  until  of  late.  When  we 
come  to  explain  the  physiology  of  the  nervous 
system  we  must  explain  also  the  anatomy  of  the 
nervous  system,  and  finally  this  leads  us  to  an 
explanation  of  the  metabolism  of  the  nervous  sys- 
tem. Hence  conception  has  its  concomitants  in 
physiology,  anatomy,  and  metabolism,  and  as  the 
physiology  of  the  nerves  is  a  process  which  also 
involves  time  in  its  evolution,  we  may  characterize 
conception  in  terms  of  evolution,  physiology, 
anatomy,  or  metabolism,  but  a  psychologic  treatment 
of  the  subject  requires  that  the  conception  should 
ultimately  be  treated  in  terms  of  psychology.  I 
shall,  therefore,  treat  all  fallacies  in  terms  of 
psychology.  I  shall  assume  that  both  sense  impres- 
sions and  feeling  impressions  may  go  astray  in 
passing  from  the  end  organ  to  the  cortex,  because 
the  fibrous  nerves  are  not  structurally  connected 


FALLACIES  OF  SENSATION  313 

with  the  ganglionic  nerves,  so  that,  tinder  certain 
conditions,  they  may  be  directed  to  any  portion  of 
the  cortex  by  the  will  acting  normally  or  abnormally. 

Every  cell  in  the  human  body  is  a  seat  of  con- 
sciousness, while  the  nervous  system  is  the  organ  of 
inference.  All  the  bodily  organs  are  related  to  one 
another  through  the  structure  of  the  nervous  system, 
the  fibers  of  which  permeate  all  the  organs, 
collect  sense  and  feeling  impressions  from  them, 
and  transmit  them  by  fibrous  nerves  to  the  ganglionic 
nerves,  where  such  impressions  are  woven  into  con- 
cepts to  be  ultimately  returned  to  the  motor 
apparatus.  In  this  conception  I  suppose  that  an 
hallucination  involves  not  only  the  central  organ  in 
the  cortex,  but  it  also  may  involve  a  subordinate 
ganglion  or  an  organ  of  sense  or  feeling. 

We  have  divided  fallacies  of  sensation  into  missen- 
sations  and  hallucinations.  The  exposition  already 
made  relating  to  missensations  will,  perhaps,  be 
sufficient  for  practical  purposes,  but  hallucinations 
will  require  further  consideration. 

In  discussing  hallucinations  there  are  no  sense 
impressions  to  be  considered,  but  there  are  feeling 
impressions  which  are  interpreted  as  if  they  were 
sense  impressions.  The  interpretation  seems  always 
to  be  made  by  the  faculty  of  perception.  We  have, 
therefore,  to  discuss  hallucinations  as  false  percep- 
tion based  on  feeling  impressions;  consequently,  in 
order  to  consider  their  cause  in  feeling  impressions, 
we  shall  illustrate  by  instances  of  fallacious  percep- 
tions which  are  specters. 

Esquirol  distinguishes  hallucinations  from  illusions 
by  considering  hallucinations  as  *' subjective  sensory 
images"  which  arise  without  the  aid  of  external 


314  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

stimuli,  and  illusions  as  the  false  interpretation  of 
external  objects,  but  he  does  not  clearly  distinguish 
between  sensation  and  perception,  which  we  have 
attempted  to  make  clear.  In  the  same  manner 
Parish  has  fallen  into  confusion;  Sully  makes  the 
distinction  but  he  classifies  illusions  in  a  manner 
which  we  cannot  follow.  I  shall  therefore  treat 
the  subject  as  demanded  by  the  standpoint  obtained 
in  considering  the  five-fold  faculties  of  the  intellect 
as  hitherto  set  forth. 

In  sensation  we  hear  sounds  that  are  caused  by 
objective  bodies;  thus  a  bell  agitates  the  air  and 
we  hear  it,  but  we  may  have  a  disturbance  of  the 
physiological  function  of  the  ear,  due  it  may  be  to 
the  influence  of  a  drug  or  perhaps  to  a  disease  of 
the  organ.  Now,  such  a  subjective  impression  or 
functioning  of  an  organ  of  sense  we  call  a  feeling 
impression,  and  when  we  consider  it  to  be  objective 
we  hallucinate  or  have  an  hallucination. 

In  a  highly  nervous  state  men  mistake  the  motor 
feeling  of  speech  for  the  sound  of  speech,  as  if 
caused  by  another  or  objective  person.  A  subjec- 
tive irritation  of  the  skin  may  be  mistaken  for  the 
objective  crawling  of  an  insect  over  the  skin.  A 
polypus  in  the  nose  may  produce  a  disturbance  in 
the  function  of  the  nose  which  is  interpreted  as  an 
odor.  A  man  may  smell  paradisic  odors  or  mephitic 
stenches  by  reason  of  disease  in  the  olfactory  organ. 
In  the  same  manner  diseases  produce  hallucinations 
of  the  gustatory  sense. 

The  literature  of  hallucination  in  large  part  is  the 
literature  of  pathology,  although  the  occurrence  of 
hallucinations  has  often  been  recorded  in  biographic 
literature,  in  which  there  are  many  notable  examples. 


FALLACIES  OF  SENSATION  315 

Socrates  had  hallucinations  of  a  demon  who  fre- 
quently warned  him  of  impending  evil.  Savonarola 
saw  the  heavens  open  and  a  sword  appear  on  which 
was  the  inscription  Gladius  Domini  super  terrain. 
Luther  had  an  auditory  hallucination  when  on  the 
stairs  at  Rome  he  heard  the  words,  "The  just  shall 
live  by  faith. "  Cromwell  had  his  greatness  foretold 
him  by  an  apparition.  At  first  it  may  be  difficult  to 
state  whether  such  fallacies  are  hallucinations  proper 
or  only  missensations.  As  we  go  on  with  the  subject, 
however,  we  may  find  reason  to  believe  them  genuine 
hallucinations. 

When  a  patient  with  peritonitis  declares  that  a 
church  congress  is  being  held  inside  of  her  and  says 
that  she  can  feel  it  in  the  abdomen,  no  one  knows 
what  a  congress  in  such  a  locality  would  feel  like, 
but  the  patient  mistakes  it  for  a  sense  impression 
and  hence  it  is  an  hallucination.  Should  the  patient 
imagine  that  she  hears  the  speeches  of  the  contend- 
ing parties  in  the  congress,  then  of  course  there 
would  be  an  auditory  hallucination. 

A  so-called  census  of  hallucinations  has  been  made 
at  the  instigation  of  the  Society  for  Psychical  Research 
which  is  really  a  list  and  description  of  hallucinations 
which  have  occurred  in  recent  times  to  such  people  as 
the  promoters  of  the  enterprise  could  induce  to  tell  of 
them.  It  is  probable  that  there  is  no  person  who 
has  not  frequently  experienced  them.  Many  of 
these  are  now  on  record,  constituting  quite  a  body 
of  hallucinations.  The  purpose  for  which  these 
records  were  made  seems  to  have  been  the  desire 
to  prove  that  hallucinations  are  often  veridical  and 
hence  give  evidence  of  some  unknown  or  hitherto 
unrecognized  method  of  communicating  ideas,  except 


316  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

in  folklore,  when  such  communications  are  attrib- 
uted to  the  interference  of  disembodied  spirits  in  the 
affairs  of  mankind  or  an  extra  sense  called  telepathy 
by  an  organ  not  yet  discovered.  Those  who  believe 
in  ghostly  manifestations  will  find  abundant  evi- 
dence of  them  here,  while  those  who  believe  in 
telepathy  will  gain  confirmation  of  their  doctrines. 
In  the  meantime  those  who  still  hold  them  to  be 
hallucinations  or  specters  will  explain  them  as 
psychologic  errors. 

Parish  in  his  work  on  Hallucinations  and 
Illusions  considers  those  of  the  S.  P.  R.  catalogue 
with  others  which  have  been  recorded  by  medical 
experts  or  derived  from  general  literature.  He 
endeavors  to  show  that  all  hallucinations  and  illu- 
sions are  phenomena  of  dissociation.  Dissociation  is 
manifestly  abnormal  association,  and  association  is 
about  synonymous  with  conception  as  we  have  used 
the  terms. 

When  awake  we  may  have  hallucinations  when- 
ever our  nerves  are  unduly  excited  or  when  we  are 
in  any  abnormal  condition,  as  from  fatigue. 

Hallucinations  are  a  constant  phenomenon  of  ecstasy,  where 
they  arise  out  of  one-sided  mental  activity  and  intense  con- 
centration on  single  groups  of  ideas,  conjoined  with  lowered 
sensibility.  The  best  known  cases  are  those  of  religious 
ecstasy,  but  religious  ideas  do  not  invariably  furnish  the 
material  for  "ecstatic  vision."  Philosophers,  artists,  and 
others  whose  habit  of  mind  tends  to  deepen  certain  channels 
of  thought,  are  also  liable  to  such  visitations.  Any  and  every 
object  of  longing  or  desire,  no  matter  how  trivial,  grotesque, 
or  perverse,  may  become  the  object  of  ecstasy. — (P.  38.) 

Emanuel  Swedenborg  was  privileged  to  behold  God  himself. 
Engelbrecht  relates  how  he  was  carried  by  the  Holy  Spirit 
through  space  to  the  gates  of  hell,  and  then  borne  in  a  golden 
chariot  up  into  heaven,  where  he  saw  choirs  of  saints  and 


FALLACIES  OF  SENSATION  317 

angels  singing  round  the  throne,  and  received  a  message  from 
God,  delivered  to  him  by  an  angel. — (P.  39.) 

The  multitudinous  hallucinations  recorded  in  his- 
tory, like  that  of  the  demon  of  Socrates  and  those 
referred  to  in  the  former  part  of  this  chapter,  are 
probably  all  hallucinations  of  ecstasy.  Hallucina- 
tions are  fundamentally  classed  by  the  sense 
deceived.  Thus  we  have  gustatory,  tactual,  motor, 
auditory,  and  visual  hallucinations.  Of  gustatory 
and  olfactory  hallucinations,  Parish  says: 

Where  hallucinations  of  taste  have  been  noted  they  are 
mostly  nauseous  or  poisonous  (arsenic,  copper,  filth),  and 
frequently  give  rise  to  refusal  of  nourishment,  or  it  may  be 
to  continued  spitting.  In  the  early  stages  of  paralysis,  on  the 
other  hand,  gustatory  hallucinations  of  an  agreeable  nature 
are  sometimes  reported,  the  patient  perhaps  describing  the 
enjoyment  of  all  the  various  dishes  of  an  imaginary  menu. 
Olfactory  hallucinations  are,  on  the  whole,  infrequent,  and  are 
seldom  of  an  agreeable  character.  The  experiences  of  the 
patient  who  declared  he  smelt  all  the  perfumes  of  Arabia  and 
the  East  are  exceptional,  for  hallucinations  of  this  sense  are, 
generally  speaking,  associated  with  delusions  about  bodily 
foulness,  and  odors  of  corruption  and  corpses,  due  to  visceral 
disturbances.  Le"lut  reports  the  case  of  an  insane  woman  who 
declared  that  the  pestilential  odors  she  perceived  arose  from 
corpses  buried  in  certain  vaults  under  the  Salpetri£re.  Some- 
times, haunted  by  the  fear  of  being  murdered,  the  sufferer 
perceives  everywhere  the  fumes  of  charcoal,  noxious  gases, 
and  particles  of  poisonous  dust.  Olfactory  hallucinations  sel- 
dom appear  alone,  but  are  generally  associated  with  other 
sensory  fallacies.  Some  authors  consider  that  they  belong 
more  to  the  early  stages  of  insanity.  They  are  frequently 
found  in  association  with  local  disease  of  the  ovaries,  and  of 
the  reproductive  organs  in  general. — (Pp.  28,  29.) 

Fallacies  of  touch  seem  usually  to  be  represented 
by  hallucination  of  external  bodies  crawling  on  the 


3l  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

skin  when  in  fact  no  such  bodies  exist.     Hallucina- 
tions of  insects,  mice,  and  snakes  are  frequent. 

There  is  not  much  to  note  concerning  hallucinations  of  the 
tactile  sense.  .  .  . 

It  is  only  when  a  darkened  intelligence  "seizes  upon  them  as 
a  basis  for  a  new  conception  of  the  ego  and  the  environment, ' ' 
that  they  become  of  primary  significance.  But  such  signifi- 
cance may  always  be  attributed  to  an  hallucination  of  either  of 
the  higher  senses,  though  opinion  is  divided  as  to  which  of 
these  two  senses  plays  the  greater  part. — (Pp.  29,  30.) 

Hallucinations  of  pressure  are  more  common  than 
those  of  touch.  In  the  dream  state  the  walls  of  the 
building  of  a  room  may  seem  to  contract  until  the 
sleeper  is  in  a  nightmare  of  trouble  with  the  com- 
pression. These  hallucinations  are  also  common  in 
certain  diseased  conditions. 

Hallucinations  of  audition  are  very  commonly 
caused  by  inflammation  of  the  inner  ear. 

The  sufferer  hears  taunting  or  insulting  voices  calling  after 
him  in  the  street,  and  making  injurious  insinuations  about  him, 
or  sometimes  unseen  speakers  incidentally  let  fall  words  which 
confirm  his  forebodings. — (P.  23.) 

A  kind  of  auditory  hallucination  worthy  of  special  note  is 
"audible  thinking,"  wherein  the  patient  hears  his  own  thoughts 
spoken  aloud,  and  imagines  that  they  can  be  heard  by  every- 
body, or  else  hears  them  repeated  or  dictated  to  him  by  an 
imaginary  being.  Fallacious  perceptions  of  the  other  senses 
are  also  not  uncommon.  Many  sufferers  see  the  persecutors 
who  torment  them  from  a  distance  by  means  of  magnetic  and 
electrical  apparatus.  They  entertain  kings  and  princesses, 
and  receive  angels'  visits ;  all  these  hallucinations  occur  in  a 
state  of  full  consciousness. — (P.  24.) 

Gall  relates  the  case  of  a  minister  of  state  who  constantly 
heard  insulting  words  whispered  into  his  left  ear ;  and  in  the 
more  recent  literature  of  the  subject  such  examples  are  no 
longer  rare.  According  to  Krafft-Ebing,  the  unilateral  voices 


FALLACIES  OF  SENSATION  319 

are  heard  better  when  the  other  ear  is  closed — when,  for 
instance,  the  patient  is  lying  on  it. — (P.  32.) 

While  walking  alone  she  hears  a  voice  calling  her,  she  turns 
round,  there  is  no  one.  While  she  is  at  her  work  familiar 
voices  speak  in  her  ear.  She  hears  them  on  both  sides,  but 
chiefly  on  the  right. — (P.  35.) 

Hallucinations  are  ...  a  frequent  cause  of  violent  and 
criminal  acts ;  for  instance,  in  hallucinatory  insanity,  epilepsy, 
hysteria,  and  somnambulism,  and  especially  in  delirious  states 
(alcohol,  morphia,  cocaine,  and  typhus-delirium).  Thrown 
into  a  paroxysm  of  terror  by  the  phantoms  which  threaten 
him,  or  obsessed  by  his  "voices,"  the  sufferer  snatches  up  a 
weapon  and  perhaps  commits  a  murder  or  sets  fire  to  the  house. 
Or,  again,  despairing  of  escape  from  the  enemies  who  pursue 
and  mock  him,  he  puts  an  end  to  his  sufferings  and  his  life  at 
the  same  time,  and  often  in  a  skilful  and  cunningly  planned 
manner. — (P.  34.) 

Tactual,  auditory,  and  visual  hallucinations  most 
frequently  occur  on  the  hemianesthetic  side. 

Hallucinations  of  vision  are  more  common  than 
those  of  any  other  sense. 

Thus  Herr  Von  M told  me  that  when  taking  his  usual 

afternoon  walk  he  used  to  see  regularly  on  reaching  a  certain 
spot  the  head  of  the  squadron  returning  from  their  daily 
exercise,  and  crossing  the  street  at  some  little  distance  in  front 
of  him.  One  day  when  he  had  seen  this  as  usual  it  occurred  to 
him  to  wonder  why  the  rest  of  the  troops  did  not  follow,  and 
he  soon  discovered  that  the  cavalry  he  had  seen  on  this 
occasion  were  phantoms. — (P.  190.) 

Some  years  ago,  a  friend  and  I  rode — he  on  a  bicycle,  I  on  a 
tricycle — on  an  unusually  dark  night  in  summer  from  Glenda- 
lough  to  Rath  drum.  It  was  drizzling  rain,  we  had  no  lamps, 
and  the  road  was  overshadowed  by  trees  on  both  sides, 
between  which  we  could  just  see  the  sky-line.  I  was  riding 
slowly  and  carefully  some  ten  or  twenty  yards  in  advance, 
guiding  myself  by  the  sky-line,  when  my  machine  chanced  to 
pass  over  a  piece  of  tin  or  something  else  in  the  road  that  made 
a  great  crash.  Presently  my  companion  came  up,  calling  to 


320  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

me  in  great  concern.  He  had  seen  through  the  gloom  my 
machine  upset  and  me  flung  from  it. — (Pp.  191,  192.) 

Gregory  mentions  the  case  of  a  patient  in  whom  the  seizure 
was  always  preceded  by  the  apparition  of  a  hideous  old  woman 
in  a  red  cloak,  who  advanced  and  struck  him  on  the  head  with 
her  cane,  whereupon  he  fell  to  the  ground  in  convulsions.  In 
another  case  the  devil  appeared  in  a  shadowy  form.  Some- 
times the  apparitions  are  less  frightful.  Conolly  tells  of  a 
patient  who  saw,  in  the  last  few  moments  before  loss  of  con- 
sciousness, pleasant  landscapes  spread  out  before  him. — (P.  33.) 

For  example,  the  commonest  visual  hallucinations  (in  which 
black  and  red  play  a  leading  part)  are  black  rats,  cats,  snakes, 
and  spiders,  shining  stars,  fiery  spheres,  and  so  on.  But  these 
do  not  remain  motionless.  Either  they  go  diagonally  across 
the  patient's  field  of  vision,  in  which  case  they  proceed  from  the 
hemianaesthetic  side;  or  else  (generally)  they  come  from  be- 
hind the  patient,  hasten  past,  and  disappear  in  the  distance. 
In  this  case  also  the  apparitions  occur  on  the  hemianaesthetic 
side.  .  .  These  premonitory  hallucinations  haunt  the  sufferer 
even  by  day,  but  in  the  night  they  become  much  more  per- 
sistent and  vivid,  and  what  was  only  a  passing  vision  before, 
develops  into  a  long  scene,  in  which  the  patient  is  called  upon 
to  take  a  part. — (P.  35.) 

Sufficient  illustrations  have  perhaps  been  given 
to  exhibit  the  fundamental  classification  of  hallucina- 
tions. Were  I  writing  a  treatise  on  hallucinations 
rather  than  a  condensed  account  of  the  subject,  every 
class  should  be  sub -classified  by  the  agency  through 
which  they  are  produced.  This  classification  would 
give  us,  (i)  the  hallucinations  of  dreams,  (2)  the 
hallucinations  caused  by  subverted  sensation  or 
ecstasy,  under  which  are  included  the  phenomena  of 
crystal  vision,  (3)  the  hallucinations  of  suggestion 
or  hypnotism,  (4)  the  hallucinations  of  intoxicants, 
(5)  the  hallucinations  of  disease. 

In  sleep  the  senses  are  dormant  while  the  func- 
tions of  life  continue.  Sense  impressions  are  only 


OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY 

FALLACIES  "&FSENSATION  32! 

instantaneous,  but  feeling  impressions  endure  as 
long  as  the  cause  acts,  although  they  may  become 
dulled  by  repetition  or  unrecognized  by  habit.  It  is 
well  known  that  a  sense  impression  may  give  rise  to 
a  feeling  if  it  is  too  intense.  It  is  an  old  doctrine 
of  psychology  that  sensation  is  inversely  proportional 
to  feeling,  and  it  remains  true  to  this  extent,  that  a 
sense  impression  may  be  neglected,  that  is,  we  may 
not  consider  the  cause  though  we  may  consider  the 
effect,  when  the  impression  will  give  rise  to  a  feel- 
ing. In  the  dream  state  sensation  lies  dormant 
and  feeling  has  the  psychic  field  to  itself. 

In  sleep  sense  impressions  frequently  impinge 
upon  the  organs:  lights  appear  in  the  darkened 
room,  sounds  are  made  which  produce  some  slight 
effect  upon  the  ear,  and  to  the  sleeping  person  there 
come  many  tactual  impressions,  all  of  which  are 
interpreted  as  feelings  and  produce  hallucinations 
because  feelings  are  so  intimately  associated  with 
external  objects ;  these  are  feeling  hallucinations. 

On  the  other  hand  if  on  a  cold  night  the  clothing 
is  partially  removed  from  the  body  the  feeling  of 
discomfort  is  quite  likely  to  produce  an  hallucination. 
Drops  of  water  falling  upon  the  face  of  the  sleeper 
may  have  the  same  effect. 

The  bedcover  pressing  on  the  arm  is  embraced  as  a  mistress 
or  felt  as  a  heavy  weight ;  a  dream  of  being  impaled,  that  is  to 
say,  of  standing  on  a  stake,  the  point  of  which  was  thrust 
through  the  foot,  has  been  known  to  arise  from  the  pressure  of 
a  straw  lodged  between  the  toes ;  a  covering  which  has  slipped 
to  the  ground  is  sometimes  a  source  of  great  embarrassment, 
when  it  causes  us  to  dream  of  appearing  half  clad  in  the  street 
or  at  a  social  gathering ;  or  it  may  call  up  visions  of  skating, 
Alpine  travels,  Polar  expeditions,  and  these  again  may  sud- 
denly end  in  the  feeling  of  falling  into  a  gulf,  due  to  a  slight 


322  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

alteration  of  the  sleeper's  position  in  bed.  Gregory,  when  he 
had  a  hot-water  bottle  at  his  feet,  dreamed  that  he  was  climb- 
ing Etna  and  walking  on  hot  lava.  Purkin je  says :  "If  our 
hand  has  become  numb  by  pressure,  in  the  dream-state  it  may 
appear  as  something  strange  and  gruesome  touching  us,  and  if 
the  whole  side  is  affected,  we  imagine  that  a  strange  bedfellow, 
whom  we  cannot  get  rid  of,  is  stretched  beside  us. — (Pp.  54,  55.) 

The  influence  of  position  during  sleep  is  generally  exhibited 
in  one  of  the  following  ways:  (i)  The  position  of  a  member 
may  be  perceived  more  or  less  correctly,  but  suggest  an  atti- 
tude; for  instance,  if  the  foot  is  stretched  and  bent  back  it 
suggests  the  dream  of  standing  on  tip-toe  to  reach  something ; 
(2)  the  strained  position  may  be  taken  to  be  part  of  a  move- 
ment and  the  dreamer  seem  to  be  dancing  on  his  toes;  (3)  the 
movements  may  appear  to  be  executed  by  some  one  else;  (4) 
sometimes  the  movements  seem  to  be  impeded;  (5)  the 
affected  member  may  be  changed  in  the  dream  into  some  animal 
or  inanimate  object  of  analogous  form;  (6)  sometimes  the 
dream-perception  of  the  member  gives  rise  to  abstract  ideas, 
which  it  symbolizes;  for  instance,  the  perception  of  several 
fingers  may  give  rise  to  dreams  of  numbers  and  calculations. 
-(P-  55-) 

A  mustard  plaster  on  the  head  may  cause  a  man 
to  dream  of  an  Indian  conflict  in  which  he  is 
scalped,  as  I  have  observed. 

Thus  Herrmann,  when  suffering  from  an  attack  of  colic, 
dreamed  that  his  abdomen  was  opened,  and  an  operation  per- 
formed on  the  sympathetic  nerve.  Others  dream  of  going  up 
for  examinations.  The  house-wife  dreams  she  is  giving  a 
party,  and  that  all  her  dainties  are  burnt  up,  and  so  on. — 
(P.  56.) 

An  individual  directed  his  servant  to  sprinkle  his  pillow 
sometimes  after  he  was  asleep  (leaving  the  choice  of  the  par- 
ticular night  to  the  servant)  with  a  perfume  which  he  had  only 
used  during  a  certain  stay  in  the  country,  but  to  which  he  had 
then  taken  a  great  fancy.  On  those  nights  he  visited  again  in 
his  dreams  the  scenes  associated  in  his  mind  with  the  perfume. 
The  occurrence  of  imaginary  tastes  and  smells  in  dreams  is 
very  rare,  so  much  so  that  it  has  been  altogether  denied  by 


FALLACIES  OF  SENSATION  323 

many  observers.  Still  a  few  cases  have  been  reported. — 
(P-  54-) 

Hallucinations  of  ecstasy  often  arise  with  persons 
engaged  in  profound  abstract  thought.  Philosophers, 
poets,  literary  men,  generals,  and  divines  are  pecu- 
liarly subject  to  them.  Extreme  ethical  emotions  are 
apt  in  begetting  hallucinations.  It  is  through  all  of 
these  cases  that  the  world's  literature  is  replete  with 
accounts  of  hallucinations.  Perhaps  every  great 
man  has  had  them. 

We  have  abundantly  affirmed  and  illustrated  the 
doctrine  that  sense  impressions  are  instantaneous, 
and  the  judgments  which  we  form  from  sense 
impressions  are  instantaneous,  while  feeling 
impressions  endure  while  the  cause  acts.  It 
is  possible  for  us  to  concentrate  the  attention 
upon  the  impressions  received  by  one  organ, 
but  if  we  fixate  the  attention  on  an  interrupted  suc- 
cession of  like  impressions  we  overthrow  or  subvert 
judgment.  As  we  must  at  every  instant  go  on  to 
form  a  new  judgment,  the  supposed  concentration  of 
attention  sets  the  mind  adrift  to  follow  feeling 
impressions  wherever  they  may  lead.  This  sub- 
verted sensation  I  call  ecstasy. 

We  make  a  multitude  of  judgments  of  recognition 
at  one  glance  of  the  eye  about  the  room  which  we 
occupy,  or  over  the  landscape  when  we  are  out  of 
doors.  Now,  if  we  can  fixate  the  attention  of  the  eye 
or  the  ear  and  abstract  the  mind  from  all  other  sense 
impressions,  hallucinations  may  be  produced.  This 
secret  has  been  an  open  one  to  those  who  have 
practiced  divination  in  the  departed  centuries. 
There  is  a  vast  body  of  literature  on  the  subject, 
though  it  relates  chiefly  to  the  abstraction  of  vision. 


324  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

Even  as  I  write,  the  boys  on  the  street  are  crying" 
the  New  York  papers  and  tempting  purchasers 
with  stories  of  divination  by  crystal  vision. 

In  crystal  vision  the  percipient  attempts  to  occupy 
his  mind  in  the  contemplation  of  a  constantly 
renewed  sense  impression,  while  the  mind  in  fact  is 
recalling  concepts  from  memory  which  he  ascribes 
to  hallucinatory  objects  in  the  glass;  that  is,  he 
forms  judgments  of  things  not  seen  but  remembered 
by  suggestion  from  feeling  impressions.  We  may 
express  this  idea  in  still  another  way.  In  crystal- 
vision  experiments  the  mind  of  the  percipient  is 
engaged  in  recalling  memories  which  may  be 
determined  by  the  feelings  or  may  arise  at  random, 
for  it  is  impossible  for  the  waking  mind  to  cease 
operations.  As  the  thing  expected  or  looked  for  in 
the  glass  does  not  appear,  these  memory  images  are 
projected  into  the  glass. 

The  percipient  strives  to  banish  all  conscious  thought  from 
his  mind,  and  fixes  his  gaze  continuously  on  a  "Braid's 
crystal,"  a  burning  glass  in  a  dark  frame,  a  glass  of  water  or 
some  similar  reflecting  object.  Many  persons  after  gazing 
thus  for  some  time  begin  to  see  pictures  in  the  crystal,  the 
spire  of  the  parish  church  perhaps,  or  familiar  faces. — (P.  63.) 

An  eye-witness  relates  the  following  anecdote  of 
an  occurrence  in  Egypt : 

His  curiosity  was  excited  by  Mr.  Salt,  the  English  Consul- 
General,  who,  on  suspecting  his  servants  of  theft,  sent  for  a 
magician.  Mr.  Salt  himself  selected  a  boy  as  seer,  while  the 
magician  occupied  himself  with  writing  charms  on  pieces  of 
paper  which,  with  incense  and  perfumes,  were  afterwards 
burned  in  a  brazier  of  charcoal ;  then,  drawing  a  diagram  in 
the  boy's  right  palm,  into  the  middle  of  which  he  poured  some 


FALLACIES  OF  SENSATION  325 

ink,  he  bade  him  look  fixedly  into  it.  After  various 
visions  had  come  and  gone,  the  form  of  the  guilty  person 
appeared  to  the  boy,  and  was  recognized  by  the  description  he 
gave.  On  being  arrested,  the  thief  thus  strangely  convicted 
confessed  his  crime.— (P.  64.) 

Just  as  visual  images  may  be  called  up  by  gazing  on  a  shin- 
ing object,  so  by  placing  a  sea-shell  to  the  ear  it  is  possible  to 
induce  auditory  hallucinations.  I  therefore  class  such 
hallucinations  with  crystal  visions,  which  they  resemble  in 
their  content.  This  analogy  is  borne  out  by  cases  like  that  of 
the  lady  who,  if  she  listened  to  the  shell  after  a  dinner-party, 
generally  heard  repeated,  not  the  conversation  of  her  "lawful 
interlocutor"  to  which  her  attention  had  been  directed,  but  the 
talk  of  her  neighbors  on  the  other  side,  which  she  had  not 
consciously  noted  at  the  time.— (P.  70.) 

All  modes  of  ecstatic  hallucination  are  of  this 
character.  It  is  the  abstraction  of  attention  to  the 
particular  object  while  waiting"  for  a  judgment  of 
cognition  or  recognition  to  come  through  the  intel- 
lectual faculties,  while  instantaneous  judgments  con- 
tinue to  be  made  through  the  emotional  faculties. 
The  consideration  of  this  fact  leads  us  to  restate 
that  which  may  seem  already  to  have  been  abun- 
dantly affirmed,  that  the  vital  organs  of  metabolism, 
circulation,  motility,  and  reproduction  are  the  end 
organs  of  feeling,  while  in  the  nervous  system  we 
find  organs  of  feeling  and  intellection. 

The  third  class  of  hallucinations  comes  from  the 
land  of  suggestion.  Much  of  the  intellectual  activity 
of  mankind  is  acception,  or  the  receiving  of  judg- 
ments made  by  others  through  the  agency  of  speech ; 
words  are  heard  or  seen  that  express  judgments 
which  we  accept  as  valid.  So  much  of  intellectual 
life  is  of  this  character  that  we  are  trained  in  the 
ability  of  acception.  This  ability  runs  astray  with 
some  persons  because  there  goes  not  with  it  the 


326  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

habit  of  constant  verification.  The  speech  of  human 
beings  must  be  verified  in  the  same  manner  that 
natural  language  in  presentation  and  representation 
must  be  verified.  He  who  accepts  the  judgments  of 
others  without  intellectual  verification  is  eminently 
qualified  for  hypnotic  suggestion. 

There  are  some  people  so  nai've  in  their  inter- 
pretation of  expressed  judgments  as  to  suppose  that 
what  is  told  them  must  be  either  truth  or  falsehood, 
not  being  able  to  distinguish  a  fallacy  from  a  lie. 
This  simplicity  in  weighing  the  judgments  of  others 
is  highly  conducive  to  the  development  of  hypnotic 
intellects. 

Frau  U.,  an  innkeeper's  wife,  forty-five  years  of  age,  an 
extremely  suggestible  subject  (so  much  so  that  while  awake  a 
mere  assurance  that  she  could  not  move  her  limbs  deprived  her 
of  all  power  of  movement),  was  hypnotized  by  me,  and  the 
post-hypnotic  suggestion  given  that  each  time  A. ,  who  was  pres- 
ent, should  cough,  a  fly  would  alight  on  her  brow.  The  hal- 
lucination was  realized ;  at  each  cough  of  A.  's  she  raised  her 
hand  to  her  forehead  and  looked  up  into  the  air  as  though 
watching  a  fly.  This  did  not  prevent  her,  however,  from  con- 
tinuing with  animation  her  conversation  with  me  on  the 
preparations  for  her  daughter's  approaching  marriage.  Her 
prompt  reaction  to  suggestions  given  in  ordinary  life  rendered 
her  post-hypnotic  suggestibility  valueless  as  a  test  of  her  state 
of  consciousness. 

Bernheim  communicates  the  following  case  of  a  young  girl, 
of  unusual  intelligence,  and  free  from  hysterical  tendency:  I 
arranged  that  on  waking  she  should  see  an  imaginary  rose. 
She  saw  it,  touched  and  smelt  it,  and  described  it  to  me ;  but 
knowing  that  I  might  have  given  her  a  suggestion,  she  asked 
me  if  the  rose  was  a  real  or  imaginary  one,  adding  that  it  was 
quite  impossible  for  her  to  tell  the  difference.  I  told  her  that 
it  was  imaginary.  She  believed  me,  and  yet  found  that  by  no 
effort  of  the  will  could  she  make  it  disappear.  "I  can  still  see 
and  touch  it,"  she  said,  "as  though  it  were  natural;  and  if  you 


FALLACIES  OF  SENSATION  327 

were  to  show  me  a  real  rose  beside  it,  or  instead  of  it,  I  should 
not  be  able  to  tell  the  one  from  the  other."  All  this  time  she 
was  thoroughly  awake,  and  talked  quietly  with  me  about  the 
apparition. — (P.  62.) 

In  a  former  chapter  it  was  stated  that  the  cor- 
puscles of  the  blood  are  unicellular  organisms  and 
that  the  red  corpuscles  are  built  into  the  system,  so 
that  every  part  is  composed  of  unicellular  organisms. 
Each  of  these  organisms  is  endowed  with  the  rudi- 
ments of  life  and  mind  which  they  take  with  them 
into  the  human  system.  The  phenomena  of  hypno- 
tism reenforce  the  discoveries  of  physiology  and 
confirm  the  doctrine  that  the  entire  body  is  the  seat 
of  consciousness  and  that  the  nervous  system  con- 
stitutes the  special  apparatus  of  inference.  This 
leads  us  to  a  theory  of  multiple  seats  of  conscious- 
ness which  is  demonstrated  by  the  phenomena  of 
hypnotism,  a  tempting  subject  which  we  are  com- 
pelled to  ignore  by  reason  of  the  limitations  of  our 
argument. 

Hallucinations  caused  by  intoxicants  are  well 
known.  Those  occurring  through  the  immoderate 
consumption  of  alcoholic  drinks  are  most  common. 

The  hallucinations  .  .  .  are  generally  of  a 
depressing  nature,  and  terrifying  impressions  predominate. 
True,  sweet  voices  are  sometimes  heard,  melodies  delight  the 
ear,  and  fair  landscapes  appear  before  the  eyes,  but  this  sel- 
dom lasts  long,  monsters  and  serpents  take  the  place  of 
flowers,  and  the  visions  shift  about  and  are  mingled  together. 
Vermin,  reptiles,  etc.,  appear  in  great  numbers,  such  for 
instance  as  the  rats,  cats,  snakes,  mice,  and  monkeys,  which 
fill  the  visions  of  delirium  tremens.  Thus  Brierre  de  Boismont 
found  among  twenty-one  cases — three  of  them  severe — twenty 
in  which  hallucinations  of  vermin  and  such  creatures  were 
seen  swarming  over  the  bed  and  up  the  walls.  Other  sensory 


328  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

delusions  of  a  purely  fantastic  nature  are  not  lacking.  Some- 
times black  men  appear  who  grimace  and  threaten,  then  climb 
the  walls,  or  vanish  up  the  chimney.  In  other  cases  the 
visions  arise  out  of  the  daily  occupations  of  the  patient,  or  out 
of  his  past  experience. — (Pp.  41,  42.) 

In  addition  to  alcoholic  beverages  many  drugs 
produce  hallucinations,  as  opium,  hashish,  santonin, 
etc.  Among  the  tribes  of  the  western  plains  of  the 
United  States  a  cactus  known  as  peyote  is  widely 
used  in  their  religious  rites.  The  plants  themselves, 
when  made  into  decoctions  or  when  eaten  as  dried 
fruit,  produce  a  variety  of  effects,  among  which  are 
those  of  color  vision.  Dr.  Theodate  Smith,  an  expert 
in  experimental  psychology,  has  furnished  me  with 
the  following  memoranda  of  an  experiment  on  her- 
self in  the  use  of  the  peyote.  Earlier  trials  produced 
in  part  very  disagreeable  effects  and  in  part  exces- 
sive motor  excitement,  but  after  repeated  trials 
color  visions  came  only  when  she  placed  herself 
under  some  restraint  from  motor  activity ;  then  there 
appeared  a  set  of  retinal  effects  in  a  succession  of 
dissolving  views  which  she  described  to  an  attendant 
who  was  charged  with  making  a  record  of  her 
words. 

The  following  is  an  extract  from  this  record: 

Branches  of  coral,  in  color  a  deep,  beautiful  blue. 

Flattened  forms  of  coral  shape,  deep  purple  changing  to  red 
with  ruby  red  tips. 

An  electric  fountain,  many  colors. 

Colors  of  a  peacock's  tail,  form  somewhat  indistinct. 

Flashes  of  light  over  the  whole  retinal  field;  predominant 
color  a  wonderful  intense  green. 

Flower  forms — quantities  of  violets,  yellow  in  color,  flicker- 
ing light  over  them,  also  yellow. 

Deep  opal-blue  rings  running  outward  from  a  center  and  in 
constant  motion. 


FALLACIES  OF  SENSATION  329 

Beautiful  green  light,  like  light  in  an  electric  fountain ;  no 
special  form. 

A  complex  Grecian  pattern,  deep  blue  with  white  dots  sug- 
gesting snowflakes  over  it. 

This  changes  through  many  tints  of  blue  to  turquoise  blue ; 
the  form  becomes  a  bowl  and  pitcher  ornamented  with  gold. 

A  ship  with  square  sails  on  the  bluest  ocean,  intensely 
blue. 

Blue  aureoles  encircling  everything  as  I  half  open  my  eyes 
in  dim  light. 

Strings  of  beads  of  many  colors. 

Embroidered  leather  with  rainbow  colors  flickering  over  it  as 
if  from  a  stained-glass  window. 

Nine  leaves  of  silvery  gray  conventionalized. 

Cat's  fur,  but  colored  blue  and  white. 

The  blue  becomes  lines  and  forms,  the  outline  of  a  big 
centipede. 

Venetian  glass,  amethyst  tinted,  shades  from  light  to  dark, 
wavy  lines  running  through  it,  forms  not  distinct. 

An  escutcheon,  quarterings  of  blue,  steely  blue,  a  shield  with 
lines;  around  the  shield  four  swallow  tails.  These  enlarge, 
cover  and  finally  blot  out  the  shield. 

A  shining  laurel  leaf. 

A  beautiful  chandelier,  richly  jeweled  and  blazing  with 
light. 

A  stained-glass  window,  red,  blue,  and  amber,  colors  rich 
and  deep,  forms  not  well  defined. 

A  crazy  quilt,  pretty  but  very  crazy.  A  transparent  flexible 
lily  shape,  with  wavy  lines  running  through  it  like  bird-of- 
paradise  feathers ;  no  color  in  the  form  itself,  but  it  seems  to 
float  in  the  midst  of  colored  light. 

Phosphorescent  fishes'  eyes. 

Fish  scales  of  wonderful  green,  changing  to  shell  shapes  in 
the  green  light. 

A  picture  of  an  arctic  sunset,  with  silver  rays  rising  from  it, 
and  far  off  on  the  edge  an  aureole  of  beautiful  blue. 

A  ceiling  from  which  hang  ribbon  cards  of  every  color. 

A  camel  with  gorgeous  trappings,  with  a  palm  tree  behind 
him. 

Embroidery  of  red  chrysanthemums,  variously  mixed  with 
pale  pinks  and  yellows. 


330  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

All  of  the  North  American  tribes  have  intoxicants 
that  produce  hallucinations,  but  they  supplement 
these  intoxicants  with  many  rites  such  as  dancing, 
singing,  ululation,  the  beating  of  drums,  and  the  tor- 
menting of  the  body  by  various  painful  operations, 
all  designed  to  produce  ecstatic  states  and  the  con- 
sequent hallucinations. 

Among  all  tribal  men  many  hallucinations  are  sup- 
posed to  be  veridical,  as  some  are  supposed  to  be 
by  certain  members  of  the  Society  for  Psychical 
Research.  So  tribesmen  resort  to  the  agencies 
which  produce  both  hallucinations  and  illusions  to 
obtain  a  view  of  the  world  about  them,  of  the  past 
and  of  the  future,  in  order  that  their  conduct  may  be 
governed  by  this  superior  knowledge. 

Had  our  psychologists  attempted  to  make  a 
"census  of  waking  hallucinations  in  the  sane" 
among  the  North  American  Indians  they  would 
have  found  a  hundred  per  cent,  ready  to  testify  in 
their  favor.  It  is  the  universal  belief  in  savagery, 
for  in  that  stage  of  culture  all  men  produce  hallucina- 
tions for  divination — for  which  times  and  seasons  are 
regularly  appointed  and  systematic  means  employed. 
But  the  savage  always  recognizes  that  some  visions 
are  not  veridical.  False  spirits  may  have  testified 
or  some  evil  being  may  by  black  art  have  vitiated 
the  ceremony  or  the  percipient  may  have  been 
unable  to  properly  read  the  communication,  for 
communications  arc  told  in  ambiguous  terms.  It 
is  very  interesting  to  read  these  communications 
recorded  in  the  annals  of  the  Society,  for  we  find 
that  after  all  it  is  often  necessary  to  wait  for  a  time 
to  discover  an  event  which  will  fit  the  halluci- 
nations. 


FALLACIES  OF  SENSATION  331 

With  the  hallucinations  already  considered,  those  appearing 
in  the  course  of  acute  somatic  diseases,  and  as  a  result  of  them, 
seem  naturally  to  be  classed.  Here,  as  in  the  delirious  states 
associated  with  intoxication,  the  swarming  of  the  hallucinations 
is  characteristic.  This  resemblance  is  not  accidental.  Tndeed, 
the  delirious  states  of  somatic  disease  may,  in  part  at  least,  be 
referred  to  intoxication.  But  of  no  less  importance  are  the  rise 
of  temperature,  acceleration  of  metabolic  processes,  and  dis- 
turbances of  circulation  in  the  brain  cavity  (first,  active 
hypersemia;  later,  in  enfeebled  action  of  the  heart,  venous 
stasis),  the  importance  of  which  is  indicated  in  typhus,  for 
instance,  by  the  parallelism  between  the  violence  of  the 
delirium  and  the  temperature  curve.  The  initial  hallucinatory 
visions  of  typhus,  smallpox,  and  intermittent  fever,  occurring 
before  the  other  causes  have  had  time  to  act,  are  on  the  other 
hand  to  be  attributed  to  the  direct  influence  of  the  specific 
virus  of  the  fever,  as  also  the  afebrile  delusions,  sometimes 
occurring  in  intermittent  fever  in  place  of  the  fever  attack,  and 
the  visual  and  auditory  hallucinations  which  are  observed  in 
smallpox  between  the  eruptive  fever  and  the  fever  of  the 
suppurating  stage. 

Hallucinations  also  occur  in  the  decline  of  the  disease,  dur- 
ing the  period  of  convalescence.  First  they  appear  singly,  in 
association  with  those  of  the  fever,  and  are  often  recognized 
by  the  patient  as  such  and  concealed  from  those  around  him. 
But  soon  they  overmaster  the  sufferer,  and  delirious  states  are 
developed,  or  states  resembling  hallucinatory  insanity,  in 
which  visions  of  corpses,  death's-heads,  mocking  voices,  and 
offensive  olfactory  and  gustatory  hallucinations  play  a  part. 
Of  an  equally  distressing  nature  are  most  of  the  sensory 
fallacies  of  collapse-delirium,  and  those  which  sometimes  pre- 
cede death.  In  tuberculosis,  on  the  other  hand,  they  are  often 
of  an  agreeable  nature,  corresponding  to  the  euphoria  which  is 
so  characteristic  of  this  disease. — (Pp.  48-50.) 

The  most  frequently  quoted  of  all  sense-deceptions  are  those 
of  insanity.  Some  authors  have  sought  to  divide  them  accord- 
ing to  their  origin  into  "idiopathic, "  those  which  are  primary 
but  which  may  also  occur  in  secondary  consensual  morbid 
states,  and  "symptomatic,"  those  which  occur  only  as  a  sec- 
ondary symptom  of  insanity.  In  any  case  a  distinction  ought 
to  be  drawn  between  sporadic  hallucinations  not  associated 


332  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

with  particular  emotional  states,  and  hallucinations  which 
reflect  the  ruling  mental  tone.  This  distinction  has  prog- 
nostic importance,  since  observation  seems  to  prove  that  hallu- 
cinations depending  on  certain  morbid  emotional  states  are 
capable  of  disappearing  with  them,  whilst  independent  hallu- 
cinations seldom  admit  of  cure,  and  pass  over  into  the  state  of 
secondary  psychical  weakness. 

The  particular  forms  of  insanity  in  which  hallucinations 
most  frequently  occur  are  such  as  are  associated  with  dream- 
like beclouding  of  the  intellect.  Thus  they  are  a  frequent  phe- 
nomenon of  amentia,  but  are  seldom  seen  in  acute  dementia 
with  its  deep-reaching  paralysis  of  the  higher  psychical 
functions.  Opinion  as  to  the  frequency  of  sensory  hallucina- 
tions in  melancholia  has  altered  very  much  of  late  years, 
chiefly  because  of  the  altered  meaning  of  the  term,  and  because 
cases  previously  classed  under  melancholia  are  now  referred  to 
other  groups.  Thus,  while  hallucinations  were  at  one  time 
regarded  as  frequent  phenomena  of  this  state,  they  are  now 
held  to  be  rare,  or  altogether  absent  from  it.  In  mania  hal- 
lucinations only  appear  when  there  is  clouding  of  conscious- 
ness, and  are  generally  vague  and  indistinct.  On  the  other 
hand,  illusions  are  frequent,  and  mistakes  of  identity  are 
specially  characteristic  of  this  state,  though  not  absent  from 
other  forms  of  insanity.  Snell,  who  devotes  an  article  to  them, 
is  of  opinion  that  the  confusions  are  not  so  much  caused  by 
mere  resemblance,  but  that  a  general  psychological  law  lies  at 
their  root;  that  the  patient  is  powerless  to  escape  from  the 
familiar  thought-channels,  and  therefore  grafts  his  new  impres- 
sions on  to  his  old  opinions  and  ideas.  In  folie  circulaire 
hallucinations  occur  in  the  maniacal  period  in  association  with 
profound  mental  disturbance,  but  as  regards  their  occurrence 
in  the  melancholic  phase  opinion  is  again  divided. 

Delusional  insanity  and  Paranoia,  on  the  other  hand,  abound 
in  hallucinations,  so  much  so  that  some  forms  classed  under 
this  head  are  designated  "hallucinated  insanity''  (hallucina- 
torischer  Wahnsinri),  and  "paranoia  hallucinatoria. "  The 
sense-deceptions  of  delusional  insanity  are  vivid  in  their 
externalization,  and  resemble  in  their  content  the  fixed  ideas 
which  they  embody.  In  cases  which  end  in  mental  decay  the 
hallucinations  frequently  persist  long.  In  depressive  mono- 
mania they  are  more  fragmentary  and  vague,  but  are  often 


FALLACIES  OF  SENSATION  333 

kept  alive  by  distressing  dreams.  .  .  .  The  sufferer  hears 
taunting  or  insulting  voices  calling  after  him  in  the  street,  and 
making  injurious  insinuations  about  him,  or  sometimes  unseen 
speakers  incidentally  let  fall  words  which  confirm  his  forebod- 
ings.—(Pp.  20-23.) 

The  physiological  conception  of  memory  is  that 
concepts  are  impressed  upon  the  brain  and  the  nerv- 
ous system  as  elements  of  structure.  Memory  is 
thus  a  function  of  structure.  The  revival  of  con- 
cepts is  recollection;  such  revival  is  accomplished 
by  a  sense  or  feeling-  impression,  but  a  sense  or  feel- 
ing impression  is  a  force  or  mode  of  motion  which  is 
utilized  by  conditions  so  that  the  central  conscious- 
ness or  consciousness  of  the  brain  is  subject  to  con- 
ditions which  we  call  causation.  Thought  is 
therefore  explained  physiologically  by  the  late 
discovery  that  sense  and  feeling  impressions  traverse 
paths  along  the  fibrous  nerves  which  are  diverted  by 
the  ganglionic  nerves  to  different  tracts  of  the 
brain,  where  concepts  are  recorded  as  structural 
elements.  Thus  hallucinations  are  explained  by 
referring  them  to  the  mechanism  of  the  brain  and 
showing  how  by  such  mechanism  incongruous  con- 
cepts may  be  aroused  by  defects  in  its  working. 

Now  we  are  prepared  to  reaffirm  that  a  judgment 
of  sensation  must  be  verified  to  become  a  cognition, 
for  if  a  judgment  of  sensation  is  an  hallucination  there 
is  no  cognition.  Many  of  our  sensations  may  be 
verified  by  repetition,  and  it  is  often  the  case  that 
this  method  establishes  their  verity. 

The  hallucination  caused  by  subjective  audition 
cannot  be  disproved  by  a  repetition  of  the  hallucina- 
tion caused  by  an  injury  to  the  middle  ear.  An 
hallucination  which  is  a  color  vision  cannot  be 


334  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

shown  not  to  be  veridical  in  this  manner,  for  it  may 
continue  while  the  intoxication  lasts.  The  ultimate 
test  of  the  verity  of  a  sensation  is  an  appeal  to  a 
higher  faculty  of  the  mind,  which  is  perception, 
that  yet  requires  explication. 

The  person  who  had  an  hallucination  of  a  church 
congress  in  her  stomach  was  not  in  a  condition  to 
appeal  to  a  higher  faculty.  Before  she  realizes  that 
she  has  an  hallucination  her  malady  must  be  cured. 
The  man  who  believes  in  ghosts  when  he  has  an 
hallucination  of  his  dead  child  appearing  to  him  in 
the  cerements  of  the  tomb  can  best  be  shown  that 
it  is  an  hallucination  by  curing  the  malady  in  his 
understanding. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

FALLACIES    OF    PERCEPTION 

We  have  found  that  sense  impressions  cause 
events  of  consciousness  which  produce  judgments  by 
recalling  concepts  of  sensation,  such  concepts  being 
reinforced  and  developed  by  the  addition  of  new 
judgments.  Judgments  of  perception  still  employ 
the  same  sense  impressions  in  the  construction  of 
new  concepts  of  form,  while  concepts  of  form  are 
recalled  when  a  judgment  of  form  is  made.  A  new 
concept  of  form  is  constituted  by  the  increment  of  a 
new  judgment  of  form.  Therefore  concepts  of 
sensation  are  concepts  of  kind,  while  concepts  of 
perception  are  concepts  of  form.  As  a  judgment  of 
sensation  must  always  precede  a  judgment  of  per- 
ception, the  same  sense  impression  which  gives  rise 
to  a  judgment  of  sensation  will,  in  the  maturer  mind 
of  the  infant,  also  give  rise  to  a  judgment  of  percep- 
tion; therefore  we  are  compelled  to  reconsider  the 
sense  impressions  from  which  perceptions  arise. 
Having  already  found  how  judgments  of  perception 
are  considered  and  how  such  judgments  are  verified, 
we  have  now  to  exhibit  in  what  manner  there  comes 
into  existence  a  multitude  of  judgments  of  percep- 
tion which  are  never  verified,  and  yet  are  entertained 
in  the  mind  as  if  they  were  veridical. 

Fallacies  of  perceptions  are  errors  of  judgment 
respecting  forms.  Such  judgments  may  occur 
through  unverified  judgments  of  sensation,  and  the 

335 


336  TRUTH   AND  ERROR 

fallacy  is  repeated  in  a  higher  state  of  mind.  Judg- 
ments, when  they  are  first  made,  are  of  slow 
growth,  but  when  once  made,  by  repetition  they 
become  habitual  and  do  not  arise  in  the  corticle  con- 
sciousness. 

The  human  mind  cannot  perceive  form  without  first 
sensing  kind.  On  the  other  hand  it  seems  almost 
impossible  to  sense  a  kind  without  at  the  same  time 
perceiving  a  form,  though  we  may  pay  attention  to  the 
kind  or  to  the  form  at  will.  In  our  discussion  of 
fallacies  of  sensation,  we  have  tried  to  pay  attention 
to  the  kind,  but  we  have  found  that  kinds  were 
usually  expressed  as  forms.  The  experimental 
observer,  Miss  Smith,  not  only  spoke  of  colors  as 
dissolving  in  succession,  but  at  the  same  time  the 
colors  themselves  were  explained  as  forms.  Most  of 
the  fallacies  of  sensation  which  we  have  cited  in  this 
discussion,  most  of  those  which  appear  in  the  general 
literature  of  the  subject,  and  most  of  those  which 
occur  in  experience  are  not  only  hallucinations  of 
sensation,  but  they  are  also  specters  of  perception, 
because  the  human  mind  rarely  senses  an  object 
without  at  the  same  time  perceiving  the  object. 
When  I  see  the  color  of  the  rose,  I  see  the  rose  as  a 
form.  When  I  see  the  color  of  the  cloud,  I  see  the 
cloud.  When  a  word  is  pronounced  in  my  hearing 
I  hear  the  sound  as  a  sound,  perceive  the  person  in 
the  other  room  represented  vicariously  by  the  voice, 
and  at  the  same  time  hear  the  word  as  a  word  and 
as  a  symbol  of  meaning.  In  general,  the  description 
of  a  sensation  is  best  accomplished  in  terms  of  per- 
ception. 

We  must  know  things  as  kinds  before  we  know 
them  as  forms,  and  we  must  first  judge  of  things  as 


FALLACIES  OF  PERCEPTION  337 

kinds  before  we  judge  of  them  as  forms.  But  when 
we  already  know  things  as  kinds,  we  can  re-cognize 
them  as  kinds  by  instantaneous  judgments,  and  at 
once  go  on  to  cognize  them  as  forms,  or  to  make  judg- 
ments about  them  as  forms.  In  a  former  chapter, 
fallacies  of  sensation  were  often  described  in  terms 
of  perception,  for  they  seem  always  to  produce 
fallacies  of  perception,  and  in  the  state  of  mind 
under  which  they  are  produced  it  is  the  forms,  not 
the  kinds,  which  are  of  chief  interest  to  the  sub- 
ject. 

There  are  many  misperceptions ;  so  common  are 
they  as  to  be  scarcely  noticed.  If  a  person  will 
observe  his  own  thoughts  from  moment  to  moment, 
he  will  be  surprised  at  the  number  of  fallacious  per- 
ceptions which  he  makes,  some  of  which  are  immedi- 
ately corrected,  others  are  corrected  after  lapse  of 
time,  and  probably  many  others  that  are  never  cor- 
rected, because  of  their  insignificance  in  the  practical 
affairs  of  life.  These  errors  of  judgment  are  espe- 
cially common  in  audition  and  vision,  the  two  senses 
most  highly  vicarious.  A  sound  may  be  obscure  by 
reason  of  its  faintness,  or  by  reason  of  diverted 
attention.  Sight  may  be  obscure  by  reason  of  the 
twilight,  or  it  may  be  obscure  because  attention  is 
elsewhere  directed.  All  such  impressions  may  be 
veridical  or  may  be  fallacious.  If  I  am  intently 
listening  for  a  sound  I  may  interpret  a  sight  for  a 
sound;  if  I  am  intently  looking  for  an  object,  I  may 
interpret  a  sound  for  a  sight.  If  I  am  intently 
listening  for  a  particular  sound  and  hear  another,  I 
may  interpret  it  for  the  one  I  was  expecting ;  if  I  am 
intently  gazing  in  expectation  of  seeing  one  object, 
and  another  falls  upon  the  field  of  vision,  I  may  see 


TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

in  it  the  one  for  which  I  was  intently  gazing.    These 
are  all  misperceptions. 

I  draw  nine  black  lines  on  white  paper,  as  shown 
in  Fig.  i,  and  you  see  them  as  lines  on  paper. 
Now  close  one  eye,  and  lift  the  page  horizontally 
nearly  to  the  height  of  the  eye,  and  these  lines  will 
appear  as  pins.  By  a  little  manipulation  you  can 
see  them  now  as  pins  and  now  as  lines.  You 
know  they  are  not  pins,  yet  you  see  them  as  pins; 


Fig.  i. 

that  is,  you  have  formed  a  habit  of  interpreting 
sense  impressions  like  those  made  by  the  lines 
when  they  are  in  certain  attitudes  as  marks  or 
symbols  of  standing  objects  set  as  pins,  stakes, 
men,  or  trees,  and  so  thoroughly  established  is 
this  habit  that  such  an  attitude  of  lines  may  be 
interpreted  as  standing  objects  when  they  are  not, 


FALLACIES  OF  PERCEPTION  339 


Fig.  2. 


340  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

and  you  will  affirm  that  they  are  lines  at  one  time 
and  standing  objects  at  another.  This  is  one  of  the 
standard  illustrations  of  misperception.  Now  will 
be  understood  the  statement  when  it  is  affirmed 
that  only  color  is  manifested  to  the  eye  by  the 
object,  and  that  when  such  a  judgment  is  formed  it 
may  or  may  not  be  valid,  but  that  the  color  is  inter- 
preted as  a  symbol  of  the  object  in  a  judgment  of 
perception. 

Before  me  as  I  write  there  is  a  steam  register, 
which  is  covered  with  a  tablet  composed  of  bars  with 
interspaces,  the  bars  being  arranged  in  patterns;  a 
drawing  of  a  portion  of  this  tablet  is  illustrated  in 
the  accompanying  diagram  Fig.  2. 

Looking  upon  it  in  the  ordinary  position  in  which 
a  book  is  read  it  appears  as  a  pattern  of  bars ;  turn 
the  top  of  the  book  to  the  left  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
see  the  bars  obliquely,  and  it  appears  as  a  collection 
of  crates  or  boxes  inclined  one  upon  another ;  turn 
it  again  so  that  the  direction  of  sight  is  changed 
ninety  degrees  from  the  first  position,  and  you  can 
see  it  as  a  series  of  steps  like  a  stairway,  every  tread 
having  a  series  of  reentrant  angles.  Again,  we  see 
that  in  vision  nothing  but  color  as  in  a  flat  is  given  to 
consciousness,  and  that  form  comes  by  interpretation 
or  inference.  Deftness  in  inference  is  acquired  by 
practice ;  that  is,  it  is  the  result  of  experience.  We 
come  to  interpret  lines  in  this  manner  as  meaning 
form  by  the  experience  of  every  moment  of  waking 
life,  and  inherit  the  skill  from  a  long  line  of 
ancestors,  so  that  our  powers  of  perceiving  formed 
in  this  manner  are  both  inherited  and  habitual,  or, 
as  I  prefer  to  say,  both  instinctive  and  habitual,  and 
that  which  is  both  inherited  and  habitual  is  intuitive. 


FALLACIES  OF  PERCEPTION  341 

Light  and  shade  are  interpreted  as  deftly  as  lines, 
and  we  can  see  forms  without  other  colors,  so  that  a 
portrait  which  you  know  is  only  light  and  shade,  is 
a  symbol  of  the  form  and  expression  of  a  human 
face.  But  there  are  other  colors  both  in  nature  and 
in  art,  and  we  instinctively  and  habitually  interpret 
all  colors  as  forms;  but  sometimes  we  see  colors 
without  seeing  forms.  The  illusions  of  inference  by 
the  interpretation  of  lines  in  vision  have  been  the 
subject  of  much  investigation  in  psycho-physics, 
which  is  one  branch  of  scientific  psychology.  But 
adequate  experiments  have  not  yet  been  made  in 
light  and  shade,  and  in  other  colors  when  not  repre- 
sented by  lines.  The  doctrine  dates  back  to  the 
days  of  Berkeley,  who  set  forth  the  nature  of  percep- 
tion in  vision  in  such  manner  that  it  has  become  a 
classic,  though  he  afterward  devoted  his  energies  to 
the  propagation  of  fallacies  in  metaphysics  and  tar- 
water. 

From  time  to  time  during  the  last  thirty  years,  I 
have  studied  the  nature  of  perception  in  myself  and 
in  others.  Especially  have  I  studied  it  as  a  mental 
phenomenon  in  the  untutored  Indians  of  North 
America.  On  every  hand  these  facts  have 
appeared:  first,  that  every  perception  as  a  judgment 
involves  an  interpretation;  second,  that  perceptions 
may  be  true  or  erroneous,  as  inferences  are  valid  or 
invalid ;  and  third,  '  that  visual  perception  itself  is 
acquired  by  experience. 

Among  the  Indians,  I  have  found  that  at  first  lines 
are  not  easily  interpreted,  so  that  pictures  in  lines 
do  not  seem  to  represent  forms;  but  the  power  of 
interpreting  forms  by  lines  is  rapidly  gained.  I 
have  found  also  that  the  power  of  interpreting  light 


342  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

and  shade  is  great  in  the  savage  for  natural  objects, 
but  must  be  cultivated  for  unknown  objects  of  art. 
And,  again,  I  have  found  that  the  power  of  inter- 
preting the  miscellaneous  colors  of  pictures  is  well 
developed  when  they  represent  things  with  which 
they  are  already  familiar,  but  that  it  is  necessary  to 
familiarize  them  with  things  to  develop  the  power 
of  interpreting  unknown  forms. 

Again,  in  topographic  maps,  relief  is  represented 
usually  by  light  and  shade  in  hachnres,  but  in  the 
best  maps  relief  is  represented  by  lines  which  follow 
the  contour  at  equal  intervals  of  altitude.  Such 
maps  cannot  be  read  by  the  inexperienced  man,  but 
he  can  develop  the  power  so  that  a  contour  map  will 
seem  to  be  a  picture  of  mountains  and  valleys  and 
of  hills  and  dales.  Experience  has  taught  me  that 
this  power  is  more  easily  gained  and  greatly  assisted 
by  representing  relief  in  one  color  and  drainage  in 
another,  as  in  blue;  for  when  the  knowledge  that 
water  is  blue  is  represented  in  the  map  as  blue,  it 
will  carry  the  streams  down  and  aid  in  the  percep- 
tion of  the  relief. 

From  the  illustrations  which  have  been  given  it 
will  perhaps  be  made  clear  that  perception  is  the 
interpretation  of  a  symbol,  and  that  the  power  of 
interpretation  comes  by  experience.  We  are  con- 
stantly perceiving  with  all  our  senses,  but  sounds 
and  sights  are  the  most  abundant,  coming  in  hosts 
with  every  minute  of  wakefulness,  and  a  habit  of 
interpretation  is  formed  which  is  conjoined  with  an 
inherited  aptness.  External  forms  do  not  come  to  the 
eye  or  the  ear  as  consciousness,  but  only  to  the  mind 
as  inferences.  Habitual  judgments  of  the  mind 
which  are  illusions  because  unverified,  may  occur 


FALLACIES  OF  PERCEPTION  343 

again  and  again  in  millions  of  cases,  and  the  repeti- 
tion but  confirms  the  illusion,  and  such  intuitive 
illusions  can  hardly  be  dispelled  even  by  overwhelm- 
ing knowledge,  but  the  truth  and  the  error  will 
appear  side  by  side  and  be  entertained  as  verities, 
and  the  mind  will  search  for  some  metaphysical 
explanation  of  them.  As  a  last  resort  of  logic,  it 
will  assume  the  existence  of  a  mystery,  and  be  con- 
firmed in  the  doctrine  that  the  universe  is  contradic- 
tory. 

Our  forefathers  called  the  sky  a  firmament.  It 
was  believed  to  be  a  solid  which  presented  a  surface 
toward  us,  and  this  misconception  is  universal 
among  barbaric  and  savage  people.  By  the  Indian 
the  sky  is  supposed  to  be  ice,  or  some  other  crystal- 
line solid,  and  it  does  appear  to  be  a  surface,  in 
spite  of  our  knowing  that  it  is  not.  This  arises  from 
the  fact  that  we  always  discover  color  on  surfaces, 
and  when  surfaces  are  removed  usually  colors  are 
changed.  We  have  thus  as  individuals  and  as  a 
race  in  all  generations  habitually  considered  color  to 
be  a  symbol  of  surface.  That  which  is  habit  in  the 
interpretation  of  a  sense  impression  contradicts  that 
which  we  have  learned  by  various  operations  of 
reasoning  from  other  sense  data.  Thus  habitual 
illusions  often  contradict  certitudes,  as  they  may  be 
discovered  by  the  higher  forms  of  reason,  and  we 
often  entertain  certitudes  and  fallacies  as  if 
co-existent,  and  the  world  seems  to  be  contradictory. 
These  judgments  have  a  curious  effect  on  the  mind, 
for  the  contradictory  judgments  may  both  be 
held  in  a  vague  way  to  be  certitudes  and  still  in  a 
vague  way  to  be  fallacies,  until  finally  this  is 
explained  by  a  theory,  that  both  are  unknown  and 


344  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

unknowable  noumena  which  are  manifested  by 
deceptive  phenomena.  So  habits  of  judgment  are 
formed  which  are  difficult  to  eradicate. 

To  unverified  perception  the  rainbow  as  a  form 
with  a  surface  has  been  established,  because  of  the 
habit  of  interpreting  color  as  a  mark  of  surface ;  this 
fallacy  is  common,  perhaps  universal.  The  clouds 
often  seem  to  be  painted  upon  the  sky,  or  to  be 
moving  along  the  sky,  but  the  trained  meteorologist 
in  time  learns  to  distinguish  clouds  as  forms,  and 
discovers  fleeting  figures  in  them,  and  he  still  further 
discovers  the  relative  position  of  clouds  by  recogniz- 
ing the  near  from  the  far,  and  yet,  to  the  untrained 
observer,  there  still  lingers  an  element  of  fallacy. 

It  was  long  believed  that  the  earth  has  ends, 
corners,  foundation,  and  a  flat  upper  surface.  When 
it  was  discovered  that  the  earth  is  a  spheroid,  the 
illusion  of  up  and  down  as  components  of  direction  at 
right  angles  to  a  flat  plane  was  dispelled,  and  a  con- 
cept substituted  of  down  toward  the  center  and  up 
from  the  center.  While  a  few  grasped  the  idea,  the 
many  still  held  to  the  old,  and  now,  after  more  than 
two  thousand  years,  there  are  people  who  have  not 
mastered  the  concept. 

One  man  sees  the  disc  of  the  moon  when  it  is 
riding  high  as  having  the  size  of  the  top  of  a  teacup, 
another  as  large  as  a  cartwheel.  But  the  moon  will 
seem  to  be  larger  than  a  barn  if  it  is  seen  behind  a 
distant  barn,  or  it  may  seem  to  be  as  large  as  a  great 
mountain  when  it  rises  behind  such  mountain,  and 
yet  every  intelligent  man  knows  the  moon  to  be 
2,162  miles  in  diameter.  As  the  moon  rides  the 
heavens,  it  seems  to  be  this  side  of  the  surface  of  the 
sky,  although  we  know  that  there  is  no  such  surface. 


FALLACIES  OF  PERCEPTION  345 

Such  habitual  judgments  of  space  and  form  seem  to 
contradict  our  knowledge.  When  knowledge  con- 
tradicts primitive  and  habitual  judgments,  there  is  a 
pseudo- belief  in  both,  and  the  universe  seems  con- 
tradictory. 

The  sun  appears  to  us  as  a  mile  or  two  away,  but 
we  know  that  it  is  ninety-three  millions  of  miles  away. 
The  sun  seems  very  much  nearer  to  us  when  it  rides 
high  in  the  heavens  than  when  it  comes  up  behind  a 
near  hill,  or  when  it  rises  behind  a  distant  mountain 
with  intervening  plains.  What  we  know  and  what 
appears  seem  to  contradict  each  other;  and  anti- 
nomies are  invented  to  explain  these  contradictions. 

By  a  natural  process  of  fallacious  judgment,  the 
idea  of  space  as  void  is  developed  as  an  existent 
thing  or  body.  This  is  the  ghost  of  space — the  crea- 
tion of  an  entity  out  of  nothing.  I  may  remove  the 
furniture  from  the  room,  it  is  still  filled  with  air;  I 
may  remove  the  air  from  the  room,  it  is  still  filled 
with  ether.  We  may  suppose  it  possible  to  remove 
the  ether,  then  nothing — void — remains,  but  man  has 
no  means  by  which  to  accomplish  the  feat,  and  we  call 
the  air  and  the  ether  space.  The  space  of  which  we 
speak  is  occupied ;  it  is  the  space  inclosed  by  the  walls, 
occupied  by  air  and  ether.  We  may  measure  its 
dimensions  by  measuring  the  walls,  but  we  cannot 
measure  the  void.  We  can  by  no  possibility  con- 
sider non-space  or  void  as  a  term  of  reality;  we 
can  consider  only  the  walls  as  the  real  terms.  If  we 
reason  about  it  mathematically  and  call  it  x,  the 
meaning  of  the  x  in  the  equation  is  finally  resolved 
by  expressing  it  in  terms  of  body  as  they  are  repre- 
sented by  surface.  This  non-space  has  no  number ; 
it  is  not  one  or  many  in  one — it  is  nothing.  It  is  not 


346  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

extension  as  figure  or  structure — it  is  nothing. 
Void  space  should  be  called  voidable  space,  as  void- 
able by  one  set  of  extensions  when  filled  by  another. 
The  fallacy  concerning  space  is  born  of  careless 
naming.  No  harm  is  done  by  this  popular  mis- 
perception  of  space  until  we  use  it  in  reasoning  as  a 
term  of  reality ;  then  the  attributes  of  space  may  be 
anything  because  they  are  nothing.  Such  space  is 
the  occult  noumenon,  the  reified  void.  This  is  the 
space  of  Kant,  and  usually  the  space  of  metaphysic. 
It  is  the  reification  of  "pure"  property,  void  of  all 
extension  which  can  have  no  relations ;  that  which 
is  without  relation  is  non-existent. 

When  I  consider  the  distance  from  here  to  San 
Francisco,  I  may  think  of  the  plateaus,  mountains, 
hills,  and  valleys  which  have  to  be  surmounted  and 
crossed  in  traversing  the  distance,  or  I  may  think  of 
the  days  required  to  make  the  journey.  Yet  I  imply 
or  posit  the  plateaus,  mountains,  hills,  and  valleys ; 
so  when  I  consider  the  distance  to  the  sun  I  posit 
the  spacial  particles  which  intervene,  though  I  may 
cancel  their  consideration,  but  if  I  affirm  that  space 
as  nothing  intervenes  I  affirm  a  fallacy.  By  calling 
it  a  five  days'  journey  I  do  not  annihilate  the 
topography. 

In  the  earlier  stages  of  culture,  when  there  was  no 
knowledge  of  air  and  ether,  this  was  the  judgment 
of  mankind,  but  I  must  not  go  on  repeating  this 
judgment  when  I  know  the  truth.  If  the  primeval 
judgments  are  held  to  be  veridical,  and  scientific 
judgments  also  to  be  veridical,  then  the  world  is 
contradictory.  Metaphysicians  formulate  these 
erroneous  judgments  and  scientific  judgments  as 
antinomies. 


FALLACIES  OF  PERCEPTION  347 

Misperceptions  have  been  discussed  sufficiently  for 
present  purposes  as  exhibiting  the  characteristics  of 
illusions.  I  go  on  to  discuss  specters  which  are 
derived  from  hallucinations  in  order  to  set  forth  the 
characteristics  of  delusions. 

It  will  not  be  necessary  for  us  to  rediscuss  all  the 
hallucinations  set  forth  in  the  last  chapter,  but  it 
may  be  well  to  recall  some  of  them  as  illustrating 
these  principles. 

Fallacies  of  sensation  in  the  metabolic  sense  seem 
rarely  to  produce  fallacies  of  perception.  If  they  do 
arise  they  are  vague.  It  is  rarely,  indeed,  when 
they  are  produced  that  the  deceived  mind  refers 
them  to  distinct  objects  as  forms,  but  in  extreme 
cases  deceptive  forms  appear,  especially  in  the 
case  of  odors,  as  when  the  subject  refers  such 
odors  to  the  bodies  of  the  dead,  as  the  woman 
who  referred  the  pestilential  odors  which  she 
believed  she  sensed  to  the  corpses  buried  under  the 
Salpetriere. 

Usually  the  fallacies  of  touch  produce  illusions 
which  the  deceived  subject  attributes  to  some  form 
of  object  which  touches  the  skin ;  commonly  these 
objects  are  insects. 

In  my  study  of  the  literature  of  hallucinations,  I 
find  but  few  hallucinations  of  the  sense  of  pressure ; 
yet  there  are  a  few,  as  when  people  dream  or 
insanely  imagine  that  they  are  enclosed  by  walls 
which  are  ever  becoming  narrower  and  thus  com- 
pressing them. 

To  the  person  who  has  all  of  the  senses,  most  of 
the  hallucinations  occur  in  audition  and  vision, 
because  of  the  function  which  spoken  and  written 
language  performs  in  the  ideation  of  these  senses. 


348  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

Hallucinatory  sounds  often  produce  phantasmal 
words  spoken  by  spectral  persons. 

The  spectral  person  may  be  the  self,  or  it  may  be 
another  or  a  congress  of  others.  When  the  voices  of 
others  are  falsely  perceived  as  persons,  these  others 
are  specters. 

Specters  may  be  classified  by  senses  deceived,  and 
subclassified  by  the  agencies  through  which  they  are 
produced.  The  class  of  specters  derived  from 
hallucinations  of  vision  we  will  treat  as  thus  sub- 
classified,  for  the  purpose  of  illustrating  the  doctrine. 

When  the  nervous  system  is  relaxed  in  slumber  so 
that  sense  impressions  carried  by  the  fibrous  nerves 
are  directed  by  the  ganglionic  nerves  at  random  to 
different  portions  of  the  cortex  of  the  brain,  sense 
impressions  are  produced  upon  that  organ  which 
result  in  dreams,  and  the  imagination  of  the  sleeper 
revels  in  wonderland.  As  these  are  of  nightly 
occurrence,  and  all  men  dream,  the  ghosts  of  dream- 
land that  fill  the  sleeping  life  are  remembered  in 
many  a  revery  of  the  waking  life. 

In  the  culture  reached  at  the  stage  of  tribal 
society,  images  reflected  by  the  water  or  other  shin- 
ing objects  are  supposed  to  be  ghosts.  Echoes  are 
also  referred  to  ghosts.  Thus  there  is  an  explana- 
tion given  to  the  common  phenomena  of  reflected 
sights  and  sounds  by  attributing  them  to  the  ghosts 
which  appear  in  dreams. 

Hallucinations  of  ecstasy  always  seem  to  produce 
phantasms  or  specters  of  vision.  Hence  the  specters 
seen  by  the  great  men  of  the  world  who  have  had  a 
weight  of  affairs  to  contemplate — too  great  for  their 
mental  faculties ;  hence  the  specters  seen  by  divines 
and  poets.  Such  ghosts  can  be  summoned  readily 


FALLACIES  OF  PERCEPTION  349 

by  those  phenomena  which  we  have  classified  under 
the  general  designation  of  crystal  vision,  for  the 
mind  seems  able  by  an  effort  of  will  to  abstract 
attention  from  sense  impressions  in  a  fixed  gaze 
upon  a  bright  object,  and  then  to  be  deluded  with 
false  judgments  about  such  bright  objects,  seeing 
in  the  bright  object  itself  many  strange  forms  which 
are  recalled  from  memory  and  projected  into  many 
incongruous  relations  of  space.  The  phantastic 
images  of  the  Braid's  crystal  are  thus  ghosts  sum- 
moned from  the  vasty  deep  of  hallucination. 

The  hallucinations  of  hypnotism  make  men  see 
things  which  do  not  exist,  and  prohibit  men  from 
seeing  things  upon  which  their  eyes  are  turned, 
when  the  patient  is  under  the  influence  of  the  words 
or  of  the  suggestions  of  a  dominant  operator. 

Chloroform,  ether,  peyote,  and  many  other  drugs 
bring  us  hallucinations  under  conscious  experimenta- 
tion. But  there  are  many  intoxicants.  In  tribal 
society  intoxicants  are  used  for  the  purpose  of 
producing  hallucinations ;  in  modern  society  alcohol 
is  used  as  a  beverage  to  produce  gustatory  pleasure ; 
but  in  whatever  way  intoxicants  are  used  hallucina- 
tions are  produced.  The  hallucinations  of  obscure 
vision,  reinforced  by  the  hallucinations  of  dream- 
ing, reinforced  by  the  hallucinations  of  hypnotism, 
are  still  reinforced  by  the  hallucinations  of  intoxi- 
cation, until  ghosts  are  the  common  property  of 
mankind,  and  only  through  scientific  training  is  the 
mind  able  to  banish  them.  But  these  ghosts,  while 
they  affect  the  lives  of  many  sane  people,  do  not 
take  entire  possession  of  them. 

When,  however,  the  mind  is  diseased,  the  halluci- 
nations of  sane  life  take  possession  of  the  person. 


35°  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

The  poor  soul  possessed  by  hallucination  becomes  a 
prey  to  melancholia,  hysteria,  and  dementia.  But 
the  mind  of  the  superstitious  man,  who  is  ever 
recalling  the  phantasms  born  of  hallucination,  is 
exploiting  upon  the  brink  of  the  sea  of  hallucination 
into  which  he  may  plunge  by  insanity.  While 
ghosts  may  be  smelled,  touched,  or  heard,  yet  they 
are  more  commonly  seen  for  vision  is  the  most  ideal- 
istic sense. 

In  the  realm  of  ghosts  there  are  five  provinces — 
the  land  of  dreams,  the  land  of  ecstasy,  the  land  of 
suggestion,  the  land  of  intoxication,  and  the  land 
of  insanity.  In  tribal  society  ghosts  of  animals 
prevail,  while  in  civilized  society  ghosts  of  men  pre- 
vail. If  you  were  talking  to  a  savage  about  some 
unusual  occurrence,  he  would  tell  you  how  he  had 
been  warned  by  a  bear,  that  a  hummingbird  had 
appeared,  that  a  rattlesnake  had  crossed  his  way, 
that  an  eagle  came  to  him  in  his  dreams.  Homer's 
ghosts  all  appear  as  deities  in  the  guise  of  human 
beings. 

For  twenty  centuries  metaphysic  has  been  in 
search  of  the  noumenon — the  thing-in-itself.  For  a 
long  time  it  spoke  with  disrespect  of  scientific 
research,  but  in  modern  times  it  patronizes  science 
as  a  very  useful  adjunct  to  metaphysic  by  showing 
how  specters,  as  phenomena,  symbolize  noumena. 
The  assumptions  of  metaphysic  as  it  patronizes 
science  would  be  the  richest  jest  of  civilization  had 
they  not  their  equal  in  the  ridicule  they  make  in 
considering  realities  as  base-born,  belonging  only 
to  the  lower  world  where  men  live,  while  meta- 
physic is  supposed  to  dwell  in  a  region  of  sublime 
thought. 


FALLACIES  OF  PERCEPTION  35! 

We  have  defined  ghosts  as  fallacies  of  hallucina- 
tion conceived  as  forms.  Those  who  believe  in 
ghosts  define  them  in  some  other  way.  Milton  may 
be  considered  one  of  the  best  authorities  on  ghosts : 

for  spirits  when  they  please 

Can  either  sex  assume,  or  both ;  so  soft 

And  uncompounded  is  their  essence  pure ; 

Not  tied  or  manacled  with  joint  or  limb, 

Nor  founded  on  the  brittle  strength  of  bones, 

Like  cumbrous  flesh ;  but  in  what  shape  they  choose, 

Dilated  or  condens'd,  bright  or  obscure, 

Can  execute  their  airy  purposes, 

And  works  of  love  or  enmity  fulfill. 

Shakspere  does  not  believe  in  ghosts,  but  he 
knows  how  they  are  seemingly  produced  by  hypno- 
tism. 

Ham. — Why,  look  you  now,  how  unworthy  a  thing  you  make 
of  me.  You  would  play  upon  me ;  you  would  seem  to  know 
my  stops;  you  would  pluck  out  the  heart  of  my  mystery;  you 
would  sound  me  from  my  lowest  note  to  the  top  of  my  com- 
pass ;  and  there  is  much  music,  excellent  voice,  in  this  little 
organ,  yet  cannot  you  make  it  speak.  'Sblood!  do  you  think  I 
am  easier  to  be  played  on  than  a  pipe?  Call  me  what  instru- 
ment you  will,  though  you  can  fret  me,  you  cannot  play  upon 
me. 

Enter  Polonius. 

God  bless  you,  sir ! 

Pol.  My  lord,  the  queen  would  speak  with  you,  and 
presently. 

Ham.  Do  you  see  yonder  cloud,  that's  almost  in  shape  of  a 
camel? 

Pol.     By  the  mass,  an  'tis  like  a  camel,  indeed. 

Ham.     Methinks,  it  is  like  a  weasel. 

Pol.     It  is  backed  like  a  weasel. 

Ham.     Or,  like  a  whale? 

Pol.     Very  like  a  whale. 

Ham.  Then,  will  I  come  to  my  mother  by  and  by.  They 
fool  me  to  the  top  of  my  bent.  I  will  come  by  and  by. 


CHAPTER   XXII 

FALLACIES  OF  APPREHENSION 

Fallacies  have  been  divided  into  two  grand 
divisions,  which  we  have  called  illusions  and  delu- 
sions. It  will  be  remembered  that  we  are  reclassify- 
ing  illusions  and  delusions,  each  into  five  classes. 
Of  the  illusions  we  have  already  set  forth  the  mis- 
sensations  and  the  misperceptions,  and  of  the 
delusions  we  have  set  forth  the  hallucinations  and  the 
specters.  In  considering  fallacious  apprehensions 
we  discover  misapprehensions  and  phantasms.  Let 
us  first  set  forth  the  nature  of  misapprehensions. 

We  are  conscious  of  pressure  when  bodies  impinge 
against  us,  and  we  are  conscious  of  push  when  we 
impinge  against  other  bodies ;  we  are  therefore  con- 
scious of  energy  both  from  an  active  standpoint  and 
from  a  passive  standpoint.  But  the  energy  of  which 
we  are  conscious  is  that  of  molar  bodies.  We  must 
here  recall  the  fact  that  knowledge  begins  in  the 
race  and  also  in  the  infant  with  the  cognition  of 
molar  bodies.  To  the  primitive  or  nai've  appre- 
hension, motion  is  an  effect  of  a  cause,  and  this 
cause  is  considered  as  something  which  acts  on 
another  and  produces  motion  in  self,  in  order  to  act 
on  that  other,  and  it  may  also  produce  motion  in 
that  other.  It  was  long  before  man  cognized  that 
force  is  itself  motion  and  motion  is  force.  Primitive 
man  formed  the  habit  of  considering  motion  as  an 
effect  of  force.  He  was  conscious  that  he  could 

352 


FALLACIES  OF  APPREHENSION  353 

exercise  force,  and  discovered  that  it  could  produce 
molar  motion.  He  knew  nothing  of  molecular 
motion,  or  that  the  force  which  he  exercised  was 
derived  from  molecular  motion,  so  he  considered 
force  and  motion  as  disparate  properties ;  this  is  the 
primordial  misapprehension. 

Erroneous  judgments  once  made  may  be  repeated 
in  perpetuating  fallacies,  for  this  constant  repetition 
of  fallacious  judgments  is  intuition,  and  there  seems 
to  be  something  sacred  about  intuition.  A  world  of 
metaphysic  is  built  on  this  foundation,  that  habitual 
or  intuitive  judgments  are  the  primordial  endow- 
ments of  mind.  A  myth  is  invented  to  explain  a 
fallacy,  then  the  myth  becomes  sacred  and  the 
moral  nature  is  enlisted  in  its  defense. 

The  stars  were  seen  to  move  along  the  firmament, 
or  surface  of  the  solid,  from  east  to  west,  as  men 
move  along  the  surface  of  the  earth  at  will.  But 
the  heavenly  bodies  move  by  constantly  repeated 
paths,  and  so  primitive  man  invents  myths  to 
explain  these  repeated  paths.  For  example,  the 
Utes  say  that  the  Sun  could  once  go  where  he 
pleased,  but  when  he  came  near  to  the  people  he 
burned  them.  Tavots,  the  Rabbit-god,  fought  with 
the  Sun  and  compelled  him  to  travel  by  an  appointed 
path  along  the  surface  of  the  sky,  so  that  there 
might  be  day  and  night.  It  is  an  offense  to  the 
religion  or  moral  sentiment  of  the  Ute  to  question 
this  explanation. 

The  man  is  conscious  that  he  can  move  himself, 
though  he  is  not  conscious  that  the  molecular 
motion  in  his  body  is  motion,  but  he  is  conscious 
that  it  produces  the  effect  of  molar  motion,  and  he 
calls  this  unknown  something  force.  In  what  man- 


354  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

ner  this  molecular  motion  of  the  particles  of  the 
body  is  transmuted  into  molar  motion  of  the  body,  is 
not  known  except  by  a  few  scientific  men  who  see 
that  molecular  motion  of  the  particles  is  transmuted 
into  the  molar  motion  of  the  body  through  the 
metabolism  of  the  muscle,  and  that  this  motility 
or  self-activity  is  controlled  by  the  will  which 
controls  the  choice  or  affinity  of  the  molecules  of  the 
muscles. 

This  primordial  misapprehension  is  universal  to 
mankind  in  tribal  society,  and  universal  in  explain- 
ing all  motion.  Although  not  formulated  in  this 
manner,  it  is  practically  believed  that  motion,  which 
is  simple  and  well  known,  is  the  medium  between 
occult  force  as  one  force  acts  on  another.  This  is  a 
very  natural  error  in  the  stage  of  culture  to  which  it 
pertains. 

We  speak  of  the  sun,  the  moon,  and  the  stars  as 
rising  and  setting,  and  when  the  sun  rises  we  conceive 
it  in  such  terms  of  speech,  but  in  fact  the  earth  in  its 
daily  rotation  turns  toward  the  sun.  Under  favor- 
able circumstances  I  can  see  the  earth  turn  toward 
the  sun,  down  in  the  front  when  looking  at  the  sun, 
and  up  as  my  back  is  turned.  I  have  often  experi- 
mented in  this  manner  with  both  the  sun  and  the 
moon,  when  I  have  been  traveling  on  the  desert, 
and  I  can  see  their  rising  and  setting  as  the  rotation 
of  the  earth.  I  assure  you  it  is  a  marvelous  revela- 
tion. It  seems  like  riding  on  a  Ferris  wheel.  It  is 
just  such  revelations  as  these  that  a  man  must 
experience  when  he  discovers  new  truths  in 
science.  When  the  fallacy  wholly  vanishes  and  the 
verity  appears  in  all  its  meaning,  it  is  impossible  to 
conceive  a  fallacy;  but  when  the  fallacy  and  the 


FALLACIES  OF  APPREHENSION  355 

verity  are  both  believed,  we  believe  contradictions 
or  antinomies. 

Phenomena  are  expressed  in  words  before  they 
are  properly  understood;  when  they  come  to  be 
known  the  facts  do  not  properly  fit  them.  I  speak 
of  the  path  of  the  heavenly  orbs  extending  from 
east  to  west,  but  the  fact  is  that  the  earth  revolves 
from  west  to  east.  The  metaphysician  takes 
propositions  to  express  judgments,  as  they  are 
formed  before  the  phenomena  are  properly  under- 
stood by  science,  to  be  valid,  and  then  finding  that 
which  science  ultimately  discovers,  takes  it  also 
to  be  valid,  and  discovers  in  the  world  a  set  of  con- 
tradictions. 

Consider  a  tower  a  thousand  feet  high,  from  which 
there  projects  an  arm  so  that  a  cannonball  falling 
from  it  will  strike  the  ground  outside  of  the  base 
of  the  tower.  Now  let  a  ball  be  dropped  from  this 
arm,  and  you  say  it  falls  to  the  ground  in  a  straight 
line.  This  is  not  true;  the  cannonball  and  the 
earth  both  have  the  motion  of  the  earth  in  rotation 
about  its  axis;  the  path  of  the  cannonball,  there- 
fore, has  two  components,  one  in  the  direction  of 
rotation  and  another  in  the  direction  of  fall.  Its 
path,  therefore,  is  in  the  direction  of  fall  and  rota- 
tion. This  is  not  all  of  the  path  of  the  ball :  it  is 
moving  in  revolution  with  the  earth  and  the  moon ; 
it  is  also  moving  in  revolution  with  the  orbs  of  the 
solar  system  about  the  sun  as  the  center ;  it  is  also 
moving  with  the  solar  system  about  some  point  in 
the  galaxy.  It  falls  to  the  earth,  therefore,  in  a 
vortical  or  spiral  path,  because  the  earth  itself  is 
moving  in  such  a  path.  For  some  purposes  it  is 
necessary  only  to  consider  this  movement  of  the 


35^  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

earth  as  a  straight  line,  because  only  this  component 
of  path  must  be  considered  when  we  consider  the 
change  of  the  ball  in  relation  to  objects  on  the  earth, 
when  the  real  path  of  the  cannonball  seems  to 
contradict  the  considered  path,  and  we  have  an 
antinomy. 

You  say  that  the  book  lying  on  the  table  is  at  rest, 
and  you  conceive  rest  as  a  motionless  state.  But  this 
is  not  true ;  the  book  which  lies  on  the  table  has  the 
motion  of  the  earth  on  its  axis,  and  it  has  also  the 
motion  of  the  hierarchy  of  celestial  bodies,  and  it  has 
also  the  motion  of  a  hierarchy  of  molecular  bodies. 
Rest,  therefore,  is  only  motion  parallel  to  the  other 
bodies  of  this  room,  and  if  you  deflect  its  other 
motion,  so  that  it  is  no  longer  parallel  to  the  other 
bodies,  you  produce  molar  motion.  If  you  still  hold 
that  rest  is  a  motionless  state,  and  then  apprehend, 
as  you  do,  that  the  book  is  in  motion  when  at  rest, 
you  believe  contradictions.  These  contradictions 
are  antinomies.  One  or  other  of  every  antinomy  is 
a  fallacy. 

If  I  have  set  forth  the  nature  of  antinomies  clearly,  I 
am  prepared  to  set  forth  the  fallacy  of  Kant's  second 
antinomy.  This  fallacy  consists  in  holding  that 
there  is  some  force  which  is  not  motion,  but  struc- 
ture. It  is  the  failure  to  conceive  properly  that  all 
bodies  are  composed  of  discrete  particles  which  are 
incorporated  by  modes  of  motion,  and  the  failure 
also  to  conceive  that  there  is  a  hierarchy  of  bodies 
in  which  the  particle  itself  is  a  constituent  and  that 
the  particle  partakes  of  all  the  motion  of  the  bodies 
in  which  it  is  incorporated,  so  that  the  motion  of 
the  particle  is  vortical.  No  matter  how  large  or  how 
small  the  particle  may  be,  it  exists  in  an  environ- 


FALLACIES  OF  APPREHENSION  357 

ment  of  other  particles  with  which  it  collides;  and 
by  reason  of  its  environment  its  tendency  to  a 
rectilineal  path  is  made  vortical,  and  whenever  this 
vortical  path  is  disturbed  by  an  unwonted  collision, 
it  has  a  tendency  to  be  straightened.  Thus  the 
cannonball  falling  has  its  path  to  the  earth  deflected 
to  one  somewhat  more  in  a  right  line.  In  order  that 
this  statement  may  more  clearly  be  understood,  it 
requires  a  further  development  of  the  motion  of  a 
particle  in  a  hierarchy  of  bodies.  If  we  can  attain  to 
this  concept,  then  the  fundamental  doctrines  of 
physics  are  self-evident. 

The  misapprehensions  relating  to  the  forces  of 
molecular  bodies  linger  much  longer  than  those 
relating  to  stellar  bodies.  Only  in  late  years  have 
we  learned  that  heat  is  a  mode  of  motion,  that  light 
is  a  mode  of  motion,  that  electricity  is  a  mode  of 
motion,  and  a  few  physicists  still  believe  that  gravity 
is  an  occult  force.  Although  the  law  of  the  per- 
sistence of  energy  or  the  correlation  of  forces  is 
established,  yet  a  few  apprehend  gravity  to  be  an 
occult  force,  as  attraction  and  repulsion  involving 
actio  in  distans;  yet  gravity,  when  it  is  understood 
as  a  mode  of  motion,  is  so  simple  that  all  of  its 
laws  can  be  derived  by  the  Euclidean  process  from 
the  law  of  the  persistence  of  energy. 

There  yet  remain  certain  properties  or  bodies  as 
forces  which  usually  are  not  conceived  as  modes  of 
motion.  Inertia  and  rigidity  are  the  two  most 
important.  If  they  are  deprived  of  their  occult 
attributes,  all  other  forces  fall  into  line  as  modes  of 
motion.  Inertia,  as  defined  by  Newton,  is  resist- 
ance to  deflection  of  motion,  or  resistance  to  acceler- 
ation, positive  or  negative ;  but  when  we  remember 


TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

that  a  body  has  the  internal  motion  of  its  parts,  and 
properly  conceive  that  these  motions  are  deflected 
when  the  body  is  accelerated,  inertia  becomes  simple 
as  resistance  to  deflection.  When  we  conceive  that 
inertia  is  resistance  to  deflection,  it  becomes  a 
proposition,  easily  comprehended,  that  rigidity  is 
resistance  to  the  differential  deflection  of  the 
molecular  parts  of  a  body.  Every  one  of  its  minute 
parts  must  be  moved  if  the  body  is  moved,  and  the 
regional  parts  as  distinguished  from  the  molecular 
parts  cannot  be  moved  without  fracturing  the  body. 
Thus  we  see  that  rigidity  can  be  explained  simply 
as  a  mode  of  motion  without  resort  to  occult  force. 

I  am  riding  in  a  railway  coach.  The  world 
moves  by.  Houses  and  men  are  on  the  wing,  land- 
scape and  animals  are  in  flight,  yet  all  this  motion 
in  the  external  world  is  an  illusion  which  I  soon 
learn  to  correct.  I  and  my  railway  coach  are  the 
moving  bodies.  Every  time  I  look  out  of  the  window 
I  correctly  interpret  the  motion  in  this  manner.  My 
coach  stops  at  a  railway  station,  and  the  trains  near 
me  move.  Now,  I  have  formed  a  habit  of  inter- 
preting the  passing  of  outside  bodies  as  motion  in 
myself  and  the  coach,  and  when  the  trains  outside 
move  I  infer  that  I  and  my  coach  move,  and  so 
strong  is  this  inference  that  I  am  impelled  to  look 
for  some  verification  before  I  can  decide  in  which 
body  the  molar  motion  inheres,  for  the  contradictory 
judgments  are  both  intuited. 

It  has  been  demonstrated  by  science  that  motion 
is  persistent — cannot  be  created  or  annihilated — and 
the  demonstration  has  been  accepted  by  a  great 
body  of  scientific  men.  Antecedently  to  this  demon- 
stration Newton  had  propounded  three  laws  of 


FALLACIES  OF  APPREHENSION  359 

motion,  one  of  which  is  that  action  and  reaction  are 
equal  and  in  opposite  directions.  In  this  law  the 
persistence  of  motion  or  the  indestructibility  of 
energy  was  implied,  but  at  first  its  full  significance 
was  not  understood,  perhaps  not  even  by  Newton 
himself. 

In  the  "Principia"  his  first  chapter  is  a  series  of 
definitions,  the  third  of  which  is  as  follows: 

"The  visinsita,  or  innate  force  of  matter,  is  a  power  of  resist- 
ing, by  which  every  body,  as  much  as  in  it  lies,  endeavors  to 
persevere  in  its  present  state,  whether  it  be  of  rest  or  of  moving 
uniformly  forward  in  a  right  line. 

"This  force  is  ever  proportional  to  the  body  whose  force  it  is, 
and  differs  nothing  from  the  inactivity  of  the  mass,  but  in  our 
manner  of  conceiving  it.  A  body,  from  the  inactivity  of 
matter,  is  not  without  difficulty  put  out  of  its  state  of  rest  or 
motion.  Upon  which  account  this  vis  insita  may,  by  a  most 
significant  name,  be  called  vis  inerticz,  or  force  of  inactivity. 
But  a  body  exerts  this  force  only  when  another  force  impressed 
upon  it  endeavors  to  change  its  condition,  and  the  exercise  of 
this  force  may  be  considered  both  as  resistance  and  impulse ;  it 
is  resistance,  in  so  far  as  the  body  for  maintaining  its  present 
state,  withstands  the  force  impressed ;  it  is  impulse,  in  so  far  as 
the  body,  by  not  easily  giving  way  to  the  impressed  force  of 
another,  endeavors  to  change  the  state  of  that  other.  Resist- 
ance is  usually  ascribed  to  bodies  at  rest,  and  impulse  to  those 
in  motion;  but  motion  and  rest  as  commonly  conceived  are 
only  relatively  distinguished,  nor  are  those  bodies  always  truly 
at  rest  which  commonly  are  taken  to  be  so." 

In  the  last  clause  it  is  apparent  that  Newton  him- 
self was  conscious  of  an  illusion  in  the  common  con- 
ception of  the  term  rest,  and  it  is  plain  from  his 
entire  discussion  that  his  term  inertia  stood  for  real 
force,  although  many  scholars  since  his  time  have 
denied  this  proposition.  Had  Newton  discovered 
the  real  nature  of  what  he  called  vis  inerticz,  the 


360  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

"Principia"  would  have  been  simplified,  as  it  has 
been  since  his  time,  by  definitions  given  to  momen- 
tum, energy,  force,  and  power.  But  even  these 
newer  definitions  can  be  revised  and  the  subject 
presented  in  a  simpler  manner. 

Vis  inertia ',  or  inertia,  is  a  component  of  real  force, 
inherent  in  every  particle  of  matter  as  speed  of 
motion,  which  can  be  changed  in  direction  only 
through  the  agency  of  collision.  The  explanation  of 
Newton's  third  law  of  motion  in  this  manner 
changes  the  ideas  of  motion  as  they  have  hitherto 
existed  in  philosophy.  Motion  as  speed  is  inherent, 
and  not  something  imposed  from  without.  If, 
indeed,  this  be  true,  then  much  reasoning  in  scien- 
tific circles  must  be  revised,  for  it  has  far-reaching 
results. 

In  every  mind  the  term  rest  seems  to  imply 
absence  of  motion,  and  thus  to  have  a  negative  con- 
tent. This  implication  still  properly  remains  with 
the  term,  and  while  rest  does  not  mean  absence  of 
all  motion,  it  still  means  absence  of  molar  motion. 
To  the  ancients,  it  meant  absence  of  all  motion,  and 
this  is  the  fallacy,  but  it  still  means  absence  of  molar 
motion.  My  pulse  beats  as  the  heart  beats  and  the 
blood  flows.  The  book  on  my  desk  is  pulseless ;  that 
is,  it  is  devoid  of  that  motion  of  blood  impelled  by  the 
heart  at  every  beat ;  still  it  has  motion,  though  not 
pulse  motion;  so  the  book  which  lies  on  the  desk 
has  motion,  but  not  molar  motion.  As  the  book  is 
not  devoid  of  motion  because  it  has  no  pulse,  so  it  is 
not  devoid  of  motion  because  it  has  no  molar  motion. 

Molar  motion  is  the  only  motion  that  can  be 
seen  directly  by  the  eye  without  instrumental  aid. 
These  molar  motions  have  been  so  often  inferred 


FALLACIES  OF  APPREHENSION  361 

and  verified  that  the  concept  is  intuitional  in  every 
human  mind.  The  concept  of  stellar  motion  has 
also  been  verified,  and  the  concept  is  intuitive  with 
some  but  not  with  all  minds,  but  the  concept  of 
stellar  motion  has  the  same  validity  as  the  concept 
of  molar  motion.  The  concept  of  molecular  motion, 
though  not  intuitional  to  most  people,  is  just  as  valid 
as  that  of  stellar  or  molar  motion. 

Concepts  of  molar,  stellar  and  molecular  motion 
are  formed  in  precisely  the  same  manner  by  the 
consolidation  of  verified  judgments.  The  distinction 
is  not  between  sense  judgments  and  intuitive  judg- 
ments, but  between  verified  and  unverified  judg- 
ments, for  intuitive  judgments  may  themselves  be 
fallacious. 

If  I  seem  to  dwell  on  this  point  and  elaborate  the 
explanation,  it  is  because  the  illusion  of  a  motion- 
less state  must  be  dispelled  before  other  facts  in 
relation  to  motion  can  properly  be  considered. 

An  unquestioned  fallacy  exerts  a  vital  influence  on 
all  modes  of  thought  to  which  it  may  relate,  and 
engenders  a  spirit  of  defense  that  easily  develops 
into  antagonism. 

In  Spencer's  "First  Principles,"  the  third  chapter 
is  on  ultimate  scientific  ideas.  In  the  seventeenth 
section  he  says: 

"A  body  impelled  by  the  hand  is  clearly  perceived  to  move, 
and  to  move  in  a  definite  direction :  there  seems  at  first  sight 
no  possibility  of  doubting  that  its  motion  is  real,  or  that  it  is 
towards  a  given  point.  Yet  it  is  easy  to  show  that  we  not  only 
may  be,  but  usually  are,  quite  wrong  in  both  these  judgments. 
Here,  for  instance,  is  a  ship  which,  for  simplicity's  sake,  we 
will  suppose  to  be  anchored  at  the  equator  with  her  head  to  the 
west.  When  the  captain  walks  from  stem  to  stern,  in  what 
direction  does  he  move?  East  is  the  obvious  answer — an 


362  TRUTH   AND  ERROR 

answer  which  for  the  moment  may  pass  without  criticism.  But 
now  the  anchor  is  heaved,  and  the  vessel  sails  to  the  west 
with  a  velocity  equal  to  that  at  which  the  captain  walks.  In 
what  direction  does  he  now  move  when  he  goes  from  stem  to 
stern?  You  cannot  say  east,  for  the  vessel  is  carrying  him  as 
fast  towards  the  west  as  he  walks  to  the  east;  and  you  cannot 
say  west,  for  the  converse  reason.  In  respect  to  surrounding 
space  he  is  stationary;  though  to  all  on  board  the  ship  he 
seems  to  be  moving.  But  now  are  we  quite  sure  of  this  con- 
clusion?" 

Then  he  goes  on  to  discuss  the  motions  of  molar 
bodies  on  the  surface  of  the  earth  as  related  to  the 
rotation  of  the  earth  on  its  axis,  the  revolution  of 
the  earth  about  the  sun,  and  the  revolution  of  the 
solar  system  about  some  point  in  the  heavens  lying 
in  the  direction  of  Hercules,  but  he  neglects  the 
molecular  motion  within  the  molar  body  itself.  In 
this  discussion  he  is  evidently  under  misapprehen- 
sion, which  has  already  been  explained  and  the 
certitude  demonstrated.  This  certitude  is  that  the 
acceleration  of  a  body  in  its  proper  motion  is  deflec- 
tion of  its  particles.  Thus,  when  a  ship  is  moving 
in  one  direction  at  a  certain  rate,  and  the  captain 
is  walking  from  stem  to  stern  at  the  same  rate,  his 
body  is  deflected  by  the  ship  as  molar  motion  in  one 
direction  and  by  motility  in  the  opposite  direction ; 
that  is,  there  is  a  double  system  of  deflection  of  the 
particles  of  his  body  that  compensate  one  another. 
The  whole  subject  is  thus  explained  as  a  double 
deflection,  and  all  the  mystery  is  solved. 

Later  in  the  section  Spencer  says: 

"Another  insuperable  difficulty  presents  itself  when  we  con- 
template the  transfer  of  Motion.  Habit  blinds  us  to  the 
marvelousness  of  this  phenomenon.  Familiar  with  the  fact 
from  childhood,  we  see  nothing  remarkable  in  the  ability  of  a 


FALLACIES  OF  APPREHENSION  363 

moving  thing  to  generate  movement  in  a  thing  that  is  station- 
ary. It  is,  however,  impossible  to  understand  it.  In  what 
respect  does  a  body  after  impact  differ  from  itself  before 
impact?  What  is  this  added  to  it  which  does  not  sensibly 
affect  any  of  its  properties  and  yet  enables  it  to  traverse 
space?  Here  is  an  object  at  rest,  and  here  is  the  same  object 
moving.  In  the  one  state  it  has  no  tendency  to  change  its 
place ;  but  in  the  other  it  is  obliged  at  each  instant  to  assume  a 
new  position.  What  is  it  which  will  for  ever  go  on  producing 
this  effect  without  being  exhausted?  and  how  does  it  dwell  in 
the  object?  The  motion  you  say  has  been  communicated.  But 
how? — What  has  been  communicated?  The  striking  body  has 
not  transferred  a  thing  to  the  body  struck ;  and  it  is  equally 
out  of  the  question  to  say  that  it  has  transferred  an  attribute. 
What  then  has  it  transferred?" 

How  simple  the  explanation!  Motion  as  speed 
cannot  be  transferred,  but  motion  as  path  may  be 
deflected. 

Then  he  goes  on  to  demonstrate  the  absurdities  of 
transferring  motion  as  speed  from  one  body  to 
another,  and  he  finally  says : 

"Thus  neither  when  considered  in  connection  with  Space,  nor 
when  considered  in  connection  with  Matter,  nor  when  con- 
sidered in  connection  with  Rest,  do  we  find  that  Motion  is  truly 
cognizable.  All  efforts  to  understand  its  essential  nature  do 
but  bring  us  to  alternative  impossibilities  of  thought." 

In  this  argument  he  assumes  that  the  transference 
of  motion  is  the  transfer  of  speed,  but  we  have 
demonstrated  that  the  transference  of  motion  is  only 
the  transfer  of  direction  by  change  in  the  paths  of 
each,  which  is  simple  and  can  be  understood  by  a 
boy.  But  the  transfer  of  motion  as  speed  leads  to 
curious  and  contradictory  conclusions,  some  of 
which  Spencer  develops.  Here  he  is  reasoning 
about  a  fallacy,  something  which  does  not  exist,  and 
something  which  is  not  only  unknown,  but  unknow- 


364  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

able,  as  he  affirms.  In  all  of  part  first  of  the  "First 
Principles,"  wherever  he  discusses  scientific  subjects, 
he  deals  with  fallacies  and  assumes  non-existent 
things  borrowed  from  the  history  of  metaphysical 
opinion,  all  involving  contradictions,  and  as  no 
explanation  of  them  can  be  given,  assumes  that 
they  are  unknowable ;  still  he  affirms  that  they  are 
known  as  something  relative  which  he  explains  as 
something  known  in  a  symbolic  manner.  Now, 
these  fallacies  are  all  represented  in  literature,  and 
have  words  by  which  they  are  known,  but  they  are 
symbols  of  fallacies  when  improper  meanings  are 
given  to  them,  but  symbols  of  certitudes  when 
proper  meanings  are  implied.  In  all  the  history  of 
metaphysic  I  know  of  no  better  illustrations  of 
reasoning  about  fallacies  than  are  here  found  in  this 
first  part,  •  for  the  propositions  are  stated  with  singular 
clearness;  they  are  never  presented  in  obscure 
rhetoric,  nor  are  they  enforced  by  an  appeal  to  moral 
sanctions. 

Spencer  is  right.  The  doctrine  that  motion  as 
speed  can  be  transferred  from  one  particle  to 
another  is  incomprehensible,  or,  to  use  his  language, 
is  unknowable,  or,  to  use  my  language,  it  is  absurd. 
We  must  not  believe  incomprehensible,  unknowable, 
or  absurd  things.  Since  the  days  of  Euclid,  we  are 
accustomed  to  the  doctrine  of  reductio  ad  absurdum 
in  scientific  logic.  If  we  can  reduce  a  proposition 
to  absurdity  we  reject  it. 

Spencer  goes  on  in  the  same  chapter  to  a  con- 
sideration of  force.  He  says: 

"On  lifting  a  chair,  the  force  exerted  we  regard  as  equal  to 
that  antagonistic  force  called  the  weight  of  the  chair ;  and  we 
cannot  think  of  these  as  equal  without  thinking  of  them  as  like 


FALLACIES  OF  APPREHENSION  365 

in  kind ;  since  equality  is  conceivable  only  between  things  that 
are  connatural.  The  axiom  that  action  and  reaction  are  equal 
and  in  opposite  directions,  commonly  exemplified  by  this  very- 
instance  of  muscular  effort  versus  weight,  cannot  be  mentally 
realized  on  any  other  condition.  Yet,  contrariwise,  it  is 
incredible  that  the  force  as  existing  in  the  chair  really 
resembles  the  force  as  present  to  our  minds.  It  scarcely  needs 
to  point  out  that  the  weight  of  the  chair  produces  in  us  various 
feelings  according  as  we  support  it  by  a  single  finger,  or  the 
whole  hand,  or  the  leg ;  and  hence  to  argue  that  as  it  cannot 
be  like  all  these  sensations  there  is  no  reason  to  believe  it  like 
any.  It  suffices  to  remark  that  since  the  force  as  known  to  us 
is  an  affection  of  consciousness,  we  cannot  conceive  the  force 
existing  in  the  chair  under  the  same  form  without  endowing 
the  chair  with  consciousness.  So  that  it  is  absurd  to  think  of 
Force  as  in  itself  like  our  sensation  of  it,  and  yet  necessary  so 
to  think  of  it  if  we  realize  it  in  consciousness  at  all." 

The  force  in  the  chair  is  molecular  force ;  the  force 
in  the  arm  is  vital  force,  partly  transmuted  into 
motility,  and  in  the  act  of  lifting  the  chair  molecular 
force  is  transmuted  into  molar  force;  force  in  the 
chair  is  one  mode  of  force,  and  in  the  arm  another 
mode  of  force ;  but  they  are  equal,  and  action  and 
reaction  take  place,  producing  effects  in  opposite 
directions.  The  chair  moves  up,  and  the  man  and  the 
earth  move  down.  Of  the  force  in  the  arm  the  man 
is  conscious ;  of  the  force  in  the  chair  he  is  cognizant, 
that  is,  it  is  learned  by  combined  judgments  through 
inference.  But  Spencer  has  never  analyzed  judg- 
ment; he  does  not  distinguish  between  conscious- 
ness and  inference,  sometimes  using  consciousness  in 
the  sense  in  which  science  must  use  it,  but  oftener 
using  it  in  the  sense  of  cognition,  and  always  con- 
founding the  two  meanings,  he  rests  under  the  fal- 
lacy of  the  double  meaning  in  consciousness,  and 
reifies  it  as  cognition  itself.  But  the  illusion  which 


366  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

especially  concerns  us  here  inheres  in  his  notion  of 
force.  With  him  force  is  the  ultimate  property  into 
which  all  other  properties  are  resolved,  for  he  seems 
to  resolve  kind  into  force,  but  of  this  I  am  not  sure ; 
plainly,  he  resolves  extension  into  force,  by  attempt- 
ing to  show  that  our  knowledge  of  extension  is 
derived  from  force,  not  seeing  that  there  can  be 
no  knowledge  of  force  without  a  knowledge  of 
form — that  the  two  are  indissoluble  properties. 

Spencer  is  supposed  to  be  the  philosopher  of  evo- 
lution, and  that  is  his  grand  theme,  but  he  resolves 
change  into  force,  not  seeing  that  there  can  be  no 
change  without  force,  and  no  force  without  change. 
He  seems  to  resolve  judgment  under  the  term  con- 
sciousness, or  under  the  term  mind,  into  force, 
though  his  doctrine  on  this  subject  is  obscure ;  but 
with  great  emphasis  and  great  reiteration,  he  denies 
that  judgment  as  mind  or  consciousness  or  cogni- 
tion can  be  rendered  in  terms  of  motion.  In  this 
respect  he  is  sound.  With  him  motion  is  derived 
from  force,  not  force  from  motion,  and  from  this 
force  he  derives  change  and  persistence ;  the  absolute 
of  change  he  explains  as  persistence  of  force.  Then 
he  derives  extension  from  force,  and  vaguely  derives 
kind  from  force,  and  leaves  force  standing  as  the 
substrate  of  the  substrate — the  substrate  of  that 
which  we  call  matter  or  substance.  Then  he  argues 
that  extension  as  a  reality  must  be  resolved  into 
void  space,  and  he  affirms,  without  attempting  to 
demonstrate  it,  that  time,  as  persistence  and  change, 
must  be  resolved  into  void  time,  so  that  with  three 
fallacious  entities — void  space,  void  time,  and  the 
resolution  of  all  of  the  attributes  of  substance  into 
void  force — he  has  three  nothings,  three  voids, 


FALLACIES  OF  APPREHENSION  367 

three  illusions,  with  which  he  deals  in  the  first  part 
of  his  book ;  and  reasoning  about  these  illusions  he 
comes  to  the  conclusion  that  they  are  unknowable, 
but  that  they  are  also  known  in  a  symbolic  manner, 
and  how  known  in  a  symbolic  manner  we  have 
already  shown — that  it  consists  in  using  terms  in  an 
illegitimate  manner. 

It  is  a  dangerous  doctrine  to  claim  that  we  know 
something  because  we  can  talk  about  it,  for  we  can 
talk  about  fallacies  and  hypotheses  as  well  as  about 
certitudes.  Fallacies  coined  into  words  or  coined 
into  concepts  are  still  fallacies. 

In  the  third  chapter  of  the  second  part,  beginning 
with  the  46th  section,  Spencer  says: 

"That  sceptical  state  of  mind  which  the  criticisms  of  Philos- 
ophy usually  produce,  is,  in  great  measure,  caused  by  the  misin- 
terpretation of  words.  A  sense  of  universal  illusion  ordinarily 
follows  the  reading  of  metaphysics ;  and  is  strong  in  proportion 
as  the  argument  has  appeared  conclusive.  This  sense  of  univer- 
sal illusion  would  probably  never  have  arisen,  had  the  terms  used 
been  always  rightly  construed.  Unfortunately,  these  terms 
have  by  association  acquired  meanings  that  are  quite  different 
from  those  given  to  them  in  philosophical  discussions ;  and  the 
ordinary  meanings  being  unavoidably  suggested,  there  results 
more  or  less  of  that  dreamlike  idealism  which  is  so  incongruous 
without  instinctive  convictions.  The  word  phenomenon  and 
its  equivalent  word  appearance,  are  in  great  part  to  blame  for 
this.  In  ordinary  speech,  these  are  uniformly  employed  in 
reference  to  visual  perceptions.  Habit,  almost,  if  not  quite, 
disables  us  from  thinking  of  appearance  except  as  something 
seen ;  and  though  phenomenon  has  a  more  generalized  mean- 
ing, yet  we  cannot  rid  it  of  associations  with  apearance,  which 
is  its  verbal  equivalent.  When,  therefore,  Philosophy  proves 
that  our  knowledge  of  the  external  world  can  be  but  phenom- 
enal— when  it  concludes  that  the  things  of  which  we  are  con- 
scious are  appearances ;  it  inevitably  arouses  in  us  the  notion 
of  an  illusiveness  like  that  to  which  our  visual  perceptions  are 


368  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

so  liable  in  comparison  with  our  tactual  perceptions.  Good 
pictures  show  us  that  the  aspects  of  things  may  be  very  nearly 
simulated  by  colors  on  canvas.  The  looking-glass  still  more 
distinctly  proves  how  deceptive  is  sight  when  unverified  by 
touch.  And  the  frequent  cases  in  which  we  misinterpret  the 
impressions  made  on  our  eyes,  and  think  we  see  something 
which  we  do  not  see,  further  shake  our  faith  in  vision.  So  that 
the  implication  of  uncertainty  has  infected  the  very  word 
appearance.  Hence,  Philosophy,  by  giving  it  an  extended 
meaning,  leads  us  to  think  of  all  our  senses  as  deceiving  us  in 
the  same  way  that  the  eyes  do ;  and  so  makes  us  feel  ourselves 
floating  in  a  world  of  phantasms.  Had  phenomenon  and 
appearance  no  such  misleading  associations,  little,  if  any,  of 
this  mental  confusion  would  result.  Or  did  we  in  place  of 
them  use  the  term  effect,  which  is  equally  applicable  to  all 
impressions  produced  on  consciousness  through  any  of  the 
senses,  and  which  carries  with  it  in  thought  the  necessary 
correlative  cause,  with  which  it  is  equally  real,  we  should  be  in 
little  danger  of  falling  into  the  insanities  of  idealism." 

Here  the  confusion  which  arises  from  fallacy, 
together  with  the  contradictions  involved,  are  fit- 
tingly set  forth;  but  our  philosopher  accepts  the 
fallacies  and  indorses  the  contradictions,  and  finally 
speculates  with  the  difference  in  meaning  between  the 
terms  phenomenon  and  appearance,  and  he  adopts 
the  philosophy  of  noumenon  and  phenomenon,  and 
makes  the  noumenon  to  stand  for  the  thing  in  itself 
the  occult  force,  which  he  supposes  to  be  void 
substance  and  void  motion.  While  Spencer  reasons 
about  nonentities  or  fallacies  in  his  first  part,  he 
sets  forth  many  important  principles  in  the  second 
part,  but  they  are  all  more  or  less  vitiated  by 
fallacies. 

How  shall  we  rid  ourselves  of  these  fallacies? 
There  is  one  simple  rule.  All  contradictory  con- 
cepts must  be  examined  to  discover  the  judgments 
that  lead  to  contradictions,  when  correct  reasoning 


FALLACIES  OF  APPREHENSION  369 

will  eliminate  the  incongruous.  We  may  always 
know  that  concepts  are  incongruous  or  contradictory 
when  they  lead  to  a  belief  in  the  unknowable. 
Belief  in  the  unknowable  is  pessimism  about  reason 
and  is  an  evidence  of  fallacy.  Fallacies  can  be  eradi- 
cated only  by  a  thorough  examination  of  the  con- 
cepts involved.  The  final  fallacy  on  which  the 
philosophy  of  the  contradictory  rests  can  be  cor- 
rected only  by  systematic  verification  of  the  ele- 
mentary judgments  of  which  it  is  composed,  and 
thus  by  eliminating  the  errors. 
In  the  5oth  section,  Spencer  says: 

"It  is  a  truism  to  say  that  the  nature  of  this  undecomposable 
element  of  our  knowledge  is  inscrutable.  If,  to  use  an 
algebraic  illustration,  we  represent  Matter,  Motion,  and  Force, 
by  the  symbols,  x,  y,  and  z;  then,  we  may  ascertain  the  values 
of  x  and  y  in  terms  of  z;  but  the  value  of  2  can  never  be  found : 
2  is  the  unknown  quantity  which  must  forever  remain 
unknown ;  for  the  obvious  reason  that  there  is  nothing  in  which 
its  value  can  be  expressed.  It  is  within  the  possible  reach  of 
our  intelligence  to  go  on  simplifying  the  equations  of  all  phenom- 
ena, until  the  complex  symbols  which  formulate  them  are 
reduced  to  certain  functions  of  this  ultimate  symbol ;  but  when 
we  have  done  this,  we  have  reached  that  limit  which  eternally 
divides  science  from  nescience. ' ' 

But  his  letters  stand  for  fallacies ;  the  certitudes 
should  be  represented  by  A,  B,  and  C,  then  C 
should  be  resolved  into  B,  and  B  into  A,  as  one  of 
the  known  concomitants  of  matter. 

Bear  with  me  in  the  reiteration  of  a  fundamental 
illustration.  A  and  B  are  particles  that  collide 
because  they  have  incident  paths.  When  they 
collide  action  and  reaction  are  instantaneous  and 
equal,  and  no  speed  is  lost  in  either,  but  when  we  con- 
sider the  antecedent  and  the  consequent  as  cause  and 


37°  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

effect,  we  consider  the  angle  of  incidence  and  com- 
pare it  with  the  angle  of  reflection,  and  find  them 
equal.  If  the  angle  of  incidence  is  90  degrees,  the 
angle  of  reflection  is  90  degrees,  and  the  particles 
return  reversely  by  the  paths  in  which  they 
approached.  If  the  angle  of  incidence  is  less  than 
90  degrees,  the  angle  of  reflection  is  less  than  90 
degrees.  If  the  angle  of  incidence  is  one  degree,  the 
angle  of  deflection  is  but  one  degree.  In  all  of  these 
cases  the  force  remains  equal,  and  in  all  of  these  cases 
the  effect  remains  equal  to  the  cause,  but  the  force 
cannot  be  said  to  be  equal  to  the  cause  or  to  the  effect, 
for  the  cause  is  angle  of  incidence,  and  the  effect  is 
angle  of  reflection.  This  simple  explanation  of  the 
difference  between  causation  and  force  is  a  complete 
refutation  of  all  of  Spencer's  philosophy  of  the 
unknowable.  It  is  also  a  complete  refutation  of  the 
doctrine  of  the  dissipation  of  motion,  which  he 
accepts  and  uses  as  fundamental  to  the  explanation 
of  evolution. 

This  is  an  illusion  which  we  must  not  neg- 
lect. When  it  is  held  that  motion  as  speed  can 
leap  from  one  body  to  another,  the  doctrine  of  the 
dissipation  of  motion  is  invented.  When  the  heated 
iron  cools,  it  is  supposed  that  the  iron  yields  its 
motion  as  speed,  and  dissipates  it  into  surrounding 
objects,  and  especially  into  the  ether;  it  was  not  seen 
that  the  thermal  motion  in  the  body  is  transmuted 
into  another  mode  of  molecular  motion  still  within  the 
body,  as  exhibited  in  strength  and  rigidity.  From 
this  fallacy  logical  consequences  are  derived  when 
it  is  held  that  the  sun  is  dissipating  its  motion 
because  it  is  a  cooling  body.  For  does  not  the 
motion  of  the  sun  as  heat  come  through  the  ether  to 


FALLACIES  OF  APPREHENSION  371 

the  earth,  and  to  all  other  external  bodies?  Yes,  but 
not  as  motion,  but  as  cause.  Path  of  motion,  not 
speed  of  motion,  is  communicated.  The  different 
modes  of  heat  and  of  light  in  the  ether  are  not  differ- 
ent modes  of  speed,  but  different  modes  of  trajectory. 
Whether  the  sun  can  continue  to  shine  is  not  a  ques- 
tion of  the  dissipation  of  motion  as  speed,  but  a 
question  of  the  transmutation  of  one  form  of  motion, 
called  heat,  into  another  form  of  molecular  motion 
in  the  body  itself.  If  the  conditions  for  transform- 
ing1 heat  into  another  mode  of  motion  are  not  favor- 
able to  this  transmutation,  then  the  sun  may  still 
continue  to  shine  and  make  the  planets  glad. 

Let  me  suggest,  merely  as  an  hypothesis,  some 
reasons  for  believing  that  the  sun  will  not  go  out. 
On  the  earth  we  discover  four  partially  differentiated 
bodies :  air,  water,  rocks,  and  the  great  central  body. 
Geologists  have  established  the  theory  that  this 
great  central  body  is  in  a  trans-fluid  condition,  due 
to  pressure,  and  that  thus  its  heat  cannot  be  trans- 
muted into  structural  motion.  Now  the  s.un  is  a 
much  larger  body  than  the  earth,  and  for  this  reason 
the  materials  in  its  outer  crust  have  high  specific 
gravity,  and  by  reason  of  this  higher  specific  gravity 
the  solid  crust  must  always  be  thinner,  and  perhaps 
this  thinner  crust  cannot  be  supported  against  the 
stresses  and  strains  produced  by  the  stellar  motion 
of  the  sun,  and  the  stresses  and  strains  developed  in 
the  crust  itself  and  coming  from  the  molten  nucleus. 
It  may  be  that  the  sun's  spots,  changeable  as  they 
are,  give  evidence  of  the  breaking  down,  remelting, 
and  reforming  of  this  thin  and  variable  crust. 

I  do  not  present  this  exposition  as  anything  more 
than  an  hypothesis,  but  perhaps  it  may  be  considered 


372  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

worthy  of  an  examination  by  those  better  equipped 
for  the  investigation.  If  we  are  to  accept  the  per- 
sistence of  energy,  we  must  accept  the  persistence 
of  motion;  if  we  are  to  accept  the  persistence  of 
motion,  we  are  compelled  to  accept  the  persistence 
of  motion  as  speed  in  every  particle.  Much  scien- 
tific speculation  needs  revision. 

We  must  now  turn  our  attention  to  the  fallacies 
of  apprehension,  which  are  derived  from  hallucina- 
tions, and  which  first  become  specters,  and  then  in 
the  stage  of  apprehension  become  phantasms.  By 
contemplating  hallucinations  as  phantasms,  another 
stage  in  the  development  of  delusion  is  produced. 
When  we  consider  specters  in  action  we  consider 
phantasms. 

When  we  dream  we  often  go  abroad,  and  the 
specters  of  our  dreams  are  engaged  in  activities.  It 
is  from  this  phenomenon  that  the  primitive  mind 
reaches  the  conclusion  that  our  ghosts  may  leave  the 
body.  Primitive  men  realize  in  others,  and  believe 
of  themselves,  that  the  body  remains  quiescent  in 
sleep,  and  to  account  for  the  actions  of  the  specters 
of  the  dream  they  conclude  that  the  ghost  can  leave 
the  body.  When  this  false  judgment  becomes 
habitual — i.  e.,  that  the  property  of  conception  or 
judgment  can  depart  from  the  body  and  sustain  an 
independent  existence,  without  number,  space, 
motion,  and  time,  or  in  reciprocal  terms,  without 
kind,  form,  force,  and  causation — then  the  specters 
of  dreams  may  have  a  separate  existence  away  from 
the  body,  as  shades,  subtle  forms,  or  occult  person- 
ages. 

Among  tribal  men  these  occult  personages  usually 
leave  the  body  by  the  portal  of  the  nostrils,  and 


FALLACIES  OF  APPREHENSION          373 

return  to  it  by  the  same  gateway.  There  is  a  vast 
amount  of  lore  concerning  ghosts  and  the  circum- 
stances under  which  they  leave  the  body.  Stories  of 
ghosts  that  leave  when  the  body  sleeps ;  stories  of 
ghosts  that  leave  when  the  person  is  absorbed  in 
deep  contemplation,  and  the  ghost  snatches  the 
opportunity  to  make  a  journey  by  itself;  stories 
when  ghosts  leave  the  body  for  the  purpose  of  gain- 
ing information  in  distant  parts;  stories  of  ghosts 
that  are  sent  on  journeys  by  hypnotic  suggestion; 
stories  of  ghosts  that  have  wended  their  way  to  a 
distant  land  on  wings  of  magic,  at  the  will  of  the 
intoxicated  shaman ;  and  stories  of  ghosts  that  have 
permanently  left  the  body  and  thus  have  produced 
insanity,  are  abundant  in  the  folk-lore  of  super- 
stitious people.  In  the  same  manner  the  ghosts  of 
others  may  come  to  us  in  our  dreams,  and  be  their 
cause.  They  may  come  to  us  in  states  of  ecstasy, 
and  make  us  perform  many  wonderful  deeds ;  they 
may  come  to  us  in  hypnotism  and  become  foreign 
tenants  of  the  body  to  do  their  own  sweet  will; 
they  may  come  to  us  in  states  of  intoxication  and 
perform  antics  in  our  bodies  and  revel  in  delight,  for 
in  insanity  they  take  more  permanent  possession  of 
the  body,  and  our  lives  will  be  controlled  by  foreign 
residents.  It  is  thus  that  the  actions  of  men  are 
attributed  to  ghosts — perhaps  wise  actions  when  they 
go  out  and  return  to  us  with  information  from  the 
external  world;  perhaps  foolish  actions  when  they 
take  possession  of  us  while  our  ghosts  are  away.  It 
is  in  this  manner  that  many  of  the  mysteries  of 
existence  are  explained. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 

FALLACIES    OF    REFLECTION 

Fallacies  of  reflection  are  fallacies  of  time  and 
cause,  and  they  may  be  classed  as  misreflections  and 
myths.  The  misreflections  are  a  fourth  group  of 
illusions  and  the  myths  a  fourth  group  of  delusions. 

Fallacies  concerning  time  are  analogous  to  those 
concerning  space.  Time  is  persistence  and  change. 
It  is  not  blank  time,  it  is  a  time  of  something  that 
exists,  not  the  time  of  something  that  does  not 
exist.  It  is  the  time  in  which  all  existence  persists 
and  in  which  it  changes.  The  seed  is  developed  on 
the  apple-tree.  Its  time  is  the  period  of  its  existence 
as  a  germ,  but  the  germ  itself  was  developed  by  the 
incorporation  of  molecules.  The  molecules  existing 
as  particles  in  the  air  were  transformed  into  the 
seed,  but  the  molecules  persisted  before  the  seed  was 
formed.  The  persistence  is  eternal  in  the  atom 
so  far  as  we  know,  but  it  is  changeable  from  its  state 
in  the  air  or  the  water  into  its  state  in  the  seed,  so 
its  persistence  is  partly  taken  up  while  in  the  seed 
state.  The  seed  is  planted  and  becomes  a  tree  by 
addition  of  other  particles  from  the  air  and  the 
water,  and  the  eternal  persistence  of  all  the  particles 
is  occupied  for  a  period  in  the  state  of  the  tree. 
Now,  the  existence  of  the  molecules  in  the  air  and 
the  water,  and  their  existence  in  the  seed,  and  their 
existence  in  the  tree,  and  finally  their  existence  as 
water  and  air,  when  the  tree  is  reduced  to  another 

374 


FALLACIES  OF  REFLECTION  375 

state  by  decay,  is  a  permanent  existence,  while  the 
temporary  existence  is  in  the  seed  and  the  tree. 

Before  man  knew  that  the  seed  was  a  continued 
existence  of  particles,  and  that  the  tree  was  a  con- 
tinued existence  of  particles,  it  was  supposed  that 
the  time  of  these  existences  was  limited,  and  that 
there  was  a  blank  time.  Out  of  this  nothing,  some- 
thing was  created,  and  these  creations  were  in 
continual  change,  which  were  called  fluxes  or  becom- 
ings. The  real  nature  of  persistence  not  being  under- 
stood there  was  assumed  to  be  a  persistence  which  was 
blank,  and  the  blank  was  called  time.  But  persist- 
ence, not  being  known,  though  called  time,  was 
held  to  be  the  thing-in -itself,  which  indeed  it  was  in 
part,  and  it  was  called  noumenon.  When  the  noume- 
non  was  discovered,  the  idea  of  blank  time  was  still 
retained  and  it  was  still  noumenon,  while  the  real 
persistence  was  called  a  phenomenon.  Now  it  is 
apparent  that  this  blank  time  is  a  fallacy.  It  was 
thus,  as  in  this  case,  that  all  unknown  things,  when 
they  came  to  be  known,  were  transferred  to  the 
things  which  were  called  phenomena ;  and  the  blank 
things  were  still  called  noumena.  Thus  noumenon 
was  a  word  originally  valid,  an  x  in  logical  com- 
putation, whose  value  was  to  be  determined;  but 
ultimately  it  came  to  mean  a  something  which  could 
not  be  determined — not  only  an  unknown  but  an 
unknowable  thing,  and  a  knowable  thing  was  held  to 
be  only  appearance  and  was  called  phenomenon. 

My  horse  is  stolen,  by  whom  I  know  not,  and  I 
say  there  is  a  thief,  but  as  I  do  not  know  this  thief 
I  call  him  a  noumenon.  But  the  detectives  capture 
him  and  he  is  sent  to  prison;  now  the  thief 
becomes  a  phenomenon,  for  he  is  apparent — he 


376  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

may  be  seen  in  the  jail.  Now,  suppose  that  I  had 
talked  about  this  noumenon,  when  he  was  unknown, 
in  a  conglomeration  of  attributes — as  an  uncanny 
man,  as  a  vicious  man  seeking-  another  that  he  may 
devour  him,  as  a  man  of  seven  heads  and  ten  horns ; 
but  now  I  find  him  only  a  poor  misguided  man  with 
the  vice  of  cleptomania  or  the  greed  for  possession 
which  made  him  a  criminal,  but  without  multiple 
heads  or  multiple  horns.  Having  discovered  my 
fallacy  in  this  case  I  still  retain  the  notion  of 
existence  of  such  a  thing  as  I  had  imagined,  and  I 
continue  to  believe  in  it  and  still  call  it  a  noumenon. 
In  the  same  manner  every  noumenon  of  metaphysics 
can  be  traced  back  to  the  original  fallacy-  entertained 
by  mankind  and  still  supposed  to  exist  as  a  reality 
in  the  universe.  When  all  of  these  illusions  are 
considered  we  have  the  world  of  occult  noumena — 
the  theater  of  idealism. 

Kant  explained  his  occult  space,  not  as  a  property 
of  physical  nature,  but  as  a  form  of  the  mind,  what- 
ever that  may  be.  In  the  same  manner  his  occult 
time  was  not  an  existence  in  physical  nature,  but  also 
was  a  form  of  the  mind.  He  had  not  the  insight  to  dis- 
cover that  such  forms  are  fallacies,  like  the  dome  of 
the  sky  in  the  mind  of  an  ignorant  man;  still,  he 
had  the  logical  integrity  to  see  that  such  space 
and  time  are  incongruous  with  a  space  of  extension 
and  position  and  a  time  of  persistence  and  change, 
and  he  boldly  followed  his  logic  in  formulating  a  set 
of  antinomies,  or  contradictions,  both  of  which  he 
seems  to  have  believed  as  valid. 

Kant  himself  was  accustomed  to  speak  of  ideas  as 
forms ;  that  is,  to  speak  of  one  abstract  concomitant 
in  terms  of  another  abstract  concomitant.  For 


FALLACIES  OF  REFLECTION  377 

science  this  habit  is  fatal.  Tropes  are  good  as 
poetry,  but  vicious  as  terms  in  propositions  of  logic. 
Systems  of  cosmology  originate  in  this  manner.  In 
tribal  society  the  earth  is  made  polar  from  east  to 
west.  About  this  Occidental  and  Oriental  pole  a 
system  of  worlds  is  projected — a  world  of  the  east, 
a  world  of  the  west,  and,  at  right  angles  to  these,  a 
world  of  the  north  and  a  world  of  the  south,  a  world 
of  the  zenith,  and  a  world  of  the  nadir,  with  a  mid- 
world  which  is  a  plane  with  sides  and  corners.  All 
the  lower  tribes  of  mankind  believe  in  such  a  world, 
and  there  are  expressions  used  in  civilized  society 
which  are  survivals  from  this  stage 'of  belief.  To 
primitive  man  these  worlds  are  the  realities  of  his 
cosmology,  and  he  uses  these  supposed  realities  as 
nuclei  for  many  concepts.  For  example, he  formulates 
social  laws  as  the  laws  of  the  east,  the  laws  of  the 
west,  the  laws  of  the  north,  the  laws  of  the  south, 
the  laws  of  the  zenith,  and  the  laws  of  the  nadir. 
Crosses,  swastikas,  and  formulated  statements  are 
alike  made  to  conform  to  this  scheme.  In  some- 
what later  culture,  when  a  somewhat  clearer  con- 
cept of  the  midworld  exists,  and  the  east,  west, 
north,  and  south  have  been  explored,  but  the  zenith 
and  the  nadir  are  yet  unknown,  there  still  remains  a 
midworld,  a  heaven  above  and  a  hell  beneath.  Laws 
and  principles  are  formulated  as  heavenly  or  hellish. 
The  transformation  of  seven  worlds  into  three  con- 
stitutes one  of  the  most  interesting  chapters  in  the 
history  of  human  opinion.  In  the  seven-world 
scheme,  method  of  statement  becomes  a  method  of 
philosophy.  This  fact  has  abundant  illustration. 
It  is  the  primal  vice  of  classification  which  was  set 
forth  in  the  chapter  on  classification. 


TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

By  a  curious  mode  of  expression  often,  perhaps 
universally,  found  in  savage  society,  time  is  con- 
sidered to  be  four-cornered  because  we  measure 
time  in  terms  of  space.  We  say  the  sun  rises  in  the 
east  and  sets  in  the  west,  and  that  at  midday  it  is  in 
the  zenith  and  at  midnight  it  is  supposed  to  be  in 
the  nadir.  Some  savages  will  tell  you  that  time  is 
four-cornered,  others  will  tell  you  that  time  is 
round,  but  that  there  are  four  cardinal  points  of  time. 
Four-cornered  time  is  a  firmly  established  notion 
among  savage  and  barbaric  tribes.  Thus  time  is 
formulated  as  if  it  were  space.  Many  modern 
physicists  mythologize  in  this  manner  about  motion, 
being  unable  to  distinguish  motion  as  an  abstract 
property,  because  motion  is  formulated  in  terms  of 
space  and  force  in  terms  of  parallelograms. 

Thus  a  scheme  of  expression  becomes  a  scheme  of 
reality.  When  a  three- world  scheme  is  substituted 
for  the  seven-world  scheme,  the  four  worlds  are 
transformed  into  four  substances,  as  earth,  air,  fire, 
and  water.  Hence  the  cardinal  points  of  compass 
become  the  cardinal  substances.  The  habit  of 
relegating  all  animals,  all  plants,  all  properties,  and 
all  qualities  to  the  seven  worlds,  is  continued  under 
the  new  scheme  by  making  a  something  like  a 
classification  between  properties  and  qualities,  and 
transmuting  the  properties  and  qualities  to  sub- 
stances or  attributes  of  substances  and  qualities,  to 
world  beings  and  attributes  of  world  beings. 
Properties  are  grouped  in  fours  because  there  are 
four  horizontal  corners  of  the  world,  and  qualities 
are  grouped  in  fours  because  there  are  four  vertical 
corners  of  the  world  as  evidenced  by  time.  Thus 
a  scheme  of  expression  becomes  a  scheme  of  philos- 


FALLACIES  OF  REFLECTION  379 

ophy.  Wet  and  dry,  cold  and  hot,  constitute  a 
scheme  of  cardinal  properties;  earth,  air,  fire,  and 
water,  a  scheme  of  cardinal  substances;  justice, 
prudence,  temperance,  and  fortitude,  a  scheme  of 
cardinal  virtues. 

It  is  an  error  of  this  nature  into  which  Kant  fell 
when  he  considered  space  and  time  as  forms  of 
thought.  The  habit  of  expressing  thought  in  terms 
of  form  led  him  to  the  conclusion  that  space  and 
time,  as  disparate  properties,  are  identical  with 
thought  as  a  succession  of  judgments,  instead  of 
being  concomitant  with  thought.  But  more  than  this, 
it  was  the  void  form  and  the  void  space  which  Kant 
supposed  to  be  forms  which  we  are  compelled  to  use 
as  a  priori  elements  of  reason  when  we  consider 
form  and  state. 

Fallacies  of  cause  occur  in  every  hour  of  waking 
life.  We  attribute  effects  to  wrong  causes.  We 
are  especially  liable  to  this  from  the  fact  that  both 
cause  and  effect  are  conditions,  and  causation  is  a 
change  of  condition  from  an  antecedent  to  a  con- 
sequent. The  conditions  of  every  causation  are 
multifarious  as  we  look  at  them  in  a  regressus  of 
causes  or  a  progressus  of  effects,  and  as  the  mind  of 
the  individual  can  make  but  one  judgment  at  a 
time,  it  may  be  that  the  one  of  the  causes  or  effects 
which  is  considered,  is  in  fact  a  trivial  element  in  the 
causation,  for  in  all  our  language  we  are  accustomed 
to  speak  of  one  of  the  causes  as  the  special  cause, 
for  it  must  be  the  special  one  in  consideration. 

Forces  are  often  processes  in  which  a  multitude 
of  unseen  objects  produce  a  seen  effect,  as  when 
many  molecules  of  air  strike  upon  a  tree  which 
bends  before  the  blast,  or  when  many  raindrops,  that 


380  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

can  scarcely  be  seen  where  they  fall  and  are  wholly 
unseen  by  the  man  who  beholds  the  river,  create 
a  flood  that  endeluges  a  valley. 

Some  instances  of  this  kind  produce  fallacies  that 
are  widely  entertained;  they  are  misreflections  that 
substitute  the  effect  for  the  cause.  One  illustration 
of  this  group  of  fallacies  must  suffice  for  us  here. 
Some  years  ago  there  was  published  an  interesting 
and  well  written  book,  the  theme  of  which  was  the  ori- 
gin of  deserts,  giving  a  pessimistic  view  of  the  world, 
in  which  it  was  represented  that  desert  conditions 
are  increasing,  and  that  wide  regions  of  country  have 
already  been  laid  waste  as  deserts,  because  mankind 
interferes  with  the  operations  of  nature  by  destroy- 
ing the  forests,  and  that  if  forests  were  restored 
rainfall  would  be  increased.  In  this  manner  effect 
was  taken  for  cause. 

The  most  subtle  fallacy  about  causation  consists 
in  mistaking  it  for  another  property,  either  as  force 
on  the  one  hand  or  as  thought  on  the  other. 
Force,  cause,  and  conception — or  motion,  space,  and 
judgment — are  disparate  properties  but  concomitant 
in  every  particle  and  body  of  the  universe.  This  has 
been  the  burthen  of  our  theme  from  the  chapter 
on  essentials,  in  which  it  was  affirmed,  to  the  present 
one,  and  all  our  demonstrations  have  had  this  end  in 
view. 

He  who  cannot  clearly  distinguish  between  ab- 
stract and  concrete,  or  between  body  and  property, 
is  certain  to  fall  into  mysticism.  Mill  and  Spencer 
in  the  late  years,  like  Aristotle  in  ancient  time, 
confounded  causation  with  force  or  energy,  while 
Kant  and  all  the  school  of  metaphysicians  confound 
both  cause  and  force  with  thought. 


FALLACIES  OF  REFLECTION  381 

Evolution  is  a  succession  of  changes  which  are 
in  time  and  require  time  for  their  accomplishment. 

The  ancients  believed  and  the  tribes  believe  that 
kinds,  forms,  and  forces  come  out  of  nothing  and 
return  to  nothing.  This  is  the  primal  fallacy  of 
causation.  Modern  science  has  demonstrated  that 
kinds,  forms,  and  forces  come  from  something  else 
and  vanish  into  something  else.  It  is  only  today 
that  this  is  universally  accepted  by  scientific  men, 
while  even  at  the  present  time  millions  of  those  who 
inhabit  the  earth  still  believe  in  creation  from 
nothing.  We  shall  not  attempt  to  recount  the 
multitude  of  fallacies  which  have  existed  and  which 
still  linger  in  scientific  circles.  We  have  already  set 
forth  the  one  most  important  to  our  argument,  that 
is,  that  motion  is  created  by  or  comes  out  of  some 
occult  force  which  is  not  itself  motion,  and  the 
other  form  in  which  motion  is  supposed  to  leap  or 
creep,  or  in  some  other  manner  to  be  transferred 
from  one  body  to  another.  An  acrobatic  motion  is 
the  last  ghost  of  force. 

We  now  come  to  the  second  part  of  our  chap- 
ter, the  discussion  of  myths.  Mythology  is 
the  history  of  ghosts.  Ghosts  are  specters,  and 
we  have  seen  what  strange  acts  they  commit 
as  phantasms,  when  they  leave  the  body  and 
travel  abroad  in  the  world  and  return  again  to 
the  body,  or  when  from  abroad  they  enter  the  body 
to  take  possession  of  it  in  the  absence  of  its  owner. 
In  savage  society  authority  is  wielded  by  the  oldest 
man,  who  thus  by  superior  age,  natural  or  conven- 
tional, becomes  the  chief.  In  the  same  manner  the 
dwellers  in  ghostland  are  ruled  by  tribes ;  the  pro- 


382  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

genitor,  prototype,  or  elder  animal  of  the  tribe  is  its 
chief. 

Now  we  are  to  consider  what  it  is  that  ghosts  have 
done — how  they  have  acted  in  the  theater  of  the 
universe.  Strange  to  say,  we  find  it  well  recorded, 
for  ghosts  have  had  more  complete  recognition  than 
men  in  all  ancient  history.  Ghosts,  as  a  race,  have 
passed  through  interesting  stages  of  history.  All 
changes  are  in  time  and  require  time  to  become 
discrete  quantities  of  change  that  may  be  recognized. 

Hence  it  is  that  in  the  evolution  of  ghosts  we 
have  to  consider  their  transmutation  from  one  to 
another  as  it  appears  when  we  consider  them 
separated  by  many  centuries  of  time.  We  are 
unable  to  find  the  distinction  in  the  race  of  ghosts, 
if  we  consider  them  yesterday  and  again  today,  or 
last  year  and  again  this  year,  or  even  last  century 
and  again  this  century;  but  when  we  consider 
them  as  they  appear  in  the  stages  of  culture  which 
are  designated  as  savagery,  barbarism,  monarchy, 
and  democracy,  we  find  discrete  degrees  of  evolution. 

It  is  only  in  such  considerations  that  planes  of 
demarcation  can  be  discovered.  I  shall  therefore 
consider  ghosts  as  they  appear  in  savagery,  barbar- 
ism, monarchy,  and  democracy,  or  to  use  more 
common  terms,  civilization  and  enlightenment. 

In  savagery  the  ghosts  are  zoomorphic.  All  lower 
animals,  stones,  bodies  of  water,  the  sun,  the  moon, 
and  all  the  stars  are  supposed  to  be  animals.  The 
universe  is  a  universe  of  animals  living  in  the  seven 
regions.  All  of  these  animals  have  ghosts  which  can 
leave  their  bodies  and  journey  through  the  world, 
and  at  will  inhabit  other  bodies,  when  they  find  them 
vacated  by  their  proper  ghosts.  It  is  thus  that  the 


FALLACIES  OF  REFLECTION  383 

primitive  mythology  is  a  theory  of  animal  ghosts. 
What  these  ghosts  can  do  in  their  proper  bodies  is 
easily  seen,  though  it  is  very  wonderful ;  but  what 
they  do  when  they  leave  their  proper  bodies  is 
mysterious  or  occult. 

To  the  savage,  lower  animals  seem  to  have 
attributes  and  to  perform  deeds  that  are  more 
wonderful  than  those  of  human  beings.  The  ser- 
pent is  swift  without  legs,  the  bird  can  revel  where 
man  cannot  go — through  void  space  with  wings. 
The  fish  can  inhabit  the  water  and  run  with  fins ;  no 
human  being  can  do  this.  The  spider  can  spin  a 
thread  and  travel  on  it;  all  that  he  has  to  do  is  to 
spin  the  thread  from  his  own  body  and  travel 
wherever  he  wills  as  it  is  unwound.  The  rivers  are 
born  of  rain  and  roll  into  the  sea  which  never 
increases.  The  winds  are  created  by  the  breath  of 
beasts  or  rise  from  under  the  wings  of  birds  from 
nothing.  The  stars  can  fly  like  birds  and  shine  like 
fire.  So  the  savage  man  considers  the  molar  bodies 
of  the  world,  which  are  all  animals  like  himself,  to 
have  many  magical  or  occult  attributes  which  are 
very  wonderful.  But  the  wonderful  things  which 
they  do  are  not  attributed  to  their  bodies,  but  to 
their  ghosts.  The  body  of  a  man  lies  inert  when 
he  sleeps,  but  his  ghost  cannot  sleep,  it  travels  about 
the  world  when  his  body  is  at  rest.  The  bodies  of 
the  rocks  are  inert,  but  when  they  sleep  at  night 
their  ghosts  shine  in  the  heaven  as  the  aurora 
borealis.  If  you  strike  one  rock  with  another  you 
can  see  its  ghost  as  a  spark  of  fire.  When  the  clouds 
gather  they  are  the  ghosts  of  water;  when  angry 
they  shine  with  lightning  light,  and  when  pleased 
the  clouds  shine  as  rainbows.  These  illustrations 


384  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

will  serve  to  show  how  thoroughly,  in  the  notion  of 
the  savage,  ghosts  and  bodies  are  differentiated. 

The  universe  being  considered  as  bodies  and 
ghosts,  and  the  bodies  being  considered  as  inert  and 
the  ghosts  as  active  principles,  we  have  the  fundamen- 
tal theory  of  savage  reasoning.  We  can  do  nothing 
except  as  it  is  done  by  our  ghosts.  We  cannot  cause 
anything  to  be  done  by  others  except  by  controlling 
their  ghosts.  Words  cause  other  human  beings  to 
do  things,  and  their  words  cause  us  to  act.  The 
words  of  the  mother  cause  action  in  the  babe ;  the 
voice  of  the  babe  causes  the  mother  to  act.  The 
voice  of  the  bird  brings  its  mate  to  its  side,  or  the 
voice  of  its  mate  takes  the  bird  to  its  side.  The 
primeval  concept  of  causation  is  the  notion  that 
words  produce  effects,  and  that  effects  are  caused  by 
words.  The  bird  flies  to  its  mate ;  the  flying  of  the 
bird  is  considered  the  action  of  the  bird,  but  when  it 
flies  in  response  to  the  call  of  its  mate  the  call 
seems  to  be  the  cause  of  its  flight.  It  is  the  special 
cause ;  primitive  man  has  no  insight  into  the  many 
causes  that  are  involved.  It  is  from  this  primeval 
concept  of  cause  as  some  special  condition,  that  is 
developed  through  the  ages,  when  in  a  higher 
civilization  we  consider  the  special  cause  as  if  it  was 
the  total  cause.  Now  mythology,  having  ghosts  as 
actors,  secures  their  action  by  causes,  and  explains 
the  phenomena  of  the  universe  as  the  activities  of 
ghosts  acting  through  body  by  verbal  causation. 
In  savagery  words  are  the  ordinary  observable 
causes  and  constitute  the  primal  cause. 

We  do  not  know  the  languages  of  the  other 
animals,  we  can  speak  to  them  only  through  signs 
or  symbols.  Great  is  that  man  who  can  talk  to 


FALLACIES  OF  REFLECTION  385 

ghosts.  The  symbol  which  he  uses  is  called  a 
mystery.  In  the  Ute  language  it  is  pokunt;  in  the 
Siouan  language  it  is  wakanda;  in  the  Algonquian 
it  is  manito.  All  tribal  languages  have  a  word 
which  signifies  the  mystery,  which  can  be  used  as  a 
symbol  to  cause  the  action  of  ghosts.  The  concept 
is  born  in  savagery  of  a  mysterious  cause  which 
has  power  over  ghosts,  which  again  have  powers 
over  bodies,  and  so  the  universe  is  a  realm  of  bodies, 
ghosts,  and  mysteries,  or  unknown  tongues. 

The  mystery,  called  by  various  names  among 
American  tribes, is  usually  translated  "medicine, "  for 
the  early  missionaries  found  the  people  appealing  to 
the  mystery  to  heal  disease,  for  diseases  are  supposed 
to  be  ghosts  of  animals.  As  the  mystery  is  some- 
thing which  must  act  as  a  word,  it  must  be  something 
which  will  suggest  to  the  ghost  that  which  is  wanted. 
Hence  there  arises  the  doctrine  of  signatures,  which 
means  among  the  tribesmen  much  more  than  the 
signatures  of  medicines,  by  which  we  are  to  learn 
what  medicines  are  good  for  diseases — it  primarily 
means  what  signatures  can  be  made  to  convey  our 
commands  to  ghosts.  As  ghosts  are  all  animals  in 
savagery,  how  can  we  talk  to  the  ghosts  of  animals? 
This  leads  in  savagery  to  the  symbols  which  con- 
stitute the  paraphernalia  of  altars.  In  savagery 
every  object  on  the  altar  is  a  sign  to  ghosts  of  what 
men  wish  when  they  perform  ceremonies.  They 
pray  to  the  ghosts  for  rain,  and  to  make  sure  that 
the  ghosts  will  understand  what  they  mean,  they 
refer  them  to  cloud  symbols.  When  they  pray  for 
corn  they  place  ears  of  corn  upon  the  altar.  When 
they  pray  that  the  corn  shall  ripen  and  become  hard 
they  place  crystals  of  quartz  upon  the  altar.  In 


386  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

various  ways  signatures  are  used  by  the  priests  in 
invoking  the  aid  of  ghosts.  Those  persons  who 
have  power  over  ghosts  are  medicine  men  or  priests, 
and  attain  great  influence  and  sometimes  are  greatly 
feared.  If  they  use  their  power  for  evil,  they  are 
wizards  and  are  killed.  If  they  use  their  power  for 
good,  they  may  be  made  chiefs. 

Primarily  the  name  given  to  a  body  designates 
some  property  of  that  body.  After  a  time  the  name 
itself  becomes  the  property  of  the  body,  and  finally 
the  name  becomes  a  mythical  body.  These  stages 
in  the  development  of  words  can  be  discovered  in 
many  of  the  languages  of  America,  doubtless  in 
them  all ;  it  is  the  transmutation  which  Max  Miiller 
calls  a  disease  of  language. 

In  the  second  stage  of  culture,  called  barbarism, 
animals  have  been  domesticated  and  thus  by  more 
intimate  acquaintance  with  animals  the  lower 
animals  are  dethroned  and  human  animals  are 
exalted.  All  animals  and  other  molar  beings  which 
are  supposed  to  be  bodies  movable  by  human  beings, 
are  still  held  to  have  ghosts,  but  their  rulers  are 
ghosts  of  human  beings  and  the  great  phenomena  of 
nature  are  personified  as  human  beings;  the  sun, 
moon,  and  stars  are  exalted  in  this  manner;  the 
seas,  the  rivers  and  the  mountains  are  likewise 
personified.  All  the  most  important  phenomena  of 
the  universe  as  they  are  known  to  man  are  personi- 
fied. The  rising  and  the  setting  of  the  sun,  or  the 
dawning  and  the  gloaming,  are  personified  as  well 
as  the  sun  itself.  The  rainbow  also  is  personified. 
Fire  is  personified.  The  ghosts  are  no  less  multi- 
tudinous, but  some  are  exalted  above  the  others,  and 
those  promoted  in  this  manner  are  deities  of  higher 


FALLACIES  OF  REFLECTION  387 

rank.  To  these  deities  are  attributed  the  important 
events  of  the  worlds.  But  there  are  many  minor 
ghosts;  the  worlds  are  full  of  them,  born  of  the 
ages. 

Now,  in  barbarism  ghosts  are  still  the  actors  in 
the  worlds  and  they  are  caused  to  act  by  signs,  and 
tribesmen  still  continue  to  ransack  the  earth  for 
signatures.  Men  still  hold  in  love  or  fear  those  who 
have  the  lore  of  ghost  science.  The  chiefs  or  head 
men  or  ancestors  of  the  ghosts  are  greatly  revered 
as  gods,  and  common  folk  ghosts  take  part  in  the 
affairs  of  the  worlds,  and  mythology  is  the  history  of 
their  doings.  These  folk-talks  elaborately  portray 
the  life  of  men  and  ghosts  and  the  potency  of  signs. 

The  ceremonies  of  supplication  which  still  con- 
tinue from  savagery,  are  believed  to  have  still  more 
potency  by  reason  of  the  sacrifices  that  have  become 
more  and  more  important  in  the  estimation  of  the 
people  as  time  has  advanced.  In  savagery  the 
ceremonials  are  chiefly  terpsichorean :  music  and 
dancing  were  the  agencies  by  which  the  attention 
of  the  ghosts  was  obtained.  While  in  savagery  the 
pouring  of  oblations  and  the  presentation  of  the 
corn  were  signs  of  what  was  desired,  and  all  the 
paraphernalia  of  the  altar  that  represented  the 
thing  for  which  men  prayed  were  merely  significant 
of  the  things  men  wanted,  in  this  higher  stage  men 
have  come  to  believe  that  the  good  things  which 
men  want  are  the  good  things  which  the  ghosts  want, 
only  they  want  the  ghosts  of  the  good  things,  not 
their  bodies.  So  the  altar  of  signatures  gradually 
becomes  the  altar  of  sacrifice.  Hecatombs  of  beeves, 
bottles  of  wine,  all  the  first  fruits  of  the  harvest, 
everything  the  ghost  desires,  even  human  beings, 


TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

may  be  sacrificed  upon  the  altar.  If  after  this  state- 
ment my  reader  will  consult  the  Odyssey  he  will  there 
find  the  most  vivid  portrayal  of  barbaric  philosophy 
that  has  been  preserved  to  us  from  antiquity. 

In  despotism,  or  the  third  stage  of  social  organiza- 
tion, ghosts  are  still  more  exalted,  in  that  the 
psychic  characteristics  of  men  are  personified. 
Certain  of  the  gods  of  barbarism  gradually  become 
representatives  of  certain  psychic  characteristics,  and 
we  have  the  stage  of  psych otheism,  and  there  is  a 
god  of  War,  a  god  of  Love,  a  god  of  Hate,  a  god 
of  Commerce,  and  many  other  major  deities;  but 
there  is  a  second  class  of  deities  representing  what 
are  supposed  to  be  secondary  attributes  of  human 
and  divine  ghosts.  It  is  in  this  stage  that  we 
observe  the  transmutation  of  words  into  gods.  The 
concepts  of  which  words  as  signs  are  personified, 
as  Max  Miiller  has  abundantly  shown.  "In  the 
beginning  was  the  Word,  and  the  Word  was  God. "  A 
development  of  cosmology  which  begins  late  in  bar- 
barism is  more  thoroiighly  carried  out.  The  cardinal 
worlds  are  wholly  thrown  out  of  mythology  and  the 
midworld  has  a  world  above  or  a  heaven,  and  a  world 
below  or  a  hell.  The  midworld  becomes  the  sole 
theater  for  the  development  of  ghosts  by  birth. 
These  ghosts,  born  in  the  midworld  of  human  beings, 
are  the  ghosts  of  the  external  world  which  of  ttimes 
visit  the  earth.  The  three  worlds  of  the  stage  of 
despotism  constitute  the  fundamental  schematism  of 
the  philosophy  of  the  period.  Institutions  are  of 
heaven  or  of  hell,  opinions  are  of  heaven  or  of  hell, 
and  in  all  philosophy  the  schematism  prevails.  But 
in  this  midworld  the  ghosts  of  heaven  and  the 
ghosts  of  hell  take  part  with  the  embodied  ghosts 


FALLACIES  OF  REFLECTION  389 

of  men  in  all  of  the  affairs  of  the  world.  Every- 
where there  is  a  ruler,  a  despot — a  commander-in- 
chief  of  the  hosts  of  heaven  and  the  hosts  of  hell ; 
while  on  earth  in  the  midworld  it  becomes  the 
ambition  of  every  despot  or  emperor  to  become  the 
sole  ruler.  The  ghosts  born  on  earth  depart  to  the 
upper  or  the  lower  regions,  where  they  are  forever 
separated  by  an  impassable  barrier,  and  life  on  earth 
is  but  a  probation  in  which  ghosts  are  selected  for 
the  other  world ;  hence  the  chief  purpose  of  life  in 
the  body  is  attained  by  securing  a  happy  life  in 
ghostland. 

During  all  this  stage  in  mythology  the  ghost-gods 
are  affected  by  psychological  considerations.  The 
supreme  being  in  every  religion  of  despotism  is 
especially  influenced  by  the  opinions  of  his  followers. 
Their  opinions  of  the  supreme  being  must  be  sound, 
and  worship  is  by  faith  in  spirit  and  in  truth.  Thus 
worship  is  fiducial.  The  supreme  being  is  supposed 
to  take  delight  in  the  opinions  of  his  followers 
and  in  the  expression  of  those  opinions  as  formulated 
in  creed  and  especially  as  formulated  in  ceremony. 
This  mythical  stage  gives  rise  to  a  vast  body  of 
folk-lore,  which  is  distinguished  from  mythology 
proper  by  the  belief  in  a  ghostly,  supreme  being. 
The  midworld  is  still  the  theater  of  ghosts  who  come 
from  the  world  above  and  the  world  below  and 
sometimes  dwell  for  a  time  in  this  world  and  take 
part  in  the  affairs  of  men.  These  ghosts  are 
especially  amenable  to  deeds  of  necromancy,  the 
more  refined  form  in  which  the  doctrine  of  signatures 
is  held.  If  my  reader  will  carefully  study  Tasso  in 
"Jerusalem  Delivered,"  he  will  there  find  recorded 
one  of  the  best  accounts  extant  of  the  necromancy 


39°  TRUTH   AND  ERROR 

of  the  despotic  age.  The  publications  of  the  various 
folk-lore  societies  of  the  world  are  rapidly  putting 
these  superstitions  on  record. 

I  shall  refrain  from  discussing  the  fourth  stage  of 
ghost-lore.  In  very  modern  times  it  has  assumed  a 
special  phase  which  is  called  spiritism,  and  attendant 
upon  the  theory  of  spiritism  there  is  developed  a 
claim  for  a  scientific  explanation  of  spiritism  in  the 
theory  of  telepathy,  which  I  cannot  wholly  overlook 
and  do  not  wish  to  ignore,  but  on  that  phase  which 
is  specially  represented  in  religion  I  purposely 
remain  silent,  lest  I  should  antagonize,  with  my  own 
opinions,  the  views  of  others  about  religion,  and  thus 
enter  a  field  of  theological  disputation.  Yet  without 
expressing  personal  opinions  about  the  evolution  of 
religion,  which  I  have  elsewhere  done,  I  shall  content 
myself  with  only  one  paragraph  upon  the  subject. 

From  the  doctrine  of  signatures  there  has  grown 
the  science  of  modern  surgery  and  medicine.  I  do 
not  despise  the  early  efforts  of  mankind  to  relieve 
their  sufferings,  even  though  they  entertained  many 
fallacies ;  but  I  rejoice  in  the  outcome  of  this  effort 
as  it  is  exhibited  in  modern  medicine.  Astrology 
was  necromancy  at  one  time,  but  has  become  astron- 
omy in  modern  times,  and  I  look  upon  the  efforts 
which  were  made  in  former  times  by  astrologists  as 
the  planting  of  the  germs  of  the  celestial  science. 
So  I  look  upon  mythology  with  no  feelings  of  hatred, 
for  it  seems  to  me  to  have  made  great  strides  in  the 
science  of  religion  or  ethics,  out  of  which  shall  come 
a  purified  science  of  God,  Immortality,  and  Free- 
dom. 


CHAPTER    XXIV 

FALLACIES    OF    IDEATION 

Fallacies  of  ideation  constitute  a  fifth  grade,  which 
are  illusions  and  delusions.  In  the  order  heretofore 
followed,  we  shall  first  speak  of  illusions,  and  then 
of  delusions. 

The  Schoolmen  speculated  much  on  the  nature  of 
kinds,  and  finally  reached  the  conclusion  that  that 
which  makes  a  thing  a  kind  is  its  essence,  i.  e.,  that 
which  is  essential  to  its  existence  as  a  kind,  like 
others  of  its  kind,  but  different  from  other  kinds. 
All  of  this  is  quite  true,  but  it  adds  nothing  to  knowl- 
edge, except  that  it  might  be  given  as  a  definition  of 
a  word.  For  a  long  time  definitions  were  consid- 
ered very  good  explanations. 

When  chemistry  was  yet  alchemy,  attempts  often 
were  made  to  discover  the  essence  of  things,  and, 
in  particular,  it  was  a  favorite  method  to  extract 
kinds,  and  these  extracts  were  called  essences.  So 
the  kind  or  essence  of  a  thing  discovered  in  this 
manner  was  supposed  to  be  its  essential  quality,  as 
this  term  was  then  used.  We  have  a  record  of  this 
superstition,  as  it  existed  in  the  days  of  alchemy,  in 
the  extracts  of  the  apothecary  shop,  which  are  often 
called  essences.  Rose-water  was  the  essential 
extract  of  the  rose,  violet-water  of  the  violet,  and 
men  were  pleased  with  the  idea  that  they  could 
make  of  that  which  constitutes  a  thing  or  kind  a 
decoction  for  a  lady's  dressing  table. 

391 


392  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

Fallacious  theories  of  kind  have  high  antiquity. 
It  has  already  been  set  forth  that  a  classification  of 
properties  and  qualities  is  made  in  tribal  society  by 
a  schematization  of  worlds.  Not  only  were  molar 
bodies,  which  were  supposed  to  be  animate,  classi- 
fied in  this  manner  into  seven  categories,  but  all 
attributes  of  bodies  were  in  like  manner  classified. 
We  have  already  seen  how  space  properties  gave  rise 
to  a  cosmology  of  seven  regions.  We  have  also  seen 
how  motion  was  explained  as  the  self-activity  of 
molar  bodies,  and  that  the  heavenly  bodies,  which 
were  supposed  to  be  molar  bodies,  are  in  motion  by 
appointed  paths  established  by  conflict  in  war,  and 
given  spacial  or  world  directions,  and  that  force  was 
considered  as  will  and  the  cause  of  motion. 

We  also  have  seen  the  manner  in  which  time  was 
considered  as  an  attribute  of  space.  We  likewise 
have  seen  the  development  of  the  seven  worlds  into 
three,  as  the  midworld,  the  zenith,  and  the  nadir 
worlds. 

Here  we  must  pause  for  a  time  to  explain  some- 
thing more  of  the  nature  of  this  transmutation. 
The  change  developed  in  later  barbarism  and  earlier 
civilization  was  wrought  by  the  increase  of  geo- 
graphical knowledge.  During  this  period  there  grad- 
ually was  developed  a  notion  of  the  land,  or  mid- 
world,  as  a  plane  from  which  mountains  and  hills 
stand  in  relief,  surrounded  by  the  sea.  Thales 
gives  us  such  an  account,  as  do  many  others.  All 
the  mythology  of  the  time  assumes  the  existence  of 
the  midworld  as  an  island  surrounded  by  an  ocean. 
During  the  same  epoch  in  human  culture  the  unseen 
atmosphere  was  discovered.  As  the  cardinal  worlds 
were  gradually  abandoned,  these  properties  and 


FALLACIES  OF  IDEATION  393 

qualities  of  bodies  that  had  previously  been  classi- 
fied in  the  world  scheme,  came  to  be  classified  by  a 
very  natural  change,  as  attributes  of  molar  bodies. 
The  schematization  still  remained  fourfold,  but 
molar  bodies  were  considered  as  kinds,  composed  of 
four  occult  substances — earth,  air,  fire,  and  water. 
Thus,  the  four  regions  were  transmuted  into  the  four 
substances.  Greek  philosophy  began  with  this 
theory,  and  there  is  abundant  evidence  that  other 
races  entertained  the  same  doctrine. 

Thus,  the  most  ancient  philosophy  of  civilization 
started  with  a  theory  of  three  worlds  and  four  sub- 
stances. We  must  now  rapidly  trace  its  develop- 
ment through  five  stages,  during  a  period  of  more 
than  twenty  centuries,  as  it  is  revealed  to  us  in  the 
history  of  metaphysic  as  distinguished  from  science. 

We  must  consider  a  little  further  the  misunder- 
standings of  ideation.  Every  man  for  himself 
verifies  the  current  judgments  which  he  makes  in 
relation  to  practical  affairs.  If  our  judgments  were 
not  verified  until  after  they  are  acted  on,  the  race 
would  be  overwhelmed  by  disaster.  We  have 
already  seen  that  erroneous  judgments  vie  in  multi- 
plicity with  valid  judgments.  If  a  man  should  act 
on  erroneous  judgments,  they  would  lead  him  into 
such  mistakes  that,  almost  every  hour  in  the  day,  he 
would  perform  some  act  causing  irreparable  mis- 
chief. The  food  which  he  selects  must  be  properly 
chosen,  but  the  many  things  which  he  might  select 
for  food,  which  are  injurious,  or  even  deadly,  out- 
number the  articles  which  should  constitute  his 
proper  food.  The  snares,  the  pitfalls,  the  precipices, 
the  floods,  which  beset  his  path,  are  so  many  that 
his  way  must  carefully  be  chosen.  The  forces  which 


394  TRUTH   AND   ERROR 

are  encountered,  as  men,  beasts,  and  natural  powers, 
are  so  many  that  he  must  constantly  avoid  antago- 
nisms. Life  is  a  perpetual  exercise  of  choice. 
Judgments  that  are  made  must  be  verified  in  prac- 
tical affairs,  lest  the  race  should  become  extinct. 
So,  in  the  making  of  our  judgments,  we  form  a  habit 
of  verifying  them  before  we  proceed  to  act. 

The  immediate  judgments  of  practical  life  must  be 
verified,  but  the  judgments  which  we  make  about 
future  events  may  be  postponed,  and,  practically, 
they  are  postponed  in  tribal  society.  But  men  come 
at  last  to  seek  for  the  verification  of  judgments 
which  are  more  and  more  remotely  practical,  for 
they  also  are  found  to  involve  ultimate  welfare. 
Then  science  is  born,  for  science  is  knowledge,  or 
verified  judgments.  When  science  is  born,  civiliza- 
tion begins.  If  judgments  are  incongruous,  some- 
where there  must  be  error.  This  is  the  method  of 
discovering  error,  which  is  habitual  or  intuitive  in 
mankind,  developed  from  infancy  in  the  individual, 
and  developed  in  the  race  from  generation  to  gener- 
ation, through  the  whole  period  of  animate  existence. 
It  is  the  most  profound  intuition  of  the  human  mind. 

With  civilization  there  springs  up  a  philosophy  of 
monism,  which  is  a  philosophy  of  the  error  involved 
in  judgments  that  are  incongruous.  The  key  to  the 
meaning  of  that  which  we  call  ancient  philosophy  is 
found  in  the  attempt  to  discover  a  unifying  principle. 

Through  the  centuries  this  has  been  the  quest  of 
wise  men.  The  seemingly  multitudinous  properties 
and  qualities  of  body  must  be  reduced  to  some 
unifying  principle.  As  the  individual  first  guesses 
and  then  verifies,  as  already  set  forth  in  the  chapters 
on  intellection,  so  the  race,  at  one  time  and  another, 


FALLACIES  OF  IDEATION  395 

guesses,  chooses,  selects  some  one  property  to  which 
all  other  properties  may  be  reduced  as  the  unifying 
principle. 

This  quest  started  at  the  beginning  of  civiliza- 
tion, when  four  substances,  earth,  air,  fire,  and 
water,  were  held  to  be  the  elements  of  which  all 
bodies  are  composed.  Civilization  inherited  a  con- 
troversy from  barbarism  about  these  substances. 
The  substances  themselves  were  derived  from  the 
cardinal  points,  and  the  brotherhoods  of  the  tribe 
were  organized  to  represent  these  cardinal  points. 
Each  brotherhood  claimed  for  itself  an  origin  in  the 
cardinal  point  from  which  it  was  named,  and  hence 
there  was  a  perennial  controversy  between  the 
brotherhoods  as  to  the  most  noble  or  honorable  of 
these  origins.  Now,  in  tribal  society,  the  most  noble 
or  honorable  is  the  eldest,  for  that  is  the  method  of 
expressing  nobler ;  elder  and  nobler  are  synonymous, 
for  the  elder  has  dominion  in  tribal  society.  In  the 
beginning  of  Greek  philosophy,  the  *PXJ  ,  the  first, 
held  dominion,  and  was  hence  the  most  honorable. 
The  controversies  about  the  most  honorable  of  the 
points  of  the  compass,  the  one  which  should  hold 
dominion,  the  one  which  was  the  first,  held  over  into 
the  stage  when  the  cardinal  points  were  considered 
as  substances,  and  hence  the  Greeks  inherited  the 
controversy  about  the  first,  or  *(>xn ,  of  the  ele- 
ments. Now,  another  method  of  expressing  this 
idea  is  that  the  first  is  the  grandfather,  so  that  it  is 
customary  in  tribal  society  to  speak  of  the  chief  as 
the  grandfather.  The  totemic  head  of  the  tribe  is 
often  called  the  grandfather,  as  is  also  the  totemic 
head  who  is  the  first  of  the  tribe,  or  the  one  from 
which  all  the  other  members  are  derived.  These 


396  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

doctrines  are  thoroughly  ingrained  in  the  habits  of 
thought  and  the  methods  of  expression  current  in 
tribal  society,  and  inherited  by  national  society. 
Hence,  we  find,  in  the  study  of  Greek  philosophy, 
which  primarily  is  cosmology,  the  first,  or  aPXj ,  of  the 
elements  still  to  be  the  subject  of  dispute,  and  the 
first  is  taken  as  the  one  from  which  all  others  are 
derived,  and  hence  to  have  dominion,  and  so  the 
most  honorable. 

At  last,  there  arose  a  philosopher  who  cleared  his 
imagination  of  the  fallacies  of  kinds,  as  earth,  air, 
fire,  and  water,  and  made  the  bold  hypothesis  that 
all  things  are  ultimately  founded,  not  on  kind,  but 
on  its  reciprocal,  number,  for  Pythagoras  was  a  mathe- 
matician. Then  began  the  theories  of  reified  abstrac- 
tions, the  theories  by  which  the  properties  of  bodies 
are  unified  as  a  foundation  for  monistic  philosophy. 

There  is  so  much  of  truth  in  the  philosophy  of 
Pythagoras,  that  when  we  consider  the  universe  as 
composed  of  properties  that  can  be  measured,  and 
that  by  measure  all  properties  are  reduced  to  num- 
ber, then  all  properties  can  be  considered  as  number. 
Counting  on  the  human  abacus  had  now  been  devel- 
oped into  the  science  of  reasoning  by  conventional 
numbers,  and,  having  discovered  that  sound  is  a 
numeric.al  relation  of  vibrations  of  the  air,  and  carry- 
ing his  magical  philosophy  into  all  his  ways  and 
thoughts,  but  not  clearly  understanding  the  nature 
of  measure  itself,  that  it  is  the  rendering  of  one 
property  into  the  terms  of  another,  until  all  of  the 
properties  are  reduced  to  number,  he  conceived  the 
doctrine  that  the  universe  is  a  world  of  numbers ;  and 
so  it  is,  but  it  is  much  more  than  a  world  of  num- 
bers, as  we.  have  abundantly  seen. 


FALLACIES  OF  IDEATION  397 

Pythagoras  is  said  to  have  taught  this  doctrine. 
This  is  not  known  from  records  left  by  himself,  but 
mainly  from  records  which  come  from  his  immediate 
successors.  The  literature  of  the  Pythagorean  phi- 
losophy is  meager,  yet,  from  the  little  that  remains, 
it  seems  to  have  been  a  theory  of  the  origin  of  all 
other  properties  from  number. 

In  mathematics,  the  science  of  verification  is  space 
reduced  to  number;  motion  is  reduced  to  space,  and 
then  to  number;  and,  finally,  time  is  reduced  to 
motion,  and  motion  to  space,  and  space  to  number; 
and  all  of  these  conventional  reductions  are  accom- 
plished by  the  device  of  measure.  But,  in  the  doc- 
trine of  Pythagoras,  number  seems  to  have  been  held 
as  the  substrate  of  properties.  It  is  the  patriarch  of 
the  illusions  of  metaphysical  philosophy ;  its  vener- 
able form  is  gray  with  the  mystical  shadows  of 
twenty-five  centuries.  This  may  be  denominated  the 
fallacy  of  Pythagoras. 

Plato  taught  that  form  is  the  substrate  of  all 
properties.  This  he  did  with  such  literary  skill  that 
he  held  the  judgment  of  mankind  for  many  cen- 
turies. He  not  only  taught  that  form  is  the  substrate 
of  physical  properties,  but  also  of  thought.  To  him 
thoughts  were  forms  given  off  by  objects  floating  in 
the  empyrean  and  taken  into  the  mind,  and  his 
exposition  of  this  doctrine  transferred  the  word  idea 
from  the  realm  of  space  to  the  realm  of  mind.  A 
monument  to  this  fallacy  still  exists  in  the  use  of  the 
term  idea  for  a  notion  in  every  modern  language  of 
civilization.  This  may  be  denominated  the  fallacy 
of  Plato. 

Aristotle  rejected  the  Pythagorean  and  Platonic 
fallacy,  but  entertained  one  of  his  own.  He  reified 


TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

energy  or  force,  which  is  derived  from  motion,  and 
taught  that  this  energy  is  the  substrate  of  all  proper- 
ties. Now,  while  this  seems  to  have  been  his  doc- 
trine, yet  it  must  be  remembered  that  Aristotle  was 
a  careless  writer,  heedless  of  the  niceties  of  expres- 
sion, and  unconscious  of  the  necessity  for  using 
scientific  accuracy  in  terms.  It  seems  possible  to 
refer  to  Aristotle  as  an  authority  for  many  of  the 
fallacies  which  have  been  entertained  in  metaphysic, 
and  philosophers  usually  reverence  him  as  the 
Master.  If  I  were  called  on  to  point  out  the  funda- 
mental doctrine  of  Aristotle,  I  should  cite  his  theory 
of  energy,  so  I  call  this  the  fallacy  of  Aristotle.  As 
his  exposition  of  the  subject  is  not  very  lucid,  and  as 
men  may  honestly  controvert  any  statement  made  of 
his  doctrine,  it  seems  better  to  look  for  another 
master  of  this  doctrine.  In  Spencer,  we  have  a 
philosopher  who  rivals  Plato  in  literary  skill.  In 
Spencer's  "First  Principles,"  where  he  lays  the 
foundation  of  his  philosophy,  he  sets  forth  the  doc- 
trine in  no  uncertain  terms.  Motion  is  derived  from 
force,  extension  also  is  derived  from  force,  and, 
finally,  all  of  the  properties  are  held  to  have  force  as 
their  substrate.  If  the  reader  will  consult  Spen- 
cer's "First  Principles,"  part  n,  chapter  in,  he 
will  there  discover  his  method  of  explaining  proper- 
ties. The  chapter  is  entitled,  "Space,  Time,  Matter, 
Motion,  and  Force."  He  not  only  derives  all  the 
properties,  but  all  bodies,  from  force,  and  then 
describes  force  as  something  unknown  and  unknow- 
able ;  so,  in  the  name  of  science,  he  meets  the  meta- 
physician on  his  own  ground,  and  sets  forth  his 
doctrines  with  a  deftness  and  simplicity  with  which 
the  dealer  in  mystery  cannot  vie.  Spencer  not  only 


FALLACIES  OF  IDEATION  399 

entertains  the  fallacy  that  properties  are  derived  from 
an  unknown  and  unknowable  force,  but  he  makes 
force  the  substrate  of  all  relations,  and  then  affirms 
that  we  know  only  of  relations,  and  that  their  substrate 
is  the  unknowable;  but  still  more,  he  accepts  the 
Kantian  illusions  of  a  void  space  and  a  void  time. 

Then,  time  was  held  to  be  the  unifying  principle 
of  all  properties  and  bodies.  This  reification  was 
designated  by  the  term  being,  taking  the  participle  of 
the  asserting  word  to  be,  but  using  it  in  its  secondary 
sense  as  signifying  to  exist.  My  reading  does  not 
furnish  me  with  the  knowledge  necessary  to  say  who 
first  clearly  propounded  this  doctrine,  but  it  was 
almost  universally  entertained  by  scholastic  meta- 
physicians. Let  us,  then,  denominate  this  the 
scholastic  fallacy. 

It  appears  that  Plato  and  Aristotle  have  been 
recorded  more  generously  than  other  philoso- 
phers of  Grecian  history.  The  authority  which  they 
wielded  seems  not  to  have  permitted  the  revival  of 
the  Pythagorean  fallacy  which  they  successfully  dis- 
pelled, while  the  Aristotelian  fallacy  had  no  ex- 
tensive following  until  modern  times,  when,  under 
the  lead  of  Spencer,  the  great  modern  master,  it  has 
been  extensively  taught. 

But,  of  all  these  fallacies,  that  of  the  reification  of 
time  has,  perhaps,  had  the  greatest  following;  it  is 
the  philosophy  of  Ontology.  It  has  one  variety 
which  almost  equals  in  importance  Ontology  itself. 
This  variety  of  the  species  is  the  metaphysic  of 
becoming,  or,  as  it  is  sometimes  called,  the  meta- 
physic of  essence,  which  has  many  phases,  the  most 
important  of  which  is  that  the  essence  of  a  thing  is 
that  into  which  it  will  develop. 


400  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

Thus,  the  philosophy  of  bodies  assumed  the  phase 
of  substance  and  properties.  How  long  it  held  the 
judgment  of  mankind  is  shown  when  we  remember 
that  even  Newton  himself  believed  light  to  be 
corpuscular  emanations  from  bodies.  The  last 
vestige  of  this  doctrine  remains  when  it  is  supposed 
that  motion  jumps  from  one  body  to  another;  and 
this  doctrine  is  accompanied  by  another  which  affirms 
that  path  is  motion  itself.  This  doctrine  of  essence 
is  the  doctrine  which  Hegel,  in  the  third  chapter  of 
his  "Phenomenology  of  Spirit,"  sets  forth  as  one  of 
the  inadequate  judgments  of  men,  which  is  prop- 
erly understood  only  when  the  external  world  is  con- 
sidered as  a  form  of  thought.  There  is  a  curious 
error  prevalent  in  scholastic  times,  which  is  the 
fallacy  of  substrates.  It  was  involved  in  the  philos- 
ophy of  Pythagoras,  Plato,  and  Aristotle,  when  one 
of  the  properties  was  held  to  be  the  substrate  of  all 
the  others.  But  it  had  a  long  history,  and  assumed 
many  phases,  one  or  two  of  which  must  briefly  be 
set  forth. 

It  was  the  theory  that  substance,  or  substrate,  or 
essence,  by  whatever  name  it  may  be  denominated, 
is  porous,  and  that  properties  emanate  from  its 
pores ;  that  substance  gives  off  an  inexhaustible  sup- 
ply of  properties.  Plato  thought  that  properties 
were  given  off  from  the  substance  of  bodies  as  forms. 
For  a  long  time  it  was  held  by  philosophers  that 
force  was  thus  given  off  from  bodies  as  subtle  emana- 
tions. 

In  this  stage  of  speculation,  properties  were  called 
accidents,  and  the  theory  of  bodies  took  this  phase. 
Bodies  are  composed  of  substance  and  accidents; 
the  accidents  may  come  and  go,  but  the  substance 


t 

FALLACIES  OF  IDEATION  4OI 

remains.     John   Locke  put  this  subject   in   a   nut- 
shell: 

"They  who  first  ran  into  the  notion  of  accidents,  as  a  sort  of 
real  beings  that  needed  something  to  inhere  in,  were  forced  to 
find  out  the  word  substance  to  support  them.  Had  the  poor 
Indian  philosopher  (who  imagined  that  the  earth  also  wanted 
something  to  bear  it  up)  but  thought  of  this  word  substance,  he 
needed  not  to  have  been  at  the  trouble  to  find  an  elephant  to 
support  it,  and  a  tortoise  to  support  his  elephant:  the  word 
substance  would  have  done  it  effectually.  And  he  that 
inquired  might  have  taken  it  for  as  good  an  answer  from  an 
Indian  philosopher, — that  substance,  without  knowing  what  it 
is,  is  that  which  supports  the  earth,  as  we  take  it  for  a 
sufficient  answer,  and  good  doctrine  from  our  European  phil- 
osophers,— that  substance,  without  knowing  what  it  is,  is  that 
which  supports  accidents.  So  that  of  substance,  we  have  no 
idea  of  what  it  is,  but  only  a  confused,  obscure  one  of  what 
it  does.  .  .  . 

4  'So  that  if  any  one  will  examine  himself  concerning  his  notion 
of  pure  substance  in  general,  he  will  find  he  has  no  other  idea 
of  it  at  all,  but  only  a  supposition  of  he  knows  not  what  sup- 
port of  such  qualities  which  are  capable  of  producing  simple 
ideas  in  us ;  which  qualities  are  commonly  called  accidents.  If 
any  one  should  be  asked,  what  is  the  subject  wherein  color  or 
weight  inheres,  he  would  have  nothing  to  say,  but  the  solid 
extended  parts;  and  if  he  were  demanded  what  is  it  that 
solidity  and  extension  adhere  in,  he  would  not  be  in  a  much 
better  case  than  the  Indian  before  mentioned,  who,  saying  that 
the  world  was  supported  by  a  great  elephant,  was  asked  what 
the  elephant  rested  on;  to  which  his  answer  was — a  great 
tortoise :  but  being  again  pressed  to  know  what  gave  support 
to  the  broad-backed  tortoise,  replied — something,  he  knew  not 
what.  And  thus  here,  as  in  all  other  cases  where  we  use  words 
without  having  clear  and  distinct  ideas,  we  talk  like  children: 
who,  being  questioned  what  such  a  thing  is,  which  they  know 
not,  readily  give  this  satisfactory  answer,  that  it  is  something: 
which,  in  truth,  signifies  no  more,  when  so  used,  either  by 
children  or  men,  but  that  they  know  not  what ;  and  that  the 
thing  they  pretend  to  know,  and  talk  of,  is  what  they  have  no 
distinct  idea  of  at  all,  and  so  are  perfectly  ignorant  of  it,  and 


402  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

in  the  dark.  The  idea  then  we  have,  to  which  we  give  the 
general  name  substance,  being  nothing  but  the  supposed,  but 
unknown,  support  of  those  qualities  we  find  existing,  which 
we  imagine  cannot  subsist  sine  re  substante,  without  some- 
thing to  support  them,  we  call  that  support  substantia;  which, 
according  to  the  true  import  of  the  word,  is,  in  plain  English, 
standing  under  or  upholding. ' ' 

It  is  this  something,  we  know  not  what,  of 
which  Locke  speaks,  that  has  come  to  be  designated 
in  metaphysic  as  noumenon,  while  the  accidents  of 
his  time  have  come  to  be  designated  as  phenomena. 
By  the  Greeks,  the  fish,  seen  by  its  ripple  in  the 
water,  is  called  a  phenomenon ;  after  it  is  caught  and 
the  fish  itself  is  seen,  instead  of  the  ripple,  it  is 
called  a  noumenon.  In  modern  metaphysic,  both 
are  called  phenomena.  The  multitudinous  proper- 
ties of  bodies  can  all  be  resolved  into  the  five  essen- 
tials which  we  have  set  forth;  these  are  the 
noumena,  while  the  multitudinous  phenomena  are 
the  relations  of  particles  or  bodies  to  one  another. 
Noumena  are  constant  or  absolute ;  phenomena  are 
relative  or  variable.  This  leads  us  to  the  discussion 
of  the  delusions  of  ideation. 

During  the  stages  of  opinion  which  were  char- 
acterized by  a  belief  in  the  Pythagorean,  Platonic, 
Aristotelian,  and  Scholastic  fallacies,  as  they  have 
been  described  above,  science  and  metaphysic  pro- 
ceeded together,  hand  in  hand,  in  search  of  the 
truth,  though  the  science  of  reality  was  clouded  with 
the  metaphysic  of  fallacy.  But  now  science  and 
metaphysic  part  company.  In  this  new  stage,  not 
only  does  metaphysic  reify,  substantialize,  or 
hypostasize  the  essentials  or  noumena  of  conscious- 
ness, but  it  adopts  the  ghost  theory,  for  the  psychic 
property  is  considered  as  a  ghost  which  can  leave 


! 

FALLACIES  OF  IDEATION  403 

the  body  and  return  to  it.  The  completed  stage  of 
the  ghost  theory  is  idealism.  Opposed  to  idealism 
or  the  ghost  theory  of  spirit — mind  or  consciousness 
— is  the  theory  which  is  most  commonly  called 
materialism,  of  which  Spencer  is  the  modern 
champion. 

Idealism  began  with  Berkeley,  but  he  formulated  it 
as  a  system  of  theology,  or  an  explanation  of  the 
origin  of  the  world  in  the  thought  of  God.  Berkeley 
gave  us,  in  clear  and  beautiful  English,  a  theory  of 
vision  which  was  the  germ  of  a  new  psychology 
developed  by  Helmholtz  into  a  more  scientific  form, 
with  greater  exactness,  as  a  scientific  theory  of  vision 
and  also  of  audition.  So  Helmholtz  may  be  con- 
sidered as  the  founder  of  scientific  psychology.  But 
the  idealism  of  Berkeley  was  taken  up  by  many 
others,  especially  by  the  German  school,  represented 
by  Kant,  Fichte,  and  Schelling.  Kant,  who  was  the 
founder  of  this  new  German  school,  left  the  subject 
in  an  attitude  wholly  unsatisfactory  to  the  human 
mind  as  a  theory  of  monism.  In  his  great  work, 
"The  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,"  he  pronounces 
sentence  on  human  reason  by  consigning  its  con- 
clusions to  the  limbo  of  antinomies;  in  his  subse- 
quent work  he  relegates  man  back  to  practical 
reason,  that  is,  the  formation  of  judgments  which 
must  be  made  in  order  that  we  may  act,  instead  of 
what  we  may  know.  I  have  already  mentioned  the 
primal  fallacies  into  which  Kant  fell ;  but  he  did  not 
produce  a  system  of  idealism,  nor  did  Fichte  nor 
Schelling.  It  was  left  for  Hegel  to  create  a  system. 
This  he  did  by  creating  a  logic  of  contradictories. 

Perhaps  I  have  sufficiently  set  forth  the  nature  of 
conception,  through  the  forming  of  judgments  of 


404  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

sensation,  perception,  apprehension,  reflection,  and 
ideation,  as  stages  in  the  process  of  forming  con- 
cepts, and  that  until  all  of  these  stages  have  been 
passed  there  is  a  probability  of  entertaining  fallacies, 
especially  when  we  do  not  recognize  that  cognition 
is  never  completed  until  judgments  are  verified. 
The  nature  of  conception  or  reasoning,  as  thus  set 
forth,  seems  to  have  been  understood  by  Hegel  in 
some  vague  way.  Hence,  he  properly  explained 
antinomies  as  the  final  harmonizing  of  judgments  by 
the  last  process  in  conception  as  ideation.  So  far,  I 
believe  his  work  to  be  sound;  surely  it  possesses 
this  germ  of  truth.  But  he  did  not  clearly  under- 
stand the  nature  of  ideation,  for  he  was  an  idealist, 
and  reified  the  property — the  psychic  property — of 
bodies ;  he  was  a  monist  of  an  abstraction,  and  he 
believed  the  external  world  to  be  a  fallacy — a  phan- 
tasm, an  illusion,  a  delusion  if  you  will — something 
which  does  not  exist  in  itself. 

Hegel  does  not  afHrm  but  he  always  assumes  that 
there  is  no  external  world,  that  is,  there  is  no  reality 
in  the  four  mechanical  properties  of  body,  the  four 
essentials — unity,  extension,  speed  and  persistence. 
They  exist  only  as  attributes  of  consciousness.  Con- 
sciousness, or  idea,  to  use  his  term,  is  the  substrate 
from  which  flows  the  accidents  or  mechanical 
properties,  as  from  its  pores,  in  an  inexhaustible  sup- 
ply of  fallacies.  There  is  kind,  form,  force,  and 
causation  of  conception,  but  there  is  no  kind,  form, 
force,  and  causation,  except  that  which  is  ideal; 
that  is,  he  everywhere  assumes,  and  practically 
affirms,  that  the  mechanical  properties  are  the  crea- 
tions of  the  mind.  It  is  in  this  sense  that  he  denies 
the  reality  of  the  external  world.  Kant  gives  four 


FALLACIES  OF  IDEATION  405 

fundamental  antinomies ;  but  with  Hegel  all  reason- 
ing about  the  external  world,  or  the  four  properties 
of  bodies,  is  fallacious,  and  the  only  way  to  cognize 
reality  is  first  to  cognize  consciousness  in  all  its 
developments,  and  then  to  cognize  the  external 
world  as  a  system  of  fallacious  judgments.  Real 
cognition  must  be  of  the  "idea"  itself.  This  is  the 
fallacy  of  Hegel. 

Kant  resolves  the  world  of  thought  into  antinomies 
of  contradictions,  and  refers  us  back  to  the  practical 
judgments  of  good  and  evil,  which  control  our  acts ; 
but  Hegel  develops  a  system  in  which  he  refers  all 
of  our  judgments  of  an  external  world  to  fallacies. 
The  only  realities  or  cognitions  are  those  about 
"idea,"  as  he  calls  it,  or  those  about  consciousness, 
and  its  development  into  the  faculties  of  the  intel- 
lect, as  herein  set  forth.  According  to  Hegel,  the 
only  noumenon  is  the  idea.  Mechanical  properties 
of  bodies  are  but  phenomena.  There  are  no  stars, 
and  we  only  fallaciously  think  there  are  stars. 
There  is  no  atmosphere,  no  sea,  no  forma- 
tions, no  rocks,  no  nucleus ;  we  only  fallaciously 
think  that  they  exist.  There  are  no  plants; 
we  only  fallaciously  think  there  are  plants.  There 
are  no  animals;  we  only  fallaciously  think  there 
are  animals.  But  there  are  minds,  which,  by 
some  occult  process,  exist  not  in  time  or  space, 
and  in  this  occult  sense  are  internal,  whatever 
that  may  be.  The  furniture  of  the  world,  which 
we  suppose  to  be  external,  does  not  exist,  except 
as  fallacy,  or,  as  Hegel  calls  it,  phenomenon.  Anti- 
nomies arise,  when  we  consider  them  as  realities. 
But  antinomies  disappear,  if  we  consider  them  as 
ideas. 


406  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

Having  made  this  discovery,  he  announces  it  in 
the  "Phenomenology, "  and  shows  us  how  he  reaches 
this  conclusion  in  a  marvelous  collection  of  sen- 
tences, paragraphs,  and  chapters,  which,  to  the 
scientific  mind,  at  first  seem  wholly  incompre- 
hensible, for  the  argument  is  hieratic.  It  cannot  be 
understood  except  by  those  who  are  initiated  into  the 
mysteries  of  its  symbolic  language.  Though 
tempted  to  analyze  it,  I  must  not,  for  it  would 
require  a  treatise  in  itself  equal  to  that  needed  for  the 
unraveling  of  the  cuneiform  inscriptions.  However, 
I  think  that  I  may  pause  long  enough  to  show  the 
fundamental  principles  on  which  he  proceeds:  (i) 
He  assumes  that  mind  is  the  substrate,  and  hence 
the  unifying  principle.  (2)  He  sees  as  clearly  as 
may  be  from  a  study  of  language,  that  one  property 
may  be  spoken  of  in  the  terms  of  another ;  thus  a 
space  may  be  spoken  of  in  terms  of  number,  as,  the 
distance  from  the  Capitol  to  the  White  House  may 
be  six  thousand  feet.  We  have  already  seen  that 
measure  itself  is  primarily  the  reduction  of  space  to 
number;  it  is  then  the  reduction  of  motion  and 
space  to  number ;  it  is  then  the  reduction  of  time  to 
motion,  and  motion  to  space,  and  space  to  number ; 
it  is  then  the  reduction  of  judgment  to  time,  and  of 
time  to  motion,  and  of  motion  to  space,  and  of  space 
to  number.  These  reductions  are  woven  into  all  the 
language  of  daily  life,  making  them  tropes,  or  giv- 
ing them  vicarious  uses;  but  especially  do  we  use 
terms  of  the  mechanical  properties  when  we  speak 
of  the  properties  of  consciousness.  The  very  same 
words  that  we  use  to  speak  of  the  properties  of 
consciousness,  we  more  often  use  when  speaking  of 
other  properties.  It  is  that  which  we  have  set 


FALLACIES  OF  IDEATION  407 

forth  as  the  vicarious  faculty  of  the  mind,  and  it  is 
the  foundation  of  trope. 

Now,  when  we  use  a  word  which  has  a  great 
variety  of  uses,  and  can  trace  in  this  usage  some  one 
meaning  as  an  attribute  of  consciousness,  Hegel  con- 
siders it  to  be  the  fundamental  meaning,  as  shown 
by  his  practice.  He  affirms  this,  sometimes,  when 
he  says  that  every  word  must  be  taken  in  all  its 
meaning,  if  it  is  logically  used.  The  word  compre- 
hend is  used  as  a  sign  of  a  mental  and  also  of  a  physical 
act.  I  may  say  that  I  comprehend  the  pen,  when 
I  mean  that  I  understand  the  pen,  or  I  may  say  that 
the  different  parts  of  the  pen  are  comprehended  in 
one,  as  the  pen  itself.  Now,  in  Hegel,  the  word  for 
comprehend  seems  to  have  many  meanings  that  are 
really  comprehended  in  one,  and,  being  an  idealist, 
that  one  meaning  is  its  psychic  significance.  There 
is  no  such  thing  as  a  pen  with  mechanical  properties, 
but  it  exists  only  with  the  properties  with  which  I 
endow  it  when  I  think  it,  for  I  create  it  with  my 
thought.  According  to  the  Hegelian  theory,  it  is 
nonsense  to  say  that  I  think  about  a  pen,  but  it  is 
the  "thing-in-itself,"  when  I  say  I  think  the  pen. 
This  thing-in-itself  is  the  noumenon  of  idealism. 
This  knife  is  composed  of  the  handle  and  its  parts, 
and  the  blades  with  their  parts,  but,  according  to 
idealism,  things  are  only  what  we  think  them  to  be, 
and  the  word  composed,  used  in  this  manner,  if  prop- 
erly understood,  is  but  a  psychic  term,  for,  accord- 
ing to  Kant,  space  is  a  form  of  thought,  not  of 
things.  When  we  come  properly  to  understand  the 
world,  that  all  things  are  thoughts,  then  we  see  that 
the  real  meaning  of  words  is  their  psychic  meaning, 
and  that  words  can  have  but  one  meaning.  As  com- 


408  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

monly  understood,  apprehended,  composed,  and 
embraced  in  the  same  senses,  have  synonymous 
meanings,  but,  according  to  Hegel,  and  to  idealism 
generally  since  his  time,  synonymous  words 
always  have  the  same  meaning,  and  that  mean- 
ing must  be  found  when  it  expresses  a  psychic 
fact.  This  is  the  secret  of  Hegel,  and  the  key 
to  his  hieroglyphics,  and,  if  consistently  used 
to  interpret  the  sayings  of  his  logic,  it  becomes  an 
open  book.  Now,  when  he  uses  a  word  for  any 
property  whatever,  we  must  understand,  if  we  follow 
Hegel  in  his  argument,  that  the  word  is  used  in  its 
psychic  meaning.  If  we  consistently  carry  out  this 
rule,  sentence  by  sentence,  paragraph  by  paragraph, 
chapter  by  chapter,  through  the  "Phenomenology," 
where  it  generally  works,  on  through  his  "Logic," 
where,  perhaps,  it  is  the  universal  rule,  we 
can  translate  his  hieratic  codex  into  demotic 
speech. 

Permit  a  word  of  advice  to  the  student  who  desires 
to  accomplish  this  feat.  First,  read  the  works  of 
Hegel's  most  devout  disciples.  Then  take  up  Hegel 
himself.  Then,  after  mastering  Hegel,  Kant's 
"Critique"  will  be  an  open  book.  The  student  must 
first  learn  the  hieratic  language,  and  then  it  is  easy 
to  read  all  of  the  works  of  the  idealists. 

Hegel  accepted  not  only  void  space  and  void  time 
as  realities,  but  he  accepted  void  essence  and  other 
nothings  which  he  included  under  the  term  being, 
and  sometimes  under  the  term  absolute.  The  world 
of  sense  is  seen  by  every  one  to  be  a  world  of 
change,  and  he  called  it  becoming;  the  fallacies, 
then,  he  called  the  being,  or  the  absolute,  and  the 
realities  the  becoming.  In  his  "Logic,"  he  says: 


FALLACIES  OF  IDEATION  409 

"But  this  mere  Being,  as  it  is  mere  abstraction,  is  therefore 
the  absolutely  negative:  which,  in  a  similarly  immediate 
aspect,  is  just  Nothing. 

"Hence  was  derived  the  second  definition  of  the  Absolute ;  the 
Absolute  is  the  Nought.  In  fact  this  definition  is  implied  in 
saying  that  the  thing-in-itself  is  the  indeterminate,  utterly 
without  form  and  so  without  content.  .  .  . 

'  'The  proposition  that  Being  and  Nothing  is  the  same  seems  so 
paradoxical  to  the  imagination  or  understanding,  that  it  is 
perhaps  taken  for  a  joke.  And  indeed  it  is  one  of  the  hardest 
things  thought  expects  itself  to  do:  for  Being  and  Nothing 
exhibit  the  fundamental  contrast  in  all  its  immediacy, — that  is, 
without  the  one  term  being  invested  with  any  attribute  which 
would  involve  its  connexion  with  the  other.  This  attribute, 
however,  as  the  above  paragraph  points  out,  is  implicit  in 
them— the  attribute  which  is  just  the  same  in  both.  So  far 
the  [deduction  of  their  unity  is  completely  analytical :  indeed 
the  whole  progress  of  philosophising  in  every  case,  if  it  be  a 
methodical,  that  is  to  say,  a  necessary,  progress,  merely 
renders  explicit  what  is  implicit  in  a  notion.  It  is  as  correct 
however  to  say  that  Being  and  Nothing  are  altogether  differ- 
ent, as  to  assert  their  unity.  The  one  is  not  what  the  other  is. 
But  since  the  distinction  has  not  at  this  point  assumed  definite 
shape  (Being  and  Nothing  are  still  the  immediate),  it  is,  in  the 
way  that  they  have  it,  something  unutterable,  which  we  merely 
mean." 


What  Hegel  means  is  that  the  world  of  reality  is 
the  creation  of  the  human  mind  out  of  nothing. 
Now,  this  creation  of  something  out  of  nothing,  as  it 
produces  the  material  universe,  is  kept  in  constant 
flux  or  change,  for  everything  is  in  evolution  and 
dissolution,  and  thus  it  is  the  becoming.  While 
Spencer  reifies  the  universe  as  force,  and  deems  it 
the  unknowable,  Hegel  reifies  the  universe  as 
thought,  and  deems  it  the  unutterable;  so  all 
metaphysical  philosophers  trace  the  universe  into 
something  occult. 


4IO  TRUTH   AND  ERROR 

Hegel  attempts  to  forestall  ridicule  in  the  follow- 
ing language : 

"No  great  expenditure  of  wit  is  needed  to  make  fun  of  the 
maxim  that  Being  and  Nothing  are  the  same,  or  rather  to 
adduce  absurdities  which,  it  is  erroneously  asserted,  are  the 
consequences  and  illustrations  of  that  maxim." 

Then  he  goes  on,  by  a  method  of  logic  which  he 
calls  dialectic,  to  show  the  validity  of  his  proposi- 
tion, in  which  he  asserts : 

"There  is  absolutely  nothing  whatever  in  which  we  cannot 
and  must  not  point  to  contradictions  or  opposite  attributes." 

This  logic  is  well  worth  perusal  by  the  curious 
reader,  as  an  example  of  mysterious  arguments 
about  mysteries,  of  propositions  about  the  unutter- 
able, of  notions  about  the  unknowable,  and  of 
attributes  assigned  to  ghosts.  In  such  manner, 
scholastic  learning  transmutes  folk-lore  into  the 
semblance  of  wisdom,  and  the  pathos  of  poetry. 
Lowell,  with  sympathetic  love,  has  given  fine  ex- 
pression to  the  thaumaturgy  of  transcendentalism, 
when  he  likens  the  gold-fish  in  the  globe  to  souls 
imprisoned  in  the  sphere  of  sense: 

"Is  it  illusion?    Dream-stuff?    Show 
Made  of  the  wish  to  have  it  so? 
'Twere  something,  even  though  this  were  all: 
So  the  poor  prisoner,  on  his  wall 
Long  gazing,  from  the  chance  designs 
Of  crack,  mould,  weather-stain,  refines 
New  and  new  pictures  without  cease, 
Landscape,  or  saint,  or  altar-piece : 
But  these  are  Fancy's  common  brood, 
Hatched  in  the  nest  of  solitude ; 


FALLACIES  OF  IDEATION  41 1 

This  is  Dame  Wish's  hourly  trade, 
By  our  rude  sires  a  goddess  made. 


"The  worm,  by  trustful  instinct  led, 
Draws  from  its  womb  a  slender  thread, 
And  drops,  confiding  that  the  breeze 
Will  waft  it  to  unpastured  trees ; 
So  the  brain  spins  itself,  and  so 
Swings  boldly  off  in  hope  to  blow 
Across  some  tree  of  knowledge,  fair 
With  fruitage  new,  none  else  shall  share: 
Sated  with  wavering  in  the  Void, 
It  backward  climbs,  so  best  employed, 
And,  where  no  proof  is  nor  can  be, 
Seeks  refuge  with  Analogy ; 
Truth's  soft  half-sister,  she  may  tell 
Where  lurks,  seld-sought,  the  other's  well. 


"The  things  we  see  as  shadows  I 
Know  to  be  substance ;  tell  me  why 
My  visions,  like  those  haunting  you, 
May  not  be  as  substantial  too. 
Alas,  who  ever  answer  heard 
From  fish,  and  dream-fish  too?    Absurd ! 
Your  consciousness  I  half  divine, 
But  you  are  wholly  deaf  to  mine. 
Go,  I  dismiss  you ;  ye  have  done 
All  that  ye  could ;  our  silk  is  spun ; 
Dive  back  into  the  deep  of  dreams, 
Where  what  is  real  is  what  seems ! 
Yet  I  shall  fancy  till  my  grave 
Your  lives  to  mine  a  lesson  gave ; 
If  lesson  none,  an  image,  then, 
Impeaching  self-conceit  in  men 
Who  put  their  confidence  alone 
In  what  they  call  the  Seen  and  Known." 

Emerson  sings  of  the  mystery   of   transcenden- 
talism : 


412  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

"The  Sphinx  is  drowsy, 

Her  wings  are  furled ; 
Her  ear  is  heavy, 

She  broods  on  the  world. 
Who'll  tell  me  my  secret, 

The  ages  have  kept? 
I  awaited  the  seer, 

While  they  slumbered  and  slept  ;- 

"The  fate  of  the  man-child; 

The  meaning  of  man ; 
Known  fruit  of  the  unknown ; 

Daedalian  plan ; 
Out  of  sleeping  a  waking, 

Out  of  waking  a  sleep ; 
Life  death  overtaking; 

Deep  underneath  deep? 


"Up  rose  the  merry  Sphinx, 

And  crouched  no  more  in  stone ; 
She  melted  into  purple  cloud, 

She  silvered  in  the  moon ; 
She  spired  into  a  yellow  flame ; 

She  flowered  in  blossoms  red; 
She  flowed  into  a  foaming  wave ; 

She  stood  Monadnoc's  head." 

Great  are  the  poets  of  mysticism,  but  there  is  one 
greater: 

'  'What  a  piece  of  work  is  man !  How  noble  in  reason !  How 
infinite  in  faculties !  in  form,  and  moving,  how  express  and 
admirable!  in  action,  how  like  an  angel!  in  apprehension, 
how  like  a  god!  the  beauty  of  the  world!  the  paragon  of 
animals!" 


CHAPTER  XXV 

SUMMARY 

I  have  tried  to  demonstrate  that  an  ultimate 
particle,  and  hence  every  body,  has  five  essentials  or 
concomitants,  these  terms  being  practically  synony- 
mous. It  has  been  shown  that  there  is  something  ' 
absolute  and  something  relative  in  every  one.  The 
essentials  of  the  particle  are  unity,  extension,  speed, 
persistence,  and  consciousness,  which  are  absolute. 
The  relations  which  arise  from  them,  in  order,  are 
multeity,  position,  path,  change,  and  choice,  which 
give  rise  to  number,  extension,  motion,  time,  and 
judgment,  as  properties  that  can  be  measured.  It 
has  been  pointed  out  that  particles  are  incorporated 
in  bodies  through  affinity  as  choice,  and  by  this  in- 
corporation the  quantitative  properties  become  clas- 
sific  properties  which,  in  order,  are  class,  form,  force, 
causation,  and  conception.  In  the  development  of 
number  into  class,  unity  becomes  kind  and  plurality 
becomes  series.  In  the  development  of  space  into 
form,  extension  becomes  figure  and  position  becomes 
structure.  In  the  development  of  motion  into  force, 
speed  becomes  velocity  and  path  becomes  inertia. 
In  the  development  of  time  into  causation,  persis- 
tence becomes  state  and  change  becomes  event.  In 
the  development  of  judgment  into  conception,  con- 
sciousness becomes  recollection  and  choice  becomes 
inference. 

As  all  particles,   except  those   of  the  ether,  are 
413 


414  TRUTH   AND   ERROR 

organized  into  bodies,  all  of  these  bodies  may  be 
viewed  or  considered  from  two  standpoints — internal 
and  external.  If  we  consider  the  body  internally  we 
consider  its  particles  externally  to  one  another; 
therefore,  we  are  compelled  to  recognize  the  recip- 
rocality  of  the  two  views — the  quantitative  view  is 
equal  to  or  the  reciprocal  of  the  classific  view. 
Now,  we  have  three  terms,  concomitancy,  relativity, 
and  reciprocality,  which,  in  all  science  and  especially 
in  psychology,  must  clearly  be  distinguished.  The 
failure  to  distinguish  them  creates  the  fog  of 
metaphysic. 

In  the  ether  we  do  not  know  of  the  existence  of 
bodies,  but  it  seems  probable  that  only  particles  exist. 
We  do  know  of  astronomical  bodies,  geonomic 
bodies,  phytonomic  bodies,  zoonomic  bodies,  and 
demotic  bodies.  In  the  last  class  the  particles  do  not 
lose  their  three  degrees  of  freedom  of  motion,  but 
this  freedom  is  transmuted  into  cooperative  recip- 
rocality. The  freedom  of  the  particles  by  develop- 
ment of  motility  as  a  mode  of  motion  becomes  the 
self-activity  of  the  individuals,  which  is  exhibited  in 
promoting  the  welfare  of  the  individual  and  of  the 
demotic  body. 

Properties  are  not  creations  of  the  mind ;  they  are 
founded  in  nature  and  are  recognized  in  nature  in 
the  plainest  manner,  hence  they  are  not  artificial, 
but  natural.  In  molecules  numbers  are  organized 
into  kinds  and  series,  that  is,  into  classes,  the  kinds 
appearing  as  substances  and  the  series  as  totalities 
of  substances.  In  stars  spaces  are  integrated  and 
differentiated  as  figures  and  structures,  and  hence 
forms  are  primarily  organized  in  stars.  In  geonomic 
bodies  motions  are  organized  as  forces,  being 


SUMMARY 


integrated  and  differentiated  as  cooperative  spheres. 
In  plants  times  are  organized  as  causations,  antece- 
dent and  consequent,  as  parents  and  children,  and 
heredity  thus  appears.  In  animals  judgments  are 
organized,  in  which  times  become  states  as  memories 
and  changes  as  inferences.  In  this  realm  mind  first 
appears  as  conception,  for  concepts  require  memory 
and  inference,  thus  only  animals  have  minds  ;  plants 
do  not  have  minds,  but  their  particles  have  judg- 
ment, for  particles  have  affinity  and  make  judgments 
of  association,  and  only  such  judgments.  They  do 
not  have  memory,  nor  do  they  have  conception, 
therefore  they  do  not  have  inference. 

All  particles  of  plants,  rocks,  and  stars  have  judg- 
ments as  consciousness  and  choice,  but  having  no 
organization  for  the  psychical  functions  they  have 
not  recollection  and  inference  ;  they  therefore  do  not 
have  intellections  or  emotions.  Only  animal  bodies 
have  these  psychical  faculties.  Molecules,  stars, 
stones,  and  plants  do  not  think  ;  that  which  we  have 
attributed  to  them  as  consciousness  and  choice  is 
only  the  judgment  of  particles;  but  it  is  the  ground, 
the  foundation,  the  substrate  of  that  which  appears 
in  animals  when  they  are  organized  for  conception. 

That  which  perchance  may  be  called  hylozoism 
in  this  work  must  radically  be  distinguished  from 
that  hylozoism  which  appears  in  metaphysical 
speculation,  when  it  attributes  mind  to  inanimate 
bodies,  or  from  that  belief  of  early  mythology 
which  also  attributes  mind  to  inanimate  things.  It 
is  this  error  of  primeval  savagery,  called  animism, 
from  which  civilized  men  have  long  ago  logically 
revolted,  that  must  be  distinguished  from  the 
hylozoism  herein  propounded.  Perhaps  it  is  this 


416  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

repugnance  to  primeval  error  which  has  chiefly  been 
instrumental  in  causing  the  rejection  of  the  funda- 
mental principles  of  concomitance  in  the  science  of 
mind,  for  it  has  occurred  to  great  thinkers  many 
times  since  the  revival  of  science  effected  by  Colum- 
bus and  Copernicus. 

It  is  marvelous  how  often  it  has  occurred  to  the 
great  thinkers  of  science  as  well  as  of  metaphysics ; 
but  so  far  as  I  know  it  was  never  clearly  formulated 
in  such  a  manner  as  to  become  a  scientific  doctrine. 
It  has  been  held  that  mind  itself  belongs  to  the 
inanimate  realm,  when  it  should  have  been  held  that 
consciousness  and  choice  only  are  inherent  in  this 
realm,  which  is  developed  into  psychic  faculties  only 
by  the  organization  of  animate  bodies. 

In  these  chapters  it  has  been  affirmed  that  every 
particle  or  body  may  be  considered  severally  in  its 
essentials  or  concomitants,  and  that  if  we  consider 
one  property  and  not  the  others  we  consider  it 
abstractly.  Abstraction,  therefore,  is  the  con- 
sideration of  one  property  of  a  body,  neglecting  the 
others  which  we  are  compelled  to  posit. 

We  cannot  conceive  one  property  as  existing  inde- 
pendently of  the  others,  but  the  discovery  of  one 
property  leads  the  mind  by  a  habit,  which  is  inexor- 
able, to  postulate  the  others.  This  postulation  of  all 
properties  from  one,  if  neglected,  leads  to  what 
has  here  been  called  reification.  The  mind  that 
deals  with  things  when  it  reasons,  cannot  make  this 
mistake,  but  the  mind  that  deals  with  words  and 
thus  reasons  by  the  methods  of  scholastic  logic,  is 
liable  to  this  error,  for  a  particle  or  a  body  may  be 
designated  by  the  name  of  one  of  its  properties. 
The  failure  to  make  this  distinction  may  be  called 


SUMMARY  417 

the  ground  of  the  failure  of  Aristotelian  logic  as 
distinguished  from  scientific  logic. 

Having  set  forth  the  reciprocal  properties  of 
bodies,  a  brief  chapter  is  given  to  explain  how  prop- 
erties become  qualities,  in  which  it  is  demonstrated 
that  qualities  arise  through  the  consideration  of 
properties  in  relation  to  the  purposes  of  animal 
bodies,  especially  of  human  bodies. 

The  failure  to  distinguish  between  properties  and 
qualities  is  the  fundamental  error  of  modern  meta- 
physic.  For  twenty-five  centuries  many  great 
thinkers  have  considered  the  properties  of  a  body, 
which  are  founded  upon  its  essentials,  and  which 
essentials  are  the  thing-in-itself,  as  if  they  were 
qualities.  Discovering  that  qualities  are  forever 
changing  with  the  point  of  view,  as  the  purpose  of 
the  individual  is  changed,  the  reality  of  properties 
was  questioned. 

The  unreality  of  properties  when  they  are  con- 
founded with  qualities  finds  expression  in  many 
ways.  Thus  it  is  affirmed  that  man  is  the  measure 
of  things,  or  that  man  is  the  measure  of  qualities, 
meaning  that  things  or  their  qualities  are  generated 
by  the  mind.  This  is  true  of  qualities,  as  I  use  the 
term,  but  it  is  not  true  of  properties.  Still,  the 
ancients  retained  sanity,  and  believed  in  the  thing- 
in-itself,  and  called  it  a  noumenon.  An  attribute  of 
a  thing  which  seems  to  vary  with  the  point  of  view 
is  called  a  phenomenon.  Then,  many  properties 
are  imperfectly  cognized,  and  their  explanation 
depends  upon  investigation  which  has  come  to  be 
recognized  as  scientific  research;  hence  properties 
that  are  still  improperly  explained  are  also  called 
phenomena,  but  when  better  explained  are  called 


418  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

noumena.  Thus  noumenon  as  used  by  the  ancients 
is  a  term  which  means  the  thing  which  changes  with 
the  point  of  view,  whether  it  is  a  change  of  purpose 
or  a  change  of  explanation.  Thus  errors  of  cogni- 
tion in  properties  are  confounded  with  what  I  call 
qualities,  and  both  are  called  phenomena. 

An  attempt  is  then  made  to  demonstrate  that  the 
cognition  of  these  properties  gives  rise  to  five  psychic 
faculties,  which  we  have  called  sensation,  perception, 
apprehension,  reflection,  and  ideation. 

In  developing  the  five  faculties  of  intellection  an 
endeavor  has  been  made  to  set  forth  the  nature  of 
the  judgment  and  to  show  that  its  validity  depends 
upon  verification.  Repeated  judgments  from  like 
sense  impressions  become  habitual  or  intuitive.  I 
here  speak  of  habitual  judgments  of  intellection  as 
intuitive,  as  in  a  later  work  I  shall  speak  of  habitual 
judgments  of  emotion  as  instinctive,  and  consider 
presentative  judgments  as  being  inductive,  and 
representative  judgments  as  being  deductive.  The 
division  of  the  faculties  into  sense  perception,  under- 
standing, and  reason,  to  which  metaphysic  has  been 
committed  in  a  more  or  less  clearly  defined  manner, 
is  here  rejected  as  a  schematization  that  leads  to 
psychological  confusion. 

That  speculation  which  deals  with  the  properties 
of  bodies  as  if  they  were  qualities,  I  call  metaphysic. 
That  theorizing  which  distinguishes  properties  from 
qualities  and  deals  with  properties  as  realities,  I  call 
science.  That  speculation  which  fails  to  find  con- 
sciousness as  an  essential  or  concomitant  'of  bodies, 
but  derives  the  mind  from  force  or  motion,  I  call 
materialism. 

Metaphysic  has  a  history  which  must  be  unraveled 


SUMMARY  419 

to  properly  understand  contemporaneous  opinion  at 
any  one  stage,  but  especially  to  understand  the  suc- 
cessive stages  through  which  it  has  passed.  Before 
the  birth  of  chemistry  man  believed  the  elements  to 
be  earth,  air,  fire,  and  water,  which  elements  were 
mixed  in  all  of  the  bodies  of  the  world,  and  it 
becomes  necessary  for  us  to  understand  how  the 
attributes  of  bodies  were  assigned  to  the  several 
elements.  Not  only  was  metaphysic  founded  upon 
these  doctrines,  but  it  was  out  of  a  philosophy  of 
these  elements  that  science  itself  was  developed. 
Gradually  in  the  history  of  civilization  there  grew  up 
a  doctrine  of  substance  or  substrate  as  something 
which  is  not  one  of  the  essentials  of  matter,  as 
particle  or  body,  but  to  which  essentials  adhere  or 
inhere  or  subsist.  This  substrate  or  substance  was 
supposed  to  be  the  vehicle  of  properties  which 
emanate  from  it.  Two  relics  of  this  doctrine  are 
especially  of  interest  to  scientific  men.  It  was  long 
believed  that  heat  and  light  are  corpuscular,  and 
that  heat  is  given  off  from  the  substrate  or  substance 
of  one  body  and  taken  up  by  another.  Even  Newton 
thought  light  to  be  corpuscular.  The  doctrine  that 
motion  as  speed  emanates  from  one  body  as  a  sub- 
stance or  substrate  and  passes  to  another,  comes 
from  this  source.  This  relic  of  ancient  philosophy 
clings  to  much  of  modern  physics,  and  is  the  founda- 
tion of  a  body  of  speculation  in  which  scientific  men 
indulge  when  they  theorize  about  the  dissipation  of 
motion,  the  exhaustion  of  the  heat  of  the  sun,  and 
the  general  running  down  of  the  solar  system  into 
a  state  in  which  life  will  be  impossible. 

In  a  very  brief  and  inadequate  way  I  have  tried  to 
set    forth   the   origin   and  history   of   fundamental 


420  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

fallacies  relating  to  properties.  This  history  com- 
mences with  the  early  Greeks,  but  we  cannot  under- 
stand its  origin  without  going  back  to  an  earlier 
stage  of  society  than  that  in  which  history  presents 
the  philosophy  of  the  Hellenic  tribes. 

In  tribal  society  all  honor  is  due  to  the  progenitor 
of  a  tribe  for  his  goodness  and  wisdom,  and  his  com- 
mands have  perpetual  authority.  The  ancient  time 
was  the  golden  age ;  the  present  is  a  time  of  degen- 
eracy. In  tribal  society  to  say  that  a  man  is  elder  is  to 
say  that  he  is  wiser  and  better  and  must  be  obeyed. 
An  ancient  who  lived  in  the  ancient  of  days  was 
supremely  wise  and  good.  He  who  can  trace  his 
ancestry  farthest  into  antiquity  has  the  most  honor- 
able beginning.  The  most  ancient,  the  first,  the 
progenitor,  the  prototype,  is  the  one  to  whom  all 
glory  must  be  given.  In  savagery,  authority,  wis- 
dom, honor,  and  parentage  are  so  intimately 
associated  in  the  minds  of  tribal  men,  that  their 
demotic  organization  is  dependent  upon  this  com- 
pound concept,  taken  as  a  single  principle.  With 
these  people  demotic  organization  is  founded  upon 
the  authority  of  the  parent  over  the  offspring.  To 
be  a  parent  is  to  have  wisdom,  and  to  be  a  parent 
is  to  have  authority.  The  parent  seems  to  have 
reason  upon  his  side  when  he  seeks  to  control  the 
offspring,  for  the  parent  is  the  author  of  the  off- 
spring; therefore,  the  progenitor  is  the  wise  and  the 
powerful,  and  this  principle,  which  is  at  the  founda- 
tion of  tribal  society,  is  so  thoroughly  interwoven 
into  the  habits  of  thought  of  the  people,  that  it  seems 
to  them  a  self-evident  proposition  that  the  pro- 
genitor is  wise  and  should  rule. 

When   a  group   of   kindred    is    considered    with 


SUMMARY  421 

parents  and  children,  and  collateral  lines  of  con- 
sanguineal  members,  and  further  lines  of  kinship  by 
affinity,  the  whole  group  organized  into  a  tribe  with 
authority  in  the  relative  elder,  and  all  the  items  of 
authority  parceled  out  in  a  hierarchy  of  real  or  con- 
ventional relative  ages,  we  have  the  tribal  plan  of 
government. 

Honor  for  ancestors  is  the  most  profound  senti- 
ment of  savage  men  and  is  daily  and  systematically 
inculcated,  so  that  the  younger  always  yields 
obedience  to  the  elder,  and  the  elder  is  always  held 
in  reverence. 

This  principle  leads  to  a  gradation  of  the  people 
of  a  savage  tribe  into  recognized  ranks  by  relative 
age,  and  if  a  man  is  promoted  within  a  tribe,  such 
promotion  is  a  formal  advancement  in  age,  and 
kinship  terms  are  readjusted  so  that  the  age  received 
by  promotion  may  be  recognized  in  terms  of  address. 
In  barbarism  there  comes  another  element  to 
increase  this  respect,  for  the  elder  is  not  only 
obeyed,  but  is  worshiped  as  a  deity.  In  this  manner 
often  the  chief  of  the  gens,  which  is  a  group  within 
the  tribe,  and  also  the  chief  of  the  tribe,  is  wor- 
shiped. Dead  ancestors  are  also  worshiped  as 
ghosts.  Clans  of  the  savage  tribe  become  gentes  of 
the  barbaric  tribe,  and  the  gentes  are  grouped  in 
phratries  as  religious  brotherhoods,  and  the  dead 
chief  of  the  phratry  is  usually  worshiped,  while  other 
departed  members  of  the  phratry  are  also  worshiped. 
Chiefs,  who  may  be  called  the  priests  of  the  phratry 
when  they  become  remarkable  for  their  ability  or 
for  success  in  shamanism  as  diviners,  medicine-men, 
and  soothsayers,  are  held  for  a  long  time  in  great 
reverence,  and  their  accomplishments  are  repeated 


422  TRUTH  AND  ERROR 

in  many  a  story.  So  in  barbaric  society  the 
patriarch — the  ancient — is  held  to  be  the  progenitor 
or  prototype  of  the  gens,  the  phratry,  or  the  tribe, 
as  the  case  may  be.  In  gentes,  phratries,  and  tribes 
there  is  a  constant  veneration  of  ancestral  ancients. 
This  appears  to  have  been  the  case  among  the 
Hellenic  tribes,  which  belonged  to  that  stage  of 
culture  which  we  call  barbarism. 

In  savagery  seven  worlds  are  developed,  as  the 
east,  west,  north,  south,  zenith,  nadir,  and  center; 
and  they  schematize  or  systematize  all  the  attributes 
of  things  into  seven  groups.  As  geographic  knowl- 
edge increases,  those  attributes  which  are  assigned 
to  the  four  quarters  of  the  earth,  are  by  natural 
methods  transferred  from  the  cardinal  worlds  to 
certain  leading  attributes  of  those  worlds  represented 
by  earth,  air,  fire,  and  water.  In  this  manner  the 
worlds  are  transmuted  into  elements,  but  there  still 
remain  the  zenith,  nadir,  and  center — the  zenith 
becoming  a  world  of  exalted  attributes  which  they 
suppose  to  be  good,  the  nadir  becoming  a  world  of 
evil. 

Greek  philosophy  was  developed  at  a  time  when 
tribal  society  was  developing.  Upon  the  ruins  of 
tribal  society  imperialism  was  erected.  The  Greek 
philosophers  inherited  the  cosmology  of  barbarism 
and  with  it  the  habits  of  thought  characteristic  of 
barbarism,  especially  the  mental  tendency  to  claim 
superiority  for  the  ancient  or  first.  Hence  they 
claimed  superiority  for  one  or  another  Of  the  four 
elements.  Particularly  was  air,  fire,  or  water  held 
to  be  the  first  or  progenitor  of  the  others.  In  all 
their  concepts  about  the  absolutes  of  bodies,  whether 
considering  properties  or  qualities,  there  always 


SUMMARY  423 

seems  to  be  a  factor  of  this  tribal  concept.  Thus 
we  see  that  one  of  the  barbaric  elements  was  always 
taken  as  the  substrate  of  the  others.  Thus  was 
born  the  doctrine  of  substrate. 

When  imperialism  had  led  to  monotheism,  and  the 
school  of  theology  was  the  school  of  philosophy 
also,  a  new  substrate  was  discovered — the  deity  as 
something  eminent  in  the  world  of  attributes.  At 
last,  in  comparatively  modern  times,  another  sub- 
strate was  developed  in  speculation  as  a  something 
to  which  the  attributes  could  inhere.  This  reifica- 
tion  still  holds  a  place  in  the  speculation  even  of 
scientific  men  and  vitiates  our  popular  physics.  It 
is  the  chimera  of  substrate,  this  thing  in  itself  as 
noumenon  that  leads  to  the  belief  in  the  world  only 
as  phenomenon.  Since  Berkeley  and  Hume  a 
special  school  of  metaphysicians  has  been  developed 
who  have  the  custody  of  this  ghost  and  are  its  leal 
defenders.  The  fifth  property,  or  consciousness  as 
mind,  is  their  ghost.  These  are  the  idealists.  The 
war  of  philosophy  is  between  Idealists  and 
Materialists. 

The  philosophy  here  presented  is  neither  Idealism 
nor  Materialism ;  I  would  fain  call  it  the  Philosophy 
of  Science. 


NDEX 


Activities,  human,  considered, 
180. 

Adaptation,  laws  of,  201. 

Affinity,  phenomena  of,  41. 

Animals,  principles  or  prop- 
erties of,  74. 

Animals,  environment  of,  75. 

Animals,  motility  in,  76. 

Animals,  heredity  in,  76. 

Animals,  reproduction  of,  77. 

Animals,  judgment  in,  77. 

Animals,  systems  of  organs  in, 
78. 

Animals,  metabolic  processes 
in,  79. 

Animals,  functions  in,  83. 

Animals,  nervous  system  in, 
87. 

Animals,  sense  organs  of,  89. 

Apprehension,  237. 

Apprehension,  term  restricted 
to  judgment  of  force,  237. 

Apprehension,  both  induc- 
tive and  deductive,  243. 

Apprehension,  definition  of, 
250. 

Apprehension,  fallacies  of, 
352. 

Assimilation,  constructive,  66. 

Assimilation,  differentiating, 
66. 

Atmospheric  agencies  of  dis- 
integration, 48. 

Berkeley,  idealism  of,  403. 
Botany,  facts  relating  to,  137. 


Causation,    primal  fallacy  of, 

381. 

Causation,  study  of,  186. 
Cause  and  effect,  37. 
Causes,  genetic,  39. 
Causes,  teleologic,  39. 
Chuar's  illusion,  i. 
Classification,     definition    of, 

109. 

Classification,  method  of,  113. 
Classification,  test  of,  117. 
Classification,     goal     of     the 

science  of,  118. 
Classification,  erroneous  meth- 

ods of,  119. 
Classification,        fundamental 

among  Greeks,  122. 
Classification,  a  tool  of  logic, 

126. 
Classification,      logical      and 

mathematical    methods    of, 

131- 

Cognition  defined,  283. 
Conception,  a  process  of  con- 

solidating judgments,  214. 
Consciousness      considered, 

211. 

Cooperation  discussed,  168. 
Cooperation  in  celestial  realm, 

173- 
Cooperation      in       terrestrial 

spheres,  174. 
Cooperation  in  vegetal  realm, 

~1?4' 

Cooperation       in       zoonomic 


realm,  174. 


425 


426 


TRUTH    AND    ERROR 


Cooperation  of   systems   with 

systems,  177. 
Cooperation,  societies  formed 

by,  179. 
Cosmology,  origin  of  systems 

of,  377- 
Culture,  law  of,  201. 

Darwin,  acceleration  of  evolu- 
tion discovered  by,  197. 

Doctrines  taught  by  modern 
science,  9. 

Dynamics  discussed,  152. 

Earth,  composition  of,   42. 

Earth,  form  of,  43. 

Earth,  geologic  facts,  43. 

Earth,  aqueous   envelope,  45. 

Earth,  oscillations  of  upheaval 
and  subsidence,  45. 

Earth,  structure  of  crust  of,  47. 

Earth,  changes  effected  in 
crust  by  water,  60. 

Effort,  law  of,  200. 

Environment,  effect  of,  204. 

Environment  of  animals,  75. 

Evolution  discussed,  183. 

Evolution,  primal  law  of,  188. 

Evolution,  organization  of  de- 
motic life  a  factor  in,  200. 

Force,  compound  of  motions, 

36. 

Forces,  outline  of.  171. 
Functions,  control  of,  178. 

Generations  or   properties    of 

plants,  64. 
Geochemism,  the  fundamental 

energy,  59- 
Geonomic  bodies,  properties  of, 

42. 
Geonomic  realm,  constitution 

of,  192. 
Geonomy,  divisions  of,  136. 

Hallucinations  defined,  313. 

Hallucinations,  so-called  cen- 
sus of,  315. 

Hallucinations,  classification 
of,  320. 


Hallucinations,  among  North 
American  Indians,  330. 

Hegel,  fallacies  of,  405. 

Heredity,  effect  of,  177. 

Heredity,  element  of,  in  plants, 
65- 

Heredity,  law  of,  199. 

Heterogeneity,  law  of,  199. 

Homologies,  extended  from 
atom  to  organism,  145. 

Homologies,  hierarchy  of, 
throughout  universe,  146. 

Homologies,  illustrated  in 
organization  of  human  soci- 
ety, 146. 

Homologies,  in  natural  organ- 
ization, 147. 

Homology  discussed,  133. 

Human  body,  a  hierarchy  of 
conscious  bodies,  86. 

Hylozoism,  theory  of,  95. 

Hypotheses  relating  to  changes 
in  earth's  crust,  51. 

Ideation  discussed,  264 
Ideation,  fallacies  of,  391. 
Inertia,  definition  of,  360. 
Intellections  discussed,  278. 
Intellections,     psychology      a 

system  of,  278. 
Intellections,  faculties  of,  279. 

Judgment,    psychic    elements 

of,  280. 
Judgment     relating  to   cause 

and  effect,  282. 

Lamarck,  motile  state  of  mat- 
ter discovered  by,  199. 

La  Place,  on  genesis  of  heav- 
enly bodies,  190. 

Law  governing  phenomena  of 
earth's  crust,  search  for,  50. 

Locke,  John,  on  accidents,  401. 

Mathematics  of  motion,  science 
of,  27. 

Matter,  definition  of,  12. 

Memory,  physiological  concep- 
tion of,  333. 

Metabolism  in  plants,  72. 


INDEX 


427 


Metabolism  in  animals,  74. 

Metagenesis,  a  process  of 
causality,  63. 

Metamorphoses  of  mineral  sub- 
stances, 56. 

Metaphysical  reasoning,  errors 

*~of,  276. 

Metaphysisis,  a  succession  of 
changes  of  force,  59. 

Mill,  John  Stuart,  on  causa- 
tion, 38. 

Misperceptions,  illustrations  of, 

338-339- 

Molar  bodies,  definition  of,  21, 
129. 

Molecular  bodies,  internal  rela- 
tions of,  21. 

Morphology,  illustrated  by 
animals  and  their  organs, 
142. 

Morphology,  illustrated  by  in- 
sects, 145. 

Morphology  and  classification, 
relation  between,  148. 

Morphology  of  plant  phytons, 
70. 

Motion  of  atoms,  152. 

Motion,  Descartes'  theory,  153. 

Motion,  laws  of,  163. 

Motion,  vibratory  and  struc- 
tural, 169. 

Motion,  persistence  of,  358. 

Motion,  concepts  of,  361. 

Myths,  discussion  of,  381. 

Nature,       five      fundamental 

realms  of,  96. 
Newton,  theory  of  inertia,  161. 

Ontology,   philosophy  of,  399. 

Parish,  on   hallucinations  and 

illusions,  311. 
Particles,  inanimate,  essentials 

of,  1 6. 
Particles  of  matter,  affinity  of, 

31- 

Particles  of  matter,  combina- 
tion into  molecules,  31. 

Particles  of  matter,  classifica- 
tion, 31. 


Particles  of  matter,  vibration 
of,  35- 

Particles  of  matter,  persistence 
of,  interrupted,  36. 

Perception  discussed,  226. 

Perception,  fallacies  of,  335. 

Perception,  as  a  mental  phe- 
nomenon, 341. 

Perception,  the  interpretation 
of  a  symbol,  342. 

Phenomena,  erroneously  classi- 
fied by  Mill,  120. 

Philosophy,  transcendental, 
errors  or,  149. 

Philosophy  of  the  unknowable, 
refutation  of  Spencer's,  370. 

Plants,  chemical  laboratories, 
69. 

Plants,  cells,  tissues  and  forms 
of,  69. 

Plants,  conditions  of  life,  72. 

Processes  or  the  properties  of 
geonomic  bodies,  42. 

Properties,  essentials  of,  9. 

Protoplasm,  constitution  of,  64. 

Psychophysics, science  of,   120. 

eualities,  definition  of,  98. 
ualities,   distinct  from  prop- 
erties, IOO. 

Qualities,  errors  of  Locke  in 
relation  to,  102. 

Qualities,  termed  attributes  by 
Spencer,  105. 

Qualities,  Berkeley's  ^opinions 
in  relation  to,  107. 

Qualities,  Hume,  Kant,  Schill- 
ing and  Fichte  on,  107. 

Quantities  or  properties  that 
are  measured,  20. 

Reflection  discussed,  251. 

Reflection,  concepts  of,  253. 

Reflection,  definition  of,  263. 

Reflection,  process  of  combin- 
ing judgments  by,  289. 

Reflection,  fallacies  of,  374. 

Reification,  origin  of,  3. 

Relations  that  must  exist 
between  particles,  23. 


428 


TRUTH    AND    ERROR 


Science  and  speculation,  issue 
between,  150. 

Science  and  metaphysics,  dif- 
ference of  methods,  184. 

Sciences,  distinction  between 
classific  and  quantitative, 
246. 

Scientific  research,  definition 
of,  7. 

Sensation  discussed,  207. 

Sensation  and  feeling,  differ- 
ence between,  207. 

Sensation,  fallacies  of,  307. 

Sense  impressions,  223. 

vSenses,  vicarious  feelings, 
209. 

Signatures,  the  doctrine  of, 
385. 


Solar  system,  motions  within, 

34- 

Space,  definition  of,  133. 
Specters,  classification  of,  348. 
Structural  geology,  56. 
Substrates,    recapitulation    of, 

222. 

Survival,  law  of,  199. 
Symbolism,  explanation  of  the 
laws  of,  300. 

Time,  development  by  incor- 
poration, 36. 

Transmutation  of  substances 
in  rocks,  54. 

Verification,  methods  of,  220. 
Volcanic  eruptions,  47. 


The  Religion  of  Science  Library. 


A  collection  of  bi-monthly  publications,  most  of  which  are  reprints  of 
books  published  by  The  Open  Court  Publishing  Company.  Yearly,  $1.50 
Separate  copies  according  to  prices  quoted.  The  books  are  printed  upon 
good  paper,  from  large  type. 

The  Religion  of  Science  Library,  by  its  extraordinarily  reasonable  price, 
will  place  a  large  number  of  valuable  books  within  the  reach  of  all  readers 

The  following  have  already  appeared  in  the  series: 

No.  i.   The  Religion  of  Science.     By  PAUL  CARUS.     250. 

2.  Three  Introductory  Lectures  on  the  Science  of  Thought.     By  F.  MAX 

MULLER.      25C. 

3.  Three  Lectures  on  the  Science  of  Language.     By  F.  MAX  MOLLER.     25<C, 

4.  The  Diseases  of  Personality.     By  TH.  RIBOT.     250. 

5.  The  Psychology  of  Attention.     By  TH.  RIBOT.     250. 

6.  Tfie  Psychic  Life  of  Micro- Organisms.     By  ALFRED  BiNET.     250, 

7.  The  Nature  of  the  State.     By  PAUL  CARUS.     150. 

8.  On  Double  Consciousness.     By  ALFRED  BINET.     ifc. 

9.  fundamental  Problems.     By  PAUL  CARUS.     500. 

10.  The  Diseases  of  the  Will,     By  TH.  RIBOT.     250. 

11.  The  Origin  of  Language.     By  LUDWIG  NOIRE.     150. 

12.  The  Free  Trade  Struggle  in  England.     By  M.  M.  TRUMBULL.     250, 

13.  Wheelbarrow  on  the  Labor  Question.     By  M.  M.  TRUMBULL.     350. 

14.  The  Gospel  of  Buddha.     By  PAUL  CARUS.     350. 

15.  The  Printer  of  Philosophy.     By  PAUL  CARUS.    25C. 

1 6.  On  Memory \  and  The  Specific  Energies  of  the  Nervous  System.     By  PROF 

EWALD  HERING.     150. 

17.  The  Redemption  of  the  Brahman.     ATale  of  Hindu  Life.     By  RICHARD 

GARBE.    250. 

18.  An  Examination  of  Weismannism.     By  G.  J.  ROMANES.     350. 

19.  On  Germinal  Selection.     By  AUGUST  WEISMANN.     250. 

20.  Lovers  Three  Thousand  Years  Ago.     By  T.  A.  GoorwiN.     150. 

21.  Popular  Scientific  Lectures.     By  ERNEST  MACH.     500. 

22.  Ancient  India  :  Its  Language  and  Religions.     By  H.  OLDENBERG.     250 

23.  The  Prophets  of  Ancient  Israel.     By  PROF.  C.  H.  CORNILL.     250. 

24.  Homilies  of  Science.     By  PAUL  CARUS.     350. 

25.  Thoughts  on  Religion.     By  G.  J.  ROMANES.     50  cents. 

26.  The  Philosophy  of  Ancient  India.     By  PROF.  RICHARD  GARBE. 

27.  Martin  Luther.     By  GUSTAV  FREYTAG.    250. 

28.  English  Secularism.     By  GEORGE  JACOB  HOLYOAKE.     250. 

29.  On  Orthogenesis.     By  TH.  EIMER.     25C. 

30.  Chinese  Philosophy.     By  PAUL  CARUS.     250. 

31.  The  Lost  Manuscript.    By  GUSTAV  FREYTAG.    6oc. 

32.  A  Mechanico-Physiological  Theory  of  Organic  Evolution.     By  CARL  VON 

NAEGELI.    150. 


THE  OPEN  COURT  PUBLISHING   CO. 

324  DEARBORN  STREET,  CHICAGO,  ILL. 
LONDON:  Kegan  Paul,  Trench,  Trubner  &  Co. 


CATALOGUE  OF  PUBLICATIONS 

OF  THE 

OPEN  COURT  PUBLISHING  CO. 


COPE,  E.  D. 

THE  PRIMARY  FACTORS  OF  ORGANIC  EVOLUTION. 
121  cuts.     Pp.,  xvi,  547.    Cloth,  $2.00,  net. 

MULLER,  F.  MAX. 

THREE    INTRODUCTORY    LECTURES    ON    THE    SCIENCE    OP 

THOUGHT. 

128  pages.     Cloth,  75  cents.    Paper,  25  cents. 
THREE  LECTURES  ON  THE  SCIENCE  OF  LANGUAGE. 
1 12 'pages.    2nd  Edition.    Cloth,  75  cents.    Paper,  250. 

ROMANES,  GEORGE  JOHN. 
DARWIN  AND  AFTER  DARWIN. 

An  Exposition  of  the  Darwinian  Theory  and  a  Discussion  of  Post- 
Darwinian  Questions.    Three  Vols.,  $4.00.     Singly,  as  follows : 

1.  THE  DARWINIAN  THEORY.    460  pages.    125  illustrations.  Cloth,  $2.00. 

2.  POST-DARWINIAJ?  QUESTIONS.    Heredity  and  Utility.    Pp.  338.    $1.50. 

3.  POST- DARWINIAN  QUESTIONS.  Isolation  and  Physiological  Selection. 
Pp.  181.    $i.oo. 

AN  EXAMINATION  OF  WEISMANNISM. 
236  pages.  Cloth,  $1.00.  Paper,  350. 
THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

Edited  by  Charles  Gore,  M.  A. ,  Canon  of  Westminster.   Third  Edition , 

Pages,  184.    Cloth,  gilt  top,  81.25. 

RIBOT,  TH. 

THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  ATTENTION. 
THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 
THE  DISEASES  OF  THE  WILL. 

Authorised  translations.    Cloth,  75  cents  each     Paper,  25  cents,    full 

set,  cloth,  $1.75,  vet. 
EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

(In  preparation.) 

MACH,   ERNST. 

THE  SCIENCE  OF  MECHANICS. 

A  CRITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL  EXPOSITION  OF  ITS  PRINCIPLES.  Translated 

by  T.  J.  McCoRMACK.    250  cuts.    534  pages.     %  m.,  gilt  top.    $2.50. 
POPULAR  SCIENTIFIC  LECTURES. 

Third  Edition.    415  pages.    59  cuts.     Cloth,  gilt  top.     Net,  $1.50. 
THE  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  SENSATIONS. 

Pp.  208.    37  cuts.    Cloth,  $1.25,  net. 

LAGRANGE,  J.  L. 

LECTURES  ON  ELEMENTARY  MATHEMATICS. 

With  portrait  of  the  author.     Pp.  172.     Price,  $i  oo,  net. 

HUC  AND  GABET,   MM. 

TRAVELS  IN  TARTARY,  THIBET  AND  CHINA. 

(1844-1846.)    Translated  from  the  French  by  W.  Hazlitt.     Illustrated 
with  loo  engravings  on  wood.     2  vols.     Pp.  28  +  660.    Cl.,  $2.00  (IDS.). 

CORNILL,  CARL  HEINRICH. 
THE  PROPHETS  OF  ISRAEL. 

Popular  Sketches  from  Old  Testament  History.    Pp.,  200    Cloth,  fi.oo. 
HISTORY  OF  THE  PEOPLE  OF  ISRAEL. 

Pp.  vi  +  325.    Cloth,  $1.50. 

BINET,  ALFRED. 

THE  PSYCHIC  LIFE  OF  MICRO-ORGANISMS. 

Authorised  translation.     135  pages.     Cloth,  75  cents;  Paper,  25  cents. 
ON  DOUBLE  CONSCIOUSNESS.  See  No.  8,  Relig.  of  Science  Library 


WAGNER,  RICHARD. 

A  PILGRIMAGE  TO  BEETHOVEN. 

A  Novelette.  Frontispiece,  portrait  of  Beethoven.  Pp.  40.  Boarfls,  500 

HUTCHINSON,  WOODS. 

THE  GOSPEL  ACC9RDING  TO  DARWIN. 
Pp.,  xii  +  241.    Price,  81.50. 

FREYTAG,  GUSTAV. 

THE  LOST  MANUSCRIPT.    A  Novel. 

2  vols.   953  pages.    Extra  cloth,  $4.00,    One  vol.,  cl.,  $1.00 ;  .paper,  750 
MARTIN  LUTHER. 

Illustrated.    Pp.  130.    Cloth,  $1.00.    Paper,  250. 

TRUMBULL,  M.  M. 

THE  FREE  TRADE  STRUGGLE  IN  ENGLAND. 

Second  Edition.    296  pages.    Cloth,  75  cents;  paper,  25  cents. 
WHEELBARROW:  ARTICLES  AND  DISCUSSIONS  ON  THE  LABOR  QUESTION 

Whh  portrait  of  the  author.    303  pages.    Cloth,  $1.00 ;  paper,  35  cents. 

GOETHE  AND  SCHILLER'S  XENIONS. 

Selected  and  translated  by  Paul  Cacus.  Album  form.    Pp.,  162,    Cl.,  $i.o» 

OLDENBERG,  H. 

ANCIENT  INDIA:    ITS  LANGUAGE  AND  RELIGIONS. 
Pp.  loo.    Cloth,  500.    Paper,  250. 

CARUS,  PAUL. 

THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

90  pages.     Cloth,  50  cents ;  Paper,  30  cents. 
FUNDAMENTAL  PROBLEMS. 

Second  edition,  enlarged  and  revised.    3.72  pp.    Cl.,  $1.50.    Paper,  goc. 
HOMILIES  OF  SCIENCE. 

317  pages.    Cloth,  Gilt  Top,  $1.50. 
THE  IDEA  OF  GOD. 

Fourth  edition.    32  pages.    Paper,  15  cents. 
THE  SOUL  OF  MAN. 

With  152  cuts  and  diagrams.    458  pages.    Cloth,  $3.00. 
TRUTH  IN  FICTION.    TWELVE  TALES  WITH  A  MORAL. 

Fine  laid  paper,  white  and  gold  binding,  gilt  edges.    Pp.  in.    $1.00. 
THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE. 

Second,  extra  edition.     Price,  50  cents.     R.  S.  L.  edition,  250.     Pp.  103. 
PRIMER  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

240  pages.     Second  Edition.    Cloth,  Si.oo.     Paper,  250. 
THE  GOSPEL  OF  BUDDHA.    According  to  Old  Records. 

4th  Edition.    Pp. ,275.    Cloth,  $1.00.    Paper,  35  cents.   In  German,  $1.25. 
BUDDHISM  AND  ITS  CHRISTIAN  CRITICS. 

Pages,  311.    Cloth,  $1.25. 
KARMA.    A  STORV  OF  EARLY  BUDDHISM. 

Illustrated  by  Japanese  artists.    2nd  Edition.     Crfipe  paper,  75  cents. 
NIRVANA:  A  STORY  OF  BUDDHIST  PSYCHOLOGY. 

Japanese  edition,  like  Ka.rma.     «i.oo. 
LAO-TZE'S  TAO-TEH-KING. 

Chinese-English.    With  introduction,  transliteration,  Notes,  etc.    Pp 

360.    Cloth,  83.00. 

GARBE,  RICHARD. 

THE  REDEMPTION  OF  THE  BRAHMAN.     A  TALE  OF  HINDU  LIFE. 

Laid  paper.     Gilt  top.    96  pages.    Price,  750.     Paper,  250. 
THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ANCIENT  INDIA. 

Pp.  89.     Cloth,  500.    Paper,  250. 

HUEPPE,  FERDINAND. 

THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  BACTERIOLOGY. 

28  Woodcuts.     Pp. ,350+.     Price,  81.75.     (In  preparation. 


THE  OPEN   COURT 

A  MONTHLY  MAGAZINE 

Devoted  to  the  Science  of  Religion,  the  Religion  of  Science,  and 
the  Extension  of  the  Religious  Parliament  Idea. 


THE  OPEN  COURT  does  not  understand  by  religion  any  creed  or  dog- 
matic belief,  but  man's  world-conception  in  so  far  as  it  regulates  his  conduct. 

The  old  dogmatic  conception  of  Religion  is  based  upon  the  science  of  past 
ages;  to  base  religion  upon  the  maturest  and  truest  thought  of  the  present 
time  is  the  object  of  The  Open  Court.  Thus,  the  religion  of  The  Open  Courtis 
the  Religion  of  Science,  that  is,  the  religion  of  verified  and  verifiable  truth. 

Although  opposed  to  irrational  orthodoxy  and  narrow  bigotry,  The  Open 
Court  does  not  attack  the  properly  religious  element  of  the  various  religions. 
It  criticises  their  errors  unflinchingly  but  without  animosity,  and  endeavors 
to  preserve  of  them  all  that  is  true  and  good. 

The  current  numbers  of  The  Open  Court  contain  valuable  original  articles 
from  the  pens  of  distinguished  thinkers.  Accurate  and  authorized  transla- 
tions are  made  in  Philosophy,  Science,  and  Criticism  from  the  literature  of 
Continental  Europe,  and  reviews  of  noteworthy  recent  investigations  are  pre- 
sented. Portraits  of  eminent  philosophers  and  scientists  are  published,  and 
appropriate  illustrations  accompany  some  of  the  articles. 

Terms:  $1.00  a  year;  $1.35  to  foreign  countries  in  the  Postal  Union. 
Single  Copies,  10  cents. 


THE  MONIST 

A  QUARTERLY  MAGAZINE  OF 

PHILOSOPHY  AND  SCIENCE. 


THE  MONIST  discusses  the  fundamental  problems  of  Philosophy  in 
their  practical  relations  to  the  religious,  ethical,  and  sociological  questions 
of  the  day.  The  following  have  contributed  to  its  columns: 

PROF.  JOSEPH  LE  COHTB,  PROF.  G.  J.  ROMANES,  PROF.  C.  LOMBROSO, 

DR.  W.  T.  HARRIS,  PROF.  C.  LLOYD  MORGAN,  PROF.  E.  HAECKEL, 

M.  D.  CONWAY,  JAMES  SULLY,  PROF.  H.  HOFFDING, 

CHARLES  S.  PEIRCE,  B.  BOSANQUET,  DR.  F.  OSWALD, 

PROF.  F.  MAX  MOLLER,  DR.  A.  BINET,  PROF.  J.  DELBCEUF, 

PROF.  E.  D.  COPE,  PROF.  ERNST  MACH,  PROF.  F.  JODL, 

CARUS  STERNE,  RABBI  EMIL  HIRSCH,  PROF.  H.  M.  STANLEY, 

MRS.  C.  LADD  FRANKLIN,  LESTER  F.  WARD,  G.  FERRERO, 

.     PROF.  MAX  VERWORN,  PROF.  H.  SCHUBERT,  J.  VENN, 

PROF.  FELIX  KLEIN,  DR.  EDM.  MONTGOMERY,  PROF.  H.  VON  HOLST, 

Per  copy,  50  cents ;  Yearly,  $ 2.00.  In  England  and  all  countries  in  U.P.U. 
per  copy,  as  6d ;  Yearly,  gs  6d. 


CHICAGO: 

THE  OPEN  COURT  PUBLISHING  CO., 

Monon  Building,  324  Dearborn  St. 
LONDON:  Kegan  Paul,  Trench,  Trubner  &  Co. 


RE  RETURN  TO  the  circulation  desk  of  any 

TC  University  of  California  Library 

LO  or  to  the 

|  NORTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 

j-  Bldg.  400,  Richmond  Field  Station 

University  of  California 

_  Richmond,  CA  94804-4698  _ 

R,      ALL  BOOKS  MAY  BE  RECALLED  AFTER  7  DAYS 
B<      •   2-month  loans  may  be  renewed  by  calling 

(510)642-6753 

_      •    1  -year  loans  may  be  recharged  by  bringing 
ft          books  to  NRLF 

•   Renewals  and  recharges  may  be  made  4 
days  prior  to  due  date. 

A  rra         —  ______ 


FORA 


DUE  AS  STAMPED  BELOW 


FEB252001 


MAY  i  fi  ?nn? 


12,000(11/95) 


CD313S33SD 


•f. 


